Do works councils inhibit investment?

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Standard

Do works councils inhibit investment? / Schnabel, Claus; Wagner, Joachim; Schank, Thorsten et al.
Erlangen: Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, 2005. (Diskussionspapiere; Nr. 32).

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Harvard

Schnabel, C, Wagner, J, Schank, T & Addison, JT 2005 'Do works councils inhibit investment?' Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 32, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen. <https://www.arbeitsmarkt.rw.fau.de/files/2016/07/1270291279_dp32.pdf>

APA

Schnabel, C., Wagner, J., Schank, T., & Addison, J. T. (2005). Do works councils inhibit investment? (Diskussionspapiere; Nr. 32). Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg. https://www.arbeitsmarkt.rw.fau.de/files/2016/07/1270291279_dp32.pdf

Vancouver

Schnabel C, Wagner J, Schank T, Addison JT. Do works councils inhibit investment? Erlangen: Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg. 2005. (Diskussionspapiere; 32).

Bibtex

@techreport{43315eedf58c473eb32f7a0568090f6b,
title = "Do works councils inhibit investment?",
abstract = "Theory suggests that firms confront a hold-up problem in dealing with workplace unionism: unions will appropriate a portion of the quasi rents stemming from long-lived capital. As a result, firms may be expected to limit their exposure to rent seeking by reducing investments, among other things. Although there is some empirical support for this prediction in firm-level studies for the United States, we investigate whether this is also the case in the different institutional context of Germany where the works council is the analogue of workplace unionism. Using parametric and nonparametric methods and establishment panel data, we find no evidence that the formation (dissolution) of a works council has an unfavorable (favorable) impact on investment.",
keywords = "Economics, work councils, investment, Germany",
author = "Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner and Thorsten Schank and Addison, {John T.}",
note = "Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen unter der Adresse http://www.arbeitsmarkt.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/pdf/diskussionspapiere/1270291279_dp32.pdf",
year = "2005",
language = "English",
series = "Diskussionspapiere",
publisher = "Friedrich-Alexander-Universit{\"a}t Erlangen-N{\"u}rnberg",
number = "32",
address = "Germany",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Friedrich-Alexander-Universit{\"a}t Erlangen-N{\"u}rnberg",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Do works councils inhibit investment?

AU - Schnabel, Claus

AU - Wagner, Joachim

AU - Schank, Thorsten

AU - Addison, John T.

N1 - Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen unter der Adresse http://www.arbeitsmarkt.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/pdf/diskussionspapiere/1270291279_dp32.pdf

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - Theory suggests that firms confront a hold-up problem in dealing with workplace unionism: unions will appropriate a portion of the quasi rents stemming from long-lived capital. As a result, firms may be expected to limit their exposure to rent seeking by reducing investments, among other things. Although there is some empirical support for this prediction in firm-level studies for the United States, we investigate whether this is also the case in the different institutional context of Germany where the works council is the analogue of workplace unionism. Using parametric and nonparametric methods and establishment panel data, we find no evidence that the formation (dissolution) of a works council has an unfavorable (favorable) impact on investment.

AB - Theory suggests that firms confront a hold-up problem in dealing with workplace unionism: unions will appropriate a portion of the quasi rents stemming from long-lived capital. As a result, firms may be expected to limit their exposure to rent seeking by reducing investments, among other things. Although there is some empirical support for this prediction in firm-level studies for the United States, we investigate whether this is also the case in the different institutional context of Germany where the works council is the analogue of workplace unionism. Using parametric and nonparametric methods and establishment panel data, we find no evidence that the formation (dissolution) of a works council has an unfavorable (favorable) impact on investment.

KW - Economics

KW - work councils

KW - investment

KW - Germany

M3 - Working papers

T3 - Diskussionspapiere

BT - Do works councils inhibit investment?

PB - Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

CY - Erlangen

ER -