Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information

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Standard

Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information. / Desgranges, Gabriel; Heinemann, Maik.
Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, 2005. (Working Paper Series in Economics; Nr. 9).

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Harvard

Desgranges, G & Heinemann, M 2005 'Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information' Working Paper Series in Economics, Nr. 9, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, Lüneburg.

APA

Desgranges, G., & Heinemann, M. (2005). Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information. (Working Paper Series in Economics; Nr. 9). Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg.

Vancouver

Desgranges G, Heinemann M. Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information. Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg. 2005 Mär. (Working Paper Series in Economics; 9).

Bibtex

@techreport{6ff9559887ff45b88e96c53e7f6041c5,
title = "Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information",
abstract = "This paper analyzes conditions for existence of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) in models with private information, where the amount of private information is endogenously determined. It is shown that the conditions for existence of a SREE known from models with exogenously given private information do not change as long as it is impossible to use the information transmitted through market prices. In contrast, these conditions are too weak, when there is such learning from prices. It turns out that the properties of the function which describes the costs that are associated with the individual acquisition of information are important in this respect. In case of constant marginal costs, prices must be half as informative than private signals in order for a SREE to exist. An interpretation of this result that falls back on the famous Grossman– Stiglitz–Paradox is also given.",
keywords = "Economics, Information , Gleichgewichtsmodell , Marktpreis , eductive Learning, private information, rational expectations, strongly rational expectations equilibrium",
author = "Gabriel Desgranges and Maik Heinemann",
note = "Literaturverz. S. 24",
year = "2005",
month = mar,
language = "English",
series = "Working Paper Series in Economics",
publisher = "Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg",
number = "9",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information

AU - Desgranges, Gabriel

AU - Heinemann, Maik

N1 - Literaturverz. S. 24

PY - 2005/3

Y1 - 2005/3

N2 - This paper analyzes conditions for existence of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) in models with private information, where the amount of private information is endogenously determined. It is shown that the conditions for existence of a SREE known from models with exogenously given private information do not change as long as it is impossible to use the information transmitted through market prices. In contrast, these conditions are too weak, when there is such learning from prices. It turns out that the properties of the function which describes the costs that are associated with the individual acquisition of information are important in this respect. In case of constant marginal costs, prices must be half as informative than private signals in order for a SREE to exist. An interpretation of this result that falls back on the famous Grossman– Stiglitz–Paradox is also given.

AB - This paper analyzes conditions for existence of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) in models with private information, where the amount of private information is endogenously determined. It is shown that the conditions for existence of a SREE known from models with exogenously given private information do not change as long as it is impossible to use the information transmitted through market prices. In contrast, these conditions are too weak, when there is such learning from prices. It turns out that the properties of the function which describes the costs that are associated with the individual acquisition of information are important in this respect. In case of constant marginal costs, prices must be half as informative than private signals in order for a SREE to exist. An interpretation of this result that falls back on the famous Grossman– Stiglitz–Paradox is also given.

KW - Economics

KW - Information

KW - Gleichgewichtsmodell

KW - Marktpreis

KW - eductive Learning

KW - private information

KW - rational expectations

KW - strongly rational expectations equilibrium

M3 - Working papers

T3 - Working Paper Series in Economics

BT - Strongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of information

PB - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg

CY - Lüneburg

ER -

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