Can we represent future generations in myopic democracies? Analyzing the design, feasibility and viability of institutional guardians of future generations

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@article{22b2166760e8460cbdd41e1f72733420,
title = "Can we represent future generations in myopic democracies?: Analyzing the design, feasibility and viability of institutional guardians of future generations",
abstract = "Future generations will be affected by political decisions of today, but they do not have a voice in their making. Recognizing that short-termist perspectives shape political decision-making, several democracies created institutional guardians designed to represent the interests of future generations in present-day decision-making, facilitating a long-term view across policy areas. In doing so, they may help to mitigate democratic myopia. However, some scholars are very sceptical of the feasibility and viability of such institutional innovations, given the ubiquitous short-termists pressures in politics. To analyze their feasibility and viability claims conceptually and empirically, this study systematically compares the design features (i.e. political instruments, access to the policy process and to branches of government, legal basis, organizational structure and resources) and the conditions of institutionalization of eight institutional guardians of future generations, four of which did not survive and were dismantled. Although each case is unique, it can be concluded that it is feasible to institutionally represent future generations even under detrimental external conditions. However, guardians that can not only bark but also bite live dangerously. Guardians are most viable when they are designed to be neither too strong nor too weak, and when they have a balanced interdependence with political decision-makers.",
keywords = "Comparative politics, democracy, democratic short-termism, institutions for future generations, intergenerational justice, sustainability governance, Sustainability Governance",
author = "Michael Rose",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.",
year = "2024",
doi = "10.1080/01442872.2024.2444632",
language = "English",
journal = "Policy Studies",
issn = "0144-2872",
publisher = "Routledge Taylor & Francis Group",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Can we represent future generations in myopic democracies?

T2 - Analyzing the design, feasibility and viability of institutional guardians of future generations

AU - Rose, Michael

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

PY - 2024

Y1 - 2024

N2 - Future generations will be affected by political decisions of today, but they do not have a voice in their making. Recognizing that short-termist perspectives shape political decision-making, several democracies created institutional guardians designed to represent the interests of future generations in present-day decision-making, facilitating a long-term view across policy areas. In doing so, they may help to mitigate democratic myopia. However, some scholars are very sceptical of the feasibility and viability of such institutional innovations, given the ubiquitous short-termists pressures in politics. To analyze their feasibility and viability claims conceptually and empirically, this study systematically compares the design features (i.e. political instruments, access to the policy process and to branches of government, legal basis, organizational structure and resources) and the conditions of institutionalization of eight institutional guardians of future generations, four of which did not survive and were dismantled. Although each case is unique, it can be concluded that it is feasible to institutionally represent future generations even under detrimental external conditions. However, guardians that can not only bark but also bite live dangerously. Guardians are most viable when they are designed to be neither too strong nor too weak, and when they have a balanced interdependence with political decision-makers.

AB - Future generations will be affected by political decisions of today, but they do not have a voice in their making. Recognizing that short-termist perspectives shape political decision-making, several democracies created institutional guardians designed to represent the interests of future generations in present-day decision-making, facilitating a long-term view across policy areas. In doing so, they may help to mitigate democratic myopia. However, some scholars are very sceptical of the feasibility and viability of such institutional innovations, given the ubiquitous short-termists pressures in politics. To analyze their feasibility and viability claims conceptually and empirically, this study systematically compares the design features (i.e. political instruments, access to the policy process and to branches of government, legal basis, organizational structure and resources) and the conditions of institutionalization of eight institutional guardians of future generations, four of which did not survive and were dismantled. Although each case is unique, it can be concluded that it is feasible to institutionally represent future generations even under detrimental external conditions. However, guardians that can not only bark but also bite live dangerously. Guardians are most viable when they are designed to be neither too strong nor too weak, and when they have a balanced interdependence with political decision-makers.

KW - Comparative politics

KW - democracy

KW - democratic short-termism

KW - institutions for future generations

KW - intergenerational justice

KW - sustainability governance

KW - Sustainability Governance

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85213325710&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1080/01442872.2024.2444632

DO - 10.1080/01442872.2024.2444632

M3 - Journal articles

AN - SCOPUS:85213325710

JO - Policy Studies

JF - Policy Studies

SN - 0144-2872

ER -

DOI