Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing?

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Standard

Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing? / Korunig, Jens.
Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, 2006. (Working paper series in economics).

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Harvard

Korunig, J 2006 'Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing?' Working paper series in economics, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, Lüneburg.

APA

Korunig, J. (2006). Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing? (Working paper series in economics). Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg.

Vancouver

Korunig J. Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing? Lüneburg: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg. 2006. (Working paper series in economics).

Bibtex

@techreport{4966dd8ed6a94ec09ca15d872b773118,
title = "Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing?",
abstract = "Peak-load pricing of natural monopolies was analyzed until now as a one-step production process with constant average rate costs. However, electric current underlies a multi-step process with decreasing average costs for power transmission. A private, vertically separated network opertor will charge profit maximizing peak-load prices and will cause a high welfare loss due to its monopolisic position. The paper examines in a two-stage model with decreasing average cost on the transmission stage, which consequences there are of prohibiting the monopolist to take different prices. Here, this interdiction enhances welfare, if the monopolist continues to serve customers in both markets (peak and off-peak). The analyzed regulation rule {"}only one price{"} is easy to apply and to supervise, as a consequence it is practicable and cost-effecitve.",
keywords = "Volkswirtschaftslehre",
author = "Jens Korunig",
note = "Literaturverz. S. 28 - 31 : Stand: 19. Dezember 2006",
year = "2006",
language = "Deutsch",
series = "Working paper series in economics",
publisher = "Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing?

AU - Korunig, Jens

N1 - Literaturverz. S. 28 - 31 : Stand: 19. Dezember 2006

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - Peak-load pricing of natural monopolies was analyzed until now as a one-step production process with constant average rate costs. However, electric current underlies a multi-step process with decreasing average costs for power transmission. A private, vertically separated network opertor will charge profit maximizing peak-load prices and will cause a high welfare loss due to its monopolisic position. The paper examines in a two-stage model with decreasing average cost on the transmission stage, which consequences there are of prohibiting the monopolist to take different prices. Here, this interdiction enhances welfare, if the monopolist continues to serve customers in both markets (peak and off-peak). The analyzed regulation rule "only one price" is easy to apply and to supervise, as a consequence it is practicable and cost-effecitve.

AB - Peak-load pricing of natural monopolies was analyzed until now as a one-step production process with constant average rate costs. However, electric current underlies a multi-step process with decreasing average costs for power transmission. A private, vertically separated network opertor will charge profit maximizing peak-load prices and will cause a high welfare loss due to its monopolisic position. The paper examines in a two-stage model with decreasing average cost on the transmission stage, which consequences there are of prohibiting the monopolist to take different prices. Here, this interdiction enhances welfare, if the monopolist continues to serve customers in both markets (peak and off-peak). The analyzed regulation rule "only one price" is easy to apply and to supervise, as a consequence it is practicable and cost-effecitve.

KW - Volkswirtschaftslehre

M3 - Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

T3 - Working paper series in economics

BT - Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Verbot von Peak-load Pricing?

PB - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg

CY - Lüneburg

ER -

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