Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing?
Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und Berichte › Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere
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Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing? / Korunig, Jens.
Lüneburg : Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, 2006. (Working paper series in economics).Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und Berichte › Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing?
AU - Korunig, Jens
N1 - Literaturverz. S. 28 - 31 : Stand: 19. Dezember 2006
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - Peak-load pricing of natural monopolies was analyzed until now as a one-step production process with constant average rate costs. However, electric current underlies a multi-step process with decreasing average costs for power transmission. A private, vertically separated network opertor will charge profit maximizing peak-load prices and will cause a high welfare loss due to its monopolisic position. The paper examines in a two-stage model with decreasing average cost on the transmission stage, which consequences there are of prohibiting the monopolist to take different prices. Here, this interdiction enhances welfare, if the monopolist continues to serve customers in both markets (peak and off-peak). The analyzed regulation rule "only one price" is easy to apply and to supervise, as a consequence it is practicable and cost-effecitve.
AB - Peak-load pricing of natural monopolies was analyzed until now as a one-step production process with constant average rate costs. However, electric current underlies a multi-step process with decreasing average costs for power transmission. A private, vertically separated network opertor will charge profit maximizing peak-load prices and will cause a high welfare loss due to its monopolisic position. The paper examines in a two-stage model with decreasing average cost on the transmission stage, which consequences there are of prohibiting the monopolist to take different prices. Here, this interdiction enhances welfare, if the monopolist continues to serve customers in both markets (peak and off-peak). The analyzed regulation rule "only one price" is easy to apply and to supervise, as a consequence it is practicable and cost-effecitve.
KW - Volkswirtschaftslehre
M3 - Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere
T3 - Working paper series in economics
BT - Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing?
PB - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg
CY - Lüneburg
ER -