Refunding ETS-proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies: an analysis based on the dynamic oligopolistic electricity market model EMELIE
Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und Berichte › Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere
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Refunding ETS-proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies : an analysis based on the dynamic oligopolistic electricity market model EMELIE. / Traber, Thure; Kemfert, Claudia.
Berlin : Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), 2009. (DIW Discussion papers; Nr. 951).Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und Berichte › Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Refunding ETS-proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies
T2 - an analysis based on the dynamic oligopolistic electricity market model EMELIE
AU - Traber, Thure
AU - Kemfert, Claudia
PY - 2009/11
Y1 - 2009/11
N2 - We use a quantitative electricity market model to analyze the welfare effects of refunding a share of the emission trading proceeds to support renewable energy technologies that are subject to experience effects. We compare effects of supporting renewable energies under both perfect and oligopolistic competition with competitive fringe firms and emission trading regimes that achieve 70 and 80 percent emission reductions by 2050. The results indicate the importance of market power for renewable energy support policy. Under imperfect competition welfare improvements is maximized by refunding ten percent of the emission trading proceeds, while under perfect competition the optimal refunding share is only five percent. However, under both behavioral assumptions we find significant welfare improvements due to experience effects which are induced by the support for renewable energy.
AB - We use a quantitative electricity market model to analyze the welfare effects of refunding a share of the emission trading proceeds to support renewable energy technologies that are subject to experience effects. We compare effects of supporting renewable energies under both perfect and oligopolistic competition with competitive fringe firms and emission trading regimes that achieve 70 and 80 percent emission reductions by 2050. The results indicate the importance of market power for renewable energy support policy. Under imperfect competition welfare improvements is maximized by refunding ten percent of the emission trading proceeds, while under perfect competition the optimal refunding share is only five percent. However, under both behavioral assumptions we find significant welfare improvements due to experience effects which are induced by the support for renewable energy.
KW - Emission trading
KW - renewable energy support
KW - experience effects
KW - imperfect competition
KW - Emissionshandel
KW - Einnahmen
KW - Förderung regenerativer Energien
KW - Regenerative Energie
KW - Innovationsdiffusion
KW - Lernprozess
KW - Elektrizitätswirtschaft
KW - Oligopol
KW - Dynamisches Modell
KW - Wohlfahrtseffekt
KW - Deutschland
KW - Economics
M3 - Working papers
T3 - DIW Discussion papers
BT - Refunding ETS-proceeds to spur the diffusion of renewable energies
PB - Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
CY - Berlin
ER -