Emissions trading in Europe: Effective tool or flight of fancy?

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Emissions trading in Europe: Effective tool or flight of fancy? / Kemfert, Claudia; Diekmann, Jochen; Ziesing, Hans Joachim.
in: Intereconomics, Jahrgang 39, Nr. 3, 01.05.2004, S. 119-121.

Publikation: Beiträge in ZeitschriftenZeitschriftenaufsätzeForschungbegutachtet

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Kemfert C, Diekmann J, Ziesing HJ. Emissions trading in Europe: Effective tool or flight of fancy? Intereconomics. 2004 Mai 1;39(3):119-121. doi: 10.1007/BF02933575

Bibtex

@article{8fa542c427024c4aa665600eccaa5f72,
title = "Emissions trading in Europe: Effective tool or flight of fancy?",
abstract = "The NAPs must be compatible with the climate goals and emissions reduction targets. Within the first period there will be no concrete sanction mechanism if countries fail to achieve their target, as is planned for later periods. A stringent allocation of allowances would prevent too high a burden on private households and the transport sector. In addition, it would also increase the incentive for other flexible mechanisms such as Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and (later on) Joint Implementation (Jl). Conversely, some important aspects of the trading system, such as the treatment of newcomers or how to react to the dynamics of the market, are not regulated at the European level. This provides a large scope for strategic action and creates uncertainties. In Germany as well as in many other countries, negotiations between politicians and industrial lobbyists has led to a less effective emissions trading system. It is questionable whether there will be significant emission trading at all. The climate goal cannot be reached if industries get the emissions allowances that they need to continue business as usual. In the future, it would be desirable to harmonise the specific rules of the initial allocation plan among all European countries in order to avoid strategic behaviour and a weakening of the entire trading system.",
keywords = "Economics, Clean Development Mechanism, Abatement Cost, Emission Trading, Trading System, Emission Allowance",
author = "Claudia Kemfert and Jochen Diekmann and Ziesing, {Hans Joachim}",
year = "2004",
month = may,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/BF02933575",
language = "English",
volume = "39",
pages = "119--121",
journal = "Intereconomics",
issn = "0020-5346",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Emissions trading in Europe

T2 - Effective tool or flight of fancy?

AU - Kemfert, Claudia

AU - Diekmann, Jochen

AU - Ziesing, Hans Joachim

PY - 2004/5/1

Y1 - 2004/5/1

N2 - The NAPs must be compatible with the climate goals and emissions reduction targets. Within the first period there will be no concrete sanction mechanism if countries fail to achieve their target, as is planned for later periods. A stringent allocation of allowances would prevent too high a burden on private households and the transport sector. In addition, it would also increase the incentive for other flexible mechanisms such as Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and (later on) Joint Implementation (Jl). Conversely, some important aspects of the trading system, such as the treatment of newcomers or how to react to the dynamics of the market, are not regulated at the European level. This provides a large scope for strategic action and creates uncertainties. In Germany as well as in many other countries, negotiations between politicians and industrial lobbyists has led to a less effective emissions trading system. It is questionable whether there will be significant emission trading at all. The climate goal cannot be reached if industries get the emissions allowances that they need to continue business as usual. In the future, it would be desirable to harmonise the specific rules of the initial allocation plan among all European countries in order to avoid strategic behaviour and a weakening of the entire trading system.

AB - The NAPs must be compatible with the climate goals and emissions reduction targets. Within the first period there will be no concrete sanction mechanism if countries fail to achieve their target, as is planned for later periods. A stringent allocation of allowances would prevent too high a burden on private households and the transport sector. In addition, it would also increase the incentive for other flexible mechanisms such as Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and (later on) Joint Implementation (Jl). Conversely, some important aspects of the trading system, such as the treatment of newcomers or how to react to the dynamics of the market, are not regulated at the European level. This provides a large scope for strategic action and creates uncertainties. In Germany as well as in many other countries, negotiations between politicians and industrial lobbyists has led to a less effective emissions trading system. It is questionable whether there will be significant emission trading at all. The climate goal cannot be reached if industries get the emissions allowances that they need to continue business as usual. In the future, it would be desirable to harmonise the specific rules of the initial allocation plan among all European countries in order to avoid strategic behaviour and a weakening of the entire trading system.

KW - Economics

KW - Clean Development Mechanism

KW - Abatement Cost

KW - Emission Trading

KW - Trading System

KW - Emission Allowance

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UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/8ab8e2fd-f25f-3fb3-b241-b9df7b65fbdf/

U2 - 10.1007/BF02933575

DO - 10.1007/BF02933575

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:52449145415

VL - 39

SP - 119

EP - 121

JO - Intereconomics

JF - Intereconomics

SN - 0020-5346

IS - 3

ER -

DOI