

The Dialectics of Open Access

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in den Geisteswissenschaften**

**Die wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift
und ihr Wert**

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Kings control technology no more directly than do merchants: it is as democratic as the economic system with which it evolved. Technology is the essence of this knowledge. It aims to produce neither concepts nor images, nor the joy of understanding, but method, exploitation of the labor of others, capital.

Adorno and Horkheimer¹

La grande erreur, la seule erreur, serait de croire qu'une ligne de fuite consiste à fuir la vie; la fuite dans l'imaginaire, ou dans l'art. Mais fuir au contraire, c'est produire du réel, créer de la vie, trouver une arme.

Gilles Deleuze²

1 Adorno, Theodor and Horkheimer, Max: Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments, Stanford 2002 [1947], p.2.

2 Deleuze, Gilles: Dialogues avec Claire Parnet, Paris 1977, p. 60.

3 The French version of this article was presented in Bernard Stiegler's *academie d'été* 2013. I would like to express my thanks to Bernard Stiegler and Axel Anderson for their comments.

4 See Simondon, Gilbert: *Du Mode d'Existence des Objets Techniques*, Aubier 2012.

Open Access and Metaphysics³

Critique always sees the darkness of its time. It situates itself in a spiral form of historical progress that constantly transforms light into shadow. Seen from this particular angle, Enlightenment soon loses its allure, since for critique to continue, it must also cast shadows. *Sapere aude* (dare to know) has to face an intimate question: what to know and how to know? Encyclopaedism emerged as a product of the Enlightenment. It provided public access to large amounts of practical knowledge determined by the subject's own will to knowledge. But soon this mode of access to knowledge was made impotent by industrialisation, since industrialisation systematised the tools of production in order to maximize the output through automation, in which we witness the congealment of technical knowledges in machines. This congealment of knowledge firstly produces the congealed labour-time that consists of repetitive simply bodily movement without knowledge; secondly undermines the possibility of social change produced by the proliferation of technical knowledge and gives it only to professionals and technocrats. Without doubt, the public may still access this knowledge out of interest, but machines already possess a technical knowledge that robs the human being of the status of "technical individual," as Gilbert Simondon claims.⁴ In between such light and shadow, we find politics. It is not only the politics of money and power, but also the will to knowledge, not only to know as spectacle, but also to act with knowledge. The development of digital technologies returns us to a discussion of openness and the public due, re-posing the question of Enlightenment and the status of knowledge – this time under the title "Digital Enlightenment". Indeed, *A Forum of Digital Enlightenment* was es-

established in Luxemburg in 2011, with the involvement of Tim Berners-Lee. It states as its vision the following:

“Europe’s Age of Enlightenment in the 18th Century serves as a metaphor for our current times. The Enlightenment took hold after a scientific and technological revolution that included the invention of book printing, which generated a novel information and communication infrastructure. The elite cultural Enlightenment movement sought to mobilise the power of reason, in order to reform society and advance knowledge. It promoted science and intellectual interchange and opposed superstition, intolerance and abuses by the church and state.”⁵

At the heart of this interpretation of the 18th Century European Enlightenment is the function of scientific and technological revolutions, which allowed for a far-reaching expansion of knowledge and information. For the Digital Enlightenment, the central question is thus again the public nature and openness of knowledge under the condition of digital technologies. This article examines the relationship between academic knowledge and Enlightenment through the investigation of Open Access (OA), a movement that started 20 years ago proposing open access to all academic publications. Rather than immediately situating the debate in the framework of political economy, this article will start with a metaphysical reading of the open access movement. By way of this approach, it hopes to expose the problem in a new, more productive, framework.

One could say that the link between Open Access and metaphysics is the question of categories. Stevan Harnad, renowned cognitive scientist and one of the pioneers of the OA movement in the early 1990s, sees open access as a process of sharing categories.⁶ “Most of what we do to survive and reproduce”, he states, “is categorising: most of cognition is categorisation.”⁷ In comparison with animals that learn categorization through “risky, time-consuming trial-and-error experience”, human beings acquire categories by “hearsay”; that is by a process of sharing categories with each other. Acquiring categories by hearsay is the beginning of science and scholarship, which in turn is the systematic collection of categories for transmission and sharing. Here, Harnad clearly identifies the relationship between publication and categories:

*The most remarkable thing about language is undoubtedly its limitless expressive power: the fact that it can indeed say anything and everything. But the second most remarkable thing is that that power comes from sharing categories, rather than from hoarding them, as we do with other precious resources. That is the link between language origins and Open Access.*⁸

5 See <http://www.digitalenlightenment.org/index.php/vision> [10.4.2014].

6 Harnad, Stevan: The Open Access Interviews, www.richardpoynder.co.uk/Stevan%20Harnad%20Interview.pdf [10.4.2014].

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.


Yet, this process of creation, transmission and sharing of categories is always altered by its technological preconditions. Harnad thus characterizes the lineages of what he calls the four cognitive revolutions that correspond to communication technologies: speech, writing, printing, and digital media or skywriting.⁹ Without doubt, it is widely accepted that each new technology carries a specific form of access to knowledge. These forms displace one another. Speech corresponds to the development of language and the creation of a system of knowledge that link the signifier and the signified. With writing, the movements of the hand displaces the movement of the tongues, visual figures displace sounds through the employment of a technical apparatus and access to knowledge moves away from its former forms, for example, Homer's epic. Subsequently, printing displaces handwriting. Through printing, bodily gestures are displaced by the mechanical actions of machines; this detachment also allows the medium to move away from its corporeal conditions. With digital writing, paper is displaced by the screen, but what is more important is that the physical constraints of storage and transportation are reduced. Certainly, a new form of distribution and access of knowledge lies ahead. Yet, beyond the new modes of distribution that facilitate the spread of categories, the current discourse on Open Access at its core has not that much to do with the advancement of technology. Everyone with a computer and access to the Internet and basic word processing software is able to contribute to Open Access.

The problem with category-sharing today is rather that it is limited by the rampant commercialisation and self-restriction of academic research and publications. Academic journal publishers charge an expensive subscription fee to libraries, and only those who can afford such fees can bring the stored knowledge to their members.¹⁰ While one has to recognize that most research results come from public funds, it is problematic if this knowledge cannot be made available to those who funded it. Access to knowledge is a technical *and* a political issue and technology and politics thus also might create barriers for the process of invention. The French historian Bertrand Gill shows that the technological system is always ahead of the human system, to which the latter then attempts to adapt itself by suppressing some of its possibilities.¹¹ The suppression of access to knowledge is at the same time the suppression of the creation and sharing of categories. It is also the suppression of resistance, or more precisely, the suppression of a burgeoning gift economy of the kind described by Marcel Mauss. But politics is always haunted by the return of the oppressed. The activist Aaron Swartz, whose contentious prosecution for downloading academic articles at MIT led to his suicide, was a

9 Harnad, Stevan: Scholarly Skywriting and the Prepublication Continuum of Scientific Inquiry, www.cogprints.org/1581/1/harnad90.skywriting.html [10.4.2014].

10 Szkolar, Dorotea: Academic Journals are too Expensive For Harvard, Elsevier is Mega Greedy, and Why this Stinks for Future Librarians, infospace.ischool.syr.edu/2012/05/29/academic-journals-are-too-expensive-for-harvard-elsevier-is-mega-greedy-and-why-this-stinks-for-future-librarians [10.4.2014].

11 Picon, Antoine: Towards a History of Technological Thought, www.gsd.harvard.edu/images/content/5/3/537913/fac-pub-picon-history-technological-thought.pdf [10.4.2014].



scapegoat to cover up this gap between the two systems. In other words, the war of open access is the war of categorisation.

Dangerous Categories

Whilst it would be incorrect to assess the Open Access movement from only Harnad's theoretical standpoint, it still seems productive to examine categories in terms of their democratic nature as well as democratizing potential. But, apart from this democratic view on categorisation, what actually is a category and how do these categories function? Clearly, such a question deserves a deeper investigation than I am able to provide here. Categories are, for Aristotle, the first philosophy that grounds all forms of knowledge. For Kant, categories are the condition of possibility of knowledge and, hence, reason. Durkheim and Mauss' investigation of classification in primitive societies shows how deeply our categories are rooted in kinship relations. Categories are thus cognitive and social at the same time.¹² In a Kantian gesture, Harnad proposed that cognition itself is categorisation. For Harnad, a category is:

a kind of thing with which one can do some things and not other things. A category is a kind. There is a potential infinity of them, but our actual categories are the ones we actually pick out and differentiate, if only by calling them one thing rather than another. The potential ones we don't, or not yet. Examples always help when one is defining any new category, including "category": A chair is a kind of thing you can sit on, a ceiling or lake or pin are not... '2+2=4' is 'true,' '2+2=3' is not .¹³

Harnad's definition is based on cognitive science where categories work like filters that regulate the movement of thoughts and judgements. They share some commonality with the categories of Kant or Aristotle, though in comparison, those of Kant and Aristotle are much more limited in number. For Harnad, categories are the agreed-upon meanings of objects, either in the cognitive or social sense. Harnad thinks that, because concepts and ideas are not definable, the fundamental cognitive faculty is the category.¹⁴ Harnad's categories are thus less specific and more abstract than the categories of philosophy but his conception is nevertheless an interesting one. Following the word "category" in the sense of Harnad, I take it to designate the basic elements for cognition and judgement.¹⁵ This understanding of categories exposes a problem for Open Access, since it generally is premised upon a simple democratic view of the pro-

12 Harnad, Stevan: Cognition is categorization. www.cogprints.org/3027/1/catconf.html [10.4.2014].

13 Harnad, Stevan: The Open Access Interviews.

14 Ibid.

15 In cognitive science, there are different ways of seeing the mind/brain functions, for example category and representation on one side, and connectionism on the other.

duction of categories as indicator of culture and civilisation. Here, democracy simply means that everyone has the right and freedom to access and participate. But that is to say that, whilst this democratic view of Open Access does look at its production process, it ignores some of the problematics of the “what” and the “how” of this process. By the same token, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer demonstrate how from Enlightenment on, politics, even in the present, can be understood as the politics of categories – which is not a politics that lacks democracy and freedom, but one that suffers from particular forms of democracy and freedom.

In the narrow sense, Enlightenment opens up rationality and reason to a public that has long stood in the shadow of superstitions, religions and customs. On the one hand, we see the restrictive side of the Enlightenment that limits all thinking to scientific procedures. Existence must pass through the court of reason and rationality. On the other hand, Enlightenment shed its light into areas that were dark and murky, in which one hopes to find more space to move, to think, to progress. Reason thus enters another dialectical process: it has to fulfil the rigid rational procedures and at the same time open them to the public. We find the same movement in Kant’s *What is Enlightenment*: the effort to get rid of all superstition and hence immaturity and the fact that reason must seek its ground in public use and communication. The consequence is the creation of social and cognitive categories, which reconstitute human knowledge and action. This combination is also a paradox: the transcendental subject of the Enlightenment – transcendental in the sense that one finds the source of experience in the ‘I think’ – has to submit itself to an episteme which can no longer escape technological modulations. The culture industry, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, is the expression of these cognitive technologies, as they conclude: “finally, the transcendental subject of knowledge, as the last reminder of subjectivity, is itself seemingly abolished and replaced by the operations of the automatic mechanisms of order, which therefore run all the more smoothly.”¹⁶

In the chapter *Culture Industry as Mass Deception*, Adorno and Horkheimer demonstrate the problem of categorization drawing upon the example of Hollywood movies and other forms of American mass culture. Freedom of consumption and intensifying commercialisation create, for them, an illusion of human freedom – human freedom being a new category. The abuse of cognitive technologies – radio, film, television – distort the categories that ground the transcendental imagination in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. This distortion lies at the heart of the debate between liberals and Marxists, the latter considering this (kind of) free-

16 Adorno and Horkheimer: *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 23.

dom as something which must be negated. The critique carried out by Critical Theory therefore centres on the task of negation. Following Hegel, Adorno and Horkheimer reaffirm that freedom is the *telos* of history, but argue that it can be thought of only as constant negation. Yet, constant negation also produces turmoil and becomes a source of its own negation. It demands a force that affirms certain values, and saves them from the problems that originate from pure reason.¹⁷ If the new, digital Enlightenment creates a transparent public sphere such as Wikileaks, Open Source, Open Access, Open Data etc., it follows, that the effective control of the system of categories must be situated in a similar dialectical critique as that of Adorno and Horkheimer. In parallel to their conception of the culture industry, the greatest mass deception of Open Access lies in the fact that it creates the category of transparency and participation, which, in the end, is transformed into something negative. But this danger of transformation is often casted aside, when compared with the hope promised by “open”.

As shown in the opening quote of the article, Adorno and Horkheimer believe that technologies embody the value that a democratic economic system produces: “neither concepts nor images, nor the joy of understanding, but method, exploitation of the labor of others, capital”¹⁸ It is possible to take this teleological approach, reducing all operations to their end products (capital), but from categories to capital there is still a gap, or rather a movement or space that we must look into. The power of the cultural industry is that it cannot only change the categories, but also reifies these categories in order to produce new symbols and new images. The democracy of categories is immediately challenged by this dialectical movement of reason, and transforms it into a question concerning subjectivity. If the critique of Enlightenment has the task of rescuing subjects from the distortion of categories, meaning the “correction” of knowledge, then how could this be thought from the perspective of Open Access? In order to elaborate these questions in a clearer manner, we can reformulate them as: what has happened to the category “open access” since its appearance? What does it signify, then and now? Or, to paraphrase Harnad, how can we know something is “Open Access” or not, based on his definition of categories? These questions have a double-edged consequence: on the one hand, they allow us to examine the internal transformation of categories themselves and, on the other hand, they allow us to see how such categories are appropriated and reproduced in the culture industry.

17 I understand this as the task of Jacques Derrida's deconstruction.

18 Adorno and Horkheimer: *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 2.

Open Access and its Enemy

Democracy, described by Adorno and Horkheimer as the promise of the Enlightenment, finally turned against itself and became its own enemy. It is the same with the vision of Open Access. We must first recognize that “open” is a strange category: it means that there is no end and no limit. Open belongs to the same register as the infinite (or democracy), one cannot grasp it with intuition and cannot determine what it is. If we situate it in philosophical thought, we will encounter this problem in different instances: Kant was haunted by the question of the infinite at the beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, hence the infinite has to be regulated by reason within the limits of the transcendental faculties.¹⁹ But reason is afraid of infinity, and constrains itself to an island.²⁰ In mathematics, the infinite was tackled by what the mathematician Georg Cantor named the transfinite²¹: transfinite is neither finite nor infinite, but a symbol or a technical object (in the sense of Simondon) in its essence.²²

The opposition between open and its reification is dangerous, since by posing Open as an idea it transforms into its own enemy and is susceptible to reification. We can see that by reifying it as a symbol, capital can dance around it, neutralize it, and absorb it as a part of its production. This reification process isn't carried out by capital alone or any singular capitalist, but rather conditioned by the actual networks of institutionalisation. Certain values inherent in the category of the Open are retained and sometimes amplified, especially moral values. Open Access becomes a symbol of morality, giving, and public good. But what has been slowly eroded is the radicality associated with the original category. The symbol – Open Access – gives lure and light to what endows it; it becomes the image of capital that produces new categories of Open Access – a paradox. I propose that what is modified is not only the change in meaning of the term “open access”, but also a complicated cycle of appropriation that generates new categories. Were this simply a shift of meaning, there would be the possibility of reclaiming the original meaning. But unfortunately, what is lost is the radical gesture. It no longer exists in the category called Open Access. We see this, if we dare to look at the original idea of Open Access announced in 2002 by the Budapest Open Access Initiative:

By “open access” to this literature, we mean its free availability on the public internet, permitting any users to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of these articles, crawl them for indexing, pass them as data to software, or

19 I refer to Howard Caygill's lecture, *The Folly of Speculation*, 21 May 2013, at Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin.

20 Already in the preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* published in 1781, Kant wrote “So far, then, as this criticism is occupied in confining speculative reason within its proper bounds, it is only negative; but, inasmuch as it thereby, at the same time, removes an obstacle which impedes and even threatens to destroy the use of practical reason, it possesses a positive and very important value.” (p. 17) Kant immediately refrained the pure practical reason from the reach of speculative reason, and promised to return to speculative reason in another treaty called “*Metaphysik der Natur*”, which never appeared.

21 Meillassoux, Quentin: *After Finitude: An Essay On The Necessity Of Contingency*, London 2008.

22 In order to operate with a concept that is infinite, it needs an exteriorisation qua symbolisation. The transfinite is here an analogy for how an abstract concept can be retained at the sometime concretised. I also refer to Simondon's notion of the technical objects whose evolution can be understood as a process of concretisation; it is also an insertion of the object into a technical ensemble or technical system in order to render it compatible with other objects.

23 See <http://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/read> [10.4.2014].

*use them for any other lawful purpose, without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself. The only constraint on reproduction and distribution, and the only role for copyright in this domain, should be to give authors control over the integrity of their work and the right to be properly acknowledged and cited.*²³

Open access no longer exists in the form of an ethics of academic publishing. Open access is adopted by both the emergence of new online journals, publishers, and traditional publishers that earn their profits through selling and subscriptions. The Open Access movement has helped generate thousands of open access journals, as well as some open access publishers that produce high-quality books, such as Open Humanities, Re:Press. At the same time, commercial publishers such as Springer, Sage, Routledge, and others have started their own Open Access policies. Today, there are two paths towards Open Access, firstly Gold OA, which means the author – instead of the reader – pays to make the article free; whereas green access indicate that authors self-archive (individually or through university) their pre-print articles, drafts of their articles after peer-review, or final versions after 12 months of publication which are exempted from copyright (this is known as the “subversive proposal” put forward by Harnad in the early 90s).²⁴ Green OA risks copyright conflicts, thus the Gold OA tends to be favoured by universities.²⁵ A notable example is Springer Open, in which the author can pay 2,200 Euro in order to make the article open.²⁶ Let me pose several questions that may help us to think through this move. First, where does this money come from? It has to come from research funding, unless we expect researchers who can hardly subsist to pay 2,200 Euro to make their writing open access. The second question is how does this model work? The number of OA journals owned by SpringerOpen is roughly 130. Springer provides peer-review, citation notice, and circulation channels for all of them, none of which most smaller publishers can provide on the same level. But perhaps the most important factor it can provide is: it is a *serious* academic publisher.

Here Open Access is still confined within the limits set by academic institutions, i.e. by the number of citations and the number of reviews. Whilst it is still within such a paradigm, the institutional force that is sustained by a whole network of production and consumption could easily reclaim it. Authors can freely upload their articles online as a blog post, but then who is going to quote them, when it is considered to lack academic seriousness and institutional association? Or one can put an

24 See Yiotis, Kristin: The Open Access Initiative: A paradigm for Academic Publication, in: Information Technology and Libraries, 24.4 (2005), pp. 157-162.

25 Price, David: Gold or green: Which is the best shade of open access?, www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/420454.article [10.4.2014].

26 See <http://www.springer.com/open+access/open+choice?SGWID=0-40359-0-0-0> [10.4.2014].

27 It is evident for certain authors who have already gained reputation, but probably not the case for younger scholars.

article on <http://arxiv.org/>, a repository of physics scholarship founded in 1992, but often this repository will mark an article as 'DRAFT' and publish it without association to a journal, which, again, makes quoting from it problematic for most scholars and institutions. Gold OA makes its profit from the economy of citation, which is guaranteed by institutionalisation within the academic world. Some researchers are trying to determine the correlation between citation and Open Access in order to determine whether Open Access actually increases the number of citations one can have.²⁷

The European Commission has committed itself to an Open Access blueprint for projects it funds.²⁸ Individual countries are establishing their own policies, for example, in the UK researchers are asked to produce certain quantities of open access articles. Fees for publishers will come from public research funds in order to make these articles public, as stated by the Research Council: "The Government, in line with its overarching commitment to transparency and open data, is committed to ensuring that such research should be freely accessible. As major bodies charged with investing public money in research, the Research Councils take very seriously their responsibilities in making the outputs from this research publicly available – not just to other researchers, but also to potential users in business, charitable and public sectors, and to the general public."²⁹ This practice uses public money to buy things that are already public. This is the effect of the image of Open Access; it becomes a crystal of moral values, as strict and rigid as rationality.

The appropriation of Open Access as a business model is analogous to what giant companies such as Microsoft, Google, and others have done to Open Source software. Energies that are produced, efforts that have been spent to call for a greater revolution through appropriating the potential of new technologies by the end negate the very possibility of its revolutionary vision. But here we also encounter great difficulties. The critique of darkness as a critique nevertheless becomes banal, since most of the times darkness overwhelms or even takes over light, and become the totality that extinguish all hopes. Not only Critical Theory but also other "dark critiques" become banal in face of the new categories firmly grounded in institutional networks.

Towards an Open with Constraints

If we understand "openness" – a transfinite object – as what is suggested above, we will sadly see that Open Access is in the process of being transformed into something banal. We can also observe this happening to

28 Towards better access to scientific information: www.ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/era-communication-towards-better-access-to-scientific-information_en.pdf [10.4.2014].

29 See <http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/research/Pages/outputs.aspx> [10.4.2014].

other concepts that accompanied the utopian internet economy, namely Free. While it seems natural to immediately distinguish “free” from “open”, the relation between free and open is not easy to explain. Being free does not necessarily mean that something is open, for example some software can be download software for free, but not modified or improved. Free but not open is the new model of the technological capitalism, for example, Facebook and Google are free to use, but they are not open. On the other hand if open does not mean free, then what does it mean? Maybe openness now has become a part of the dispositif of the management of institutions – we might call this “open washing”. In order to make software and literature open – in terms of participation – being free is a precondition. But again, if we go a step back, and consider the dispositif of the academic publication and the promotion system in the universities at large, we can find these feelings among senior researchers: free of charge often entails that it is not serious, that peer-reviews are not strict, publishers not well-known, articles of second rank.

In his speech *L’avenir de la profession ou l’université sans condition*³⁰, Derrida proposed a university without condition, by which he means a university which is entirely independent, which remains the place that produces critical resistance. What interests me is not what Derrida described as the relation between such a university and literature, but rather the question of its existence. A university without condition, as Derrida said, does not and probably will not exist. But it is precisely this hope that makes the idea of the unconditional university a site of resistance.³¹ World-becoming (*mondialisation* in French, in contrast to globalisation) must be posed as a question of humanisation. It seems that at the moment when open and free – two of the key elements that constitute that which is public – are reified as business operations, our question should be: how can we reinterpret both open and free in the current academic environment and, hence, reaffirm their critical value?

I would like to think of an idea of the open with conditions, or rather I prefer to say “an Open with constraints.” This proposition contradicts itself, since how can something with constraints still be called open?³² I fear that true openness will only come through the imposition of constraints that radically open the Open into other directions. This is the second dialectic that I would like to point out in this article. There are two types of constraints I want to impose on the Open: one constrains it against the public; the second constrains it against participation. Here I see the Open as a technical object (as the treatment of Cantor’s transfinite) that is open to different forms of imagination and invention. Instead of breaking down the process of appropriation, I would like to propose

30 See Derrida, Jacques: *L’Université sans condition*, Paris 2001.

31 Ibid, p. 14

32 I owe this idea to Bernard Stiegler, who in a Summer Academy 2011 called for an university with conditions.

33 See Karatani, Kojin: *世界史の構造* [The Structure of World History], Beijing 2012.

to return to the question of self-archiving. I alluded to the return of gift economy and communities, as Kojin Karatani proposed that one can consider the return of the motivation of the gift economy as the return of the oppressed of Freud.³³ This oppressed will come back in one form or another, expressing itself as a new form of exchange. There are two methods of self-archiving: the first is to use a central repository, e.g. a university, to archive articles that could be accessed by the public; the second way is a personal archive and sharing at the individual level. Some sites such as aaaaarg.org and bookos.org provide alternative economies of “Open Access”, creating a utopia that is somewhat guarded by the morality of openness. Authors and readers share their books and articles anonymously. There are some social networking sites for academia, for example, Academia.edu, where one can upload articles and books and make them publicly available. I rarely heard of anyone having a problem with copyright, but at the same time, these files are directly posted to Scribd, where one needs to exchange or to pay in order to download – a crowd-sourcing technique.

Hence, such centralized archiving still needs to be radicalised further. I want to return to the question of self-archiving, through which individuals can share their archives and others can search to obtain the file. I think it is at the point where Open Access and alternative social networks meet and it is possible to create a new economy that is not of the Facebook-type nor the Academia.edu-type, but rather a decentralised and federated social web³⁴ by which people can use different tools to collaboratively publish, archive and share articles: this is no longer to bypass copyright issues as Stevan Harnad’s subversive proposal, but to confront the high subscription fee associated with material that is copyrighted. Such an approach falls in two frameworks that I have tried to propose over the years. The first is the social web project that I worked on with Harry Halpin from the World Wide Web Consortium and Bernard Stiegler of IRI Centre Pompidou, which re-assesses the question of sociality and collectivity and proposes to take groups and projects as the fundamental unit of a social network.³⁵ Similarly we can see one constraint here: the user can only use the functions by participating in a group or a project. It would be interesting or even ironic if one were to ask oneself, why peer-review has to be mediated at all by commercial publishers who may have only little knowledge of your subject. Why cannot the whole system of academic publishing become transparent with regard to its own processes? One can always publish a few articles with a commercial publisher to satisfy the requirements of promotion, but one does not have to publish all ones papers with that same publisher, one can always experiment

34 See: <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/03/introduction-distributed-social-network>

35 See Hui, Yuk and Halpin, Harry: *Collective Individuation: The Future of the Social Web*, in: *UnLikeUs Reader*, ed. Geert Lovink and Miriam Rasch, Amsterdam 2013, pp. 103-116.

36 See Hui, Yuk: *Archivist Manifesto*, <http://www.metamute.org/editorial/lab/archivist-manifesto> [10.4.2014].

with other options and means of collaboration. The second framework is the archivist manifesto³⁶ that I recently proposed to develop personal archives, in order to open up a new circulation and exchange of digital objects, so that these objects can keep on circulating even if one of the archives is blocked or destroyed due to a copyright issue. I call this the archivist culture to come, and this brings us back to the question of categorisation (in terms of classification, annotation, etc). I hesitate to say that these are solutions to the problem, because I feel that we are still at the very beginning of realising a true Open Access especially after the death of Aaron Swartz; I think at the same time that it is probably the right moment to wrestle Open Access away from the current discourse threatening to enclose it.

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