The case for risk-based premiums in public health insurance

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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The case for risk-based premiums in public health insurance. / Zweifel, Peter; Breuer, Michael.
in: Health economics, policy, and law, Jahrgang 1, Nr. Pt 2, 01.04.2006, S. 171-188.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Zweifel P, Breuer M. The case for risk-based premiums in public health insurance. Health economics, policy, and law. 2006 Apr 1;1(Pt 2):171-188. doi: 10.1017/S1744133105001064

Bibtex

@article{9ce4bfee7c1f4c5185a0aa354235a5ae,
title = "The case for risk-based premiums in public health insurance",
abstract = "Uniform, risk-independent insurance premiums are accepted as part of 'managed competition' in health care. However, they are not compatible with optimality of health insurance contracts in the presence of both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. They have adverse effects on insurer behaviour even if risk adjustment is taken into account. Risk-based premiums combined with means-tested, tax-financed transfers are advocated as an alternative.",
keywords = "Health sciences, Economic Competition, Insurance Selection Bias, Insurance, Health, Public Sector, Risk Adjustment, Taxes",
author = "Peter Zweifel and Michael Breuer",
year = "2006",
month = apr,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1017/S1744133105001064",
language = "English",
volume = "1",
pages = "171--188",
journal = "Health economics, policy, and law",
issn = "1744-134X",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "Pt 2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The case for risk-based premiums in public health insurance

AU - Zweifel, Peter

AU - Breuer, Michael

PY - 2006/4/1

Y1 - 2006/4/1

N2 - Uniform, risk-independent insurance premiums are accepted as part of 'managed competition' in health care. However, they are not compatible with optimality of health insurance contracts in the presence of both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. They have adverse effects on insurer behaviour even if risk adjustment is taken into account. Risk-based premiums combined with means-tested, tax-financed transfers are advocated as an alternative.

AB - Uniform, risk-independent insurance premiums are accepted as part of 'managed competition' in health care. However, they are not compatible with optimality of health insurance contracts in the presence of both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. They have adverse effects on insurer behaviour even if risk adjustment is taken into account. Risk-based premiums combined with means-tested, tax-financed transfers are advocated as an alternative.

KW - Health sciences

KW - Economic Competition

KW - Insurance Selection Bias

KW - Insurance, Health

KW - Public Sector

KW - Risk Adjustment

KW - Taxes

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34547922214&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/5072f89a-e22e-3504-a305-f5588c9179d1/

U2 - 10.1017/S1744133105001064

DO - 10.1017/S1744133105001064

M3 - Journal articles

C2 - 18634689

VL - 1

SP - 171

EP - 188

JO - Health economics, policy, and law

JF - Health economics, policy, and law

SN - 1744-134X

IS - Pt 2

ER -

DOI