Pavel Šatra, PhD student
Leuphana University of Lüneburg
Centre for the Study of Democracy (ZDEMO)
PhD program Democracy under Stress
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1st Supervisor Prof. Vera van Hüllen
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Autocracies' Counterintuitive Delegation Preferences to International Human Rights Organizations

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Abstract

Autocracies sustain their power due to human rights violations. Therefore, autocracies would not be expected to delegate authority to human rights international organizations that reveal human rights abuses and contribute to democratization processes. I observe, however, that some autocracies support even the highest level of authority delegation. Namely, they decide to delegate authority to human rights monitoring bureaucracies instead of shutting them down. To solve this puzzle, I ask: "Under what conditions prefer autocracies to delegate authority to international human rights organizations?" I argue that if autocracies have managed to impose monitoring missions on their rival states, then autocracies should prefer to delegate authority to monitoring bureaucracies.[1]

Contents

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1. Introduction

The promotion of state sovereignty is the crucial defense strategy of autocracies against human rights critics and waves of democratization (Acharya 2003; Ambrosio 2008, 2010). State sovereignty allows non-democracies to avoid outside pressures for democratization and to suppress more easily domestic human rights movements. According to autocracies, world politics should be organized around states and not international organizations (IOs) with authority (Ambrosio 2008, 2010). In particular, we may expect that autocracies would not support monitoring bureaucracies of IOs (short: monitoring bureaucracies) that scrutinize compliance with universal human rights and liberal democracy. Since autocracies sustain their power thanks to human rights violations (e.g. Poe 2007; Schmitz, Sikkink 2013; Svolik 2012), they should prefer to shut down monitoring bureaucracies that impose reputational costs on them and that support actors striving for democratization.

Nevertheless, I observe that certain autocracies prefer to delegate authority to human rights monitoring bureaucracies of IOs. For example, Russia and its autocratic partners from the regional organization (RO) Commonwealth of Independent States preferred to delegate authority to the election bureau[2] of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Russia and its partners did so, although the election bureau had already criticized them for their flawed domestic elections. It is puzzling to reveal that the autocracies did not want to close the bureaucracy in order to avoid further reputational costs. Moreover, I indicate a variation in the delegation preferences of autocracies. The autocracies of the Commonwealth of Independent States wanted to refrain from delegating authority to the Special Procedures, whereby Special Procedures are the monitoring bureaucracy of the UN Human Rights Council. The literature has not sought to find an answer to the puzzling delegation preferences of autocracies yet.

To approach the delineated topic, I define autocracies (/authoritarian regimes) as states that fail to elect their legislature and executive in free and competitive elections (Alvarez, Cheibub 1996; Cheibub et al. 2010; Svolik 2012, p. 10). Furthermore, human rights monitoring bureaucracies stand for permanent or mission-related IO-bodies that generate, cumulate and disseminate knowledge on human rights violations. Monitoring bureaucracies do not consist of member states, as intergovernmental bodies do, but include human rights experts who conduct remote or on the ground missions (see Barnett, Finnemore 1999, 2004). Moreover, I understand delegation as delegation of authority. Authority is delegated to IOs when states transfer competencies to IOs and recognize that IOs can make binding decisions (Cooper et al. 2008; Zürn et al. 2012; Zürn et al. 2015) whereby IOs may in the short [and long] term harm interests of some member states (Zürn et al. 2015, p. 6, modified by author). Finally, I examine authority delegation under moral interdependency where the domestic relationship of governments and their inhabitants is regulated and thus includes universal human rights field which is interlinked with liberal democracy policies (e.g. Hill 2016, p. 1; Moravcsik 2000, p. 217; Rittberger et al. 2013, p. 232).

[2] "Election bureau" refers to the part of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe that conducts election monitoring.

In general, autocracies are expected to be "delegation-averse"[3], while democracies are expected to be "delegation-friendly"[4]. Democracies are known to dominate the international system (Ambrosio 2008; Torfason, Ingram 2010) and autocracies — as violators of human rights — are said to lack the credibility to influence human rights IOs (see Johnston 2001, p. 508). Consequently, previous accounts failed to explain the delegation preferences of autocracies to monitoring bureaucracies because they did not even seek to explain them. It was simply taken for granted that autocracies would not support the highest form of delegation to monitoring bureaucracies. The current research provides for contributions on authority delegation to intergovernmental bodies, which represent medium level of authority, and manifold analysis on accession to international treaties which usually foresee self-reporting procedures that do not qualify as authority delegation.

To solve the puzzling delegation preferences and address the research gap, I ask the question: **"Under what conditions prefer autocracies to delegate authority to international human rights organizations?"** In order to examine the conditions of the counterintuitive delegation preferences of autocracies, I develop the following argument: If autocracies have succeeded in the past to target missions of monitoring bureaucracies to their rival states, then autocracies should be ready to delegate authority to monitoring bureaucracies in reform processes of IOs. Principally, when authoritarian regimes target missions of monitoring bureaucracies, they choose which or how states are going to be reviewed by human rights experts. Most often, autocracies decide that democracies should be monitored as well. I outline that autocracies possess twofold motives to utilize missions of monitoring bureaucracies. First, when authoritarian regimes direct monitoring bureaucracies to rival states, they re-allocate scarce monitoring capacities and therefore shift the focus partially away from own repressive regimes. Second, already conducted missions to democracies revealed also systematic deficiencies. A critic of core democratic institutions reported by monitoring bodies, which are perceived to work impartially, serves the purposes of autocracies. It allows them to question the legitimacy of external human rights and democratizing actors. Therefore, I expect autocracies to have defensive as well as pro-active motives to aggregate interests and power in order to point monitoring missions of bureaucracies to rival states.

Although it is indispensable to elaborate on the *motives* of the targeting of monitoring missions, they are not of capital importance for this dissertation project. This project primary strives to analyze the *effects* of targeting of monitoring missions. According to my empirical preview, certain autocracies preferred to keep the monitoring bureaucracies running and target them to their political rivals rather than avoiding reputational costs and precluding support for human rights movements by shutting the monitoring bodies down. As a result, we witness a partial convergence of preferences by autocracies and democracies, where democracies support strong IOs and autocracies stand out for at least relatively strong IOs. I examine – in non-systematic manner – delegation preferences by democracies as well because they are inherent actors to human rights global governance structures. An insight into

[3] E.g. Acharya 2003; Ambrosio 2008; Eisentraut, Tokhi 2013; Hill 2016, 14.

[4] Abromeit, Stoiber 2007; Finnemore, Sikkink 1998; Johnston 2001; Lebovic, Voeten 2006; Maoz, Russett 1993; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; Simmons 2009. But see Cox 2010; Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Moravcsik 2000 for variation in delegation behavior of young and established democracies.

democracies' stance will help me to contextualize autocracies' position and will ensure that the entire potential of the study is used.

It is important to generate knowledge on state delegation preferences, since in re-institutionalization processes[5], it is up to the states to give their consent to re-shape the IO-authority.[6] IO-authority should in turn effect the enforcement of human rights (Simmons 2009, pp. 103–108).[7] The results of a regime type sensitive analysis have the potential to produce policy relevant knowledge. Such knowledge should help states to better understand their coalition and oppositional actors during IO-reforms. Moreover, I perceive strong normative demand for this PhD project. Monitoring bureaucracies have the potential to generate systematic expertise on human rights violations which cannot be provided by other political actors. States tend to follow their particular interests and NGOs are able to generate only fragmented knowledge (see Dai 2014, pp. 50, 65). The generation of systematic expertise on human rights violations is the first step in enforcement of human rights. Without clear and systematic observations, it is difficult to identify violators and seek to induce compliance (Hollyer, Rosendorff 2011, pp. 6–7).[8]

Human rights [or democracy] policy field is the most demanding one to induce compliance and at the same time political actors of this field has to rely on the least developed compliance mechanisms (Fawn 2013, p. 5; Luck, Doyle 2004, modified by author). Most of the research on international human rights concentrates on democracies, whereby it is the authoritarian regimes who abuse human rights more (Møller, Skaaning 2013). Therefore, Hafner-Burton (2012, p. 280) calls to place authoritarian regimes in the center of analysis. Regarding research on IOs, we need to strengthen the agenda on autocracies since they constitute a significant share of the IO membership (Eisentraut, Tokhi 2013, p. 1). Thus, I aim to shed light on the relationship of autocracies and IOs.

Taken together, this project should allow me to resolve a crucial analytic puzzle in order to provide for an improved understanding of autocracies in global governance structures, where rigid state sovereignty norm protection and securing power on the domestic level are no more primary encompassing strategies of autocracies. Such a research goal is an instance of a larger question about the relationship of states and international authority, where our knowledge is still incomplete.

[5] Re-institutionalization processes or reforms are initiated by selected member states which are dissatisfied with the IO's work (studied case of the OSCE) or are introduced because of consensual disapproval with the IO (studied case of the UN Human Rights Council).

[6] There are certainly other influential actor types in the global governance structures like NGOs (Deitelhoff 2009) and secretariats of IOs (Johnson, Urpelainen 2014), which are told to shape the IO-authority. However, these actors do not get to vote in reform processes. Thus, NGOs and secretariats of IOs must in the first place persuade states to give their consent and modify the IO-authority. Unfortunately, the literature on NGOs' and secretariats' influence of IO authority is mostly not regime type sensitive. Therefore, it is more than complicated to integrate such contributions into my research design that differentiates between autocracies and democracies. Based on this criteria, I have also excluded the Principal-Agent literature that treats autocracies and democracies within the general category of "states."

[7] Nevertheless, the scientific debate whether IOs significantly improve human rights is still ongoing (e.g. Donnelly 2013; Rittberger et al. 2013; Schmitz, Sikkink 2013; Risse et al. 2013).

[8] I do not aim to evoke the impression that the work of IO-bureaucracies should not be exposed to critical evaluation. See for example Barnett, Finnemore (2004) and Piiparinen (2008) for IO-bureaucracy paradoxes and Grigorescu (2013) on democratic deficit, accountability and transparency of monitoring bureaucracies.

2. Puzzle: Unexpected preferences of autocracies

This project is driven by an important puzzle. Autocracies stay in power due to human rights violations (Poe 2007; Schmitz, Sikkink 2013; Svolik 2012). Consequently, autocracies should employ all their resources to avoid human rights criticism done by monitoring bureaucracies that aim to contribute to democratization. This would imply that autocracies strive to dissolve the monitoring bureaucracies. For example, Cuba holds that country missions conducted by the monitoring bureaucracy Special Procedures of the old UN Human Rights Committee "have proven to be dysfunctional, controversial and useless (Cuba 2006)." Some authoritarian regimes, however, support the existence of monitoring bureaucracies although they embody the most authoritative form of human rights monitoring (e.g. Bradley, Kelley 2008; Simmons 2009, pp. 103–108; Zürn et al. 2015, pp. 10–11).

It is the large degree of autonomous decision making that ranks monitoring bureaucracies on the top of the authority scale. Monitoring procedures which require unanimous consent by members of an international treaty or foresee self-reporting qualify as a pre-stage of authority delegation. Such a pre-stage is an instance of international cooperation incentive and is represented by self-reporting provisions of international treaties;[9] IO bodies that employ majority decision making procedures have medium authority and take form of intergovernmental bodies (Zürn et al. 2015, p. 11); and finally, monitoring bureaucracies which determine monitoring results without a voting approval by member states score the highest authority (ibid).[10] In addition, by intergovernmental and bureaucratic bodies, I differentiate between monitoring authority with high and low autonomy. Based on my master's thesis, democracies prefer monitoring bureaucracies with high autonomy (strong bureaucracies) whereas autocracies aim to establish monitoring bureaucracies with low autonomy (relatively strong bureaucracies) (see Satra 2015).

As the highest form of international monitoring authority, bureaucracies generate substantial resistance not only because they are the most expensive form of monitoring (Dai 2007) but especially because they can impose the highest reputational costs and empower domestic and transnational human rights movements and stakeholders (Dai 2014). They impose the highest reputational costs because their human rights expertise is perceived to be trustworthy. Bureaucracies can generate their own interests and seem to be primary interested in fulfilling their monitoring mandate impartially. Consequently, their work is believed to be conducted apart from particular state interests (Busch, Liese 2016; Barnett, Finnemore 1999, 2004; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2009, 2012).[11] Building on their trustworthy image and exclusive expertise, results of monitoring missions of bureaucracies are distributed by press and diverse political actors (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). In contrast, state-driven naming and shaming done by intergovernmental

[9] On "notoriously weak" monitoring provisions of human rights treaties see Cole 2015; Goodliffe, Hawkins 2006; Hathaway 2008; Powell, Staton 2009; Simmons 2009.

[10] Such delegation levels speak to the monitoring authority of IOs. I certainly would not argue that, for instance, the UN Security Council as an intergovernmental body has less authority than the monitoring bureaucracy of the UN Human Rights Council. Furthermore, international courts possess higher authority than monitoring bureaucracies do as far as the legal character of their work is considered (see Hill 2016). An international court makes one precise judgment per trial. Monitoring bureaucracies "judge" systemic conditions and conduct repeatedly large scale observations of human rights abuses. Thus, their action radius is much broader.

[11] See also Barnett, Coleman 2005; Cortell, Peterson 2006; Ellinas, Suleiman 2012; Huber, Shipan 2002; Koch 2008.

bodies and self-reporting mechanisms of international treaties are not able to achieve the same levels of credibility.

By imposing reputational costs on autocracies, monitoring bureaucracies can trigger multiple negative consequences on the international as well as domestic level. Due to reputational costs, an image as a trustworthy partner of international relations diminishes (Axelrod, Keohane 1985; Bradley, Kelley 2008, p. 29). For human rights violators, it is very difficult to formulate credible normative arguments (Johnston 2001, p. 508). Countries with a clear human rights record may pressure human rights violators to contribute military personnel for international peacekeeping missions (see Daxner, Schrade 2011; Stock, Varwick 2012). A very negative human rights score can also upset foreign investors since it evokes the impression that the rule of law is not well-established and thus investments not secured (Farber 2002; see also Jetschke 2015; and Hafner-Burton et al. 2015, p. 22).

However, the most crucial consequences of human rights monitoring strike autocracies on the domestic level where regime change actors get initiated and legitimized by critical monitoring results. To properly grasp such consequences, at least an elemental understanding of autocratic domestic settings is required: Compared to democracies, autocracies are weak on legitimation (see Davenport 2007) and resort to human rights violations in order to mitigate real or perceived threats to their power (Poe 2007; Schmitz, Sikkink 2013; Svolik 2012).[12,13] Out of the freedoms incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, autocracies repress civil liberties (e.g. right to gather) by far more than individual human rights (e.g. free choice of religion) (Møller, Skaaning 2013). Autocracies impinge on civil liberties to inhibit political competition (ibid).[14] Human rights movements and stakeholders constitute such a political competition as they aim to induce regime change.[15] International bureaucracies — which are believed to provide for trustworthy human rights expertise — initiate and legitimize local and transnational human rights actors (Dai 2014, pp. 13–14).[16] The critical assessments of human rights draw attention of democratizing actors to repressive policies as well as to single grave abuses. At the same time, poor freedom record legitimize action of human rights stakeholders which are already active. More generally, together with other factors, human rights critics can initiate democratization processes (Pevehouse 2002). As a result, monitoring bureaucracies pose a threat to the authoritarian rule.

Consequently, autocracies have multiple incentives to fight monitoring bureaucracies. Nonetheless, drawing on a qualitative content analysis of the delegation preferences expressed during the reform process of the UN Human Rights Council (UN HRC) in 2006-7 and 2010-11, I observe that some

[12] Parallel to this power-related argument, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that autocracies choose to repress human rights when it is less costly than introducing liberal democracy institutions.

[13] Though the repression is a defining feature of autocracies, it does not mean that autocratic rulers would not seek legitimation. For example, Gerschewski (2013) theorizes and Hess (2013) empirically analyzes that only a combination of repression, legitimation and co-optation can account for longevity of autocracies.

[14] Furthermore, autocrats resort to repression although it is often not effective in dispersing the opposition. Such behavior is well known as the "Punishment Puzzle". (Davenport 2007)

[15] Diamond 1999; Higley, Burton 1989; O'Donnell et al. 1986; Przeworski 1991; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Welsh 1994.

[16] Moreover, IOs in general provide for a communication channel where domestic opposition align international actors to criticize authoritarian policies (Keck, Sikkink 1998).

autocracies support the existence of monitoring bureaucracies (see Satra 2015). Even more, the delegation of Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which represents autocratic members, praises the monitoring bureaucracy Special Procedures: "The OIC has always held that special procedure system of the UN Human Rights is an extremely useful mechanism for the promotion and protection of Human Rights (Janjua 2007)." It is the main goal of my dissertation to find out under what conditions autocracies support monitoring bureaucracies that can or even already did harm their interests.

3. State of the art and research gap

In this part, I would like to first define the analyzed policy field which is common for autocracies as well as democracies. Second, I will briefly summarize the well-developed research on democracies and their delegation-friendly preferences. Third, I will review the underdeveloped literature on autocracies. Finally, I will position my argument and draw attention to the research gap which is about to be covered.

Irrespective of the regime type and policy field, states are ready to delegate authority to IOs and accept an asymmetrical relationship because they recognize that there should be a decision-making instance that advances common goods and avoids chaos (Zürn et al. 2012, p. 87). The extent of authority to be delegated, however, varies. This dissertation project examines authority delegation preferences within the realm of moral interdependence which includes two overlapping policies of human rights and democracy. In practice, these two fields are covered by the universal human rights which guarantee private freedoms (e.g. free choice of religion) and political liberties (e.g. right to gather). Unlike IOs governing financial, environmental, or security policies, human rights and democracy IOs are not predominantly designed to regulate policy externalities arising from cross-border interactions but to hold governments accountable for domestic activities (e.g. Hill 2016, 1; Moravcsik 2000, p. 217; Rittberger et al. 2013, p. 232). Thus, these IOs foremost constrain states' behavior towards their inhabitants and only exceptionally focus on inter-state cooperation generating obvious gains as it is the case of delegation under material interdependency. It is hard to make the case especially for autocracies – whose "governance backbone" is repression of the society – and to motivate them for international authority delegation.[17]

It has to be further clarified that democracies as well as autocracies engage in delegation behavior when embedded in a normatively shaped environment where human rights and democratic governance are to a great extent perceived as desired political goals. Many current contributions directly implement or at least contextualize the explanations by referring to influential human rights protection and liberal democracy governance norms.[18] Norm driven politics motivate democratizing actors to take action and

[17] It is true that human rights and democracy policy fields are not always treated together within the discipline of International Relations. For example, the literature on effects of international election monitoring has gained its own audience or there are even specialized journals like the Journal of Human Rights that avoid specific democracy topics. Nevertheless, the democracy and human rights policy fields re-join in the literature on delegation since states delegate to human rights or democracy IOs under the moral interdependence where IOs regulate the relationship of state and its inhabitants. Moreover, specifically regarding my analysis, these two fields fusion since autocracies either impinge upon democracy or human rights standards in order to repress the opposition and thus stay in the driving seat.

[18] The robustness of these norms is assessed as rhetoric action in institutionalization processes (Deitelhoff 2009); implementation on the domestic level varying over number of states, durability and norm specificity (Legro 1997);

at the same time, it allows them to instrumentally pressure autocracies also for non-altruistic goals. In response, autocracies counter the norms of universal human rights and liberal democracy as they disseminate authoritarian governance structures (Ambrosio 2008, 2010), organize in "own" regional and international organizations (e.g. Acharya 2003; Börzel, van Hüllen 2015; Soest 2015), and offer an alternative to democratic regime type by pushing forward a "sovereign democracy" (Ambrosio 2008, p. 1338) where repression should protect traditional values and anti-terrorism measures legitimize tightening of the regimes (Plattner et al. 2016). A "sovereign democracy" helps autocracies to decrease the normatively backed external pressure (ibid). Nevertheless, as this project suggests, the authoritarian concept of non-interference into domestic affairs is merely a tactical act. I expect autocracies to be ready to breach the state sovereignty norm and prefer to delegate authority to human rights IOs.

Starting the literature review with democracies, democracies are significantly more willing to delegate than autocracies. This applies both within the realm of material and moral interdependence as the dataset Correlates of War reveals (see Pevehouse et al. 2007). Under the moral interdependence, democracies are ready to delegate since they externalize the design of their political systems with checks and balances (Abromeit, Stoiber 2007; Maoz, Russett 1993). Democracies have a better human rights account than autocracies do. Thus, they can afford to delegate authority to IOs without risking reputational costs (Lebovic, Voeten 2009). Young democracies delegate even more authority to IOs than established democracies do. It is because democratizing states aim to externally lock-in their human rights promoting political system for future generations.[19] Last but not least, democracies aim to spread human rights norms and use IOs as their "vehicles", thus empowering them by authority delegation.[20]

On the contrary, the literature on delegation preferences of autocracies suggests that autocracies withstand large scale authority delegation under both material (Mansfield, Pevehouse 2006; Eisentraut, Tokhi 2013) and moral interdependence (Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Mansfield, Pevehouse 2008, pp. 275–276). The most frequently mentioned reason for autocracies to be delegation-averse is that they want to avoid regime change associated either with state-to-state or IO-driven intervention.[21] When autocracies decide to delegate to IOs or ROs operating in human rights and democracy fields, then explanations like fear of unilateral military intervention or political interference by democracies; foreign direct investment and foreign aid linkages; countering liberal democracy and putting forward concept of "authoritarian democracy"; and in special scenarios also mitigation of negative cross-boarder externalities come into play. Examples of such explanations take us on a tour throughout American, African, European, and Asian regional and international organizations. ROs with prevailing authoritarian membership serve as "incubators" for explanations of delegation patterns of non-democratic states. Prominent literature on IOs with mixed authoritarian and democratic membership tend to overly concentrate on democracies and does not provide for thorough theoretical reasoning on autocracies'

believes of people (see Hawkins, Shaw 2008, p. 467) and NGO activity (Deitelhoff 2009; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; see also Tallberg et al. 2016).

[19] Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Mansfield, Pevehouse 2006; Moravcsik 2000; but see Tallberg et al. 2016.

[20] Finnemore, Sikkink 1998; Hafner-Burton et al. 2015, p. 4; Pevehouse 2002, 2005; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999.

[21] E.g. Ambrosio 2010, p. 376; Johnston 2003, pp. 14–15; Eisentraut, Tokhi 2013, pp. 9–10; Lynch 2007; Pevehouse 2002.

position.[22] Thus, I mostly resort to literature on ROs in order to learn more about autocracies' delegation preferences.[23]

Regarding American IOs, Hawkins and Shaw (2008) delineate the explanatory variable "fear of unilateral military intervention" as they scrutinize reforms of the Organization of American States (OAS) throughout its lifespan. The authors explore by means of process tracing that authoritarian regimes of South and Latin America abided from dedicated protection of the state sovereignty norm as they did not fear unilateral intervention by the USA shortly after the Cold War.

Van Hüllen (2015) elaborates on the influence by the external democratizing actor USA as well. She provides for insights on the development of the Arab League. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the US intervention of Iraq in 2003, the Middle East and North African countries perceived substantial threat of political interference into domestic institutional settings. As a response, they decided to create an intergovernmental body called Arab Human Rights Committee in 2004 which does not foresee public reporting or other type of sanctioning of human rights abuses. The creation of such a body should satisfy external democratizing actors as well as assure human rights enforcement "without a bite". Thus, the countries aimed to satisfy the international actors and provide for non-intrusive instrument which would not constitute a threat for the domestic level of the non-compliant authoritarian regimes.

The already mentioned human rights norm pressure gets financial attributes when democratizing actors condition foreign aid flows and investments to democratic governance organizations. Hulse and van der Vleuten (2016) mention the relation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and external actors such as the EU together with other OECD countries. The SADC countries created a regional tribunal with even supranational/bureaucratic features in 2005. Nevertheless, as the court tried to execute its authority, it was dismantled by its non-democratic members in 2010. Therefore, the shortly lived regional tribunal can be interpreted as an instance of window dressing, where the RO members aimed to signal that they were ripe for foreign aid or investment but, however, were not prepared to expose themselves to judgments of the international authority. [24,25]

Not willing to accept judgments as well, the members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) created its own monitoring instrument named Election Monitoring Organization (CIS-EMO) in 2003 (Fawn 2013, p. 77). This kind of a monitoring bureau was called into life to counter assessments conducted by the OSCE election bureau which severely criticized elections in post-soviet countries (Evers 2009, p. 277; Libmann 2011). Its personnel consists of active and former politicians from illiberal as well as democratic European countries whereby the leadership resides with Russia (CIS-EMO 2017).

[22] See e.g. Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Hill 2016; Mansfield, Pevehouse 2006; Mansfield, Pevehouse 2008.
[23] The most peculiar issue of the research on delegation preferences towards IOs is that many contributions draw on data sets with prevailing number of ROs but label the results as being true for IOs. See Mansfield, Pevehouse (2006, p. 156) and Pevehouse, Borzyskowski (2016, p. 12) for more reflection on this problem.
[24] *Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs* (CEPGL) is another case where external donors provided for material incentives for autocracies to delegate to a RO but could not ensure an operative status of the organization over time (see Heyl 2010).
[25] See Robinson (1993) for international political conditionality that puts African countries under pressure to develop domestic democratic institutions.

It is supposed to guard domestic governance standards set up by formerly democratizing states whose democracy score and practices decreased to authoritarian category past 2000, as Russo (2015) analyzes.

An example of a window dressing situates us according to Munro (2009) and Gingbar (2010) to Asia, where the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – being under pressure of human rights norms – created the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009. Munro (2009) is suspicious about the altruistic aims of the intergovernmental body since young democracies did not ratify optional protocols of the underlying treaties as they seem to undermine the IO-authority. Meanwhile, these protocols were ratified by authoritarian members.

Regarding ASEAN, a different argument is made by Jetschke (2015). She leaves the window dressing delegation motives aside and concentrates on mitigation of negative cross-border externalities and foreign direct investments linkages. Her analysis puts forward an argument where authority delegation should protect state sovereignty.[26] In Southeast Asia, a series of gross human rights abuses occurred when states conducted military operations within their territories to suppress opposition and to retain control of secession movements. As a consequence, the region experienced multiple transboundary refugee flows whereby neighboring countries complained about the material and social costs to shelter internationally displaced persons. At the same time, the EU and the US condemned the state-led violence and refused to appoint the ASEAN members. Such a move questioned the continuity of European and American foreign direct investments. To decrease the territorial breaches and improve their international reputation, autocracies have delegated some degree of authority to the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.[27]

So far, the current literature reveals that autocracies delegate to intergovernmental level in order to first, deflect political interference by democratizing actors (case of Arab League); second, protect and disseminate own authoritarian governance standards (case of CIS); third, pretend to keep up with influential human rights norms (case of ASEAN); fourth, secure continuity of foreign direct investments (case of ASEAN); and fifth, mitigate negative cross-border externalities caused by sever domestic repression and ensure state sovereignty norm (case of ASEAN). In all of these instances, authoritarian regimes did not strive to please only the international community or norms. They thought also of own domestic levels as they delegated to intergovernmental bodies predominantly “without a bite” so that domestic interests does not get hurt. Regarding authority delegation to supranational or bureaucratic level, the SADC regional court was a product of foreign aid and investment linkage. The court could bite but it was dismissed as it had left its tooth marks. Furthermore, the CIS monitoring bureau was — even

[26] Gingbar (2010) claims as well that the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights of ASEAN could strengthen the state sovereignty of its members. It is because of the legal status of the commission findings which are clearly subordinated to the domestic policies of the majoritarian autocratic members (ibid). However, Gingbar does not identify any advantages for human rights enforcement as Jetschke (2015) does.

[27] Furthermore, the foreign direct investment linkage is approved also by quantitative analysis. Hufner-Burton et al. (2015, p. 22) tested that foreign direct investments play a role for delegation behavior of autocracies but not democracies. See Li, Resnick (2003) for a nuanced account on how foreign direct investment effects diffusion of domestic democratic governance.

from the beginning on — meant to meet the interests of repressive regimes, namely to cover for their non-competitive political practice and disseminate authoritarian values.

In scenarios where autocracies withstand to delegate authority to either intergovernmental or bureaucracy level during reform processes, they might suggest to adopt an international treaty with a self-reporting procedure.[28] Self-reporting procedures do not belong to the concept of authority delegation. They are an instance of international cooperation incentive where decision making procedures stay with every single state. I interpret preferences for adoption of an international treaty with a self-reporting procedure as a resistance to authority delegation and consequence of pressure to provide for results of reform processes.

To curve out the main analytical foci of this dissertation, it is required to put monitoring authority into perspective. In contrast to creation of self-reporting procedures and delegation to intergovernmental bodies, my project investigates delegation preferences to monitoring bureaucracies. For autocracies, this difference is crucial. When autocracies ratify human rights treaties with self-reporting mechanisms, they risk being revealed as strategic ratifiers with no normative incentives to comply. If autocracies build human rights intergovernmental bodies "without a bite" or emphasize that the domestic policies are more important than the working results of the intergovernmental body, they dismiss the monitoring results as unimportant from the beginning on. The literature review discovered also a case where autocracies created a monitoring bureaucracy in order to protect and diffuse repressive domestic institutions. But when autocracies support monitoring bureaucracies devoted to universal human rights and liberal democracy norms, they are counterintuitively advocating the existence of institutions which are designed to impose credible reputational and sovereignty costs on them. Monitoring bureaucracies are a part of the mechanism that forces autocracies to organize large scale election fakes or "only quietly" dissolve human rights movements. Thus, although authoritarian regimes partially learned how to cope with the monitoring bureaucracies (Hyde 2011; see also Kelley 2012), it does not mean that their domestic politics would not be better off without the monitoring authority. Faking elections or repressing human rights entails additional critic for the attempt to cover for repressive practice. In short, I observe that autocracies support IOs which were brought to life by democracies in order to criticize autocracies.

Such puzzling delegation preferences question prevailing assumptions on behavior of autocracies in IOs. The reviewed literature postulates that authoritarian regimes keep domestic and international interests in balance as they decide to delegate authority. In contrast, I argue that autocracies may favor international goals to the domestic ones when they support relatively strong IOs with monitoring bureaucracies. This modification of the basic assumption on autocracies in IOs will guide my further theoretical reasoning. From the reviewed literature, I draw especially on the contribution by Jetschke (2015) who partially argues that autocracies decide to delegate authority to advance own genuine agenda. Thus, autocracies do not have to be pressured by external human rights and democratizing actors in order to decide to delegate authority under moral interdependence.

[28] See Cole 2015; Goodliffe, Hawkins 2006; Hathaway 2008; Powell, Staton 2009; Simmons 2009.

Regarding human rights IOs, we have plenty of accounts on preferences of democracies. However, we completely lack a systematic analysis on preferences of autocracies toward monitoring bureaucracies working in the name of universal human rights or liberal democracy.[29] We are confronted with such a research gap since autocracies' influence on, and stances on human rights IOs are being underestimated. There are many contributions on democracies because they are assumed to be the drivers of human rights IOs, but autocracies are expected to lack the power and credibility to make normative arguments in order to influence IOs.[30] My research design avoids such a misleading assumption and pays an appropriate attention to autocracies' behavior. In essence, I follow the call by Hufner-Burton (2012, p. 280) to strengthen the research on autocracies in the field of international human rights.

4. Research design

The very precise conceptual goal of my dissertation is to find out under what conditions are autocracies ready to delegate authority to bureaucracies monitoring universal human rights and liberal democracy standards. Authority of monitoring bureaucracies is discussed in re-institutionalization processes which are initiated by selected member states or manifest consensual dissatisfaction with IO's work. Yet, re-institutionalization processes does not necessarily include merely discussions on authority of monitoring bureaucracies since autocracies may decide to delegate only to an intergovernmental body or withstand delegation at all and opt out for an international treaty adoption with a self-reporting procedure. Thus, to provide for a holistic explanation of autocracies' preferences, it is indispensable to broaden the analytical question and ask about all authority delegation options. Consequently, I formulate one guiding analytical question:

Q: "Under what conditions prefer authoritarian regimes to delegate authority to human rights international organizations?"

In order to solve the puzzling behavior of autocracies, a careful conceptualization of the dependent variable is required. Essentially, I understand delegation preferences to be explicit statements that states have submitted in re-institutionalization processes. Such statements take the form of *claims* whereby *claims* express a demand for change (Koopmans, Statham 1990; Wilde 2013). Thus, state preferences demand a change of IO-authority. Zürn et al. (see 2015, p. 8) operationalize IO-authority as "*bindingness times autonomy*". Bindingness measures the degree to which decisions taken by IOs are compulsory or of recommendatory character (Zürn et al. 2015, p. 7). Autonomy stands for the extent to which IO-bodies can decide to follow their own logic or have to take into account the opinion of some or even every member state (ibid).

[29] Exceptions could be reports by practitioners like Evers (2009) who mention but do not interpret or explain autocracies' intentions to keep monitoring bureaucracies alive. Most frequently, research contributions choose examples of profound state sovereignty defenders like China or the United Arab Emirates. Based on these, it is often concluded that autocracies withstand authority delegation to monitoring bureaucracies (e.g. Cox 2010).

[30] Regime diffusion research faced a similar situation recently: Autocracies as diffusing actors were overlooked since the last democratization wave evoked the impression that autocracies simply do not have a say in this world (Albrecht, Frankenberger 2010, p. 11; Ambrosio 2010, p. 376). At the same time, I join Ambrosio who does not contend that „democracy, as a political and normative force in global politics, is somehow dying (2010, p. 377)." See also Merkel (2010).

I do not rely on the results of the equation above but rather disaggregate them to underscore the added value of autonomy. According to my understanding, authority consists of bindingness and autonomy, but autonomy is highlighted. As a result, I substantially differentiate between A) monitoring authority with *high* autonomy and B) monitoring authority with *low* autonomy. The authority with *high* autonomy represents strong and independent monitoring bureaucracies. A strong and independent bureaucracy can to a large extent decide on its own who and how will be monitored. Such a monitoring authority is usually preferred by democracies. Meanwhile, the authority with *low* autonomy stands for relatively strong monitoring bureaucracies controlled by states, where states decide from an intergovernmental body, who and how will be monitored. This scenario is – according to my empirical preview – preferred by some autocracies.

To properly grasp the delegation behavior of autocracies, I draw a broad understanding of autocracies from contributions which elaborate on autocracies' self-serving interaction with democratic or human rights institutions and ideas. To start with, autocracies provide for an alternative model of democracy to cover for or even legitimize their repressive domestic practice (Plattner et al. 2016). On the bilateral level, Obydenkova and Libman (2015) mention that autocracies are ready to support even democracies if it suits their regional strategy. As far as IOs are concerned, Eisentraut (2013) demonstrates that authoritarian regimes plea for more procedural democratic standards in IOs in order to gain more participation opportunities. Overall, regarding their relationship to democracies, autocracies seek equality with democracies in global affairs as Kneuer and Demmelhuber (2015, p. 776) mention. Against this background, I understand autocracies as actors that are prepared to engage with liberal institutions and ideas when certain advantages are prospective. When doing so, they give priority to international goals over the domestic ones. Prioritizing the domestic level or even balancing between the international and domestic level would mean to shut down the monitoring bureaucracies. I theorize that autocracies might be ready to accept prevailing negative tradeoffs of authority delegation to monitoring bureaucracies as an expression of the will to become full-fledged members in global governance structures. Such a will is not completely new for autocracies. Nevertheless, this time, autocracies strive to be equal partners in the policy fields of human rights and democracy, where they were formerly told to lack legitimacy to gain a pro-active and influential actor status.

Moreover, it is required to narrow down such a broad understanding to provide for thorough insights into the relationship of autocracies and IOs. There must be specific advantages for autocracies to accumulate power in order to overcome their legitimacy deficits and be able to target monitoring missions in the first place. At this point, I envision that the delegation motives underlay a twofold logic. First, autocracies discover positive gains of delegation under moral interdependence. Second, they strive to avoid external human rights norm pressure.

The OSCE figures, again, as an example. I postulate that Russia and its autocratic partners from the CIS broadened the OSCE election observation practice over European and American democracies to let them taste the same medicine of intrusive and systematic monitoring. For instance, the OSCE monitored the US presidential election in 2012. However, many US states struggled with the idea of being

scrutinized by the OSCE election bureau. The press reported that Texas and Iowa even threatened the international observers with criminal sanctions if they approach the polls too close.[31] Furthermore, Alabama, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Tennessee also tried to obstruct the monitoring mission.[32] In the end, the OSCE mission counting 57 employees reported several shortcomings. The overarching problem seems to be that the election legislative is "highly decentralized and complex" which causes that voter registration rules are not unified whereby this issue is "politically polarized" (OSCE 2012). As a consequence, no smaller democratizing actor than US realized what a state sovereignty breach by an IO "feels like" and had to expose itself to critics of its declared core value of competitive elections. At this point, autocracies pick up on such independent monitoring results and question the legitimacy of human rights or democracy pressure by the US.[33] Therefore, there are positive gains for autocracies to let democracies be monitored as well.

Furthermore, the OSCE missions to the US illustrate vividly how autocracies partially shift IO capacities away from their repressive regimes. After first observation missions to Western liberal democracies, Russia and its partners pronounced them to be pseudo-missions with restricted personnel who cannot account for systematic observations. In the awake of US 2016 presidential election, the OSCE employed 417 short and long-term observers (OSCE 2016). This means that the personnel capacities rose more than seven times compared to the US 2012 observation mission. Thus, scarce capacities of monitoring bureaucracies are deployed in democracies which do not stand for the most obvious suspects. Consequently, I expect that autocracies target observations to their rival states in order to re-allocate IO capacities and thus lower the human rights pressure put originally only on authoritarian regimes.

The above paragraphs elaborate on the proactive and defensive motives for targeting of monitoring missions induced by autocracies. This dissertation takes up the challenge to examine the effects of the already targeted missions. Finally, we arrive to the broad theoretical expectation. Autocracies should prefer to delegate authority to monitoring bureaucracies if they managed to use them to advance own political agenda. And, if autocracies could not use the monitoring bureaucracies for their own sake, then the baseline assumption about delegation-averse autocracies should hold and autocracies are expected to strive to shut down the monitoring bureaucracies. Accordingly, I articulate the following hypothesis. It introduces the independent variable of targeting of monitoring missions:

H: When autocracies already managed to impose monitoring missions of human rights bureaucracies on rival states, then autocracies should prefer to delegate authority to monitoring bureaucracies with low autonomy (i.e. relatively strong monitoring bureaucracies controlled by states).

At his point, the added value of a contrast between autocracies and democracies becomes even more apparent. Democracies are known to delegate authority in order to approach human rights and

[31] See thinkprogress.org/international-election-monitors-good-job-america-despite-your-states-e5fcc245c193#.8f7v6b13d, November 10, 2012.
[32] See thinkprogress.org/international-election-monitors-good-job-america-despite-your-states-e5fcc245c193#.8f7v6b13d, November 10, 2012.
[33] See for example Russian online news "US bans OSCE observers: What are they trying to hide?" „sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2012_11_06/US-bans-OSCE-observers-What-are-they-trying-to-hide/, November 6, 2012.

democratizing agenda. Furthermore, they externalize own domestic institutions with autonomous control instances but may also utilize monitoring results to put autocracies under pressure for non-altruistic purposes. As a result of especially the normative delegation motives, democracies prefer strong and independent monitoring bureaucracies. The independent or autonomous characteristics of these bodies condition the impact of their human rights expertise. Only independent bodies has a good potential to generate expertise which is perceived to be produced aside of particular state interests and in the name of the human rights agenda. Such an expertise gets recognized as trustworthy and therefore can encompass actions of human rights or democratizing actors (see Busch, Liese 2016; Barnett, Finnemore 1999, 2004; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2009, 2012).

By contrast, autocracies lack normative reasons to delegate authority since the support of universal human rights and liberal democratic institutions counters their domestic repressive policies. In short, they do not strive to increase the impact of expertise generated by monitoring bureaucracies but to utilize monitoring missions to advance international goals and to lower the human rights pressure. Therefore, I expect that autocracies prefer relatively strong monitoring bureaucracies which are not independent or autonomous. In summary, I assume that autocracies balance the past experience with the IO (targeting of monitoring missions) and consider future goals (absent support of normative agenda) as they articulate authority delegation preferences.

5. Alternative explanations

At this point, it has to be addressed that autocracies learned over the time to combine repression, legitimation and co-optation strategies to secure power on the domestic level (see Gerschewski 2013; Hess 2013). This may in turn mean that authoritarian regimes "could afford" to delegate authority to monitoring bureaucracies whereas their governance "backbone" is still repression but gets increasingly complemented by legitimation and power sharing strategies. Nevertheless, insights from the OSCE scenario suggest the opposite. After the Cold War, the post-soviet countries that are members of the CIS and the OSCE as well were rated as rather democratizing states than autocracies (Gershman, Allen 2006; Plattner et al. 2016, pp. 3–4). However, they experienced an authoritarian backslash from 2000 on and introduced a number of repressive policies (ibid, see also Walker 2016, Note 5). Later, under the leadership of Russia, the CIS countries changed the monitoring practice of the OSCE election bureau and let also Western democracies be scrutinized by the IO. I observe that thereafter, during a re-institutionalization process of the OSCE from 2004 to 2007, the authoritarian CIS members decided to delegate authority to the election bureau of the OSCE but wanted to limit its independence (see Evers 2009). Taken together, I do not associate delegation preferences of autocracies with decreasing repressive practice. [34]

The increasing legitimation and cooptation strategies on the domestic level raise another issue. As mentioned previously, democracies externalize their domestic system of checks and balances as they

[34] Furthermore, monitoring bureaucracies do not get fooled by strategies that should legitimate or hide repression. For example, it is an easy task for the OSCE election bureau to reveal that only "friends" of an authoritarian regime may register their parties and participate in elections. As a reaction to such legitimation strategies, monitoring bureaucracies apply reputational costs. Moreover, if monitoring bureaucracies cannot access for example a site where genocide might happen, then they again release critic of the authoritarian actors.

decide to delegate authority to strong and independent monitoring bureaucracies. It could be argued that autocracies follow path-dependent patterns as well. On the domestic level, autocracies create institutions to include more actors into the regime and to legitimize repression strategies (see Svolik 2012; Boix, Svolik 2013). Such institutions are not independent and autocracies keep them alive as far as they can steer them (Boix, Svolik 2013). Thus, these domestic institutions could remind of the delegation preferences of autocracies that aim to establish relatively strong but *not independent* monitoring bureaucracies. However, there is one limitation to this argument. It is a rather sporadic situation when autocracies have the upper hand in the intergovernmental bodies of "liberal/Western" IOs. Therefore, autocracies could not expect to be exclusive managers of monitoring bureaucracies as they are of their domestic institutions.

There is also a second type of a path dependent argument. The Historical Institutionalism literature demonstrates that IOs get "sticky" over time and that it is very complicated to dissolve an IO since IOs create broad networks in favor of their own organizational structures and bring revenues for member states (Fioretos 2011). Applying this perspective, it could be argued that autocracies support the self-reinforcing patterns of institutional development as they form own delegation preferences. Put simply, autocracies would not even come up with the idea of putting a monitoring bureaucracy to death. I have a twofold objection against this. First, there are multiple contributions which demonstrate that autocracies withstand authority delegation.[35] Second, the prevailing analytical focus of Historical Institutionalism is on the *outcomes* of reform processes (/resultant IO design).[36] Meanwhile, I concentrate on the state delegation preferences which constitute the *input* of reform processes. Thus, the analytical focus differs which complicates the potential theoretical transfer.

As I understand delegation preferences as oral or written statements submitted in reform processes of IOs, it could be pointed out that authoritarian regimes merely comply with diplomatic standards as they prefer to keep monitoring bureaucracies alive. Drawing on the OSCE scenario, I would not expect, for example, a global player like Russia to be afraid to voice an actual position towards the OSCE election bureau. Russia applies even military means to advance its international politics. Therefore, I assume that Russian diplomatic apparatus reflects the country's interests in negotiation processes. Apart of the self-confident and rising autocracies like Russia, "smaller" autocracies found a way how to voice their delegation preferences without attracting too much of an attention. For instance, Cuba holds that the self-reporting procedure of the UN HRC called Universal Periodic Review[37] was sufficient (Cuba 2006). The monitoring bureaucracy called Special Procedures would only duplicate the work (ibid). Thus, Cuba avoided an open assault of the bureaucracy and argued in favor of an overall simplified monitoring system which does not entail any authority delegation.

[35] E.g. Hafner-Burton et al. 2015; Mansfield, Pevehouse 2006; Pevehouse 2002, 2005.

[36] An exception would be the agent-centric Historical Institutionalism that focuses on the state-driven input of reform processes. See more in Büthe (2016, pp. 4–8).

[37] The Universal Periodic Review gathers reports in which states themselves describe improvements of human rights undergone in own domestic settings.

6. Methods

I aim to employ mixed methods to examine the relationship of autocracies and human rights IOs. I will resort to inferential statistics and qualitative comparisons. In this project, an authoritarian regime represents a case. The whole universe of cases consists of all autocratic member states of IOs with an operative monitoring bureaucracy working in the name of universal human rights or liberal democracy. To acquire enough cases for the quantitative analysis and to secure sufficient data especially on the dependent variable of delegation preferences, I have selected three IOs and their respective monitoring bureaucracies: the OSCE with its election bureau, the UN HRC with the monitoring bureaucracy Special Procedures, and the OAS with its monitoring bureaucracy called Secretariat for Strengthening Democracy.[38] These three monitoring bureaucracies already imposed sovereignty and reputational costs on their autocratic member states.

The independent variable called "targeting of monitoring missions" is operationalized as a change of monitoring practice where the original purpose and recipients of monitoring get revised on behalf of autocracies. First, targeting of monitoring missions can be indicated when autocracies managed to employ human rights missions conducted by a monitoring bureau in a country that would not be scrutinized based on the previous practice. For example, the OSCE election bureau was called into life to make observations in East European countries with autocratic past. However, Russia and its partners from the CIS managed to establish monitoring missions to West European and American democracies as well. Second, targeting of monitoring missions occurs when autocracies achieved to essentially restrict or broaden a certain monitoring mission so that human rights violators got included into or excluded out of the observation scrutiny. For instance, except for one, all missions of the UN HRC Special Procedures generate knowledge on human rights abuses within a certain territory embracing *all* violators into the reports and the missions has to be renewed in approximately three year periods (OHCHR 2017). An exemption of such a practice and thus an example of targeting of monitoring missions is the quest in Palestine. This mission has special aims due to influence by autocratic members of the OIC, whereby Palestine is a member of the OIC. In Palestine, only human rights breaches by Israeli government are monitored, meanwhile other violators are left out of the observation scope, and the mission does not have to be periodically renewed. Taken together, the operationalization of the targeting of monitoring missions stands for modifications of observation practice induced by authoritarian regimes. The independent variable will be of binominal character: An autocracy either did or did not impose monitoring mission(s) over rival state(s).[39]

[38] As the most American countries has undergone democratization, I expect to gain only two or three hybrid regimes into my sample by analyzing the OAS.

[39] There is another option to operationalize the independent variable of targeting of monitoring missions. Hug (2015) works with a so called *politicization* of IO-authority which is inspired by policy agenda of democracies. In his analysis, politicization stands for scenarios where states impose disproportioned or ill-placed monitoring over a certain state. To identify politicization, it is required to establish that the monitoring has been induced to carry out bilateral or multilateral political conflict whereby the enforcement of human rights does not figure as a primary goal. This kind of politicization does not represent public contestation of IOs with high authority levels as it was analyzed by Zürn et al. (2012).

The dependent variable called "delegation preferences" is here understood as *claims* to modify authority of IOs. States demand to refine the authority in reform processes of IOs. To provide for a systematized picture of delegation preferences by autocracies and to generate genuine, sufficiently detailed and contextualized data on the dependent variable of delegation preferences, I will employ qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2010; Kromrey 2009).[40] By the means of the qualitative content analysis, I will assess statements submitted by autocracies in reform processes of the three IOs (OSCE 2004-7, UN HRC 2006-7 & 2010-11, OAS – period not settled down yet). The category system will be set up based on theory-led criteria and the smallest unit of analysis is a sentence. In reform processes, states may choose from the following five forms of monitoring authority which will be measured and recorded on an ordinal scale. These are ranked from the highest form of authority delegation to an option that does not foresee any authority delegation:

4. Monitoring bureaucracy with high autonomy (/independent monitoring bureaucracy; is expected to be preferred by democracies, e.g. OSCE election bureau)
3. Monitoring bureaucracy with low autonomy (/monitoring bureaucracy controlled by states; is expected to be preferred by autocracies that imposed monitoring missions over rival states, e.g. UN HRC Special Procedures)
2. Intergovernmental body with high autonomy (e.g. UN HRC with 47 states)
1. Intergovernmental body with low autonomy (e.g. UN General Assembly with 193 states)
0. Self-reporting mechanism (entails no authority delegation; e.g. UN Universal Periodic Review)

The quantitative analysis should allow me first, to generalize when interpreting the empirical results, and second, to address or learn from alternative explanations that are in the literature traditionally assessed through quantitative data. I aim to apply an ordered probit model, where the explanatory variable is of a binominal character, the control variables are of different scales and the dependent variable is captured at an ordinal scale. The ordered probit model should primary test, how probable it is that an autocracy – which utilized the monitoring missions for own sake – prefers to delegate authority to a monitoring bureaucracy with low autonomy (/monitoring bureaucracy controlled by states). Furthermore, the model will accommodate control variables to account for the alternative explanations: First, do autocracies externalize semi-independent domestic institutions as they decide to delegate authority to monitoring bureaucracies with low autonomy ("path-dependency of domestic institutions")? Second, can autocracies allow themselves to delegate to monitoring bureaucracies since they apply low levels or repression? Third, does economic strength influence authority delegation preferences? (GDP levels, source IMF's World Economic Outlook)

[40] At this point, I join the authors Binder and Eisentraut (2015), Deitelhof (2009), Eisentraut and Tokhi (2013). This means that I avoid the very common operationalization of delegation preferences understood as membership to international institutions. I do so since this measure is indifferent to the relationship of states and bureaucratic bodies. I also avoid the method of process tracing. The process tracing allows to reduce complexity and therefore enables to delineate development throughout a whole life span of an IO. However, it produces merely fragmented observations of the most powerful, most active states, or most polarizing actors. This counters my aim to provide for systemized picture of all autocracies that are members of the three selected IOs.

The qualitative empirical analysis should allow me to make sense of the regressions and to explain delegation preferences in its full details. The qualitative analysis will make use of comparative quasi-experimental logic (Gerring 2007), where cases vary over one independent variable, while being controlled for other influences (Gerring, McDermott 2007, pp. 164–165). The qualitative analysis will examine the relationship of autocracies and the UN HRC Special Procedures. The UN HRC offers a good opportunity for such a study. It is the central IO of the global universal human rights regime and has an almost universal membership including the most of the authoritarian regimes. As my master's thesis suggested, some of the authoritarian member states were involved in targeting of monitoring missions and others were not (see Satra 2015). For instance, the autocratic members of the OIC imposed an unusual monitoring over Israel in 1993. Therefore, I would expect them to be ready to delegate authority to the Special Procedures during the reform process of the UN HRC in 2006-7 and 2010-11. Whereas, autocracies like China or Belarus did not induce targeting of monitoring missions. Thus, I expect that they would prefer to dissolve the monitoring bureaucracy. In sum, the analysis of the UN HRC should allow for a variation over present and absent independent variable on the country level.

Furthermore, as the UN HRC hosts the majority of autocracies, it will provide for a comparison over types of authoritarian regimes. I aim to show that delegation preferences do not depend on the type of authoritarian regime like military, party-based or personalist regimes.[41] The next comparison utilizes the fact that the UN HRC and the OSCE have an overlapping membership. The autocracies from the OSCE, which were involved in targeting of monitoring missions, were ready to delegate authority to the OSCE election bureau. Of my interest is to find out whether they wanted to keep the UN HRC Special Procedures alive or to shut them down. Such a variation over IO settings — while keeping the country level steady —should allow me to isolate the impact of the independent variable even better. Moreover, as a part of the qualitative analysis, I will seize the opportunity to provide for contextual knowledge. For example, the current literature does not elaborate on how autocracies actually achieve to overcome their legitimacy deficits and use monitoring bureaucracies for own political goals. At this point, I will provide for at least descriptive insights.[42]

As highlighted earlier, only autocracies' preferences will undergo systematical empirical analysis. Democracies will be studied in non-systematic manner to provide for sufficient contextualization. In order to discriminate between democracies and autocracies, I aim to employ a dichotomous measure.

[41] The thesis that delegation preferences vary over types of authoritarian regimes was suggested by Fails and Woo (2014). Nevertheless, they analyzed delegation under material interdependence drawing on the case of IMF whereby my dissertation copes with delegation under moral interdependence.

[42] Already now, I may reveal that autocracies coordinate in ROs with homogenous autocratic membership and decide, who should be targeted by monitoring bureaucracies of IOs with mixed membership comprising democracies and autocracies. Thus, I refer to the theoretical literature on the so called "nested IOs", where two IOs with overlapping membership influence each other (Gehring, Oberthür 2009). Furthermore, the empirical insights on interplay of ROs and IOs suggest to shed light not only on the homogeneity of regime type but also on shared experience [which generates shared interests] and activity of powerful members of ROs (Panke 2013, modified by author). Moreover, Panke et al. (2016) found out that it is also the design of large IOs with majoritarian rules that accounts for higher activity of ROs. In sum, nested ROs and IOs could represent a mechanism through which autocracies manage to use monitoring bureaucracies for their own sake. I interpret such an interaction between (smaller) "autocratic" ROs and (larger) IOs with both democratic and non-democratic states as a consequence of dense regional coordination by authoritarian regimes.

It should be merely differentiated between regimes that induce political competition to avoid power accumulation and those ones who repress opposition in order to gain power. Of course, a clear cut between democracies and autocracies is a complicated act especially in times where autocracies emulate democratic domestic institutions to cover for their repressive practices. Therefore, there will be enough time spent on qualitatively treating the so called hybrid regimes for the sake of a reliable dichotomous regime type differentiation.

In summary, the presented mixed methods approach should allow me to tackle an important analytical puzzle and explain a so far overseen behavior of autocracies. This should in turn help me to provide for an improved understanding of authoritarian regimes in global governance structures where autocracies ease upon the state sovereignty norm to advance goals of international politics. At the same time, I expect autocracies to be ready to accept disadvantages of authority delegation as a part of their strategy to become full-fledged members of the global governance structures. This has challenging implications for the human rights and democratizing actors.

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