TY - JOUR

T1 - Divert when it does not hurt

T2 - The initiation of economic sanctions by US presidents from 1989 to 2015

AU - Attia, Hana

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2023 The Author. Review of International Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

PY - 2024/2

Y1 - 2024/2

N2 - A dominant argument in the literature is that leaders tend to initiate military disputes in periods plagued by economic distress. This article revisits the diversionary theory and adapts it to the use of economic sanctions in the United States, contending that their use follows a similar diversionary logic. Using a novel dataset on US sanctions from 1989 to 2015, I find that presidents are more likely to use sanctions when unemployment is high and the president's party power in Congress is weak. I show that when doing so presidents opt for sanctions that inflict little harm on the US economy.

AB - A dominant argument in the literature is that leaders tend to initiate military disputes in periods plagued by economic distress. This article revisits the diversionary theory and adapts it to the use of economic sanctions in the United States, contending that their use follows a similar diversionary logic. Using a novel dataset on US sanctions from 1989 to 2015, I find that presidents are more likely to use sanctions when unemployment is high and the president's party power in Congress is weak. I show that when doing so presidents opt for sanctions that inflict little harm on the US economy.

KW - diversion

KW - economic coercion

KW - sanctions

KW - US politics

KW - Politics

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85168382309&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/roie.12704

DO - 10.1111/roie.12704

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:85168382309

VL - 32

SP - 109

EP - 131

JO - Review of International Economics

JF - Review of International Economics

SN - 0965-7576

IS - 1

ER -