Do works councils inhibit investment?
Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und Berichte › Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere
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Do works councils inhibit investment? / Schnabel, Claus; Wagner, Joachim; Schank, Thorsten et al.
Erlangen : Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, 2005. (Diskussionspapiere; Nr. 32).Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und Berichte › Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere
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RIS
TY - UNPB
T1 - Do works councils inhibit investment?
AU - Schnabel, Claus
AU - Wagner, Joachim
AU - Schank, Thorsten
AU - Addison, John T.
N1 - Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen unter der Adresse http://www.arbeitsmarkt.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/pdf/diskussionspapiere/1270291279_dp32.pdf
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - Theory suggests that firms confront a hold-up problem in dealing with workplace unionism: unions will appropriate a portion of the quasi rents stemming from long-lived capital. As a result, firms may be expected to limit their exposure to rent seeking by reducing investments, among other things. Although there is some empirical support for this prediction in firm-level studies for the United States, we investigate whether this is also the case in the different institutional context of Germany where the works council is the analogue of workplace unionism. Using parametric and nonparametric methods and establishment panel data, we find no evidence that the formation (dissolution) of a works council has an unfavorable (favorable) impact on investment.
AB - Theory suggests that firms confront a hold-up problem in dealing with workplace unionism: unions will appropriate a portion of the quasi rents stemming from long-lived capital. As a result, firms may be expected to limit their exposure to rent seeking by reducing investments, among other things. Although there is some empirical support for this prediction in firm-level studies for the United States, we investigate whether this is also the case in the different institutional context of Germany where the works council is the analogue of workplace unionism. Using parametric and nonparametric methods and establishment panel data, we find no evidence that the formation (dissolution) of a works council has an unfavorable (favorable) impact on investment.
KW - Economics
KW - work councils
KW - investment
KW - Germany
M3 - Working papers
T3 - Diskussionspapiere
BT - Do works councils inhibit investment?
PB - Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
CY - Erlangen
ER -