Emissions trading in Europe: Effective tool or flight of fancy?
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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in: Intereconomics, Jahrgang 39, Nr. 3, 01.05.2004, S. 119-121.
Publikation: Beiträge in Zeitschriften › Zeitschriftenaufsätze › Forschung › begutachtet
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Emissions trading in Europe
T2 - Effective tool or flight of fancy?
AU - Kemfert, Claudia
AU - Diekmann, Jochen
AU - Ziesing, Hans Joachim
PY - 2004/5/1
Y1 - 2004/5/1
N2 - The NAPs must be compatible with the climate goals and emissions reduction targets. Within the first period there will be no concrete sanction mechanism if countries fail to achieve their target, as is planned for later periods. A stringent allocation of allowances would prevent too high a burden on private households and the transport sector. In addition, it would also increase the incentive for other flexible mechanisms such as Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and (later on) Joint Implementation (Jl). Conversely, some important aspects of the trading system, such as the treatment of newcomers or how to react to the dynamics of the market, are not regulated at the European level. This provides a large scope for strategic action and creates uncertainties. In Germany as well as in many other countries, negotiations between politicians and industrial lobbyists has led to a less effective emissions trading system. It is questionable whether there will be significant emission trading at all. The climate goal cannot be reached if industries get the emissions allowances that they need to continue business as usual. In the future, it would be desirable to harmonise the specific rules of the initial allocation plan among all European countries in order to avoid strategic behaviour and a weakening of the entire trading system.
AB - The NAPs must be compatible with the climate goals and emissions reduction targets. Within the first period there will be no concrete sanction mechanism if countries fail to achieve their target, as is planned for later periods. A stringent allocation of allowances would prevent too high a burden on private households and the transport sector. In addition, it would also increase the incentive for other flexible mechanisms such as Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and (later on) Joint Implementation (Jl). Conversely, some important aspects of the trading system, such as the treatment of newcomers or how to react to the dynamics of the market, are not regulated at the European level. This provides a large scope for strategic action and creates uncertainties. In Germany as well as in many other countries, negotiations between politicians and industrial lobbyists has led to a less effective emissions trading system. It is questionable whether there will be significant emission trading at all. The climate goal cannot be reached if industries get the emissions allowances that they need to continue business as usual. In the future, it would be desirable to harmonise the specific rules of the initial allocation plan among all European countries in order to avoid strategic behaviour and a weakening of the entire trading system.
KW - Economics
KW - Clean Development Mechanism
KW - Abatement Cost
KW - Emission Trading
KW - Trading System
KW - Emission Allowance
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=52449145415&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/8ab8e2fd-f25f-3fb3-b241-b9df7b65fbdf/
U2 - 10.1007/BF02933575
DO - 10.1007/BF02933575
M3 - Journal articles
AN - SCOPUS:52449145415
VL - 39
SP - 119
EP - 121
JO - Intereconomics
JF - Intereconomics
SN - 0020-5346
IS - 3
ER -