Subsidies for learning in renewable energy technologies under market power and emission trading

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Standard

Subsidies for learning in renewable energy technologies under market power and emission trading. / Traber, Thure; Kemfert, Claudia.
Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), 2011. (DIW Discussion Papers; Nr. 1126).

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Harvard

Traber, T & Kemfert, C 2011 'Subsidies for learning in renewable energy technologies under market power and emission trading' DIW Discussion Papers, Nr. 1126, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin. <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55297>

APA

Traber, T., & Kemfert, C. (2011). Subsidies for learning in renewable energy technologies under market power and emission trading. (DIW Discussion Papers; Nr. 1126). Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW). http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55297

Vancouver

Traber T, Kemfert C. Subsidies for learning in renewable energy technologies under market power and emission trading. Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW). 2011 Mai. (DIW Discussion Papers; 1126).

Bibtex

@techreport{8ab19337a44c4ac992dde762247c36e2,
title = "Subsidies for learning in renewable energy technologies under market power and emission trading",
abstract = "Under perfect competition on the output market, first best technology subsidies in the presence of learning by doing are justified by knowledge spill overs that are not accounted for by individual companies. First best output subsidies are thus depending directly on the learning effects and are, if applicable, positive. Considering electricity markets, a setting of imperfect competition is more appropriate. We show that the second best output subsidy for learning by doing in renewable energies takes the market distortion due to imperfect competition into account and is of ambiguous sign. Based on simulations with a European electricity market model, we find that second best renewable energy subsidies are positive and only insignificantly impacted by market power. By contrast, the welfare gains from an optimal subsidy are considerably higher compared to a hypothetical situation of perfect competition.",
keywords = "energy policy, renewable energy, learning by doing, imperfect competition, emission trading, Regenerative Energie, Lernprozess, Elektrizit{\"a}tswirtschaft, F{\"o}rderung regenerativer Energien, Subvention, Unvollkommener Wettbewerb, Emissionshandel, Theorie, Europa, Economics",
author = "Thure Traber and Claudia Kemfert",
year = "2011",
month = may,
language = "English",
series = "DIW Discussion Papers",
publisher = "Deutsches Institut f{\"u}r Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)",
number = "1126",
address = "Germany",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Deutsches Institut f{\"u}r Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Subsidies for learning in renewable energy technologies under market power and emission trading

AU - Traber, Thure

AU - Kemfert, Claudia

PY - 2011/5

Y1 - 2011/5

N2 - Under perfect competition on the output market, first best technology subsidies in the presence of learning by doing are justified by knowledge spill overs that are not accounted for by individual companies. First best output subsidies are thus depending directly on the learning effects and are, if applicable, positive. Considering electricity markets, a setting of imperfect competition is more appropriate. We show that the second best output subsidy for learning by doing in renewable energies takes the market distortion due to imperfect competition into account and is of ambiguous sign. Based on simulations with a European electricity market model, we find that second best renewable energy subsidies are positive and only insignificantly impacted by market power. By contrast, the welfare gains from an optimal subsidy are considerably higher compared to a hypothetical situation of perfect competition.

AB - Under perfect competition on the output market, first best technology subsidies in the presence of learning by doing are justified by knowledge spill overs that are not accounted for by individual companies. First best output subsidies are thus depending directly on the learning effects and are, if applicable, positive. Considering electricity markets, a setting of imperfect competition is more appropriate. We show that the second best output subsidy for learning by doing in renewable energies takes the market distortion due to imperfect competition into account and is of ambiguous sign. Based on simulations with a European electricity market model, we find that second best renewable energy subsidies are positive and only insignificantly impacted by market power. By contrast, the welfare gains from an optimal subsidy are considerably higher compared to a hypothetical situation of perfect competition.

KW - energy policy

KW - renewable energy

KW - learning by doing

KW - imperfect competition

KW - emission trading

KW - Regenerative Energie

KW - Lernprozess

KW - Elektrizitätswirtschaft

KW - Förderung regenerativer Energien

KW - Subvention

KW - Unvollkommener Wettbewerb

KW - Emissionshandel

KW - Theorie

KW - Europa

KW - Economics

M3 - Working papers

T3 - DIW Discussion Papers

BT - Subsidies for learning in renewable energy technologies under market power and emission trading

PB - Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

CY - Berlin

ER -

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