

Multispecies Futures

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
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MULTISPECIES FUTURES

New Approaches to Teaching
Human-Animal Studies

edited by / hrsg. von
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Neofelis

Andreas Hübner / Micha Gerrit Philipp Edlich / Maria Moss (eds)

Multispecies Futures
New Approaches to Teaching Human-Animal Studies



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Maria Moss (eds)

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Neofelis

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Lüneburg, March 2022

Introduction

In the last decade, human-animal studies (HAS)¹ and other intersecting fields dealing with “the question of the animal”² – ecofeminism, the environmental humanities in general and ecocriticism in particular, extinction studies, and the posthumanities, to name but a few³ – have grown dramatically. While the developments Margo DeMello described in 2010 only seem to have accelerated,⁴ there has been, somewhat surprisingly, a rather limited number of

1 We use the designation proposed in Margo DeMello: *Animals and Society: An Introduction to Human-Animal Studies*. New York: Columbia UP 2012, p. 2. <https://doi.org/10.7312/deme19484> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

2 Jacques Derrida: *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, ed. by Marie-Louise Mallet, transl. from the French by David Wills. New York: Fordham UP 2008, p. 8. We are referencing the second of many times that Derrida uses this key phrase in his text.

3 It is beyond the scope of this introduction to provide even a cursory overview of the overlapping trajectories of the environmental humanities, ecocriticism, or the posthumanities, but we will address some pedagogical interventions of note in these fields below. Key academic texts in the recent discourse on extinction include Deborah Bird Rose / Thom van Dooren / Matthew Chrulew (eds): *Extinction Studies: Stories of Time, Death, and Generations*. New York: Columbia UP 2017. <https://doi.org/10.7312/van-17880> (accessed: January 24, 2022); and Ursula K. Heise: *Imagining Extinction: The Cultural Meanings of Endangered Species*. Chicago / London: U of Chicago P 2016. <https://doi.org/10.7208/9780226358338> (accessed: January 24, 2022); see also Bartosch's contribution to this collection for a nuanced discussion of how global problems such as extinction and climate change require us to reconsider how and why we teach HAS or, for that matter, other issues. For a discussion of ecofeminist HAS and related pedagogies, see the epilogue by Greta Gaard in this volume.

4 Margo DeMello: Introduction to Human-Animal Studies. In: Idem (ed.): *Teaching the Animal: Human-Animal Studies Across the Disciplines*. New York: Lantern 2010, pp. XI–XIX, here pp. XII–XIV. Back then, DeMello described HAS as “one of the most rapidly growing fields of intellectual inquiry today” (ibid., p. XII).

studies focusing on pedagogical theory and practice across different disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities. Those looking for guidance on how to propose, develop, and teach a HAS course are likely to consult *Teaching the Animal: Human-Animal Studies Across the Disciplines*, a groundbreaking volume that showcases a wide range of disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches.⁵ More recently, collections such as Björn Hayer and Clarissa Schröder's *Tierethik transdisziplinär: Literatur – Kultur – Didaktik* (2018) have provided additional theoretical and practical perspectives with a focus on philosophy and ethics, literary and cultural studies, and didactics, thereby also expanding the debate beyond the Anglophone academy.⁶

In addition to these studies in the field of HAS proper, other closely related and often overlapping discourses have provided guidance on how to teach animal studies in various institutional contexts, at different levels, and with different groups of learners. For example, ecocriticism has, since its inception in the US in the early 1990s, interrogated traditional literary and cultural studies approaches toward nonhuman animals and how they are represented across media, often by integrating different analytical frameworks or by exploring inter- and transdisciplinary perspectives.⁷ In many ways, the premises, course designs, curricula, methods, and educational goals in ecocritical approaches to teaching HAS have closely resembled those in other disciplines.⁸ For example, these approaches share the assumption that the animals that students encounter in texts are, simply put, more than mere symbols signifying human

5 DeMello (ed.): *Teaching the Animal*.

6 Björn Hayer / Clarissa Schröder (eds): *Tierethik transdisziplinär: Literatur – Kultur – Didaktik*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2018. <https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839442593> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

7 See, for example, Greg Garrard: *Ferality Tales*. In: Idem (ed.): *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*. Oxford: Oxford UP 2014, pp. 241–259. <https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199742929.001.0001> (accessed: January 24, 2022). In this chapter, Garrard aims to “locat[e] ferality by *triangulating* from animal studies to ecocriticism, ethology and evolutionary ecology and literary fiction, using the insights (and perhaps lacunae) of each to produce a multifaceted, interdisciplinary projection of this concept” (ibid., p. 242 emphasis in original).

8 See, for example, the approaches to teaching literary animals included in DeMello (ed.): *Teaching the Animal*; or in Hayer / Schröder (eds): *Tierethik*; to those presented in Karla Armbruster: *Thinking with Animals: Teaching Animal Studies-Based Literature Courses*. In: Laird Christensen / Mark C. Long / Fred Waage (eds): *Teaching North American Environmental Literature*. New York: MLA 2008, pp. 72–92; or Bart H. Welling / Scottie Kapel: *The Return of the Animal: Presenting and Representing Non-Human Beings Responsably in the (Post-)Humanities Classroom*. In: Greg Garrard (ed.): *Teaching Ecocriticism and Green Cultural Studies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan 2012, pp. 104–116.

characteristics, desires, and preoccupations. Recent work in didactics that has embraced a posthumanist perspective has likewise considered the question of how learners, particularly students in second and tertiary education, could and should (re)engage with the-more-than-human world and, more specifically, nonhuman animals.⁹ These interventions and the approaches put forward by ecocritics discussed above have, for the most part, proposed teaching practices that have been or could be implemented in current curricula.

As critics like Helena Pedersen have pointed out, these approaches to teaching HAS matter, and yet they might fall short of their goals because they require further grounding in educational theory.¹⁰ In addition, what is ultimately required, Pederson argues, is the “liberation” of the current educational system “from the grips of the animal-industrial complex” and new critical animal pedagogies that turn “[e]ducation [into] a space for unthinking the human, ourselves and our relations to the world.”¹¹ In this sense, Pederson’s approach to teaching is much more in line with other activist and intersectional takes on animal pedagogies, and issues such as veganism or social justice,¹² which are likewise calling for dramatic changes in the way we learn about and interact with nonhuman animals. This is not to say, however, that these critical animal pedagogies are by default more political or effective than those discussed above. Rather, it is probably best to conceive of all of these approaches

9 See, for example, several contributions in Roman Bartosch / Julia Hoydis (eds): *Teaching the Posthuman*. Heidelberg: Winter 2019; or Roman Bartosch: Animals Outside in the Teaching Machine. In: *Anglistik: International Journal of English Studies* 27:2 (2016), pp. 147–164. The term “more-than-human world” has been used by environmental philosopher David Abram, for example in *The Spell of the Sensuous: Perceptions and Language in a More-Than-Human World*. New York: Vintage Random House 1996.

10 For a discussion of Pedersen’s point regarding the (lack of) theoretical underpinning in current approaches, see Helena Pedersen: Teaching the Animal. Review of *Teaching the Animal*, ed. by Margo DeMello. In: *Humanimalia* 2:1 (2010), pp. 86–89, here p. 87. For a contribution that does engage with these theoretical questions, see Roman Bartosch: Dying to Learn: Teaching Human-Animal Studies in an Age of Extinction, in this volume.

11 Karin Gunnarsson Dinker / Helena Pedersen: Critical Animal Pedagogies: Re-Learning Our Relations with Animal Others. In: Helen E. Lees / Nel Noddings (eds): *The Palgrave International Handbook of Alternative Education*. London: Palgrave Macmillan 2016, pp. 415–430, here pp. 422, 427. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-41291-1_27 (accessed: January 24, 2022).

12 See, for example, the contributions to Agnes Trzak (ed): *Teaching Liberation: Essays on Social Justice, Animals, Veganism, and Education*. New York: Lantern 2019; or Anthony J. Nocella II / Carolyn Drew / Amber E. George / Sinem Ketenci et al. (eds): *Education for Total Liberation: Critical Animal Pedagogy and Teaching Against Speciesism*. New York: Lang 2019.

to teaching HAS as part of a continuum, with most if not all of them pursuing similar objectives and premised on various conceptions of relationality, ethical regard, empathy, respect, bodily integrity, and agency.

In her article, “Current Objectives of Human-Animal Studies: Why the Story of Harriet the Tortoise Should Be Retold,” Mieke Roscher engages with these issues and, more specifically, responds to Haraway’s call to action in *When Species Meet* in order to propose a political history of animals. To develop this new historiographical approach, she turns to concepts of agency and human-animal interaction as the most widely discussed paths to making visible the involvement of animals in “our” shared history. Built on the story of Harriet, a Galápagos tortoise and a decisive historical figure living in the Galápagos Islands during Darwin’s visit in 1835, who died as recently as 2006, Roscher shows how praxiography, material culture, and spatial approaches could be connected to tell different stories to the ones currently being told by traditional historiography. Tortoises and turtles in particular have already influenced historical thinking, not least because they have come to symbolize the extinction discourse as well as debates on climatic change and the Anthropocene. Hence, Roscher introduces a political history of animals that pays attention to agency and relations (and agency as a relation), practices and materialities, spaces and places, and offers a way to retell Harriet’s life story – and the life stories of many other animals – in the future.

In “Tiere im imperialen Diskurs: Die Human-Animal Studies als Unterrichtsparadigma für das antike Rom” (Animals and Imperial Discourse: Human-Animal Studies as a Paradigm for Teaching Ancient Rome), Nils Steffensen, a historian specializing in ancient history, also focuses on political history, but he takes a different path from Roscher. Steffensen combines human-animal studies with the concept of new political history to explore innovative perspectives for teaching Roman history. He thus provides a framework that allows students to further their understanding of the political dimensions of historical consciousness and to enhance their orientation competency. Students learn to recognize and analyze power structures and relationships in historical and contemporary societies. According to Steffensen, HAS is of utmost significance for the initiation of this process. Animals played important roles in political decision-making processes in ancient Rome, and animals were meaning-making figures in governance discourses. Focusing on the practical and semantic functions of animals in the context of divination and the discourse of decadence, this essay shows that HAS can serve as a starting point for teaching in a way that addresses the formation and

utilization of empire. However, Steffensen does not only seek to promote students' understanding of political processes in the past but also hopes to motivate students to assess modern-day politics.

In "Preventing Malicious and Wanton Cruelty to Animals': Historical Animal Welfare and Animal Rights Education," Andreas Hübner outlines future historical animal welfare and animal rights education, sketching concepts and themes such as animal agency and historicity as well as the relational, spatial, and material practices employed between humans and animals. Hübner then historicizes present-day attitudes toward anthropocentrism and discusses educational and learning processes that (can) help to overcome human-animal dichotomies in the history classroom. Hübner presents subject-specific recommendations for critically integrating topics into future curricula and shows that it is possible to teach in a way that acknowledges the role of nonhuman actors. He thereby challenges conventional human-centered narratives of historical learning.

While Hübner, Steffensen, and Roscher provide new insights into how historical texts can lead students to reconsider relations and develop empathy, in "Dying to Learn: Teaching Human-Animal Studies in an Age of Extinction," Roman Bartosch assesses the pedagogical potential of literature and the role of literary studies in an age of climate change, biodiversity loss, environmental destruction and degradation, and animal death and suffering. As he points out, these developments and students' responses to these various crises have received little or no attention in most educational contexts. Furthermore, many of today's curricular goals are essentially useless and meaningless for students facing an uncertain future. Bartosch, like Pedersen, asks us to reconsider what education could and should be in the Anthropocene, to acknowledge students' needs, and to reflect on why and how we teach literature and literary HAS in particular. As he also shows with his reading of Max Porter's novel *Grief Is the Thing with Feathers* (2015), engaging with literary and cultural animals can be a means to "[cultivate] an interest in acts of relating animality and textuality in ways that open up ambiguity and, thus, imaginative spaces for potential conviviality and flourishing."¹³ In contrast to the current emphasis on competencies, solutions, and teleological thinking, this kind of learning, Bartosch suggests, "is geared toward bearing witness, ruminating on its meanings, and thus repositioning oneself within a larger web of

13 Bartosch: Dying to Learn, in this volume, p.87.

ecological and semiotic diversities under threat.”¹⁴ Teaching literary HAS and emphasizing “[c]apabilities, resilience, and multispecies flourishing,”¹⁵ then, could be important means of preparing students for the uncertain and perilous times ahead.

Considering texts that are ideally suited to engaging students in the way Bartosch proposes, Liza B. Bauer looks at science fiction or speculative fiction writing – the literary genre *par excellence* for exploring alternative models of human-nonhuman coexistence. In her article “Reading to Stretch the Imagination: Exploring Representations of ‘Livestock’ in Literary Thought Experiments,” she dissects processes of reciprocal negotiation between human and nonhuman beings in texts such as Sue Burke’s *Semiosis* and Margaret Atwood’s *Oryx and Crake* and *The Year of the Flood*. Following Brian McHale’s and Donna Haraway’s credo that highly unlikely worlds encourage readers to critically reflect on current realities, Bauer addresses the following questions: What if chickens, cows, or pigs had the chance to exist for their own ends? What would happen if they could communicate in human language? Or if they were of superior intelligence? Would they subdue humankind, domesticate their co-inhabitants, or coexist harmoniously? By enacting these scenarios in literary storyworlds, SF proves to be particularly fertile ground, yielding insights into the current and future challenges of coexistence. As Bauer convincingly outlines, immersing ourselves in (science) fictional worlds to practice multispecies living does not seem too far removed from reality. The redistribution of animal agency shows that the passivity to which most livestock animals are condemned is not irrevocable. The well-being of both human and nonhuman animals will depend on whether it is possible to theoretically and practically broaden students’ understanding of these entanglements. Since alternatives to animal commodification are thinkable in experimental SF storyworlds, they could constitute, Bauer argues, a significant step toward abolishing animal exploitation.

In her contribution, “Of Birds and Men: Lessons from Mark Cocker’s *Crow Country*,” Michaela Keck discusses strategies for teaching Mark Cocker’s encounters with the often-ignored members of the corvid family in *Crow Country* (2007). Part natural history, part pastoral, and part personal memoir, *Crow Country* raises and explores questions central to HAS regarding both dichotomies such as self / other, human / animal, and subject / object,

14 Bartosch: Dying to Learn, p. 83.

15 Ibid., p. 94.

as well as the potential and limitations of anthropocentrism and the narratives humans construct about other animals. As Cocker's twenty-first-century account of the rooks in East Anglia demonstrates, these corvids are neither domesticated nor companion animals. Since students will be familiar with crows and might even consider them a nuisance at times, Cocker's text offers new perspectives for thinking about so-called "trash animals."¹⁶ However, crows are also famous for their cognitive skills and cooperative capacities, and are therefore particularly suitable agents for challenging human-animal distinctions and simple notions of species boundaries. Keck's paper engages with *Crow Country* as an entry point to teaching core questions of HAS, exploring the ways in which Cocker's narrative draws students' attention to the de-/constructions of the birds' natural and cultural history and, conversely, of human animality and/or difference. Focusing on rooks as social constructs and agents, as well as rooks anthropomorphized and reconfigured, Michaela Keck illuminates the role of human-bird relationships in current Anthropocene contexts.

In "Teaching Empathy and Emotions: J. M. Coetzee's *The Lives of Animals* and Human-Animal Studies," Alexandra Böhm focuses on one of the most influential novels in the field of HAS. In her article, she delineates the two main difficulties in teaching Coetzee's text: firstly, the text's protagonist, fierce and fearless Australian author Elizabeth Costello, is often less-than-lovable and offers few grounds for identification; secondly, the text's multilayered structure further problematizes the authorial voice. However, by focusing on Costello's reassessment of emotion and empathy, Böhm convincingly demonstrates that Coetzee's text offers possibilities for understanding the key concepts of HAS, such as animal agency, alterity, and the necessity of assuming a non-anthropocentric perspective. In the narrative, Costello employs empathy in her approach to animals, but is this also true of the metadiegetic level of Coetzee's text? Does the text itself suggest how to teach empathy? Alexandra Böhm demonstrates that it is possible to elicit affective responses to these questions through emotion journals and role-playing.

Taking her cue from Margo de Mello's *Teaching the Animal*, Maria Moss employs a hands-on, didactic approach to teaching human-animal studies (THAS), introducing texts that she has used in her seminars in the past – from philosophical background materials and sociological surveys to novels,

16 See Kelsi Nagy / Phillip David Johnson (eds): *Trash Animals: How We Live with Nature's Filthy, Feral, Invasive, and Unwanted Species*. Minneapolis / London: U of Minnesota P 2013.

short stories, and poems. In her article, “‘The skin and fur on your shoulders’: Teaching the Animal Turn in Literature,” Moss uses texts that “look at the animals from inside out,”¹⁷ ending with a discussion of SF (see Liza B. Bauer’s article) and chimp fiction. From James Lever’s *Me Cheetah* to George Saunders’s story *Fox 8*, she focuses on animal agency within the narrative form, presenting texts that feature animals as narrators. Once we acknowledge that notions of language, cognition, and thinking about the future are no longer limited to human narrators and that “storying” is no longer specific to humans, Moss writes, interspecies storied imaginings mark one possible alternative to the long history of human dominance and exceptionalism – not just in life, but in literature, too.

In “Jagd oder die Kultivierung der Gewalt: Tierethische Sensibilisierung anhand der Filme *Die Spur* und *Auf der Jagd*” (Hunting or the Cultivation of Violence: Sensitizing Students to Animal Ethics using the Films *Spoor* and *On the Hunt*), Björn Hayer proposes an intervention that allows students to understand hunting as a cultural practice and its representation in contemporary film, and to develop greater compassion for nonhuman animals. Arguing that it is possible to relate the cognitive and affective educational goals listed in several secondary school curricula with the objectives of HAS as defined by Gabriele Kompatscher, Hayer sketches a teaching sequence that focuses on two texts featuring hunts: Agnieszka Holland’s *Pokot* (*Spoor*, the 2017 screen adaptation of Olga Tokarczuk’s novel *Drive Your Plow Over the Bones of the Dead*) and Alice Agneskirchner’s 2018 documentary *Auf der Jagd*. Framing his nuanced readings of these two films with recent debates on hunting and animal ethics, Hayer shows that this approach allows secondary school students to develop a better understanding of cinematography. In addition, students also discover how cinematic animals can be used to elicit different cognitive and affective responses that may lead to the development of an ethical regard for nonhuman animals. Contributing to both the literature on animals in film and on related pedagogies, Hayer proposes an approach that could easily be implemented both in secondary schools and in various other educational contexts and settings.

While Hayer convincingly shows how engaging with different film genres can lead not only to a better understanding of the medium but also to a greater awareness of and empathy for nonhuman animals, Jobst Paul proposes an

17 Michael Ondaatje: Introduction. In: Idem: *The Broken Ark*. Ottawa: Oberon 1971, pp. 5–9, here p. 6.

approach to teaching HAS that develops learners' ability to understand and evaluate how representations of animals may function as vehicles for racism, antisemitism, and other dehumanizing ideologies that are based on modes of thinking that provide justifications for animal death, suffering, and exploitation. As Paul notes in "The Philosophical Animal Deconstructed: From Linguistic to Curricular Methodology," the animals that appear in Western philosophical and theological traditions have been disconnected from their referents and have primarily served various human purposes, for example, as figures of thought. Analyzing representations of wolves in the 2019 election campaign by Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a right-wing German political party, Paul demonstrates how animals have been used to stigmatize and marginalize vulnerable populations such as refugees, and how these stereotypes have, in turn, been instrumental in justifying centuries of violence against nonhuman animals. To help learners understand this vicious circle, Paul introduces a method that can be used in various educational contexts, at different levels, and with learners of all ages. The approach to teaching HAS that he proposes allows learners to reconsider how language and power work through the figure of the animal and to develop the ability to think intersectionally. Particularly in an age of numerous political and environmental crises, there is an urgent need for pedagogical interventions such as the one proposed by Paul.

In her article, "Spinnenbrille, Dog-Cam und Gassi mit Ziege: Reflexionen über ein tierlinguistisches Projektseminar" (Spider-Glasses, Dog-Cams, and Walkies with a Goat – Reflections on a Project Seminar on Animal Linguistics), Pamela Steen describes a linguistics seminar that she taught in the summer semester of 2020 at the University of Koblenz-Landau. The author offers a general classification of pragmatic linguistics in HAS in order to justify its categorization as a sub-discipline of cultural animal studies. Steen pays special attention both to the creative methods participants use to incorporate animal perspectives into their research and to the aspect of empathy for animals. This aspect is not only a central linguistic feature but also relevant to the researcher's perspective. A particularly sophisticated method of empathizing with animals are the "spider glasses" developed by a student of Steen's seminar, Katharina Anna-Lena von Werne. In excerpts from her research report, von Werne describes how she sees the world "through the eyes of a spider" and what personal changes this has brought about for her in relation to non-human animals.

Reframing and contextualizing the contributions to this collection in her epilogue, Greta Gaard shows how many of the key concerns and objectives of human-animal studies and of related fields such as critical animal studies can be traced back – sometimes directly, at times obliquely – to earlier forms of intersectional activism as well as scholarship by women on behalf of (non)human others. In her account of the emergence of human-animal studies as a distinct institutionalized discourse, Gaard stresses the important contributions made by feminist scholars working at the intersection of fields such as ecofeminism and critical race studies, as well as environmental justice and animal liberation movements. These perspectives have, Gaard argues, greatly contributed to the evolution of human-animal studies into a dynamic and increasingly transdisciplinary field. These developments have opened up numerous lines of inquiry regarding modes of oppression and exploitation across species lines for researchers and students alike while also pointing to, in very practical terms, numerous opportunities for sustainability initiatives, for example, on campuses. Perhaps most importantly, human-animal studies has, Gaard emphasizes, effectively dismantled dominant and destructive conceptions of Western identity, inviting us to reclaim and practice “ecological multispecies kinship, powering and re-storying our collective humanimal resistance and recovery in the Anthropocene.”¹⁸

Taken together, the contributions in this volume and their different approaches to teaching HAS consider how concepts of agency, interaction, relationality, and empathy could be used to overcome human exceptionalism and the categorical divide between humans and animals in and outside the classroom. In this sense, they also expand the institutional boundaries of teaching HAS without necessarily abolishing the institutions of education and knowledge themselves. The articles thus provide guidance for readers teaching in these institutional structures while pushing these structures at the same time. In light of the rapid advances being made in the field of HAS and new perspectives that are developing on the concepts listed above, it is safe to assume that theoretical and practical approaches to teaching HAS will continue to evolve. We hope that the present volume can contribute to this development and inspire those seeking to firmly establish HAS in school and university curricula in an effort to overcome anthropocentrism and its effects in education and beyond.

18 Greta Gaard: Epilogue, in this volume, p. 231.

Mieke Roscher

Current Objectives of Human-Animal Studies

Why the Story of Harriet the Tortoise Should Be Retold

1. Introduction: Tortoise beginnings

“On Tortoise shells the world began.”¹ Thus begins the poem by R. W. Stallman on the relationship between tortoises and the concept of evolution. Stallman seems not to have been an outspoken admirer of this particular species, calling them “freaks,” and “monsters.” At the same time, however, he suggests that the tortoise has had a foundational impact on how the world was shaped. Pitting the creation of the world as described in the Book of Genesis against the one proposed by scientific discoveries and the emerging theory of the (biological) evolution of all life forms, the poem casts the species as the decisive factor in this debate. If we take the poem literally, Charles Darwin’s encounter with turtle cosmology, as suggested in the poem, thus provided for a new telling of creation and providence, which led to a new world. This new world was, of course, mainly one characterized by nineteenth-century ideas of scientific progress, bourgeois and Victorian values, and imperialist endeavors.² However, such narratives of an empire characterized by its ability to classify and control nature also leave room for a different interpretation, namely one that sees the tortoise, indeed, as more than an accidental bystander in what

1 R. W. Stallman: Darwin and His Tortoise. In: *The Southern Review* 18:3 (1982), pp. 560–562, here p. 560.

2 Janet Owen: Collecting Artefacts, Acquiring Empire: Exploring the Relationship between Enlightenment and Darwinist Collecting and Late-Nineteenth-Century British Imperialism. In: *Journal of the History of Collections* 18:1 (2006), pp. 9–25; K. Thalia Grant / Gregory B. Estes: *Darwin in Galápagos: Footsteps to a New World*. Princeton: Princeton UP 2009.

was to become a revolution in the history of ideas, as I would like to argue here. The tortoise could just as well be framed as a decisive historical figure, albeit one that does not fit into a propriety kind of historiography. For the sake of simplicity, let me individualize the encounter.

In 2006, the tortoise of my story died. Although she did not receive a ceremonial funeral or any other honors, her death was widely reported in the media. Her name was Harriet, she was a Galápagos tortoise, and she died at the age of approximately 175.³ She rose to fame due to the fact that she was reportedly collected by Darwin during his 1835 visit to the Galápagos Islands as part of his survey expedition on board the *Beagle*. She was then transported to England and, in 1841, the former captain of the *Beagle*, John Clement Wickham, took her to Australia, where she lived in several botanical and zoological gardens.⁴ Although there is some doubt as to the truthfulness of this story – Darwin never visited the island that Harriet originally came from – she has left her footprint on the historical narratives of evolutionary history and the history of nineteenth-century scientific and social reformism. In view of the argument presented here – namely that it was through contact with these animals and through the forming of interspecific relations, in which tortoises served not just as some sort of passive interface for new ideas about how the world developed but as both semiotic and material agents of change, that these evolutionary transformations in thinking came to fruition – I will assume that Darwin and Harriet actually did meet. Harriet thus serves as a model to show what a more inclusive narrative that considers the impact of animals on historical events might look like and what methodological steps the political history of animals that I am proposing here would entail.

In the aftermath of Harriet's death, other tortoise specimens that had been buried in the vaults of the London Natural History Museum were "rediscovered," leading to a new appreciation of the animal life that had influenced the

3 Thair Shaikh: Harriet, Who Probably Knew Darwin, Dies at 175. In: *The Independent*, June 24, 2006. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/harriet-who-probably-knew-darwin-dies-at-175-6097292.html> (accessed: August 24, 2020).

4 Scott Thomson / Steve Irwin / Terri Irwin: Harriet, The Galápagos Tortoise: Disclosing One and a Half Centuries of History. In: *Intermontanus* 4:5 (1995), pp. 33–35; Henry Nicholls: Celebrity Pet: The Rediscovery of Charles Darwin's Long-Lost Galápagos Tortoise. In: *The Guardian*, February 12, 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/science/animal-magic/2014/feb/12/celebrity-pet-discovery-darwin-tortoise> (accessed: August 31, 2020).

revolutionary discoveries of the famous naturalist.⁵ When the shell of James, another one of Darwin’s “pets,” was located in 2014, Riley Black wrote in *National Geographic*:

The same sense of human history and fascination surrounds innumerable other specimens – from dinosaur bones to pressed flowers – saved in museums around the world. The hands that touch them and the minds that wonder about them might not leave any permanent marks like the inscription of “James” on Darwin’s tortoise, yet by studying and arguing over these curious representations of the wild we intertwine human history with nature’s mysteries.⁶

Historical investigations that aim to make visible the past lives of animals such as Harriet or James and to uncover, to use Black’s somewhat paternalistic words, the “intertwining” of “human history” with “nature’s mysteries,” might be based on several concepts well established in the discipline. Approaches used in the fields of environmental history, the history of science, as well as social history have all been fruitfully employed to examine the monumental shifts ignited by evolutionary theory. All of these approaches have been employed by another Harriet, namely historian Harriet Ritvo, an acclaimed scholar of Darwinian science, and author of *The Animal Estate*, which has been recognized as one of the first works of animal history, whose work has both paved the way for and inspired this chapter.⁷ The objective of achieving more visibility for animal actors like the ones considered in this article could

5 Aaron M. Bauer / Colin J. McCarthy: Darwin’s Pet Galápagos Tortoise, *Chelonoidis Darwini*, Rediscovered. In: *Chelonian Conservation and Biology* 9:2 (2010), pp. 270–276.

6 Riley Black: A Tale of Two Turtles. In: *National Geographic*, February 25, 2014. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/phenomena/2014/02/25/a-tale-of-two-turtles/> (accessed: August 26, 2020); see also Henry Nicholls: Celebrity Pet: The Rediscovery of Charles Darwin’s Long-Lost Galapagos Tortoise. In: *The Guardian*, February 12, 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/science/animal-magic/2014/feb/12/celebrity-pet-discovery-darwin-tortoise> (accessed: June 11, 2021).

7 Harriet Ritvo: *The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1987. For her work on evolutionary history, see Harriet Ritvo: *The Platypus and the Mermaid and Other Figments of the Classifying Imagination*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1998, and idem: *Noble Cows and Hybrid Zebras: Essays on Animals and History*. Charlottesville: U of Virginia P 2010. For an appreciation of Ritvo’s work in human-animal history, see André Krebber: History of Ideas. In: Idem / Brett Mizelle / Mieke Roscher (eds): *Handbook of Historical Animal Studies*. Berlin / Boston: de Gruyter 2021, pp. 275–291. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110536553> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

also benefit from more recent debates developed in light of changing social conditions and the growing recognition of animals as historical agents in a society now often understood as a multispecies society.

In 2015, geographer Henry Buller summarized the methodical approaches taken in human-animal studies as follows:

The key methodological endeavour of human-animal relational studies has been to come to some emergent knowing of non-humans: their meaning (both materially and semiotically); their “impact” on, or even co-production of, our own practices and spaces; and our practical and ethical interaction with and/or relationship to them – or at least to find creative ways to work around unknowing.⁸

For Buller, looking at what is common to both humans and animals and what has been the result of a common shaping of their environment is at the center of interest. As this quotation shows, human-animal studies has moved away from a perspective that treats animals as mere symbols, developing toward one that focuses on the agency of “real” animals and their impact on society and in history. As Donna Haraway suggests in her groundbreaking volume *When Species Meet*, human-animal studies should juxtapose the imprints of our cultural ideas of animals with the life we share with them.⁹ Responding to Haraway’s call to action, this chapter engages with previous historiographical approaches and with concepts that have been developed in other disciplines such as geography or sociology, and that aim to consider other-than-human actors in their narratives in order to propose a political history of animals.

To develop this new historiographical approach, I will first turn to the concept of agency as the most widely discussed path to making visible the involvement of animals in “our” shared history. I will then take up recently introduced concepts that concentrate on relations rather than individual actors as a point of departure for historical analyses of human-animal interactions. I want to show how both praxiography and material culture studies have been used to tell stories different from the ones provided by traditional historiography, aiming to acknowledge and consider animals’ interspecific experiences. Moreover, spatial approaches have been particularly fruitful in animal history for getting

8 Henry Buller: Animal Geographies II: Methods. In: *Progress in Human Geography* 39:3 (2015), pp. 374–384, here p. 379.

9 Donna J. Haraway: *When Species Meet*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P 2008.

to the “real” animal instead of the one represented as a historical cipher, if only through their bodily presence, and I will show how human-animal studies has revisited concepts provided by animal geography.¹⁰

I will return to Harriet and her extraordinary life because, in spite of all the media attention she has received in her lifetime and since her death, historians could and should do more to analyze and reevaluate her role and influence. Tortoises and turtles have, of course, already influenced historical thinking, not least because they have come to symbolize the extinction discourse and debates on climatic change and the *Anthropocene*.¹¹ However, the case of Lonesome George in particular shows that focusing on an iconic individual animal and its status as the last of its kind fails to recognize either its whole life story or the stories of different lives and the potential of his (former) conspecifics.¹² I would argue that more is indeed possible, and that historians need to grapple with, among other things, the issues of scale and species. This chapter argues for the need to individualize interspecies relations while at the same time recognizing the cultural semiotics and political symbolism that shape these relations. The kind of political history of animals proposed here takes into account agency and relations (and agency as relation), practices and materialities, spaces and places, and suggests tentative answers to these pressing methodological questions. Finally, this article will also shine a light on how Harriet’s life story could be retold.

10 On the writing of animal history as a subdiscipline, see, for example, Hilda Kean / Philip Howell (eds): *The Routledge Companion to Animal-Human History*. Abingdon / New York: Routledge 2018; André Krebber / Brett Mizelle / Mieke Roscher: Writing History after the Animal Turn? An Introduction to Historical Animal Studies. In: Idem (eds): *Handbook of Historical Animal Studies*, pp. 1–19. For its theoretical framing, see Gesine Krüger / Aline Steinbrecher / Clemens Wischermann: *Animate History. Zugänge und Konzepte einer Geschichte zwischen Menschen und Tieren*. In: Idem (eds): *Tiere und Geschichte: Konturen einer Animate History*. Stuttgart: Steiner 2014, pp. 9–34.

11 Ursula K. Heise: *Imagining Extinction: The Cultural Meanings of Endangered Species*. Chicago: U of Chicago P 2016.

12 Henry Nicholls: *Lonesome George: The Life and Loves of a Conservation Icon*. Basingstoke / New York: Macmillan 2006.

2. Tortoise agency: Animal actors

In his diary of his voyage on the *Beagle*, published after his return to England, Darwin describes his encounter with tortoises as follows:

As I was walking along I met two large tortoises, each of which must have weighed at least two hundred pounds: one was eating a piece of cactus, and as I approached, it stared at me and slowly stalked away; the other gave a deep hiss, and drew in its head. These huge reptiles, surrounded by the black lava, the leafless shrubs, and large cacti, seemed to my fancy like some antediluvian animals. The few dull-coloured birds cared no more for me, than they did for the great tortoises.¹³

While the birds apparently were not impressed by the tortoises, Darwin clearly was. The diary is full of such accounts and those of other crew members and of locals, bearing testament to not only the physical presence of these animals, and the character and actions of individual specimens, but also to the impact of the encounters themselves. (Fig. 1) Acknowledging this impact, geographer and environmental historian Elisabeth Hennessy argues in a recent publication the importance of the tortoise for species survival and, more generally, for narrating turtle life on the Galápagos archipelago as an “all-the-way-down history.”¹⁴ In such a history, tortoises do not take center stage as an arbitrary effort to inscribe other-than-human beings into our history books, but because the story of these islands simply cannot be written without recognizing the deep history of the tortoise’s rootedness. Animal historians have set out to trace these roots, of a presence that goes beyond mere being, mainly through the impact of animals on their human counterparts – in short, through the agency that those animals have exhibited.

Of course, the agency approach is not reserved to the field of history, nor does it focus on the impact of large reptiles. On the contrary, it still is one of the central motifs with which human-animal studies scholars across all disciplines

13 Charles Darwin: *Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries Visited during the Voyage of H. M. S. Beagle Round the World, under the Command of Capt. Fitz Roy*, R. N. 2nd ed. London: John Murray 1845, pp. 374–375.

14 Elisabeth Hennessy: *On the Backs of Tortoises: Darwin, the Galápagos, and the Fate of an Evolutionary Eden*. New Haven: Yale UP 2019. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvqc6h1b> (accessed: January 24, 2022). Hennessy adopted the phrase “turtles-all-the-way-down” from a philosophical debate held at the beginning of the twentieth century in which a member of the audience claimed that the world really rests on turtles, one stacked on top of the other (see *ibid.*, p. 2).



Fig. 1: Meredith Nugent: *Darwin Testing the Speed of an Elephant Tortoise (Galapagos Islands)*, drawing, 1891.

are engaging.¹⁵ However, the concept has mainly been adopted from Bruno Latour, actor-network theory (ANT), and the broader subfield of science and technology studies (STS), rather than from long-standing discussions in the fields of labor or social history. In these fields, the concept of agency has also been used to consider those who have not left any written traces of their existence, although it has come under scrutiny in recent years because it does not (fully) consider sociohistorical contexts. In particular, tendencies within ANT to treat hierarchies conceptually rather than contextually have increasingly been met with criticism. An ANT perspective has been shown to ignore the radical asymmetrical power relations between and among individual species.¹⁶ Because of this inevitable contradiction, human-animal studies has turned in recent years toward a more nuanced social theory that accepts – theoretically, though not morally – the power relations between humans and animals as

15 For example: Sarah E. McFarland / Ryan Hediger (eds): *Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*. Leiden: Brill 2009; Chris Pearson: History and Animal Agencies. In: Linda Kalof (ed.): *The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies*. Oxford: Oxford UP 2017, pp. 240–257; Susan McHugh: Literary Animal Agents. In: *PMLA* 124:2 (2009), pp. 487–495; Mieke Roscher: Actors or Agents? Defining the Concept of Relational Agency in (Historical) Wildlife Encounters. In: Jessica Ullrich / Alexandra Böhm (eds): *Animal Encounters*. Stuttgart: Metzler 2019, pp. 149–170.

16 Bob Carter / Nickie Charles: Animals, Agency and Resistance. In: *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 43:3 (2013), pp. 322–340.

fundamentally asymmetrical. Still, most scholars in the field maintain that these imbalances are worth looking at if only to show how they are in flux and historically contingent. Especially by making the social structures defined by multi-relations the focal point of their inquiry, they hope to illustrate the different social positionings of animals at particular points in time, which are, in turn, the result of species *and* cultural affiliation and which determine the scope of any activity.

What would it now mean to consider the hierarchical multi-relations for the history of one tortoise born in the Galápagos Islands sometime around the 1830s? It would mean that, yes, Harriet was forcefully taken from her home island in the wake of the explorative voyages of European scientists,¹⁷ and that, yes, she had little control over her own life. This was, however, also true for many humans in a world shaken up by the new stratifications of class society as well as the waning of the indentured labor system and slavery, all of which produced unfree labor.¹⁸

If we consider these power asymmetries (determining the extent and degree of agency), we can adopt an understanding of agency that is implicitly relational as it reveals itself in relationships, and view social settings as something that includes both human and nonhuman animals. After all, it is through social figuration that animals are integrated into meaningful relations.¹⁹ Understood in this manner, agency becomes visible in interactions between humans and other animals, and in a wide range of different practices. These practices include riding, hunting, breeding, trading, loving, attending, presenting, drawing, cooking, killing, and eating animals. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, many, if not all, of these practices were also carried out with and on tortoises.

17 Owen: *Collecting Artefacts*; see also Dane Kennedy: *British Exploration in the Nineteenth Century: A Historiographical Survey*. In: *History Compass* 5:6 (2007), pp. 1879–1900; Tony Ballantyne (ed.): *Science, Empire and the European Exploration of the Pacific*. London: Routledge 2018.

18 The classic texts on this issue are Edward P. Thompson: *The Making of the English Working Class*. London: Gollancz 1963; and Kay Saunders (ed.): *Indentured Labour in the British Empire, 1834–1920*. London: Routledge 2018; on the context of slavery, see the recent PhD project by Christopher Michael Blakely: *Inhuman Empire: Slavery and Nonhuman Animals in the British Atlantic World*. Doctoral thesis, 2019. <https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/61693/> (accessed: June 10, 2021).

19 Nadir Weber: *Das Bestiarium des Duc de Saint-Simon: Zur „humanimalen Sozialität“ am französischen Königshof um 1700*. In: *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 43:1 (2016), pp. 27–59. <https://doi.org/10.3790/zhf.43.1.27> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

For all these relations, whether they were formed through practices of animal keeping or of collecting animals like Harriet in order to study them, we should not ignore the importance of affect and intercorporeal exchange that have resulted in the forging of agency within the participating subjects. This means that relations are not fully asymmetrical but, in fact, much more complex. Furthermore, by singling out individual animals and by relating their lives to those of the humans who have accompanied, studied, killed, cooked, dissected, and adored them, it is possible to map the specific social and historical contexts that have produced the ideas of certain species at certain times but are also constantly influenced by their real physical presences and action.²⁰ Such meaning-making practices appear, however, as only one part of a multi-species sociality that needs to be considered in full. To put it bluntly: without the animals that Darwin encountered, no meaning could have been attributed to his writing; they are literally the flesh and bone of the narration. Framed in this manner, relational agency destabilizes classical dichotomies between action and reaction, and considers animals as active partners in the making of specific cultural, scientific, and social meanings, thereby offering opportunities for telling stories from a different perspective.²¹ In line with Haraway's notion that relation is "the smallest possible unit of analysis,"²² relational agency can be observed between all beings and species, but especially between individual specimens of a species, and between one animal and one human. If we consider the relations between human and nonhuman animals, it is also possible to examine the ways in which animals have established and influenced relationships with humans.

The question is, however, how relational agency can be identified and traced. How does one read the source material in a way that runs counter to traditional narratives about the relationship between, for example, Darwin and Harriet as one-directional? To be sure, one could consider how human-tortoise relations developed over time. Hunted as food by pirates, whalers, and

20 For the biographical method, see André Krebber / Mieke Roscher (eds): *Animal Biographies: Reframing Animal Lives*. London: Palgrave Macmillan 2018.

21 Relational agency is my term. Others have used similar concepts, also suggesting that animal agency is best considered not as a fixed set of capacities but as revealing itself in processes and in relationships with humans. See Vinciane Despret: From Secret Agents to Interagency. In: *History and Theory* 52:4 (2013), pp. 29–44; Philip Howell: Animals, Agency and History. In: Hilda Kean / Philip Howell (eds): *The Routledge Companion to Animal-Human History*. Abingdon / New York: Routledge 2019, pp. 197–221.

22 Donna J. Haraway: *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness*. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm 2004, p. 24.

merchants during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, more than 200,000 tortoises were killed or extracted for scientific research between 1830 and 1870 alone, the period in which Darwin visited the Galápagos Islands.²³ Human-tortoise relations were thus primarily defined by killing and eating. But Darwin's account also includes clues that indicate that he perceived tortoises as distinct individuals with distinct personalities and individuality. He noted that "the inhabitants [...] state that they can distinguish the tortoises from the different islands; and that they differ not only in size, but in other characters."²⁴ He discovered that these tortoises had evolved over the course of time and had adapted to their environment. It was through different responses to his presence that he came to recognize their distinct personalities and to see them as individuals: his observations of tortoises pursuing various activities such as feeding, moving, or hissing at or ignoring him, were foundational for his subsequent work. Other things to consider when looking for evidence of relational agency are the working environments of those involved with Harriet or other tortoises, whether they were the members of the ship's crew, museum staff, or the zookeepers who took care of her and other tortoises in Australia.²⁵ Indeed, Harriet's story is quite well documented, as curators at the zoo in Australia learned when they were looking for evidence that Harriet had indeed met Darwin.²⁶ As Wiebke Reinert has shown in her analysis of California sea lions, zookeepers were engaged in multilayered (working) relationships with animals that not only revealed the general character to which Darwin was referring but also what that character meant for day-to-day interactions.²⁷ It is thus through the relationships that were formed and that – in Darwin's case – were chronicled through (his) writing that historians are able to make inferences regarding the agency of individual animals.

23 Paul Chambers: *A Sheltered Life: The Unexpected History of the Giant Tortoise*. London: Murray 2004.

24 Darwin: *Journal of Researches*, p. 384.

25 Nicola Foote / Charles W. Gunnels: Exploring Early Human-Animal Encounters in the Galápagos Islands Using a Historical Zoology Approach. In: Susan Nance (ed.): *The Historical Animal*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UP 2015, pp. 203–220, here p. 212.

26 Thomson / Irwin / Irwin: Harriet, The Galápagos Tortoise, p. 33.

27 Wiebke Reinert: *Applaus der Robbe: Arbeit und Vergnügen im Zoo, 1850–1970*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2020; see also idem: Betwixt and Between: Making Makeshift Animals in Nineteenth-Century Zoological Gardens. In: Philip Howell / Aline Steinbrecher / Clemens Wischermann (eds): *Animal History in the Modern City: Exploring Liminality*. London: Bloomsbury 2018, pp. 181–200.

3. Tortoise practices: Animals and praxeology

Darwin spent quite some time with the tortoises on the Galápagos Islands, observing them and also engaging in other kinds of activities. He notes in his diary that

the inhabitants believe that these animals are absolutely deaf; certainly they do not overhear a person walking close behind them. I was always amused when overtaking one of these great monsters, as it was quietly pacing along, to see how suddenly, the instant I passed, it would draw in its head and legs, and uttering a deep hiss fall to the ground with a heavy sound, as if struck dead. I frequently got on their backs, and then giving a few raps on the hinder part of their shells, they would rise up and walk away.²⁸

Multispecies ethnographers look in particular at how these relations are performed in concrete practices, and this has become another method employed by human-animal studies scholars seeking to recount interactions between human and nonhuman animals.²⁹ Historians can adapt these perspectives by looking at how performances shaped the thinking *and* doings of the actors. When Elizabeth Hennessy writes that “animals [...] change because of the ways that they become entangled in social life” and that through this entanglement “they change history too,” she is referring to the fundamental prerequisites for the potential historiographical framing of practices.³⁰ First explicitly articulated by historian Susan Pearson and anthropologist Mary Weismantel in 2010, human-animal practices are defined as elemental to the social environment that constitutes human societies.³¹ Hennessy describes this social context as follows:

Giant tortoises are both objects and agents of a socionatural history in which people and animals – and plants and all nature – together make history, though not on equal terms or in conditions of any of our own choosing.³²

28 Darwin: *Journal of Researches*, p. 384.

29 On multispecies ethnography, see Eben Kirksey / Stefan Helmreich: The Emergence of Multispecies Ethnography. In: *Cultural Anthropology* 25:4 (2010), pp. 545–576.

30 Hennessy: *Backs of Tortoises*, p. 12.

31 Susan J. Pearson / Mary J. Weismantel: Does “The Animal” Exist? Toward a Theory of Social Life with Animals. In: Dorothee Brantz (ed.): *Beastly Natures: Animals, Humans, and the Study of History*. Charlottesville: U of Virginia P 2010, pp. 17–37.

32 Hennessy: *Backs of Tortoises*, p. 16.

It was, after all, the practice of collecting animal specimens that characterized the age of exploration and then continued in the age of empire. Animals appear to be part of the setting in the *narratives* that recounted these discoveries, yet they were also at the core of its *practice*. Animal history that examines such practices seeks to capture the history in the making that produces and is *made* by animals. Evolutionary history would not have been written in the same manner were it not for the animals crawling, flying, or swimming through it. As historian Nicola Foote and animal behaviorist Charles W. Gunnels argue in an article that aims to adapt zoological theory to historical analysis,

[t]his effort begins by embedding any interpretation of animals through their *umwelt*, which describes the unique sensory and experiential world of each animal. In zoology, this approach allows rich descriptions of animal perspectives without falling into the paired traps of anthropomorphism and human exceptionalism.³³

Animal practices conceptualized in this manner rely, on the one hand, on the embeddedness of interactions within the (human) social realm and, on the other, on the acceptance that the animals involved in this social space experience it in a unique way. Applying approaches in historical human-animal studies that draw on theories of practice means considering what we do with animals, what they do, and the material consequences of those actions. After all, it was the distinct performance of a specific nonhuman species, tortoises, in relation to human hunters, caretakers, killers, and collectors that have defined how these animals have behaved and been perceived in their environments. Performativity relies on bodily interaction, it relies on some sort of relation, be it intentional or accidental. It is only in interspecies interactions that the relational agency I have argued for above emerges.

Applying a praxeological perspective, which is most commonly understood as research into practices, then, means to accept the concept of species as a social relation and the product of a praxiographic endeavor.³⁴ Following Annemarie Mol, praxiography can be described as a method that “take[s] notice of the techniques that make things visible, audible, tangible, knowable.”³⁵

33 Foote / Gunnels: Human-Animal Encounters in the Galápagos, pp. 204–205 (emphasis in original).

34 Eben Kirksey: Species: A Praxiographic Study. In: *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 21:4 (2015), pp. 758–780.

35 Annemarie Mol: *The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice*. Durham, NC: Duke UP 2002, p. 33.

This approach allows animal historians to depict animals as historically constructed. Furthermore, it helps them to show that the concept of species is also performed, especially through differentiations between human and non-human animals. In line with Gabrielle Spiegel's take on praxiography, animal practices are increasingly being depicted in human-animal studies as culturally co-constitutive, and the field has followed her, moving away from "culture as discourse to[ward] culture as practice and performance."³⁶ Harriet, seen in this light, is not part of the historical narrative because of her natural desire to eat, hiss, or stroll, but because her performances took place in a culture of observation and exploration. It is thus through the practices described in the source material that historians are able to uncover past relations and therefore also the agency of animals.

4. Tortoise bodies: Animal materiality

The material value of tortoises, their utilization as food, drink, fuel, and scientific specimens, has been highlighted in all accounts of Darwin's visit to the Galápagos written by his contemporaries: "In the days before refrigeration, the tortoises embodied an ideal, low-maintenance way to transport fresh meat and fat."³⁷ However, their build and weight – male tortoises can weigh more than half a ton – at times prevented crews from capturing live animals as provisions. Some of the large male specimens on the islands eventually became venerated icons in their own right. According to Foote and Gunnels, those "celebrity animals" were used as a sort of premodern graffiti wall, with sailors carving their names in the shells of the living animals, who would then bear material testimony not only to a history of the encounter itself, but also to the different value systems attributed to them.³⁸ This is also because the bodily contours of tortoises varied significantly: on one island, they had saddle-shaped shells, while those on another island had dome-shaped shells. People who lived on the islands could even tell the island a turtle came from by its shell.

Scrutinizing the material dimension of the interspecific encounter is another approach utilized by human-animal studies scholars to examine how animals

36 Gabrielle M. Spiegel: Introduction. In: Idem (ed.): *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn*. New York: Psychology Press 2005, pp. 1–31, here p. 3.

37 Hennessy: *Backs of Tortoises*, p. 37.

38 Foote / Gunnels: *Human-Animal Encounters in the Galápagos*, pp. 215–216.

make meaning. Following new trends in material culture studies and new philosophical materialism, they have focused on the social meaning of objects, including dead animals, such as the taxidermies of exotic animals that natural history museums mounted in the second half of the nineteenth century.³⁹ In these spaces, social meaning and hierarchies were constructed through the arrangement and presentation of artefacts.⁴⁰ Again, this may be particularly true of animals such as Harriet, which were at the heart of the exploration craze. One could argue that putting animals on display was a way to demonstrate one's dominance as a species, as a colonial power, and so on. All of these practices, to be sure, generated particular material objects that are now stowed away in archives and cabinets of curiosities, presented in museums, analyzed in laboratories. The ambiguous, liminal status of these animal objects is often related to the changing cultural assumptions that underlie them. By focusing on these transformations of animal objects in specific cultures or over time, human-animal studies has followed the approach proposed by Erica Fudge, who argues that "a living animal and animal matter are not separate categories. Like subject and object, they are utterly intertwined."⁴¹ Of course, this is also true for other animals and animal-made objects involved in other instances of social contact in that same period. These ritualistic bodily entanglements with animals are thus disentangled by scholars in the field in much the same way as animal-related practices are in view of the implicit or explicit expression of power relations. The hope here is to better tease out the biopolitical meaning of animals when framing them as material objects first and as sociocultural beings second. The bodily companionship is then described by paying attention not just to the symbolism and representationalism but to the material, biopolitical consequences for both humans and animals. Consider the case of Harriet: she might have been a representative of both evolutionary theory in the nineteenth century and of species extinction in the late twentieth century, but it was only through her material existence that these discourses

39 Helen Cowie: *Exhibiting Animals in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Empathy, Education, Entertainment*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2014.

40 Julia Courtney: The Secret Lives of Dead Animals: Exploring Victorian Taxidermy. In: Helen Kingstone / Kate Lister (eds): *Paraphernalia! Victorian Objects*. New York / London: Routledge 2018, pp. 122–140.

41 Erica Fudge: Renaissance Animal Things. In: Joan B. Landes / Paul Youngquist / Paula Young Lee (eds): *Gorgeous Beasts: Animal Bodies in Historical Perspective*. University Park, PA: U of Pennsylvania P 2012, pp. 41–56, here p. 42.

made it into a historical narrative. Considering the material bodily existence of animals thus grounds performance theories in such a way that the significance of human-animal relations and their spatial surroundings are always taken into account.

5. Tortoise places: Animal spaces

Admittedly, Harriet and Darwin met in a specific spatial environment. It was not until the sixteenth century that humans encountered the animals living on the Galápagos Islands in their natural habitat. The idea of *first contact* between the species and what it meant for them is therefore much easier to trace back and to recount. Furthermore, the isolation of the islands, now a “living museum of evolution”⁴² and often perceived as a mythical Eden, has allowed researchers to examine interspecific relations without any major disruptions. Focusing on the places of cohabitation and on different mappings of life with animals has become a central feature of the human-animal studies perspective, not only in the field of animal geography.⁴³ However, spatial interspecies encounters here are seen not only as microscopic displays of general human-animal relations but also as something that more precisely reveals the particularities of, for example, the age of discovery, in which animals played, as noted earlier, an important role. As Hennessy writes:

The idea that the Galápagos archipelago is an evolutionary Eden is a “geographical imagination” – a powerful way of understanding and engaging with particular places that reflects social, class, and political positions and has profound material effects. The evolutionary Eden trope draws from a long history of romantic ideas about desert island Edens in Western culture.⁴⁴

Hence, taking a spatial approach means considering the imaginative and ideological positioning of animals as stand-ins for cultural geopolitical ideas and *contact zones*, or as separation tropes of alleged inferiorities. It is also a means of reflecting on the diverse ways in which nonhuman animals have been quite literally “penned in” by human beings and examining how animals shape

42 Hennessy: *Backs of Tortoises*, p. 6.

43 Alice J. Hovorka: Animal Geographies II: Hybridizing. In: *Progress in Human Geography* 42:3 (2018), pp. 453–462.

44 Hennessy: *Backs of Tortoises*, p. 10.

of the exotic, and the ideology of empire building were clearly mirrored in the animals on display, but the idea of empire was also produced through them.⁴⁵ Monitoring the systemic consequences of human-animal relations that are a result of where animals are placed helps animal historians but also scholars in the wider field of human-animal studies to analyze the biopolitical fallout of these encounters. This is relevant to the practice of collecting and observing animals, especially in places such as the Galápagos Islands, where the microcosm of the extinction debate has been narrowed down to some *flagship species*, species chosen to raise support for biodiversity conservation. This is why human-animal studies, by looking at shared mappings and usages of space and place, can chart the relations between humans and animals more precisely than by looking at the practices of, say, collecting alone. Places structure relationships in a fundamental way, and the spatial ordering of animals significantly affects the social order of both human and nonhuman animals.⁴⁶

6. Toward a political history of tortoises

Taking all these perspectives on animal agency, practice, materiality, and spatiality into account, I propose an approach that I refer to as a political history of animals and that builds on the considerations above.⁴⁷ This approach combines material interactions between humans and animals (and the impact of these interactions on animal lives, bodies, and so on) with their discursively charged representations. Through this lens, it is possible to identify (both materially and discursively) a distinct mode of *producing* animals. Underlying this argument is the assumption that this process of production relies on constant exchange with the animal. This exchange can also be regarded as a process of political negotiation via or with the animal. In other words: Darwin was first and foremost negotiating through animals the impact of the environment on their appearance. He was able to show that there could be distinct specimens of the same species only one island away, specimens that,

45 See for example Robert W. Jones: *The Sight of Creatures Strange to Our Clime: London Zoo and the Consumption of the Exotic*. In: *Journal of Victorian Culture* 2:1 (1997), pp. 1–26.

46 Jacob Bull / Tora Holmberg / Cecilia Åsberg (eds): *Animal Places: Lively Cartographies of Human-Animal Relations*. London: Routledge 2017.

47 I outline this approach more substantially in: Mieke Roscher: *New Political History and the Writing of Animal Lives*. In: Hilda Kean / Philip Howell (eds): *The Routledge Companion to Animal-Human History*. London: Routledge 2018, pp. 53–75.

however, looked radically different from the ones on the island he first visited. Added to this rather straightforward description is an underlying subtext, one that was, of course, at least not directly intended by the author. As is well known, the idea of social development was also negotiated via animal evolutionary systems, and there were very few issues in the nineteenth century that were more controversial than evolution.⁴⁸ This debate, however, centered not only on the idea of the animal, but also on the animals that were displayed in the museums and zoos of London, Amsterdam, Berlin, and other colonial metropolises and that were actively used as a constant reminder of the special place of “mankind,” or, alternatively, the white, male European of a certain social standing. This story therefore built on a certain interpretation of Darwin’s material findings. Apes in particular, but to a certain extent other (exotic) animals such as tortoises as well, came to represent certain political discourses that shaped the nineteenth century.

The political history of animals proposed here is a response to critics of human-animal studies who argue that animals leave no intentional traces, are without a sense of history, can only ever be encountered through human representation, and thus must be reduced to their symbolic construction. This approach aims to cut the “material-semiotic knots”⁴⁹ that create this symbolism, this “representationalism” in the first place. In a first step, a political history of animals would trace the spatial and physical presence of animals and their actions, all of which can be found in the diverse sources available. These could include geographical sketches of the Galápagos Islands as scenes of first contact, of the ships that transported the tortoises, or of the zoos and museums where they were often displayed. A second step would include looking at the specific process of producing animals as the result of human-animal relations, both physically through breeding or selection, and symbolically by assigning properties and characteristics to animals. The beginnings of tortoise conservation programs in 1985 and the repatriation of animals to the Galápagos from zoos across the globe come to mind here. Lastly, a political history of animals would reflect upon the extent to which these tortoises were discursively charged. What did it mean, for example, that some of the animals on display were seen as “lesser,” some as “higher” animals? What was the implication of the fact that some were displayed as being closer to humans than

48 It is also well established that Darwin did not have some sort of epiphany when he visited the Galápagos Islands and instead only came to his theory once he was back in England studying his specimens. See Frank J. Sulloway: Tantalizing Tortoises and the Darwin-Galápagos Legend. In: *Journal of the History of Biology* 42:1 (2009), pp. 3–31.

49 Haraway: *When Species Meet*, p. 4.

others? How did their exoticism and uncommonness make them more palatable for interspecific analogies, and to what extent did the association between *race* and breed play into these animal related discourses? To understand the impact and impressions of the “real” animals, it is necessary to consider their entangled meaning at a specific time.

7. Conclusion: Harriet’s story retold

In a short essay called “On the Animal Turn” (2007), the other Harriet, Harriet Ritvo the historian, remarks that human-animal studies is far from becoming mainstream in cultural and social studies. However, this “very marginality,” she notes, “allows the study of animals to challenge settled assumptions and relationships to re-raise the largest issues both within the community of scholars and in the larger society to which they and their subjects belong.”⁵⁰ Complicating a dualistic perspective of the human vs. the other animals thus allows us to ask the question: where does Harriet the tortoise belong? Even if the world did not begin with her shell or was not built on her back, she was, over the course of her lifetime, part of very different social systems and stood for very different cultural discourses.

This makes her a perfect specimen for also considering how thinking about human-animal relations can help students to develop the ability to consider an issue from different perspectives (multiperspectivity), an educational goal pursued by many proponents of the didactics of history. Looking at the practice of classifying animals, students can learn much about human society and (the development of) its structures. Imperialism, colonialism, and the emergence of science in the bourgeois world are all topics fundamental to an understanding of nineteenth-century history. Debates on the place and the rights of animals are closely linked to these developments. Changes in social structures equally reflect lived relationships with animals. In the classroom, this means regarding Harriet not just as a representative of her species but also as a victim and a product of the colonial history of European exploration, which could be taught from multiple perspectives. By analyzing how zoos, for example, simultaneously functioned as colonial brokers, cultural agents, and scientific institutions, students can begin to interrogate many narratives of imperial advancement and to question the role that humans – as well as nonhuman animals – have played in them.

50 Harriet Ritvo: On the Animal Turn. In: *Daedalus* 136:4 (2007), pp. 118–122, here p. 122.

By adopting a political history of animals in the classroom, i. e., by asking students to engage with the symbolism of animals and their agency, practices, and materialities, it is possible to get a better sense of how past societies understood themselves. Furthermore, such didactics help to illustrate the complexities of the historical processes of transformation accompanying, say, the age of discovery while at the same time highlighting, by way of the critical reading of sources, how entanglements between humans and animals have shaped, for example, the ideas of the metropolis and the colonial periphery.

With this in mind, we can get a glimpse of animals such as Harriet and their impact on humans like Darwin, and we can teach and write about relationships, be they rational or emotional, close or more distanced. We must then, however, align these relationships with the relationships that were possible at a specific point in time. In other words, we must ask what kinds of relations were permissible and could be written about. With such detailed analyses, it should become apparent that there is no such thing as *the* animal or *the* human-animal-relationship, but that there is a whole spectrum of possible relationships, and that the one between Darwin and Harriet was framed by a specific historical context and by the respective ways in which they existed in the world. Such an analysis will reveal that the “settled assumption” about the passive role of animals in history, society, and culture needs to be challenged. If done correctly, Harriet will get the narrative she deserves: a narrative that takes into account the hardships that she and her species faced, her prominent role in the extinction debate, and also the various relationships that she had with handlers, with those who studied her, and with those with whom she shared spaces in pens, cages, or in the natural habitat of her youth on the Galápagos Islands. This would also illustrate that Harriet can be conceived of as a historical figure whose story is worth redeeming. To be sure, she was part of various interspecific relationships, even if Darwin may not have been a member of any of them.

Tiere im imperialen Diskurs

Die Human-Animal Studies als Unterrichtsparadigma für das antike Rom

1 Einleitung

Eine kleinkindersäugende Wölfin, ein Rabe, der sich während der Schlacht auf der Schulter von Feldherren niederlässt, extravagante Fische und Vögel, für deren Zucht sich Aristokraten bissige Polemik in der politischen Debatte zuziehen, Uhus, deren Anblick Panik und Schrecken auslöst, exotische Wesen, die zu hunderttausenden in der Arena abgeschlachtet werden¹ – Tiere sind in der römischen Geschichte omnipräsent. Ihrer Integration in den Geschichtsunterricht stehen allerdings strukturelle Probleme entgegen, die von curricularen Vorgaben zu Zielen, Inhalten und Umfangsbeschränkungen ausgehen. Dennoch besitzen die Human-Animal Studies ungeachtet aller

1 Vgl. zur Wölfin: Liv. 1,4,6 mit Robert M. Ogilvie: *A Commentary on Livy. Books 1–5*. Oxford: Oxford UP 1965, S.46–48. <https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198144328.book.1> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022); zum Raben: Liv. 7,26; zu den Fischen und Vögeln Anm. 32, 33; zu den Uhus bspw. Ov. met. 5,487, Sen. Herc. f. 654; zur Arena Anm. 35. Die fachwissenschaftliche Literatur ist längst unübersehbar geworden. Für nützliche Überblicksdarstellungen und Handbücher vgl. Marion Giebel: *Tiere in der Antike. Von Fabelwesen, Opfertieren und treuen Begleitern*. Darmstadt: WBG 2003; Linda Kalof (Hrsg.): *A Cultural History of Animals in Antiquity*. Oxford: Berg 2007. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350049505> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022); Gordon Lindsay Campbell (Hrsg.): *The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life*. Oxford: Oxford UP 2014. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199589425.001.0001> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022); Thorsten Fögen / Edmund Thomas (Hrsg.): *Interactions between Animals and Humans in Graeco-Roman Antiquity*. Berlin / Boston: de Gruyter 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110545623> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022). Eine umfassende, nach Tieren geordnete Quellensammlung bietet Sian Lewis / Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones: *The Culture of Animals in Antiquity*. London / New York: Routledge 2017. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315201603> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022).

Komplikationen ein bislang unausgeschöpftes Potenzial für realisierbare didaktische Innovationen.

Die Herausforderungen, die sich bei der Einbindung von Tier-Mensch-Beziehungen in die Konzipierung des Geschichtsunterrichts stellen, beziehen sich auf Fragen des Bildungsinhalts und des Bildungsgehalts.² Was den Bildungsinhalt betrifft, konzeptualisieren die traditionell anthropozentrisch orientierten Lehrpläne³ die römische Geschichte für die Sekundarstufe I in der Regel als Geschichte eines Imperiums, gegliedert in die Gründung der Stadt, den Aufstieg Roms zur Weltmacht, die politische, soziale und kulturelle Ordnung der Kaiserzeit und die spätantike Transformation des Reiches in Richtung mittelalterliche Staatlichkeit. Schlüsselthemen sind die Militärgeschichte, das republikanische System, soziale und ökonomische Umwälzungen als Folge des Imperiums, das schließlich zur Monarchie und zum Zusammenleben in multikulturellen Gesellschaften auf hohem zivilisatorischen Niveau führt. Tiere sind in Lehrplänen und Schulbüchern lediglich beim Gründungsmythos (Romulus und Remus) und bei der Alltagskultur in der Kaiserzeit (Arena, Jagd) präsent. Mit zehn bis zwölf Einzelstunden bzw. fünf bis sechs Doppelstunden unterliegt das zur Verfügung stehende Unterrichtsvolumen einer strengen Limitierung.⁴

2 Zu den Definitionen vgl. Wolfgang Klafki: Zum Verhältnis von Didaktik und Methodik. In: Günther Dohmen / Friedemann Maurer (Hrsg.): *Unterricht. Aufbau und Kritik*. 6., bearb. Aufl. München: Piper 1976, S. 44–61, hier S. 51–52.

3 Vgl. Andreas Hübner / Mieke Roscher: Pandadiplomatie im Klassenraum. Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen als geschichtsdidaktische Aufgabe. In: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtsdidaktik* 18 (2019), S. 112–129, hier S. 113–115 m. w. Lit. <https://doi.org/10.13109/zfgd.2019.18.1.112> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022).

4 So ausdrücklich der Lehrplan für die bayerischen Gymnasien, vgl. Staatsinstitut für Schulqualität und Bildungsforschung München: *LehrplanPlus, Gymnasium, Jahrgangsstufe 6*, o. D. <https://www.lehrplanplus.bayern.de/fachlehrplan/gymnasium/6/geschichte> (Zugriff am 01.12.2020). Aber auch wo keine exakten Angaben zum Umfang fixiert werden, lässt sich ein vergleichbarer Umfang erschließen, vgl. bspw. Ministerium für Schule und Berufsbildung des Landes Schleswig-Holstein: *Fachanforderungen Geschichte. Sekundarstufe I, Sekundarstufe II*, 2016. https://fachportal.lernnetz.de/files/Fachanforderungen%20und%20Leit%C3%A4den/Sek.%20I_II/Fachanforderungen/Fachanforderungen_Geschichte_Sekundarstufen_I_II.pdf (Zugriff am 01.12.2020), S. 20. Für eine detaillierte Analyse aktueller Lehrpläne zur römischen Geschichte für die Sekundarstufe I im bundesweiten Vergleich vgl. Nils Steffensen: Neue Chancen für Gegenwartsbezüge? Das unterrichtsfachdidaktische Potential der Krise der Römischen Republik. In: Krešimir Matijević (Hrsg.): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in der späten Römischen Republik. Fachwissenschaftliche und fachdidaktische Aspekte*. Gutenberg: Scripta Mercaturae 2020, S. 121–152, hier S. 122–124. Verbindlicher Unterrichtsgegenstand ist das antike Rom zumeist nur in der Sekundarstufe I. Auf jeden Fall ist die römische Geschichte daher Thema im Anfängerunterricht.

Hinsichtlich des Bildungsgehalts ist der Geschichtsunterricht auf eine strikte Kompetenzorientierung ausgerichtet. Durch die Ausbildung von Geschichtsbewusstsein⁵ sollen die Schülerinnen und Schüler zu einer autonomen Orientierung in der Gegenwart und zur Gestaltung der Zukunft befähigt werden. Ausschließlich in diesem Gegenwarts-, Zukunfts- und Lebensweltbezug drückt sich die Relevanz unterrichtlicher Themen aus. Jede einzelne Unterrichtsstunde wird als ein stringenter Erkenntnisprozess modelliert, dessen Ziel der Erwerb von Reflexions- und Orientierungskompetenz und die damit zusammenhängende Fähigkeit zur Sach- und Werturteilsbildung ist.⁶ Aus den skizzierten Rahmenbedingungen ergibt sich, dass der Unterricht zur römischen Geschichte die Verwirklichung eines fachwissenschaftlich wie didaktisch höchst ambitionierten Programms innerhalb eines engen zeitlichen Korsetts erfordert. Ein pragmatisch auf Realisierbarkeit ausgelegtes Konzept zur Adaption von Human-Animal Studies in den Geschichtsunterricht wird vor diesem Hintergrund keine additive Ergänzung zu den schulrechtlichen und didaktischen Vorgaben bieten und Aspekte der Tiergeschichte als primären Gegenstand von Erkenntnisinteressen adressieren können. Vielmehr sollte es eine Horizonterweiterung bei der Verfolgung bestehender inhaltlicher Zielvorstellungen anstreben, indem es die Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen für neue Zugriffe auf klassische Probleme der Geschichtswissenschaft fruchtbar macht.

5 Einen nützlichen, da sehr allgemein gehaltenen Ausgangspunkt für die Thematisierung des Geschichtsbewusstseins bildet dessen Definition als das „Insgesamt der unterschiedlichsten Vorstellungen von und Einstellungen zur Vergangenheit“, als die „stets sich erneuernde und verändernde Rekonstruktion des Wissens von der Vergangenheit“ (Karl-Ernst Jeismann: *Didaktik der Geschichte. Die Wissenschaft von Zustand, Funktion und Veränderung geschichtlicher Vorstellungen im Selbstverständnis der Gegenwart*. In: Erich Kothorst (Hrsg.): *Geschichtswissenschaft. Didaktik – Forschung – Theorie*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1980, S. 9–33, hier S. 13, 12). Vgl. ferner ders.: *Geschichtsbewusstsein. Überlegungen zur zentralen Kategorie eines neuen Ansatzes in der Geschichtsdidaktik*. In: Hans Süßmuth (Hrsg.): *Geschichtsdidaktische Positionen*. Paderborn: UTB 1980, S. 179–222, hier S. 185–186, 199–204. Zur Strukturierung des Geschichtsbewusstseins in Dimensionen ist immer noch grundlegend Hans-Jürgen Pandel: *Dimensionen des Geschichtsbewusstseins. Ein Versuch, seine Struktur für Empirie und Pragmatik diskutierbar zu machen*. In: *Geschichtsdidaktik* 12,2 (1987), S. 130–142.

6 Zur Terminologie vgl. grundsätzlich Franziska Conrad: *Perspektivenübernahme, Sachurteil und Werturteil. Drei zentrale Kompetenzen im Umgang mit Geschichte*. In: *Geschichte lernen* 24 (2011), S. 2–11, sowie – zu aktuellen Entwicklungen in der Forschung – Lisa Fauth / Inga Kahlke: *Perspektiven oder Kategorien? Die Unterscheidung von Sach- und Werturteil in der Forschung, in Unterrichtsmaterialien und bei Geschichtslehrkräften*. In: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 1–2/2020, S. 35–47, hier S. 37–39.

Anknüpfen kann eine solche Perspektiverweiterung an die für die Konzeptualisierung der römischen Geschichte in den Lehrplänen charakteristischen, teils kulturgeschichtlich aufgeladenen Paradigmen „Herrschaft“ und „Imperium“ durch eine Verbindung von Human-Animal Studies mit dem Konzept der Neuen Politikgeschichte bzw. Kulturgeschichte des Politischen, deren Fokus sich auf die Funktion von Tieren in politischen Prozessen oder in Reflexionen über Politik richtet. Im Unterschied zur herkömmlichen Politikgeschichte setzt die Neue Politikgeschichte auf die Erforschung der Legitimierung von politischen Entscheidungen, von Verfahren der Entscheidungsfindung und performativen Praktiken sowie von Ideologien und Mentalitäten als Teil der Politik.⁷ Die Human-Animal Studies haben dieser Erweiterung der historischen Politikforschung gegenüber ihre Anschlussfähigkeit unterstrichen und heben hervor, dass Tiere eine neue Akteursgruppe in der Politik jenseits des Subjekt-Objekt-Dualismus darstellten, anhand derer Praktiken, Semantiken und Rituale untersucht werden könnten; dass an Tieren mentale Ordnungen geschaffen würden; dass tierische Agency kollektive Beziehungen beleuchten könne; und dass Tiere bedeutungstragende Gestalten in politischen Diskursen seien.⁸

In eine vergleichbare Richtung zielen Forderungen der Geschichtsdidaktik, „den politikgeschichtlichen Blick durch sozial-, gesellschafts-, alltags-, mentalitäts-, gender- und kulturgeschichtliche Betrachtungsweisen mit ihren je verschiedenen Zugriffsarten und Erkenntnispotentialen auszuweiten“⁹

7 Vgl. Ute Frevert: Neue Politikgeschichte. Konzepte und Herausforderungen. In: Dies. / Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (Hrsg.): *Neue Politikgeschichte. Perspektiven einer historischen Politikforschung*. Frankfurt am Main / New York: Campus 2005, S. 7–26; Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger: Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen? In: Dies. (Hrsg.): *Was heißt Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?* Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2005, S. 9–24; Thomas Mergel: Kulturgeschichte der Politik. Version 2.0. In: *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte*, 22.10.2012. <http://doi.org/10.14765/zzf.dok.2.267.v2> (Zugriff am 01.12.2020). Für entsprechende Fragestellungen zur römischen Republik vgl. Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp: Politische Kultur – Karriere eines Konzepts. Ansätze und Anwendungen am Beispiel der römischen Republik. In: Matthias Haake / Ann-Cathrin Harders (Hrsg.): *Politische Kultur und soziale Struktur der römischen Republik. Bilanzen und Perspektiven*. Stuttgart: Steiner 2017, S. 457–495, hier S. 472–482.

8 Vgl. Mieke Roscher: Tiere und Politik. Die neue Politikgeschichte der Tiere zwischen Zóon Alogon und Zóon Politikon. In: Gesine Krüger / Aline Steinbrecher / Clemens Wischermann (Hrsg.): *Tiere und Geschichte. Konturen einer Animate History*. Stuttgart: Steiner 2014, S. 171–197, hier S. 171–176.

9 Markus Bernhardt / Peter Gautschi / Ulrich Mayer: *Historisches Lernen angesichts neuer Kerncurricula. Von Bildungsstandards und Inhaltsfeldern zur Themenbestimmung und Unterrichtsplanung im Geschichtsunterricht*. Wiesbaden: Hessisches Kultusministerium, Institut

und „Schlüsselprobleme“ (Krieg, Frieden, Herrschaft, Umwelt etc.) mittels „geschichtswissenschaftlicher Dimensionen“ wie Zeitvorstellungen, Weltbilder, Praktiken und Kommunikationsweisen zu adressieren.¹⁰ Die inhaltliche Substanz dieser Vorstellungen liegt nicht fern von der Neuen Politikgeschichte. In der geschichtsdidaktischen Theorie scheint der Trend allerdings dahin zu gehen, entweder die konventionelle Trennung der „Basisdimensionen“ Politik und Kultur aufrechtzuerhalten¹¹ oder einschlägige Aspekte einer (hegemonialen) Kulturgeschichte als „grundlegende[m] und integrative[m] Zugriff auf die Vergangenheit“¹² zuzuschlagen. Eine explizite heuristische Verbindung von Schlüsselproblemen mit den „geschichtswissenschaftlichen Dimensionen“ wird jedoch kaum hergestellt. Die genaue Funktion der kulturgeschichtlichen Perspektiverweiterung für die Entwicklung des in mindestens sieben Dimensionen ausdifferenzierten¹³ Geschichtsbewusstseins bleibt daher tendenziell unbestimmt.

Der hier unternommene Versuch, ein durch Human-Animal Studies spezifiziertes Konzept der Neuen Politikgeschichte auf curriculare Vorgaben zur römischen Geschichte zu applizieren, verfolgt demgegenüber ausdrücklich das Ziel einer Ausbildung der politischen Dimension des Geschichtsbewusstseins, also der Fähigkeit, „Macht- und Herrschaftsstrukturen und -verhältnisse in einer historischen und gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft erkennen und beurteilen zu können“¹⁴. Tiere erfüllten im antiken Rom wichtige Aufgaben bei der politischen Entscheidungsfindung, und sie konnten im Diskurs

für Qualitätsentwicklung 2011, S. 15. Vgl. auch bspw. den schleswig-holsteinischen Lehrplan: Ministerium für Schule und Berufsbildung des Landes Schleswig-Holstein: *Fachanforderungen Geschichte*, S. 13.

10 Vgl. Ulrich Mayer / Peter Gautschi / Markus Bernhardt: Themenbestimmung im Geschichtsunterricht der Sekundarstufe I. In: Michele Barricelli / Martin Lücke (Hrsg.): *Handbuch Praxis des Geschichtsunterrichts. Historisches Lernen in der Schule*, Bd. 1. Schwalbach / Ts.: Wochenschau 2012, S. 378–404, hier S. 398–400.

11 Vgl. Ulrich Baumgärtner: Was sollen SchülerInnen wissen? Zu Inhalten und Themen im Geschichtsunterricht. In: Thomas Sandkühler / Charlotte Bühl-Grahamer / Anke John / Astrid Schwabe et al. (Hrsg.): *Geschichtsunterricht im 21. Jahrhundert. Eine geschichtsdidaktische Standortbestimmung*. Göttingen: V&R unipress 2018, S. 113–130, hier S. 121, 123. <https://doi.org/10.14220/9783737008914.113> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022).

12 Bernhardt / Gautschi / Mayer: *Historisches Lernen*, S. 16.

13 Vgl. Pandel: Dimensionen des Geschichtsbewusstseins, sowie aus schulpraktischer Sicht Michael Sauer: *Geschichte unterrichten. Eine Einführung in die Didaktik und Methodik*. Seelze: Kallmeyer 2018, S. 85–89.

14 Dietmar von Reeken: *Historisches Lernen im Sachunterricht. Eine Einführung mit Tipps für den Unterricht*. 6., akt. Aufl. Baltmannsweiler: Schneider Hohengrehren 2016, S. 12.

über die Bedingungen und Ziele des Regierens die Rolle von *meaning-making figures* übernehmen. Das Ziel ist, durch Fragestellungen, die sich auf die Entstehung und Nutzung des Imperiums richten, das Potenzial der Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen für die Vermittlung von Kompetenzen zu demonstrieren, die mit traditionellen Ansätzen womöglich nur schwer zugänglich wären. So soll sich das Verständnis der Schülerinnen und Schüler für politische Prozesse ausdifferenzieren und anhand von Alteritäten, die charakteristische Züge von Politik in der Moderne herausstellen, ihre Orientierungskompetenz gefördert werden. Angestrebt ist dabei weder, eine Art Gesamtgeschichte des Imperiums aus der Perspektive der Tiere zu skizzieren, noch, didaktische Operationalisierungen vorzuschlagen. Die konzeptionellen Überlegungen sollen vielmehr konzeptionelle Grundlagen für die selbständige Gestaltung von Unterricht anbieten.

Exemplarisch sollen hierzu die praktischen und semantischen Funktionen von Tieren im Rahmen der Divination und des Dekadenzdiskurses analysiert werden. Für jeden dieser Themenkomplexe wird zunächst eine Sachanalyse vorgenommen, dann die Rolle der Tiere im Rahmen einer Neuen Politikgeschichte erläutert und schließlich das didaktische Potenzial dieser Perspektive dargestellt. Das Fazit möchte abschließend den didaktischen Mehrwert des Ansatzes aufzeigen und dadurch seine Anwendung legitimieren.

2 Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen im Geschichtsunterricht zum antiken Rom

2.1 Die Divination

Nach römischem Verständnis oblag den Göttern die Lenkung der Welt.¹⁵ Im Privaten wie im Politischen war die Bitte um Frieden mit der überirdischen Welt und die Beseitigung kommunikativer Störungen von existentieller Bedeutung. Über Rituale wie das Opfer oder die Weissagung (Divination) ließ sich in Erfahrung bringen, ob ein Vorhaben zu einem guten Ende geführt werden könnte. Der Wille der Götter manifestierte sich entweder in Naturzeichen oder in Tierverhalten (z. B. Vogelflug). Vor jeder wichtigen

15 Hierzu und zum Folgenden vgl. bes. Jörg Rüpke: *Pantheon. Geschichte der antiken Religionen*. München: Beck 2016, S. 161–165. <https://doi.org/10.17104/9783406696428> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022); ders.: *Die Religion der Römer. Eine Einführung*. 2., überarb. Aufl. München: Beck 2016, S. 215–222; Kurt Latte: *Römische Religionsgeschichte*. 2., überarb. Aufl. München: Beck 1967, 194–212; David Engels: *Das römische Vorzeichenwesen (753–27 v. Chr.). Quellen, Terminologie, Kommentar, historische Entwicklung*. Stuttgart: Steiner 2007.

politischen Aktion – einer Senatssitzung oder Volksversammlung, dem Auszug in den Krieg, der Schlacht, ja sogar der Überquerung von Flüssen – wurden die Götter nach ihrer Zustimmung befragt. Vorgenommen von Amtsträgern und Sachverständigen, basierte die Weissagung auf der Opposition von Zustimmung oder Ablehnung. Traten vorhergesagte Ergebnisse nicht ein, lag kein Irrtum der Götter vor, sondern war ein Fehler bei der Divination aufgetreten, der rituell geheilt werden musste. Nach der bisweilen farcehaften Politisierung bildete die Divination ein Element des auf Anknüpfung an die sakrale und politische Kultur der *res publica libera* und den *mos maiorum* gerichteten Restaurationsprogramms des Augustus,¹⁶ der seine persönliche Vormachtstellung mit der göttlichen Verheißung von der Weltherrschaft und der Erneuerung eines Goldenen Zeitalters propagierte.¹⁷

Die Divination erfüllte in dreifacher Hinsicht eine politische Legitimierungsfunktion. Erstens versicherte sich die Bürgerschaft des Wohlwollens der Götter. So war die älteste Bezeichnung der von einer Person ausgeübten Gewalt das *auspicium* (Vogelschau), und der oberste im Feld stehende Magistrat trug sowohl das *imperium* als auch das *auspicium*. Die Auspicien dienten somit zweitens der Legitimierung der Magistraten bei der Ausübung ihrer Amtsgewalt. Erhoben andere Amtsträger oder Priester keinen Einwand, galt dies als Signal des Einverständnisses. Der Konsens der Entscheidungsträger und die friedliche Regulierung politisch-militärischer Angelegenheiten in der auf einer integrierten Nobilität ruhenden *res publica* wurden auf diese Weise gewahrt. Ein Zuwiderhandeln des Magistraten gegen divinatorische Erkenntnisse bedeutete eine schwere Kommunikationsstörung. Als beispielsweise der Consul Publius Claudius Pulcher, im Jahr 249 v. Chr. einer von zwei Kommandanten der römischen Flotte vor der Seeschlacht von Drepanum, die bei der Divination eingesetzten Hühner über Bord gehen ließ, weil sie das Futter verweigert hatten, und anschließend die Schlacht verloren ging, wurde ihm in Rom der Prozess gemacht. Angeklagt wurde er aber nicht etwa wegen militärischen Versagens, sondern wegen Verstoßes gegen eine sakrale Vorschrift.¹⁸

16 Vgl. Dietmar Kienast: *Augustus. Prinzeps und Monarch*. 4., akt. Aufl. Darmstadt: WBG 2009, S. 220–227.

17 Vgl. Verg. Aen. 1,278–283; 6,791–800; 847–853. Zu Augustus' Vorstellung von der Weltherrschaft vgl. Andreas Mehl: *Imperium sine fine dedi*. Die augusteische Vorstellung von der Grenzenlosigkeit des Römischen Reiches. In: Eckart Olshausen (Hrsg.): *Stuttgarter Kolloquium zur historischen Geographie des Altertums* 4. Amsterdam: Hakkert 1994, S. 431–464.

18 Vgl. u. a. Cic. nat. 2,7; Val. Max. 1,4,3; 8,1,absol. 4; damn. 4.

Neben dem religiösen Ziel, die Götter zu besänftigen, stand die politische Absicht, den potenziell für das Gemeinwesen gefährlichen Ehrgeiz einzelner Aristokraten zu dämpfen, die sich über Recht und Konventionen hinwegsetzten.¹⁹ Drittens sorgte die Divination in medialer Vermittlung sowohl innen- als auch außenpolitisch für die Rechtfertigung römischer Herrschaft sowie für die Steigerung von familialem Prestige. Wenn etwa Livius berichtet, dass im Jahr 341 v. Chr. der Militärtribun Marcus Valerius einen Krieg durch einen Zweikampf entschied und ihm dabei ein Rabe zu Hilfe eilte, weshalb Valerius künftig den Beinamen „Corvus“ trug,²⁰ kommt darin einerseits die göttliche Unterstützung für den militärischen Aufstieg zum Ausdruck, während andererseits die gentilizische Legende der Valerii fortgeschrieben wird.

Als Repräsentanten der Götter besaßen die Tiere in der Divination nur eine abgeleitete Autorität. Auch bedurfte ihr Handeln der Sinnzuschreibung – Bedeutung gewann es erst durch die Interpretation der Menschen. Im Umgang mit Tieren bei der Divination manifestierte sich so ein zentrales Element vormoderner Gesellschaften, das unauflösliche Aufeinanderbezogensein von Politik und Religion. Die Handlungskalküle der Menschen folgten ihrer eigenen Logik, bedurften aber der Sanktionierung durch eine überweltliche Macht. Tiere und Menschen standen nicht in einer Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung. Vielmehr erfüllten sie als Teil eines Kommunikationsnetzwerks eine Vermittlungsfunktion innerhalb eines ganzheitlich aufgefassten Kosmos mit hierarchischen, aber auch reziproken Verhältnissen. Ihre Beziehung zueinander lässt sich mit dem Konzept der *entangled agency*²¹ umschreiben. Menschen und Tiere waren im spezifischen Fall der Weissagung in einer ‚Akteursumwelt‘ miteinander vernetzt, die durch ein theologisches Weltbild mit einem Götterapparat an der Spitze konstituiert wurde. Beide Seiten erfüllten die ihnen von einer höheren Instanz zugewiesene Funktion in einer Ordnung, in der sie eine Koexistenz führten. Aus der Perspektive der Human-Animal Studies ist

19 Zu Claudius vgl. Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp: Senat und Volkstribunat im frühen 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr. In: Walter Eder (Hrsg.): *Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik*. Stuttgart: Steiner 1990, S. 437–457.

20 Vgl. Liv. 7,26 mit Stephen P. Oakley: *A Commentary on Livy. Books VI–X*, Bd. 2: Books VII–VIII. Oxford: Oxford UP 1998, S. 238–251. <https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198152262.book.1> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022).

21 Für die Definition vgl. Mieke Roscher: Zwischen Wirkungsmacht und Handlungsmacht. Sozialgeschichtliche Perspektiven auf tierliche Agency. In: Sven Wirth / Anett Laue / Markus Kurth / Katharina Dornenzweig et al. (Hrsg.): *Das Handeln der Tiere. Tierliche Agency im Fokus der Human-Animal Studies*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2015, S. 43–66, hier S. 58. <https://doi.org/10.14361/978383839432266-001> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022).

entscheidend, dass es sich dabei nicht um eine durch natürliche Gegebenheiten entwickelte Beziehung, sondern um ein kulturelles Konstrukt handelte. Dessen Urheber ordneten sich in ein ganzheitliches Verständnis des Kosmos ein, ohne sich als die maßgeblichen Gestalter der Welt zu stilisieren.

Der Bildungsgehalt der bei der Divination sichtbar werdenden Facette von Politik liegt in der Alterität des Welt- und Politikverständnisses von Antike und Moderne begründet, die einen neuen Zugang zur Begründung und zum Modus politischer Entscheidungsfindung eröffnet. Anders als in der säkularen Welt verstanden sich die Römer als Teil einer göttlichen Ordnung, in der spezifische Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse sowie Rechtfertigungszwänge herrschten. Dieser Kontrast demonstriert nicht nur grundsätzlich die zeit- und kulturbedingte Andersartigkeit von Weltansichten, die für das Leben in den heterogenen Gesellschaften einer globalisierten Welt sensibilisiert, sondern schärft auch das Bewusstsein für die spezifische Rationalität der säkularisierten Moderne. Dem religiös imprägnierten Weltverständnis der Römer, demzufolge Tiere Agenten einer göttlichen, dem Menschen übergeordneten Kraft waren, steht das neuzeitliche Verständnis vom Menschen als einem von transzendentalen Entitäten autonomen Akteur in einer „entzauberten“ Welt²² gegenüber.

Zu den Folgen dieser Emanzipation durch Rationalisierung zählt, dass aus der Naturbeobachtung keine Handlungsempfehlungen für politische Maßnahmen mehr abzuleiten sind. Politisches Handeln entbehrt seither einer religiösen Fundierung und kann nur anhand immanent politischer Kriterien beurteilt werden. Als Teil der von der Politik abgetrennten Natur haben die Tiere ihre Rolle als Bedeutungsträger in der politischen Kommunikation verloren. In einem Vergleich mit der Gegenwart lässt sich herausstellen, dass zwar auch in der Gegenwart Politik und Religion in einem Zusammenhang stehen können, dass es jedoch im antiken Rom lediglich um die Bestätigung politischer Absichten und politischen Handelns ging, nicht um religiös bestimmte Zielvorstellungen und deren politische Durchsetzung.

Die Thematisierung der Legitimationsfunktion der Auspicien im Unterricht kann auch einen Beitrag zur Ideologiekritik leisten. Da die Anrufung der Götter über Fragen der religiösen Identität hinaus ein Element der innenpolitischen Kommunikation mit Möglichkeiten für Manipulationen war und in dieser Hinsicht rein säkularen Zielen folgte, kann Schülerinnen und Schülern deutlich werden, dass nicht immer weltanschauliche und religiöse

22 Zu diesem Konzept vgl. Max Weber: *Wissenschaft als Beruf*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1967, S. 17.

Gründe ursächlich für politisches Handeln sind, selbst wenn sie zu dessen Rechtfertigung herangezogen werden. In vergleichbarer Weise kann die Legitimierung der in Rom keineswegs immer unumstrittenen expansiven Außenpolitik durch die Götter und deren Einfluss dekonstruiert werden, beispielweise in der Verheißung des Weltreichs in Vergils *Aeneis*²³ oder in Livius' Postulat der göttlichen Legitimität des Imperiums als eines integralen Bestandteils römischer Identität²⁴.

Die Tiere dienen in diesem Konzept als didaktischer Hebel. Weder waren sie Objekte der Ausbeutung, noch steuerten sie eigenmächtig menschliches Handeln. Durch den Vergleich des antiken mit dem modernen Weltbild, der von der Analyse der sakralen und politischen Funktion der Tiere ausgeht, werden die Charakteristika der pluralistischen Demokratie erkennbar, die im Wettbewerb unterschiedlicher und unterschiedlich begründbarer Interessen bestehen. Hier ist die Politik eine autonome Sphäre, hier die Religion kein unverzichtbarer Teil der Staatspraxis. Das Zentrum der Politik bildet der Mensch. Wie das Beispiel des antiken Rom zeigt, war dies keinesfalls der historische Normalfall. Dass auch vormoderne Praktiken der Entscheidungsfindung nicht unter das Verdikt des Primitivismus fallen, sondern zu einem ausgefeilten Kommunikationssystem gehörten, relativiert den modernen Monopolanspruch auf Rationalität. Mit Blick auf die Ausbildung der politischen Dimension des Geschichtsbewusstseins fördern die Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen die Orientierungskompetenz durch die Analyse der Beziehungen zwischen Religion und Politik, der Instrumentalisierung von Religion für die Politik und der Selbstverortung des Menschen zwischen Autonomie und Einbindung in einem göttlichen Kosmos.

2.2 Leben und Regieren im Imperium

Ein zweiter Aspekt des Komplexes „Imperium“, der einen beherrschenden Raum in den Lehrplänen einnimmt, lässt sich mit dem Etikett „Leben und Regieren im Römischen Reich“ fassen. Mit diesem Paradigma können die Krise der Republik und deren Transformation zum Principat sowie die Kaiserzeit narrativiert werden, wobei für das Imperium gemäß den Lehrplänen und Schulbüchern der Fokus auf den zivilisatorischen Leistungen sowie der Herausbildung vielfältiger Formen des multiethnischen und multikulturellen Zusammenlebens liegen soll.²⁵

23 Vgl. Anm. 17.

24 Vgl. Liv. praef. 7.

25 Vgl. Anm. 4.

In einem Spannungsverhältnis zu der teleologischen Perspektive der Curricula steht die ambivalente, teils sogar dezidiert pessimistische Beurteilung dieser Entwicklung im zeitgenössischen Diskurs. Seit dem 2. Jahrhundert v. Chr. hatten sich infolge der Expansion Erosionserscheinungen im politischen System gezeigt. Es begann die in Bürgerkrieg und die Begründung des Kaiserreichs mündende Krise der Republik, die auf alle Sektoren von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft ausstrahlte.²⁶ In der Geschichtsschreibung und der politischen Publizistik wurde das Zeitalter der Bürgerkriege in Form eines Peripetiediskurses gedeutet.²⁷ Als Ursachen des Verfalls galten exaltiertes, sich extralegalen Mittel bedienendes und die gesamte Bürgerschaft korrumpierendes Machtstreben der Eliten sowie eine zunehmend die gesamte Gesellschaft erfassende Dekadenz durch bisher in Rom unbekannten Luxus. Tatsächlich waren mit dem militärischen Ausgreifen der Republik in den östlichen Mittelmeerraum enorme Geldströme nach Italien verbunden, für die nach Anlagemöglichkeiten gesucht wurde oder die in Konsum investiert wurden.²⁸ Bei den antiken Autoren wurden die Auswirkungen dieser sozio-ökonomischen Veränderungen aber einer ausschließlich moralisierenden Analyse unterzogen. Das als wiederhergestellte Republik inszenierte Principat des Augustus, das sich im 1. Jahrhundert n. Chr. als eigenständige Ordnung institutionalisierte, bewirkte dann zwar die Stabilisierung von Staatlichkeit und einen kulturellen Innovationsschub.²⁹ Im damaligen Diskurs blieben jedoch durch die Turbulenzen in der iulisch-claudischen Dynastie und die an der Vergangenheit orientierten Legitimationsstrategien der Principes der Zerfall der Republik und die Thematisierung der Krisensymptome der Bürgerkriegszeit präsent.

26 Vgl. Harriet I. Flower: *Roman Republics*. Princeton / Oxford: Princeton UP 2010. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831166> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022); Michael Sommer: *Rom und die antike Welt bis zum Ende der Republik*. Stuttgart: Kröner 2013; Wolfgang Blösel: *Die römische Republik. Forum und Expansion*. München: Beck 2015. <https://doi.org/10.17104/9783406674143> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022).

27 Vgl. Klaus Bringmann: Weltherrschaft und innere Krise im Spiegel der Geschichtsschreibung des zweiten und ersten Jahrhunderts v. Chr. In: *Antike & Abendland* 23 (1977), S. 28–49. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110241358.28> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022); Uwe Walter: *Memoria und res publica. Zur Geschichtskultur im republikanischen Rom*. Frankfurt am Main: Antike 2004, S. 319–329; Benjamin Biesinger: *Römische Dekadenzdiskurse. Untersuchungen zur römischen Geschichtsschreibung und ihren Kontexten (2. Jahrhundert v. Chr. – 2. Jahrhundert n. Chr.)*. Stuttgart: Steiner 2016.

28 Vgl. Dominik Maschek: *Die römischen Bürgerkriege. Archäologie und Geschichte einer Krisenzeit*. Darmstadt: Zabern 2018.

29 Vgl. bspw. Karl Galinsky: *Augustan Culture. An Interpretive Introduction*. Princeton: Princeton UP 1998; Andrew Wallace-Hadrill: *Rome's Cultural Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2010.

Roms Weltmachtstatus und der Aufschwung an materiellem Zivilisierungsgrad wurde auch am Umgang mit Tieren und den Reflexionen darüber manifest. Tiere symbolisierten die Verfügungsgewalt über das Imperium, illuminierten das Sozialprestige der Angehörigen der Elite und dienten als Ressource in Machtkämpfen.³⁰ In der politischen Sittenkritik konnte Tierhaltung allerdings *auch* als Erscheinungsform des Verfalls figurieren und als Indiz für Fehlentwicklung in der Herrschaftsausübung und in der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung interpretiert werden. Für Cicero beispielsweise war die Frage, ob er während seines Proconsulats in Cilicien seinem Freund Caelius Panther für Spiele zusenden dürfe, ein Politikum, weil sie seine Amtsführung und Integrität als Statthalter tangierte.³¹ Cicero war es auch, der unmittelbar vor dem Bürgerkrieg die Aufzucht teurer Zuchtfische beklagte und Angehörige der Senatsaristokratie beschuldigte, sie würden durch diese ebenso exquisite wie sinnlose Freizeitaktivität ihr Engagement für das Gemeinwesen vernachlässigen.³² Ebenso konnte sich Kritik an landwirtschaftlichen Einrichtungen wie luxuriösen Vogelhäusern festmachen, wenn der Eindruck entstand, die gewinnorientierte Tierhaltung verblasse hinter dem bloßen Amüsement.³³

In beiden Fällen handelt es sich um eine Form von Dekadenzkritik, die sich gegen Orientierungslosigkeit und Selbstzufriedenheit in Zeiten der Krise richtete.³⁴ Der Elite wurde ein fundamentaler Identitätswandel unterstellt. Durch die Aufgabe des senatorischen Lebensstils, der traditionell auf die *res publica* gerichtet war, zugunsten einer Konzentration auf die exorbitanten Bedürfnisse empfindlicher Zuchttiere seien die Fischteichbesitzer faktisch zu

30 Vgl. hierzu die in Anm. 1 genannte Literatur.

31 Vgl. Cic. fam. 8,2; 4; 6; 8; 9; 2,11,2. Eine detaillierte Interpretation bietet Meike Rühl: *Ciceros Korrespondenz als Medium literarischen und gesellschaftlichen Handelns*. Leiden / Boston: Brill 2018, S. 51–57. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004383159> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022).

32 Vgl. z. B. Cic. Att. 1,18,6; 19,6; parad. 38 sowie Att. 2,9,1 mit 2,17; Varro rust. 3,17.

33 Zur Ideologisierung der Landwirtschaft vgl. Silke Diederich: *Römische Agrarhandbücher zwischen Fachwissenschaft, Literatur und Ideologie*. Berlin / Boston: de Gruyter 2007, S. 273–403 (zum Vogelhaus bes. S. 358–360). <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110893359> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022); Werner Tietz: *Hirten – Bauern – Götter. Eine Geschichte der römischen Landwirtschaft*. München: Beck 2015, S. 241–265. <https://doi.org/10.17104/9783406682346> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022).

34 Für die historischen Hintergründe vgl. Astrid Habenstein: *Abwesenheit von Rom. Aristokratische Interaktion in der späten römischen Republik und in der frühen Kaiserzeit*. Heidelberg: Heidelberg UP 2015, S. 51–119. <https://doi.org/10.17885/heup.43.32> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022).

Komplizen der Usurpatoren geworden. An den Tieren wurde – dieser Deutung gemäß – die Dominanz privater Interessen über politische Belange und die Gefahr eines Kollapses der Republik durch den Eskapismus der Tierfreunde sichtbar.

Eine Form der Zerrüttung des Staates erblickten Kritiker auch in der Tierhatz der Arena (*venatio*). Spiele waren ursprünglich eine religionspolitische Veranstaltung. Sie waren Teil des Systems zur Herstellung und Festigung der *pax deorum*, wurden aber zusehends auch als politisches Kommunikationsmedium genutzt. Bis zur Spätantike sollten hunderttausende Tiere ihr Leben in der Arena lassen.³⁵ In dieser Form der Ausbeutung sahen Kritiker, für die in der Regel nicht das Mitleid mit den Tieren ausschlaggebend war,³⁶ eine moralische Schwächung der Gesellschaft.³⁷ Als Ursache galten ihnen die asymmetrischen Kräfteverhältnisse zwischen Menschen und Tieren, die in blutigen Abschlachtungsorgien resultierten. Anders als bei den Gladiatorenkämpfen ging so die unkalkulierbare Auseinandersetzung im Kampf Mann gegen Mann verloren. Die Spiele büßten dadurch die Funktion ein, die Bürger mental auf den Krieg einzustellen. In der *venatio* wurde der Triumph über die Natur in Szene gesetzt, die menschliche Befähigung zur Kultur gab den Ausschlag für den Sieg. Das Tier war als Gegner kein gleichrangiger Partner für den Menschen.³⁸ Aus dieser Sicht musste die *venatio* zu einer Beeinträchtigung der für das Imperium notwendigen *virtus* führen.

Die Quintessenz der Dekadenzkritik war, dass langfristig der Verlust des Reichs durch den Besitz des Reichs selbst einzutreten drohte, weil die Ressourcen des Imperiums missbraucht wurden. Diese spätrepublikanischen und kaiserzeitlichen Reflexionen bieten eine alternative Deutung der römischen Geschichte im Vergleich zu einem modernen Fortschrittsnarrativ an, das auch

35 Vgl. Frank Bernstein: *Ludi publici. Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Entwicklung der öffentlichen Spiele im republikanischen Rom*. Stuttgart: Steiner 1998; Thomas Wiedemann: *Kaiser und Gladiatoren. Die Macht der Spiele im antiken Rom*. Darmstadt: WBG 2001; Egon Flaig: *Ritualisierte Politik. Zeichen, Gesten und Herrschaft im Alten Rom*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2003, S. 232–260. <https://doi.org/10.13109/9783666367007> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022); Jo-Ann Shelton: *Beastly Spectacles in the Ancient Mediterranean World*. In: Kalof (Hrsg.): *Cultural History of Animals*, S. 97–126, hier S. 116–126. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350049505-ch-004> (Zugriff am 24.01.2022).

36 Für ein Gegenbeispiel vgl. jedoch Plutarchs *De sollertia animalium* sowie ferner Cic. fam. 7,1,3; Plin. nat. 8,21.

37 Vgl. Cic. fam. 7,1,3, v. a. aber Sen. epist. 7 (bes. 3–4).

38 Hierbei soll allerdings nicht unterschlagen werden, dass auch Menschen als eine Form von Hinrichtung Tieren faktisch wehrlos preisgegeben wurden.

die Lehrpläne dominiert. Neben die Erzählung vom Aufstieg Roms und vom Zivilisierungsprozess im und durch das Imperium tritt eine skeptische Sicht, die auf vermeintlich destabilisierende Langzeitwirkungen der Expansion für das politische System und die Gesellschaft abhebt. Solche Deutungen resultierten zwar nicht unbedingt in konkreten politischen Entscheidungen, und sie alleine boten auch keine tragfähigen Erklärungen für den mannigfachen Wandel, der Folge der Reichsbildung war, aber die in den Diskursen artikulierten Wahrnehmungen und Sichtweisen wirkten auf den politischen Raum ein, indem sie das Geschichtsbewusstsein und die Mentalität der maßgeblichen Akteure – Kaiser, Senatoren und andere Eliten – beeinflussten und deren kommunikative Aushandlungsprozesse mitbestimmten. Über die Analyse der Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen als einer Facette des Dekadenzdiskurses kommt dieser kulturgeschichtliche Aspekt von Politik im Principat zum Ausdruck. Als korrumpierende Ressourcen ließen sich nicht nur materielle Reichtümer und Kunstwerke auffassen, sondern auch Tiere, da die Interaktion mit ihnen aus dieser Perspektive nicht nur zur Vernachlässigung tradiert politischer Handlungsweisen, sondern zu einer schleichenden mentalen Demobilisierung der Gesellschaft führte. Durch die Verfeinerung und Übersteigerung bestehender Alltagspraktiken mithilfe von Tieren entwickelte sich eine negative Dialektik von zivilisatorischen Errungenschaften und gesellschaftlicher Degeneration.

Der Bildungsgehalt dieses Gesellschaftsdiskurses liegt in mehreren für die Ausbildung der politischen Dimension des Geschichtsbewusstseins wesentlichen Erkenntnissen, die sich in den Sektoren Herrschaft und Macht verorten lassen. Die Praktiken im Umgang mit Tieren, anhand derer sich zentrale Elemente des Selbstverständnisses und der Weltsicht der Römer manifestieren, weisen markante Alteritäten zur Moderne auf und stellen damit deren Eigenarten heraus. Koloniale Herrschaftsausübung dürften Schülerinnen und Schüler zuallererst als ein ethisches Problem ansehen. Dass nach antikem Verständnis die zivilisatorische Kraft des Imperiums keineswegs als uneingeschränkt positiv zu bewerten war, weil von ihr Korruptionsgefahr für die Gesellschaft ausging, ist eine Fortschrittskritik, die Aktualität für die Ausbildung von Gegenwartsorientierung besitzt. Diesen Sachverhalt veranschaulichen Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen, wenn sie an Tiere als Objekte von Repräsentation, Lifestyle und Ausbeutung anknüpfen. Im Sinne der Orientierungskompetenz wird das Phänomen relevant, dass Veränderungen der materiellen Lebensgrundlagen Sorgen um die Stabilität und die Zukunftsfähigkeit des Staates

auslösen und eine Debatte über den damit einhergehenden Wandel von Mentalitäten initialisieren können. Ob diese Befürchtungen tatsächlich gerechtfertigt sind oder ob es sich um eine moralisierende Deutung ohne empirische Evidenz handelt, ist eine Frage, die es im Rahmen einer Sachurteilsbildung zu bearbeiten gilt, deren Auflösung aber auch die Fähigkeit einer Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Realität beleuchtet.

In diesem Komplex fungieren die Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen als Anknüpfungspunkte für Niedergangsmodelle, die Wirklichkeit konstruieren. Tiere waren im Dekadenzdiskurs nicht nur Bedeutungsträger, sondern schufen auch Ordnung. Unterstellt wurde, sie hätten sich so sehr in das Handeln der Römer eingeschrieben, dass deren kulturelle und politische Identität in Gefahr geraten sei und der innere wie äußere Zusammenbruch der politischen Ordnung gedroht habe. Als Problem galten nicht etwa die oft kritischen Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehungen von Menschen und Tieren, sondern ihr zerstörerisches Zusammenspiel. So wendete sich das Imperium in dieser Perspektive gegen dessen Erschaffer und Nutznießer.

Dem geschichtsdidaktischen Prinzip der Multiperspektivität folgend darf dabei nicht übersehen werden, dass in der Bewertung der Tiere ein Gegensatz zwischen Oberschicht und breiter Bevölkerung besteht. Während sich die Massen über Abwechslung vom Alltag freuten, waren es eher die Senatsaristokratie oder Intellektuelle, die sich für Fragen von Governance interessierten. Insofern ist im Unterricht auch zu untersuchen, ob es sich bei den dekadenzkritischen Auffassungen nicht um einen Elitendiskurs handelte, der für die Gesamtbevölkerung möglicherweise keinesfalls repräsentativ war.

Anders als bei der Divination kann das Mensch-Tier-Verhältnis im Dekadenzdiskurs mit dem Konzept von *embodied agency* erfasst werden. Die Tiere ‚bevölkerten‘ mit den Menschen einen „gemeinsam geteilten Raum“ und ‚führten‘ mit ihnen „bestimmte [...] Interaktionen“, aus.³⁹ Einerseits stellten die Zuchttiere eine Form der „körpergeschichtliche[n] Annäherung“⁴⁰ dar, durch die zivilisatorische Standards geprägt werden. Im existentiellen Kampf in der Arena trat andererseits die Ähnlichkeit zwischen Menschen und Tieren als Angehörige einer Natur zutage. Nicht nur trafen sie als Gegner aufeinander – die Menschen drohten in dieser Auseinandersetzung sogar von den Tieren wesensmäßig assimiliert zu werden und ihre Menschlichkeit zu verlieren.

39 Für eine Definition vgl. Roscher: Zwischen Wirkungsmacht und Handlungsmacht, S. 59–60 (Zitat S. 59).

40 Ebd., S. 59.

Der unmittelbare Aktualitätsbezug dieses geschichtsdidaktischen Komplexes für Schlüsselprobleme liegt in der Bewertung des Fortschritts. Die Frage nach der nachhaltigen Nutzung von Ressourcen ist eine sehr moderne. In ihrem Zentrum steht das Problem, ob die Menschen durch ihre kulturellen Errungenschaften Lebensgrundlagen zerstören. Dass Kulturleistungen ambivalente oder ungeahnte Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen können, ist schwer bestreitbar. Zugleich ist die Einsicht zu vermitteln, dass politische oder moralische Bewertungen stets mit rationaler Methodik auf ihre Evidenz hin zu befragen sind. Als Ergebnis einer Auseinandersetzung mit dem Fortschritts-gedanken stellt sich die Frage nach Prioritäten in der Lebensführung und nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen dem Privaten und dem Politischen. Die Thematisierung des Imperiums über Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen besitzt das Potenzial, am Beispiel des Fortschritts den Diskurs über die Herrschaftsausübung zu konkretisieren. Die Perspektive der Human-Animal Studies kann dazu beitragen, diese ebenso abstrakten wie komplexen Bezüge plastisch und greifbar zu machen.

3 Fazit

Die Didaktisierung der römischen Geschichte mittels der Human-Animal Studies im Rahmen der Neuen Politikgeschichte ist auf eine „Steigerung und Raffinierung der Wahrnehmung“⁴¹ gegenüber traditionellen Perspektiven gerichtet. Fruchtbar gemacht wurden die Human-Animal Studies aber nicht für eine Rekonstruktion von Tierleben im antiken Rom oder für vernachlässigte Probleme der Alltags-, Mentalitäts- oder Kulturgeschichte. Im Mittelpunkt standen vielmehr Fragen nach dem Erwerb und der Nutzung von Herrschaft. Anhand verschiedener politischer Kontexte wurden praktische und semantische Funktionen von Tieren vorgestellt, an denen Begründungen, Modi und Ziele von Politik ablesbar sind: als Botschafter der Götter, als Luxusobjekte, als Kampfpartner der Menschen. Teils fungierten sie als Instrumente zur Herstellung von innen- wie außenpolitischer Ordnung, teils war am Umgang mit ihnen selbst der Zustand der Ordnung ablesbar. Die Römer sahen Tiere in den erörterten Zusammenhängen nie als bloße Objekte an, sondern konzeptualisierten sie als Akteure in asymmetrischen

41 Karl Schlögel: *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit. Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik*. München: Hanser 2003, S. 503 (zum Nutzen geschichts- bzw. kulturwissenschaftlicher turns).

Beziehungsnetzwerken. Sowohl für das Verständnis des Kosmos als auch von menschlichem Verhalten dienten Tiere der Herstellung politischer Sinnstiftungsmuster.

In der politischen Kultur von Republik und Kaiserzeit besaßen Tiere unterschiedliche Formen von Agency: in der Divination als Agenten übernatürlicher Mächte, die über den Kosmos und damit über Menschen und Tiere gleichermaßen herrschten (*entangled agency*), im Dekadenzdiskurs als Provokateure der Korruption, die zunächst von den Menschen in zivilisatorische Strukturen eingeschrieben wurden und dann auch aktiv Interaktionen mit den Menschen unterhielten (*embodied agency*). Aus der hier lediglich exemplarisch vorgenommenen Analyse geht hervor, dass die Tiere in ihren verschiedenen Rollen über das ganze fragile Spektrum von Wirkungsmacht und Handlungsmacht⁴² verfügten, in dem diese Formen von Agency angesiedelt sind. Die Stellung der Tiere im antiken Rom zu postulieren, bedeutete eine Simplifizierung der Vergangenheit.

Im Hinblick auf die Orientierungskompetenz des Geschichtsunterrichts und die politische Dimension des Geschichtsbewusstseins können die Human-Animal Studies durch die Erzeugung von Alteritäten sowohl die Charakteristika der römischen Antike als auch der Gegenwart prägnant aufzeigen sowie die Vielschichtigkeit von Politik im Allgemeinen herausarbeiten. In Fragen der Legitimation von politischem Handeln und diskursiven Strategien zur Beeinflussung von gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen, in denen Tiere eine Funktion übernahmen, erkennen Schülerinnen und Schüler, dass Politik über bloße Entscheidungen hinausgeht und auch deren Hintergründe sowie die Verfahren ihres Zustandekommens einschließt.

Schülerinnen und Schüler nehmen Tiere vor allem als Haustiere oder schützenswerte Wildtiere wahr. Die vorgestellten Impulse regen eine Horizont-erweiterung an. In ihr figurieren Tiere als Akteure in der Politik und werden zu Objekten der Analyse von Politik. Über den Gegenwartsbezug, den sie für Kinder darstellen, können diese komplexen und abstrakten Zusammenhänge altersgerecht fassbar gemacht werden. Wichtiger noch ist die Erkenntnis, dass Grundfragen der politischen Ordnung und politischen Kultur Roms in der Rolle von Tieren in der Gesellschaft angelegt sind. Dieser Ansatz zur Weiterentwicklung der politischen Dimension des Geschichtsbewusstseins könnte als ein instruktives Instrument für die Vermittlung

42 Zur Problematik der Begrifflichkeiten und zur Diskussion vgl. Roscher: Zwischen Wirkungsmacht und Handlungsmacht, S. 48–55, 61–62.

von Orientierungskompetenz dienen und auch geschichtsdidaktisch einen Impuls für die Aufweichung der Grenzen zwischen den Basisdimensionen Politik- und Kulturgeschichte setzen. Gleichzeitig setzt ein solcher Unterricht aber auch Reflexionen über Tiere und ihre Stellung in menschlichen Gesellschaften in Gang und befreit sie womöglich aus bestehenden Klischees. So werden die Schülerinnen und Schüler für eine Umwelt sensibilisiert, die anthropozentrisch aufzufassen eine Verkürzung darstellt und in der Tiere auch „Handlungsträger“⁴³ sind.

43 Aline Steinbrecher: Auf Spurensuche. Die Geschichtswissenschaft und ihre Auseinandersetzung mit den Tieren. In: *Westfälische Forschungen* 62 (2012), S. 9–29, hier S. 20.

Andreas Hübner

“Preventing Malicious and Wanton Cruelty to Animals”

Historical Animal Welfare and Animal Rights Education

1. The rise of animal welfare and animal rights movements

Animal welfare and animal rights movements can look back on a long history.¹ As early as in 1809, the English Lord Chancellor Thomas Erskine was calling for animal welfare to be written into the British body of law as part of a legislative initiative to prevent “malicious and wanton cruelty to animals.”² Although his plan failed, the foundations for an organized animal welfare and animal rights movement had been laid. Shortly afterwards, in 1824, the British Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was founded and, in 1840, thanks to its patroness Queen Victoria, was elevated to the rank of Royal Society.³

The founding of the society fueled the animal welfare and animal rights movements in many other countries, both on the continent and outside Europe. The institutional birth of the animal welfare and animal rights movement in German-speaking countries was marked by the founding of the Fatherland

1 In a recent overview, Kenneth Shapiro, cofounder of the Animals and Society Institute, emphasized the interrelation between animal welfare and animal rights movements and the emergence of human-animal studies. See Kenneth Shapiro: Human-Animal Studies: Remembering the Past, Celebrating the Present, Troubling the Future. In: *Society & Animals* 28:7 (2020), pp. 797–833. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685306-BJA10029> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

2 Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ed.): *Cruelty to Animals: The Speech of Lord Erskine in the House of Peers on 15th May 1809, on the Second Reading of the Bill for Preventing Malicious and Wanton Cruelty to Animals*. London: Rivington 1824.

3 A concise history of the animal welfare movement in England has been offered by Hilda Kean: *Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800*. London: Reaktion 1998.

Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Vaterländischer Verein zur Verhütung von Tierquälerei) by the Protestant pastor Albert Knapp in 1837. Many countries in Europe had followed suit by the end of the nineteenth century by founding their own national animal welfare organizations. In the United States, it was the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals that launched the animal welfare movement in 1866.⁴ Animal welfare initiatives in North America can be traced back to colonial times, when the first laws against animal cruelty were enacted in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the mid-sixteenth century.⁵

Similar to this development, modern animal welfare and animal rights education dates back to the nineteenth century. In German-language textbooks and readers for agricultural schools, traces can still be found today that testify to the importance of caring for domestic animals. Clear warnings were issued, for example, “Never mishandle or abuse an animal!”⁶ in a textbook published by Hugo Weber in 1885, which at the same time reveals the norms and values of early animal welfare and animal rights education:

Domestic animals are of extraordinary use to humankind and make an essential contribution to the preservation and comfort of his [*sic*] life by providing him with the best and most nutritious food, material for clothing and for hundreds of useful objects. For this reason alone, humans have a great moral duty towards animals, the duty to treat and care for them well – apart from the fact that his religion and his own human dignity also impose this duty on him in the most definite way.⁷

4 Mieke Roscher: Geschichte des Tierschutzes. In: Roland Borgards (ed.): *Tiere: Kulturwissenschaftliches Handbuch*. Stuttgart: Metzler 2016, pp. 173–182, here pp. 176–177. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05372-5_4 (accessed: January 20, 2022); Gieri Bollinger / Michelle Richner: Tiere schützen – Rechtliche Entwicklungen. In: Meret Fehlmann / Margot Michel / Rebecca Niederhauser (eds): *Tierisch! Das Tier und die Wissenschaft: Ein Streifzug durch die Disziplinen*. Zurich: vdf Hochschulverlag 2016, pp. 83–96, here pp. 85–86. <https://doi.org/10.3218/3597-1> (accessed: January 20, 2022); Frank Uekötter / Amir Zeliniger: Die feinen Unterschiede: Die Tierschutzbewegung und die Gegenwart der Geschichte. In: Herwig Grimm / Carola Otterstedt (eds): *Das Tier an sich: Disziplinenübergreifende Perspektiven für neue Wege im wissenschaftsbasierten Tierschutz*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2012, pp. 119–134.

5 Andreas Hübner: American Studies. In: André Krebber / Brett Mizelle / Mieke Roscher (eds): *Handbook of Historical Animal Studies*. Berlin / Boston: de Gruyter 2021, pp. 69–83, here pp. 74–75. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110536553-008> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

6 Hugo Weber (ed.): *Lehr- und Lesebuch für ländliche Fortbildungsschulen*. Berlin / Leipzig: Klinkhardt 1885, p. 84. All translations from the German, unless otherwise noted, Paul Lauer.

7 Weber (ed.): *Lehr- und Lesebuch*, p. 82.

The focus of early animal welfare and animal rights education, as a glance at this textbook clearly shows, was treating and caring for so-called domestic and farm animals. The human-animal relations involved were often defined in terms of the humans' moral and religious duties. The duty toward animals served the education and development of human dignity and secured the extraordinary benefit for humankind that derived from animals. Early animal welfare and animal rights education thus amounted to an anthropocentric enterprise that placed "man's interest in the animal above the animal's interest in a life fit for the animal."⁸ The focus was not on the welfare and protection of domestic and farm animals but on educating the modern human being, who was supposed to act with moral and religious dignity. Animals provided humans with moral improvement and education, while humankind's domination over and paternalistic attitude toward animals went unquestioned.⁹ However, current educational and learning processes that take into account the goals of animal welfare and animal rights education require completely new goals and guidelines. To date, few scholars have embarked upon this journey.¹⁰ Still, the textbooks and readers of the nineteenth century offer an excellent starting point for reflecting on current approaches to animal welfare and animal rights education. This article begins with the basic themes and concepts of a history of animal welfare and animal rights education, then critically contextualizes and historicizes their anthropocentric orientation, before discussing educational and learning processes that might help to overcome conventional human-animal dichotomies. The aim of this article is to present subject-specific recommendations for critically integrating topics and content relevant to animal welfare and animal rights into future curricula, and to make recommendations that recognize the importance of nonhuman actors in history and question conventional human-centered narratives of historical learning.

8 Mieke Roscher: Tierschutzbewegung. In: Arianna Ferrari / Klaus Petrus (eds): *Lexikon der Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2015, pp. 371–376, here p. 372. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839422328-118> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

9 Mieke Roscher: *Ein Königreich für Tiere: Die Geschichte der britischen Tierrechtsbewegung*. Marburg: Tectum 2009, p. 77.

10 Among this small number of researchers, mention should be made of Edward Eadie, whose studies aim above all to make a contribution to "enhancing the welfare of individual animals, which is important, as well as result in better animal welfare generally" (Edward N. Eadie: *Education for Animal Welfare*. Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer 2011, p. 2).

2. Exploring historicity and animal agency

In recent years, historical animal studies have repeatedly referred to the historicity of human-animal relations and, in exploring these relations, have chosen primarily interdisciplinary, cultural studies approaches that have placed the practices, materiality, and spatiality of human-animal relations at the center of investigation.¹¹ Similarly, the basic themes of historical animal welfare and animal rights education should be formulated along these premises, not least because this allows past forms of speciesism to be analyzed and the ongoing discrimination as well as unequal treatment of animals to be openly discussed in class.

It is one of the legacies of Western philosophical and historical traditions that educational and learning processes have often been shaped, and are *still* being shaped, in such a way that the historicity of the animal has taken a back seat to notions of the historicity of the human being; that animals, unlike humans, have rarely been accorded the status of actors; and that historical change has been attributed solely to humans. Recently, the cultural studies scholar Dominik Ohrem stated that the animal, in opposition to humans, has continuously embodied the ahistorical “other,” and that the historiography of the earth and humanity have largely been based on the ahistoricity of the animal.¹² Such traditions of thought can already be found in the textbooks of the nineteenth century, for instance (in relation to cows) in the *World History Guide for Secondary and Elementary Schools* (*Weltkunde: Leitfaden der Geographie, Geschichte, Naturgeschichte, Physik und Chemie für Mittelschulen und mehrklassige Volksschulen*) from 1896: “It is probably the oldest and in any case the most important domestic animal of man; for it benefits him not only by its labor, but also by its milk, its meat, its skin and its horns.”¹³ The textbook suggests that cattle *have* no history, that they have always been limited to their role as domestic animals, and that they have been included in the understanding of human societies solely due to their usefulness to humans.

11 Andreas Hübner / Mieke Roscher: Pandadiplomatie im Klassenraum: Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen als geschichtsdidaktische Aufgabe. In: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtsdidaktik* 18 (2019), pp. 112–128, here p. 116. <https://doi.org/10.13109/zfgd.2019.18.1.112> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

12 Dominik Ohrem: A Declaration of Interdependence: American History and the Challenges of Postanthropocentric Historiography. In: Idem (ed.): *American Beasts: Perspectives on Animals and Animality in U. S. Culture, 1776–1920*. Berlin: Neofelis 2017, pp. 9–48, here pp. 23–24.

13 August Renner / Gustav Feddeler / J. F. Hüttmann / Heinrich Jastram et al. (eds): *Weltkunde: Leitfaden der Geographie, Geschichte, Naturgeschichte, Physik und Chemie für Mittelschulen und mehrklassige Volksschulen*. Hanover: Helwing 1896, p. 312.

The historicity of the animal must be considered at the beginning of every concept of historical animal welfare and animal rights education. The assumption that animals also *have* history must be taken into account in didactics and teaching; biological reductionism and the cultural uniqueness of humans must be critically questioned.¹⁴ This is the only way forward to forcing an animal history as “co-history,” which, as Donna Haraway states, is characterized by the transgressions of human and nonhuman animals and their bodies.¹⁵ The smallest possible particles for analyzing this co-history are not human-animal subjects or objects, but human-animal *relationships*, or, as Haraway defines them, *co-constitutive relationships*.¹⁶ In this sense, the ahistorical, unprotected, and unlegislated body will become a thing of the past. In the future, both animals and humans should, in the sense of the Anthropocene, be understood as geological factors in a network of protectable and legally relevant actors that also includes plants, substances, and objects.¹⁷

Animals will thus become *animal agents* in historical animal welfare and animal rights education as they are conceived of as agents in many other sub-disciplines of human-animal studies today – more than a decade after Sarah McFarland and Ryan Hediger’s seminal claim: “We think it is time to focus on animal agency.”¹⁸ Such inclusion of animal agents in animal welfare and animal rights education, of course, may be regarded as a political act; or, to draw on Mieke Roscher, André Krebber, and Brett Mizelle, it may be regarded as a “necessary and important intervention in discourses on animals’ societal standing and recognition.”¹⁹ In this sense, animals are actors in history, even if they “mostly unfold their life story outside of human perception.”²⁰

14 Hübner / Roscher: Pandadiplomatie, p. 116.

15 Donna Haraway: *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness*. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm 2003, pp. 12, 31.

16 Pascal Eitler / Maren Möhring: Eine Tiergeschichte der Moderne: Theoretische Perspektiven. In: *Traverse* 15 (2008), pp. 91–105, here p. 92. <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-99718> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

17 Hübner / Roscher: Pandadiplomatie, p. 117.

18 Sarah E. McFarland / Ryan Hediger: Approaching the Agency of Other Animals: An Introduction. In: Idem (eds): *Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*. Leiden / Boston: Brill 2009, pp. 1–20, here p. 16.

19 André Krebber / Brett Mizelle / Mieke Roscher: Writing History after the Animal Turn: An Introduction to Historical Animal Studies. In: Idem (eds): *Historical Animal Studies*, pp. 1–18, here p. 7. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110536553-002> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

20 Gabriela Kompatscher / Reingard Spannring / Karin Schachinger: *Human-Animal Studies: Eine Einführung für Studierende und Lehrende*. Münster: Waxmann 2017, p. 187. <https://elibrary.urb.de/doi/book/10.36198/9783838547596> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

In educational and learning processes, it is advisable to include the diverse research findings on *animal agency* in didactic concepts, to operationalize the various concepts of agency in the classroom, and thus – in spite of existing power relations between humans and animals – to reflect on animal subjectivities.²¹ Taking into account the heterogeneity of various groups of animals, I would like to suggest three agency concepts: (1) *relational agency*, which foregrounds interactions and their effects in human-animal relations; (2) *entangled agency*, which manifests itself in the interconnectedness of the actors in networks; and (3) *embodied agency*, which accentuates the corporeality of human-animal relations and seems particularly promising as a praxeological approach toward animal welfare and animal rights education.²²

3. Tracing the practices of human-animal relations

Recently, historical animal studies have increasingly turned to praxeological and sociological approaches to avoid the dilemma of having to provide evidence of the actions and intentions of animals. A variety of studies emphasize that it is above all the practices employed in human-animal interactions that leave behind legible signs revealing the concrete doings of animals, that make animal actors an “other” that can be studied, and that thus map the social practices performed in human-animal interactions as processes that shape society and everyday life. This kind of praxeological approach also enables historical animal studies to break through dichotomous notions of human-animal power relations: just as the polarities of familiarity and strangeness between humans and animals are permanently negotiated in practices of interaction, the tensions between dominance and subjugation as well as the nature of structures of domination, power, and exploitation should be understood as part of the constant process of negotiation between humans and animals.²³

21 Markus Kurth / Katharina Dornenzweig / Sven Wirth: Handeln nichtmenschliche Tiere? Eine Einführung in die Forschung zu tierlichen Agency. In: Sven Wirth / Anett Laue / Markus Kurth / Katharina Dornenzweig et al. (eds): *Das Handeln der Tiere. Tierliche Agency im Fokus der Human-Animal Studies*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2016, pp. 7–42, here p. 35. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839432266-001> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

22 Kompatscher / Spannring / Schachinger: *Human-Animal Studies*, p. 188.

23 Aline Steinbrecher: Tiere und Geschichte. In: Borgards (ed.): *Tiere*, pp. 7–16, here p. 12; idem: “They do something”: Ein praxeologischer Blick auf Hunde in der Vormoderne. In: Frederike Elias / Albrecht Franz / Henning Murmann / Ulrich Wilhelm Weiser (eds): *Praxeologie: Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Reichweite praxistheoretischer Ansätze in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften*. Berlin: de Gruyter 2014, pp. 29–52. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110370188.29> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

Practices of human-animal interaction are never static; rather, they are subject to constant historical change. They change with time, just as the political meanings generated by these practices change. Animals have always been interwoven with this historical and political change, which directly affects them. On the one hand, they feel the change of normative measures that are part of political decision-making processes, as in the case of animal welfare laws; on the other, the roles of animals in the overall social framework are continuously being reshaped as a result of changing philosophical and ethical ideas.²⁴

Practices of human-animal interaction have also determined the social construction and classification of animals, which are usually made according to their relationships with and usefulness for humans (and not according to biological systematizations). Social constructs and animal classifications are highly anthropocentric. From a human perspective, the routines of making meaning that arise from practices of interaction lead to divisions and classifications into categories such as domestic animals, farm animals, feedlot animals, animals for slaughter, and wild animals, but also into predators, pests, and plagues.²⁵ Such categorizations are mostly the result of emotional relationships and intersubjectively shared images of animals that express assumptions about the nature of certain animals and ascribe legitimacy to certain actions toward animals. The basis for these attributions is cultural practices and ideas that have been historically and spatially reinforced time and again. In other words, in their historical and spatial specificity, the social practices of interaction – and not biological determinants – condition whether an animal, for example a rabbit, can be legitimately seen as a domestic, experimental, or wild animal – or as food or a pest.²⁶

Historical animal welfare and animal rights education must take into account seemingly arbitrary categorizations of this kind when designing future educational and learning processes. After all, these categorizations and

24 Mieke Roscher: New Political History and the Writing of Animal Lives. In: Hilda Kean / Philip Howell (eds): *The Routledge Companion to Animal-Human History*. London / New York: Routledge 2019, pp. 53–75, here p. 54. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429468933> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

25 Kompatscher / Spannring / Schachinger: *Human-Animal Studies*, pp. 56–57.

26 Marcel Sebastian: Subjekt oder Objekt? Ambivalente gesellschaftliche Mensch-Tier-Beziehungen als Resultat kultureller Aushandlungs- und Wandlungsprozesse. In: Elke Diehl / Jens Tuider (eds): *Haben Tiere Rechte? Aspekte und Dimensionen der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2019, pp. 70–81, here pp. 71–72.

classifications do not take place in a norm- and value-free vacuum; rather, they often have legal consequences for animals, which go hand in hand with the legal privileging or the legal excluding and limiting of individual animal species. “The decisive dividing line” of animal categorizations, as legal scholars Margot Michel and Saskia Stucki recently noted, runs “between legally and factually privileged pets, which are kept out of interest in the animal or as companions in the household, and deindividualized farm animals, which are used for economic or scientific interests.”²⁷ From a historical perspective, the boundaries between privileged pets and deindividualized farm animals have always been fluid. As late as in the nineteenth century, for example, dogs were harnessed to carts by rag merchants in urban centers like New York as horses for the common man and used in so-called dog treadmills and wheels to drive various mechanisms, while the pet and lap dog was reinvented as a *companion animal* for the emerging middle class, and dog breeding became discursively intertwined with the humane treatment of animals.²⁸ In New York, dogs being kept as both pets and farm animals simultaneously was instrumental in the rise of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Under its founder Henry Bergh, the society prosecuted hundreds of animal abuse cases annually after 1866 and helped to limit human-dog practices to the roles of owner and pet, adapting pet and lap dogs to a humanistic ideal of pet ownership.²⁹

27 Margot Michel / Saskia Stucki: Rechtswissenschaft: Vom Recht über Tiere zu den Legal Animal Studies. In: Alejandro Boucabeille / Gabriela Kompatscher / Karin Schachinger / Reingard Spannring (eds): *Disziplinierte Tiere: Perspektiven der Human-Animal Studies für die wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2015, pp. 229–255, here p. 236. <https://doi.org/10.1515/transcript.9783839425183.229> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

28 John Homans: *Warum Hunde? Die erstaunliche Geschichte des besten Freundes des Menschen – ein historischer, wissenschaftlicher, philosophischer und politischer Streifzug*. Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer 2014, p. 304. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43388-1> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

29 Andrew A. Robichaud: *Animal City: The Domestication of America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2019, pp. 174–175, 195–196. <https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674243187> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

4. Experiencing the materiality and physicality of human-animal relationships

“It is the vulnerability of animals’ bodies and feelings that makes them so worthy of protection in our eyes,”³⁰ writes animal philosopher and ethicist Arianna Ferrari in her reflections on the treatment of animals. Ferrari accentuates the material component of human-animal relationships, which was already a theme in the textbooks and readers of the nineteenth century. It was not uncommon for textbooks at the time to disapprove of physical contacts between humans and animals and to warn against violence toward animals, with the usual reference to its coarsening and brutalizing effects on humans:

Whoever mistreats his working animals without giving them proper food and the necessary rest, whoever subjects them to excessive burdens and forces them to exert their last strength by rough blows and maltreatment, sinks down to the level of the animal himself, and such a person who beats his animals is despised by every decent human being.³¹

In historical animal studies, the corporeality of animals has always received special attention, and animal historians have repeatedly pointed out that the bodily contact between humans and animals allows significant conclusions to be drawn about past and present societies. In addition to human-animal contacts, historians, especially those with a preference for medical history, have in recent years explored the bodily imperfection of humans and animals. In particular, the historical dimensions of the practices of healing as well as the production of knowledge through medical testing laboratories and animal experiments have been increasingly discussed with reference to post-humanist approaches. Donna Haraway’s ideas about the “co-constitutive” nature of human and animal bodies has found productive application in animal and historical pandemic research.³² In a joint contribution, the medical

30 Arianna Ferrari: *Anthropozentrismus: Zur Problematisierung des Mensch-Tier-Dualismus*. In: Diehl / Tuider (eds): *Haben Tiere Rechte?*, pp. 353–365, here p. 362.

31 Weber (ed.): *Lehr- und Lesebuch*, p. 84

32 See, among others, Dominik Merdes: *Co-Constitutive Relationships in Modern Medicine: Körper-Werden um die Geburtsstunde der modernen Chemotherapie*. In: *Zeitschrift für Körpergeschichte* 2:4 (2016), pp. 329–364, here pp. 262–263. The basis for the reflections here is provided by: Donna Haraway: *Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s*. In *Socialist Review* 80 (1985), pp. 65–108; idem: *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*. New York: Routledge 1991.

historian Daniela Haarmann and the animal ethicist Kerstin Weich note that animal epidemics in the nineteenth century were interpreted less as a disturbance in an organism than as a disturbance of the national order. In their words, animal epidemics were considered “an attack on the health of the national body.”³³

The display of animal bodies in the context of educational and learning processes must also be critically viewed from the perspective of historical animal welfare and animal rights education since the material remains of animal bodies still lie buried not only in curiosity cabinets, evidence rooms, and museum collections, or in animal cemeteries and monuments in public spaces, but are also preserved in taxidermied form in the biology cabinets of schools and universities.³⁴ The display of animal bodies is reflected in the reified mode of everyday language: “their dead bodies are not ‘corpses’ but ‘carcasses.’”³⁵ Time and again, students in history lessons encounter forms of dehumanization and objectification in their investigations of hunting and hunting culture in prehistory and early history, in lessons on colonialism and imperialism, and in France under the *Ancien Régime*. Animals are not killed but “bagged” or “culled”; they are not frightened into fleeing from the hounds but “put up.” The rights and protection of animal bodies are undermined by this use of language, a language which makes it easier to speak about killing and forgives the act of killing itself.³⁶

5. Exploring spatial human-animal relationships

In 1980, the British art historian John Peter Berger published an essay entitled “Why Look at Animals?” Referring to animals locked up in zoos, he criticized the marginalization and imprisonment of nonhuman bodies as a symbol of Western capitalism. While animals, according to Berger, disappeared elsewhere, in zoos they were stylized as monuments to their own disappearance.³⁷ Berger linked the material display of animal bodies to a critique of

33 Daniela Haarmann / Kerstin Weich: Geschichte der Tiermedizin. In: Borgards (ed.): *Tiere*, pp. 149–159, here p. 154.

34 Hübner / Roscher: Pandadiplomatie, p. 122.

35 Reinhard Heuberger: Tiermetaphern und andere anthropozentrische Sprachphänomene: Was sie über das Mensch-Tier-Verhältnis aussagen. In: Diehl / Tuider (eds): *Haben Tiere Rechte?*, pp. 366–378, here p. 369.

36 Ibid., p. 370.

37 John Peter Berger: *Why Look at Animals?* [1980]. London: Penguin 2009, p. 36.

their spatial confinement and disenfranchisement, and unmasked the liminal spaces and places that were thought to belong to animals. Berger's reflections spread widely in the years that followed and were taken up in the writings of cultural geographers such as Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert. Their fundamental differentiation between "animal spaces," that is, spaces assigned to animals by humans, and "beastly places," that is, places that animals appropriate for themselves, is now widely accepted in historical animal studies.³⁸

Such distinctions are not unfamiliar in the history of animal rights and animal welfare education and can be found in nineteenth-century textbooks. In these works, readers could always rely on the authors providing them with information about the spatial orders of animal husbandry. In the *World History Guide for Secondary and Elementary Schools* mentioned above, the authors distinguished between domestic dogs and cats, animals that lived in the home, and animals in the poultry yard and barn, and made precise spatial allocations. While a parlor companion like the goldfish was to be placed in a larger water vessel, cattle, sheep, and goats, according to the guide, belonged in the barn.³⁹ However, the authors of the *World History Guide* could not deny that some animals – against the will of humans – took possession of the parlor room and the bedroom. Houseflies, fleas, and bedbugs, as well as cockroaches and moths, were therefore all declared uninvited guests in the house; kitchens, pantries, cupboards, and furniture crevices were proclaimed places of animal disorder.⁴⁰

In addition to a basic understanding of past spatial human-animal relations, historical animal welfare and animal rights education must create an understanding of the historicity of spatiality. After all – to stay with the example of the farm – the parlors, bedrooms, and farms were not static products of social spatial practices but were in a constant state of flux. The dog, to take just one animal as an example, migrated from the rural farmyards to the streets of the metropolises in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, sneaking from there into the parlor rooms of the bourgeoisie and, at the end of the twentieth century, not infrequently finding a place at the foot of their owner's bed. With this spatial reconfiguration of human-dog relationships,

38 Chris Philo / Chris Wilbert (eds): *Animal Spaces, Beastly Places: New Geographies of Human Animal Relations*. London: Taylor & Francis 2005, especially pp. 1–35.

39 Renner / Feddeler / Hüttmann / Jastram et al. (eds): *Weltkunde-Leitfaden*, pp. 306–314.

40 Ibid., pp. 309–310.

not only did the social practices of human and animal actors change, but the protective and legal relationships between humans and dogs also changed dramatically.⁴¹

Generally speaking, industrialization, mechanization, and urbanization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to a radical transformation of spatial human-animal relations. Animals were now fixed within a certain space, hierarchized, and sometimes legally excluded. Whether animals were desired or allowed in certain places depended not least on spatial discourses. Thus, with the beginning of the twentieth century, the rat was domesticated and, in some respects, relocated: the Norway rat was still considered a pest in public spaces, but the laboratory rat rose to become indispensable in animal testing laboratories. The fancy rat found its way into the rooms of urban teenagers.⁴² Meanwhile, urban decision-makers declared more and more places to be prohibited areas for animals or created spaces that were defined by the absence of animals. In a countryside supposedly free from human influence, humans slowly but steadily invaded the last refuges of wild animals.⁴³ While horses and cows not only disappeared from the newly created parks and gardens of metropolises such as New York and San Francisco,⁴⁴ humans also restricted any remaining free spaces for animals by establishing large-scale wildlife reserves and national parks, “which, as state-decreed and scientifically sanctioned spaces of the wild animal, became a constant field of conflict between animal and human rights.”⁴⁵

For historical animal welfare and animal rights education, these considerations result in a particular challenge: these fields must initiate reflections on the spatial allocations and orders of human-animal relations, make the hierarchical structures of the spatial transparent, and then discuss the consequences of spatial configurations for animal welfare and animal rights. This can only succeed, of course, if the relationships between the spatial, the material, and the corporeal are considered together within the framework of a cultural studies reorientation of history didactics and the insights of human-animal histories enter school classrooms.

41 Robichaud: *Animal City*, p. 195.

42 See, among others, Pascal Eitler: In tierischer Gesellschaft: Ein Literaturbericht zum Mensch-Tier-Verhältnis im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. In: *Neue Politische Literatur* 54:2 (2009), pp. 207–224, here p. 207.

43 Jessica Ullrich: Editorial. In: *Tierstudien* 6 (2014), pp. 7–14, here p. 7.

44 Robichaud: *Animal City*, pp. 13–46. Significantly, the chapter is entitled “Cow Town.”

45 Bernhard Gissibl: Das kolonisierte Tier. Zur Ökologie der Kontaktzonen des deutschen Kolonialismus. In: *WerkstattGeschichte* 56 (2011), pp. 7–28, here p. 10.

6. Historical animal welfare and animal rights education

So, how can educators initiate learning processes that sustainably anchor the ideas of animal welfare and animal rights in history didactics and history teaching? What recommendations for reflection and action can be derived from the basic themes of historical animal welfare and animal rights education? Even in the age of the Anthropocene, history didactics and history teaching are still characterized by their pronounced anthropocentrism. The animal, as we have already seen, continues to represent the nonhuman “other” in classrooms and study rooms and “is consistently demarcated from the human.”⁴⁶ Such anthropocentrism, of course, is no stranger to other subjects and classrooms in primary, secondary, and higher education. Speaking on behalf of educational philosophers and scholars of moral education, animal rights philosopher Kai Horsthemke recently remarked that “[l]eading journals of philosophy of education and moral education, too, have tended to contain comparatively little about the treatment, status and rights of other-than-human animals, and about the relevance of such philosophical thought within education and pedagogy.”⁴⁷ Introducing the term “institutional anxiety,” Helena Pedersen, a leading scholar in the fields of critical animal pedagogy and human-animal education, even detects a sort of infrastructural anthropocentrism of educational institutions, built on “unspoken assumptions about human exceptionalism.”⁴⁸ Educators and scholars must counter this infrastructural anthropocentrism. In its place, they should introduce post-humanist approaches and objectives to didactics and teaching – that is, humans should not be the end or key point of historical animal rights and animal welfare education anymore. Instead, it is time to conceive a *humanimal* history of animal rights and animal welfare.⁴⁹ According to the animal historian Amir Zelinger, this would lead to minor stories of partnerships between humans and animals and the exploration of minor anecdotes, in which “the emergence of such relationships is described.”⁵⁰

46 Hübner / Roscher: *Pandadiplomatie*, p. 126.

47 Kai Horsthemke: *Animal Rights Education*. Cham: Springer 2018, p. xiv. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98593-0> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

48 Helena Pedersen: Education, Anthropocentrism, and Interspecies Sustainability: Confronting Institutional Anxieties in Omnicidal Times. In: *Ethics and Education* 16:2 (2021), pp. 164–177, here p. 165. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2021.1896639> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

49 Amir Zelinger: *Menschen und Haustiere im Deutschen Kaiserreich: Eine Beziehungsgeschichte*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2018, p. 20. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839439357> (accessed: January 20, 2022).

50 *Ibid.*, p. 24–25.

At the same time, educators and scholars should initiate reflections on the historical varieties of animal welfare and animal rights and their changes. With regard to the origins of the animal welfare and animal rights movement in the nineteenth century, Mieke Roscher has shown how animal welfare discourse was gradually emotionalized during the transition from anthropocentric to pathocentric animal welfare. Building on the ideas of utilitarianism and legal developments in England, an animal welfare movement took shape in the German-speaking world that, according to historical animal studies consensus, no longer focused on the morality of humans but on the capacity of animals to suffer. In the twentieth century, an economization and politicization of the discourse on animal welfare took place, bringing about a multitude of new terms in debates on animal welfare and animal rights. In addition to the concept of “animal rights” per se, these included the concept of “animal liberation” and that of “speciesism” as an institutionalized form of “animal oppression.”⁵¹

The historicization and contextualization of concepts related to animal welfare and animal rights can be taken as starting points for educational and learning processes that offer many opportunities to further reflect on history didactics and teaching: concepts often gain strength in the context of social conflicts, which also involve processes of social transformation and change. Within such conflicts, animal welfare and animal rights issues are often used for political positioning and contribute to the implementation or realization of interests. For example, conflicts about gender relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were repeatedly negotiated through debates on animal welfare and animal rights. Especially in Great Britain, where the proportion of women in almost all animal welfare organizations was high, activists were able to closely link their commitments to animal welfare and animal rights with questions about their own emancipation. Similar tendencies manifested themselves in the German-speaking countries. However, women’s rights activists acted more cautiously there as they did not want to expose their goals to the accusations of hysteria to which their English comrades-in-arms had been subject.⁵²

Accordingly, future (historical) animal welfare and animal rights education will require critical reflection on the interconnections of central processes of transformation and the developments of human-animal relations. Scholars

51 Roscher: *Geschichte des Tierschutzes*, p. 180.

52 Mieke Roscher: *Geschichte des Tierschutzes: Von der Aufklärung bis zur veganen Revolution*. In: Diehl / Tuider (eds): *Haben Tiere Rechte?*, pp. 39–52, here pp. 43–44.

need to rethink gender conflicts, industrialization, urbanization, colonialism, and many other topics through the lens of animal welfare and animal rights history and make them productive for educational and learning processes. If further recommendations for action are to be derived from these reflections, then these recommendations must also take into account the current discussions taking place in history didactics and the curricular guidelines for history teaching. However, the aim is not for these insights – as is often the case – to indirectly lead to the relegitimization or reinstallation of anthropocentric convictions, to the ahistorical application of concepts, or to the supposedly unavoidable separation between historical subject areas in history didactics and history teaching. Instead, historical animal welfare and animal rights education provide opportunities to challenge established settings and approaches and should encourage teachers and students to create lessons that go “against the grain.” In doing so, historical animal welfare and animal rights education would be responding to current calls for an “orientation toward competencies,” supporting task-oriented approaches, and could easily be implemented in history didactics and teaching by employing case-analytical, biographical, and longitudinal as well as cross-sectional concepts.⁵³ The curricular prerequisites for this educational turn are in place in many countries; the only thing left is to arouse the willingness of teachers and learners to use interdisciplinary methods in order to rediscover and teach familiar topics from the perspective of animal welfare law.

From a thematic perspective, the transformations that took place in human-animal welfare and animal rights during the National Socialist era require special attention in history didactics and teaching. As early as on November 24, 1933, the Nazi regime passed the Reich Animal Protection Act (Reichstierschutzgesetz), which in its novelty went far beyond the animal welfare and animal rights measures of the time, specifically making animal cruelty and vivisection punishable, but nevertheless taking up previous ideas and policies from the days of the Weimar Republic.⁵⁴ From the beginning, the law also formed an integral “component of the reorganization of society

53 Andreas Körber / Niko Gärtner / Annika Stork / Hanna Hartmann: Task-Based History Learning (TBHL): Ein Konzept für reflexive Lernaufgaben im Geschichtsunterricht? In: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtsdidaktik* 20 (2021), pp. 197–212. <https://doi.org/10.13109/zfgd.2021.20.1.197> (accessed: February 4, 2022).

54 Maren Möhring: „Herrentiere“ und „Untermenschen“. Zu den Transformationen des Mensch-Tier-Verhältnisses im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland. In: *Historische Anthropologie* 19:2 (2011), pp. 229–244, here p. 230. <https://doi.org/10.7788/ha.2011.19.2.229> (accessed: January 21, 2022).

on a racist national basis.”⁵⁵ The National Socialist regime brought, organized and institutionalized animal welfare under its control, ousted radical progressive animal welfare activists, and designed almost all animal welfare law measures in such a way that racist and biologicistic concepts, instead of animal welfare, provided the guiding principles for future Nazi policies.⁵⁶ Furthermore, they regularly disregarded essential elements – for example, concerning animal experiments – because they were able to suspend them on the grounds of war-relevant research, among other things. The historian Maren Möhring has impressively demonstrated that “the inclusion of animals in a cross-species National Socialist *Lebensgemeinschaft* [...] was constitutively linked to the exclusion (and extermination) of certain groups of people.”⁵⁷ The Reich Animal Protection Act further excluded, restricted, and defamed Jewish life in particular. Henceforth, it was punishable to slaughter animals according to Jewish rites, and Jews were denounced in public as callous vivisectionists or cattle traders for whom, according to Nazi propaganda, the animal was merely a thing with monetary value.⁵⁸

Furthermore, the Reich Animal Protection Act was unmistakably intertwined with the National Socialist programs of the *Volks Gemeinschaft* (people’s community) and *Lebensgemeinschaft* (biocoenosis, a community based on biocoenotic principles, at times also described as ecological community). This also affected the biopolitical consequences of the law, as again Maren Möhring has demonstrated: animals were classified into “lower” and “higher” species, healthy and useful animals were included in the *Lebensgemeinschaft*, and measures were initiated against so-called “vermin” that threatened collective entities such as the “German forest” and the “German people.”⁵⁹ This process was accompanied by the “racial improvement” of certain people and animals, while others were degraded to “vermin” and “parasites.” Animal welfare and animal rights were now discursively intertwined with the National Socialist exclusion and persecution of people as “vermin” and “subhumans.”⁶⁰

For historical animal welfare and animal rights education, a critical discussion of the Nazi regime is unavoidable. Scholars must not only deconstruct

55 Möhring: „Herrentiere“ und „Untermenschen“, p. 230.

56 Mieke Roscher: Tierschutz- und Tierschutzbewegung: Ein historischer Abriss. In: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 62:8–9 (2012), pp. 34–40, here p. 35.

57 Möhring: „Herrentiere“ und „Untermenschen“, p. 231.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid., p. 235.

60 Ibid., p. 243.

the myths of an “animal-friendly” Nazi policy but also counter the myth that the Reich Animal Protection Act was passed solely for propagandistic reasons. The Reich Animal Protection Act was, from the outset, fully embedded within the antisemitic, biological, and culturally racist ideologies of the Nazi system and at the same time part of their realization. In other words, understanding animal welfare and animal rights in the Nazi state will further our understanding of National Socialist society and rule as such.

7. Against anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism

“The question is not, Can they *reason*? Nor, Can they *talk*? But, Can they *suffer*?” the British social reformer Jeremy Bentham asks in his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* in 1789.⁶¹ With this statement Bentham, like many other utilitarians, brought the sentience and suffering of animals to the fore and linked them to questions of animal rights: “The day may come, when the rest of animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withhelden from them but by the hand of tyranny.”⁶² While Bentham’s inspirations were certainly in tune with the sentiments of the French Revolution, they provided decisive impulses for modern animal welfare and animal rights movements in the years that followed – even if modern animal welfare and animal rights movements have rightly criticized the pathocentrism inherent in Bentham’s ideas. In hindsight, the wording of his question seems to be of particular interest for historical animal welfare and animal rights education. In his *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Bentham used the term “the rest of the animal creation” to describe nonhuman animals and, in a sense, moved beyond the speciesism of his day.

61 Jeremy Bentham: *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* [1789]. Oxford: Clarendon 1823, Ch. XVII, Section 1, IV, Note 1, p. 311: “The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withhelden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognised, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the *os sacrum*, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they *reason*? Nor, Can they *talk*? But, Can they *suffer*?”

62 Ibid.

Bentham's comments are therefore an excellent starting point for future historical animal welfare and animal rights education. Above all, reading his writings and those of his (many) successors allows us to explore the historical changes that have occurred in animal welfare and animal rights discourses. The same can be said for the German-language textbooks and readers of the nineteenth century. They, too, reflect the changes that have been constantly taking place in animal welfare and animal rights discourses, and thus provide a glimpse into the anthropocentric frameworks of early animal welfare and animal rights education. From warnings against being "bad-tempered and easily angered" by animals to the condemnation of "profane cursing and shameful cruelty to animals," the textbooks not only educated young pupils and future farmers about how to treat of animals but also introduced them to discourses of human morality, ethics, and religion.⁶³

Historical animal rights and animal welfare education may help us to realize interspecies learning projects, but even more so within the framework of an inter- and transdisciplinary educational process, it can help us to anchor the ideas of animal welfare and animal rights not only in history didactics and history teaching, but also in the learning processes of school and university environments. Here, animal welfare and animal rights education are closely connected to topics of sustainability, the climate crisis, and environmental challenges, and favor – as do ecocriticism, new materialism and post-humanist critique – a "holistic, responsible, and multifaceted understanding of our world(s)."⁶⁴

Animal welfare and animal rights education need to confront today's anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism. Considering resonance pedagogy, animal welfare and animal rights education must, as Simone Horstmann recently noted, overcome the appropriation, aggression, and dominance of past human-animal relationships.⁶⁵ The prerequisite for this is understanding

63 Weber (ed.): *Lehr- und Lesebuch*, p.84.

64 Roman Bartosch: Animals outside the Machine. In: *Anglistik: International Journal of English Studies* 27:2 (2016), pp. 147–164, here p. 148.

65 Simone Horstmann: Was und wie man über, von und mit Puten lernen kann: Einleitende Überlegungen zur resonanz- und emanzipationstheoretischen Bedeutung eines „Interspezies Lernens“. In: Idem (ed.): *Interspezies Lernen: Grundlinien interdisziplinärer Tierschutz- und Tierrechtsbildung*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2021, pp. 9–25, here p. 15. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839455227-001> (accessed: January 21, 2022); see also Wolfgang Endres: *Resonanzpädagogik in Schule und Unterricht: Von der Entdeckung neuer Denkmuster*. Basel / Weinheim: Beltz 2020; Hartmut Rosa: *Resonanz: Eine Soziologie der Weltbeziehung*. Berlin: Suhrkamp 2016.

historical human-animal relations and how they have changed as represented in the practices, spatiality, physicality, and materiality of those relations and as outlined in the recommendations for reflection and action. This could initiate a process of interspecies education that would sooner or later put an end to the “malicious and wanton cruelty” to animals that Thomas Erskine denounced over two hundred years ago.

Roman Bartosch

Dying to Learn

Teaching Human-Animal Studies in an Age of Extinction

At heart, every educational endeavor is an optimistic one. Education is grounded in the conviction that learners can be empowered and should be allowed and encouraged to grow, and it seeks to foster agency, autonomy, and well-being. Sustainability-related education or pedagogies in the context of climate change are no exception: here, too, hope is, as David Orr puts it, an imperative.¹ This rather general inclination toward “hope” has a programmatic and institutionalized match in curricula and policy documents where “competence orientation” – despite various and often justified points of critique – underlines the educational belief in a learner’s eventual ability and autonomy when it comes to solving problems and employing sets of skills for a good life, however defined. And yet, such compulsory optimism begs a number of questions. One key question has to do with the instrumentalist and anthropocentric nature of educational hopes in the context of this volume’s interest in the teaching of human-animal studies, particularly with regard to the catastrophic dimensions of extinction in times of climate change and the radical loss of biodiversity. Against the backdrop of unfolding catastrophes, we have to interrogate the nature of educational hopes based on notions of competent progress, which, in the modern imaginary, constitutes a core educational value in and of itself, even though it always links autonomy and subjectivation with mastery and anthropocentric hubris.

1 David W. Orr: *Hope Is an Imperative: The Essential David Orr*. Washington: Island 2011.

Current work on posthumanist education and critical pedagogies of different vantages are concerned with this branch of critique and provide helpful and much-needed recalibrations of educational theory and practice in this regard.² Despite the reformatory thrust of these interventions, however, the traditional story of education by and large remains unchanged as far as basic plotlines are concerned: education can make learners and the world better; it can refine their sensibilities, provide them with the knowledge necessary for a better political, social, and personal life – and not least enable them to become critical, engaged citizens.³ While acknowledging the relevance of such aspirations, this chapter therefore asks: What are educators to make of pedagogy's foundational dogma when its basic promises no longer hold? What, in other words, can we hope for in times of extinction? In the drastic phrasing of Lee Zimmerman, we have to think about the steps necessary “to prevent global warming from reaching a tipping point where less fucked turns into more fucked”⁴ while clinging to the hope that education matters. Educators thus have to ask themselves what educational vision might look like when climate change and large-scale, global extinction events suggest a whole generation of learners (and many more to come) might be “more fucked” than previous generations. Put less bluntly: we have to rethink an educational practice built on the conviction, no longer tenable, that the future will be the same as the present, only better. As educators, this might mean that we take seriously Roy Scranton's memorable phrase that we have to “learn to die in the Anthropocene.”⁵

2 See Nathan Snaza / John A. Weaver (eds): *Posthumanism and Educational Research*. London / New York: Routledge 2015. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315769165> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Roman Bartosch / Sieglinde Grimm (eds): *Die Materie des Geistes: Der material turn im Kontext von Literatur- und Bildungsgeschichte um 1800*. Heidelberg: Winter 2018; Roman Bartosch / Julia Hoydis (eds): *Teaching the Posthuman*. Heidelberg: Winter 2019; David Gerlach (ed.): *Kritische Fremdsprachendidaktik: Grundlagen – Ziele – Beispiele*. Tübingen: Narr 2020.

3 See, e.g., Michael Byram: *From Foreign Language Education to Education for Intercultural Citizenship: Essays and Reflection*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters 2008. <https://doi.org/10.21832/9781847690807> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

4 Lee Zimmerman: *Trauma and the Discourse of Climate Change: Literature, Psychoanalysis, and Denial*. London / New York: Routledge 2020, p. 2. Zimmerman here refers to a discussion sparked by geophysicist Brad Werner. For an insightful discussion of the consequences of such forthright estimations in the public discussions around climate and catastrophes, see John H. Richardson: When the End of Human Civilization Is Your Day Job. In: *Esquire*, July 20, 2018. <https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a36228/ballad-of-the-sad-climatologists-0815/> (accessed: December 15, 2020).

5 Roy Scranton: *Learning to Die in the Anthropocene: Reflections on the End of a Civilization*. San Francisco: City Lights 2015.

Learning to die, dying to learn:

Extinction events and communities of practice

In light of this dire context, an honest discussion of education in times of extinction could well begin by reflecting on the sixth extinction event in which we find ourselves at the beginning of the new millennium. And it might recount and assess the many challenges (not only) for formal educational contexts. As the scholar and film critic E. Ann Kaplan puts it, anxiety about future developments against the backdrop of runaway climate change is currently exacting new psychological taxonomies that include not just post-but also pre-traumatic stress.⁶ Confronted with an “increasing number of futurist dystopian worlds in film and literature”⁷ and steeped in building levels of hopelessness in the face of the expectable deterioration of economic, social, and environmental standards, learners are put at increasing risk of unprecedented anxiety about the “coming barbarism.”⁸ It is because of this mismatch between existential crises and the disturbingly jolly lingo of educational policies of sustainability that Isabelle Stengers sharply criticizes the current fashion of greenwashing educational practice, writing that extant educational frameworks and institutions only reproduce narratives of progress and solutionism, lacking significantly when it comes to engendering transformative and collaborative capabilities:

Where, in schools, are the modes of working together that would create a taste for the demands of cooperation and the experience of the strength of a collective that works to succeed “all together” against the evaluation that separates and judges? [...] [Instead individual competition] keeps coming back, again and again, like a refrain, and it asks us to pretend to believe that things will end up sorting themselves out, and that [...] we would do the same thing, and that our own task is limited to insulating our houses, changing our lightbulbs, etc., but also to continue buying cars because growth has to be supported.⁹

6 E. Ann Kaplan: *Climate Trauma: Foreseeing the Future in Dystopian Film and Fiction*. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP 2015, p. 2. <https://doi.org/10.36019/9780813564012> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

7 Kaplan: *Climate Trauma*, p. 1.

8 Isabelle Stengers: *In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism*. London: Open Humanities Press 2015. <http://www.openhumanitiespress.org/books/titles/in-catastrophic-times/> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

9 Ibid., p. 31.

Similar criticism has been levelled at theories and practices of education for sustainable development by scholars and teachers working on pedagogies of global citizenship and education for sustainability and the environment. Malin Ideland, for instance, writes about what she calls the “eco-certified child,” arguing that what current educational practice is concerned with is a very specific – conscious, rational, and cosmopolitan – subject, whose disciplining relates to individual consumer choices rather than political consciousness and agency.¹⁰ Any discussion of education that takes sustainability or non-anthropocentrism seriously must therefore engage with the tendency inherent in pedagogic policy and research to uncritically endorse an optimistic notion of action and activity as the main educational focus and objective. In particular, it has to challenge its actionist subtexts and inquire if they feed into a potentially outdated or damaging narrative of mastery and progress, or if notions of agency can be readjusted so as to sustain communities of practice and resilience in the face of widespread and recognized vulnerabilities. Taking my cue from Hannah Arendt’s famous distinction between the *vita activa* and the *vita contemplativa*,¹¹ I want to probe the potential meanings of such a reconsideration and suggest formal education as a school for “contemplative action” in multispecies societies at risk. In order to spell out more clearly what I mean by contemplative action, let me begin by recalling a different extinction event currently under way. Before COVID-19 necessitated digitized and remote educational engagements, the streets were awash with pupils demanding transformative action and their right to learn the right things: Fridays for Future and the Extinction Rebellion, among many other initiatives and action groups, have given the lie to the idea of an apolitical youth with almost unprecedented clarity and insistence, and instead pointed a finger at the apoliticity of current educational systems, unable and unwilling to tackle the most pressing concerns of the present and future. In a remarkable twist in the established narrative that says that educators know which competences are needed and how to support their acquisition, it is from the mouths of pupils that teachers, politicians, and global economic players are now being reprimanded for excessive, fatal inaction and for ignoring the need to finally change our ways.

10 Malin Ideland: *The Eco-Certified Child: Citizenship and Education for Sustainability and Environment*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2019.

11 Hannah Arendt: *The Human Condition*. Chicago: U of Chicago P 1958.

The crucial – and somewhat painful – questions educators have to ask themselves are these: Why is such a forceful movement built on *absence* from schools?¹² Have pupils already acquired sufficient transformative, communicative, and media competences that they now can become game-changers and turn their thoughts into sustainable action? Or are these demonstrations and movements putting to shame yesteryear’s educational reforms, our established standards of assessment, and the “professionalization” of teachers as mediators of efficient instruction while overlooking the fact that the kids were *not* alright because they saw, and understood, how former generations simply ignored scientific facts and shunned their responsibility? For better or worse, it seems obvious to me that students are indeed “dying to learn” – and that we need educational theories and practices that acknowledge and address both this unambiguous demand for meaningful pedagogy and the potential that this demand holds for formal education.

This observation is not only a call for greater awareness of sustainability or the import of scientific literacy in the current or future curriculum, but is also forcing me, as someone working in the field of English language teaching and the teaching of literature and culture, to better explain what we bring to the interdisciplinary table.¹³ My suggestion of “contemplative action” is an attempt in this direction and intends to combine the strengths of humanist education when it comes to historicizing and diversifying perceptions and interpretations of crises with the prerogative of communicative agency in language and culture pedagogy (such as multiliteracies and symbolic competence).¹⁴ With regard to the looming threat of extinction for supposedly autonomous learners and the enduringly optimistic enterprise of education, I suggest we up our interest in the creative dimension of literary and cultural learning, and try to understand learning groups as inclusive “communities of practice” whose focus is on relative and relational agency in the specific environment of the classroom. When Harald Welzer speaks of

12 See, e.g., Jürgen Budde: Die Fridays-for-Future-Bewegung als Herausforderung für die Schule. In: *Die Deutsche Schule* 112:2 (2020), pp. 216–228.

13 I have sketched some ideas concerning such a conversation in Roman Bartosch: What If We Stopped Pretending? Environmental Catastrophe and the Limits of “Education for Sustainability.” In: *Anglistik: International Journal of English Studies* 32:3 (2021), pp. 157–171. <https://doi.org/10.33675/ANGL/2021/3/13> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

14 See Bill Cope / Mary Kalantzis: *Multiliteracies: Literacy Learning and the Design of Social Futures*. London / New York: Routledge 2000; Claire Kramsch: *Language as Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108869386> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

Handlungsspielräume,¹⁵ I am tempted to take him quite literally to mean “playing fields” of distributed agency that we should seek to cultivate with learners eager to grow in an increasingly devastated world. My interest in distributed agency could help us to refrain from associating agency with autonomy, and action or activity with impact on a global scale, popular in much of the work being done on education for sustainable development. It instead underlines the import of meaningful engagements in times of helplessness and waning hopes for an “improved” future.

Creative catastrophe communication?

In order to spell out what such a revised focus on agency means in the context of a frightening present and a precarious future, I want to understand the communities of practice organized around literary education as a playing field of collaborative action and, from this angle, explore what we have to offer, as literary pedagogues and educators more generally, to those who have understood that they do not have a future but want to transform it. This includes an acknowledgment of those affects and concerns usually relegated out of sight in pedagogical debate or confined to the margins of a “dark pedagogy”¹⁶: hopelessness, anger, vulnerability – and, eventually, flourishing in the ruins of a soon-gone civilization. As Jem Bendell reminds us, hopelessness may indeed lead to “emotional and even spiritual growth.” In his influential call for “deep adaptation,” he avers that in his own work with students, “inviting them to consider collapse as inevitable, catastrophe as probable and extinction as possible, has not led to apathy or depression. Instead, in a supportive environment, [...] something positive happens.”¹⁷ Whether or not “something positive” happens is, according to Bendell, closely tied to the “supportive environment,” the creation of which is part of every teacher’s responsibility. It challenges us to rethink opportunistic conceptions of agency when powerlessness and apathy abound in the world for which we are supposedly

15 Harald Welzer: *Selbst denken: Eine Anleitung zum Widerstand*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 2013, p. 222.

16 Stefan Bengtson / Martin Hauberg-Lund Laugesen / Jonas Andreassen Lysgaard: *Dark Pedagogy: Education, Horror and the Anthropocene*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19933-3> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

17 Jem Bendell: Deep Adaptation: A Map for Navigating Climate Tragedy. In: *IFLAS Occasional Paper 2* (July 27, 2018). <https://mahb.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/deepadaptation.pdf> (accessed: December 16, 2020).

educating young learners. If educators find themselves in a position where students are explicitly and vocally demanding sustainability, our task is to understand the valence of these demands – and to see them as calls for engaged and meaningful education or, at least, the honesty of taking despair and outrage seriously.

Asking what kind of support and what kind of positive outcome we should be working toward, I want to bring Bendell's demand for "deep adaptation" into dialogue with what educator Greg Misiasek calls the "broadening" and "widening" of understanding.¹⁸ Thus reconceived as something that can adapt to the demands of a precarious future, learning is about enriching our understanding of and eventually inhabiting a precarious planet by literary and cultural means. Instead of reinforcing the primacy of an "active" life over and against a "reflective" one, I suggest in particular that our strength lies in "contemplative action": communicative, reflective, and creative learning that refrains from burdening learners with the onus of transformative change that we supposedly know how to bring about because climate catastrophe and biodiversity loss are problems waiting for a clear-cut solution. Modelled around Gregory Fuller's concept of "serene hopelessness," my notion of contemplative action instead builds on the insight that we have yet "to learn to let go in our – species'! – hour of death" and reframes the imperative of hope as one of fruitful tension with the more existential questions of living and dying in times of extinction.¹⁹

When it comes to the teaching of human-animal studies, this means that we should not expect students to actually "do" something "about" extinction processes but to recognize and relate to them. This kind of relating entails cognitive and affective as well as creative processes; it does not preclude political (or individual) action, but instead of simplistically expecting literary learning to lead to predetermined forms of action, it is geared toward bearing witness, ruminating on its meanings, and thus repositioning oneself within a larger web of ecological and semiotic diversities under threat. This is what closely engaging with texts and creative ways of working through and with them can offer – and it is an intellectual and affective lesson not to be discarded lightly

18 Greg William Misiasek: *Educating the Global Environmental Citizen: Understanding Ecopedagogy in Local and Global Contexts*. New York: Routledge 2018. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315204345> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

19 Gregory Fuller: *Das Ende: Von der heiteren Hoffnungslosigkeit im Angesicht der ökologischen Katastrophe*. Hamburg: Meiner 2017, p. 108 (transl. R. B.).

as if it were not central to all meaningful engagement with what is happening and will continue to happen. Of course, this approach draws on prior work on the role and potential of literary learning in the contemporary educational system, also and especially in contexts of sustainability.

Literary fiction's specific potential when it comes to bringing home the further realities of animalities has long been recognized. Yet for a comprehensive account of what animal fictions mean in the educational settings of late modernity, we have to better understand its double nature between presencing and distancing. Let us begin with such literary presences. Bart H. Welling and Scottie Kapel remind us that our task is

presenting animals to students in the sense of making them *present* in literal, literary, bioregional and scientific terms, and by equipping students with analytical tools with which to make sense of the contemporary flood of visual animal imagery, essentially re-presenting these representations.²⁰

Indeed, they concede, “it may seem woefully naïve to herald the return of non-human creatures under present conditions, when they are worse off than they have been in some 65 million years.”²¹ But given the ubiquity of animals in human imaginaries as well as their role, as some would argue, in the emergence of writing and meaning,²² it is more than reasonable to look at the specific ways in which animals abound and reappear in human minds, and to formulate teaching objectives geared toward mobilizing these literary potentials.

For this endeavor, and with an eye to the insoluble ambiguities at the heart of human attempts to grasp the nonhuman animal other, various concepts have been proposed: some have suggested the “creaturely” and argued that this

20 Bart H. Welling / Scottie Kapel: The Return of the Animal: Presenting and Representing Non-Human Beings Respons-ably in the (Post-)Humanities Classroom. In: Greg Garrard (ed.): *Teaching Ecocriticism and Green Cultural Studies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012, pp. 104–116, here p. 105 (emphasis in original). https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230358393_9 (accessed: January 24, 2022).

21 Ibid., p. 104.

22 Roland Borgards / Catrin Gersdorf / Frederike Middelhoff / Sebastian Schönbeck (eds): *Texts, Animals, Environments: Zoopoetics and Eco-poetics*. Freiburg: Rombach 2019; Rodolfo Piskorski: *Derrida and Textual Animality: For a Zoogrammatology of Literature*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51732-8> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

notion helps us get “beyond the human-animal divide”²³; others have begun to critically rethink the links between animality and vulnerability.²⁴ Matthew Calarco suggests we move from paradigms of sameness and difference to a notion of indistinction, writing that indistinction changes the “*direction* in which such continuity [between humans and other animals] is thought.”²⁵ In contrast to thinkers concerned with sameness and human-animal continuity, “indistinction theorists attempt to develop ways of thinking about human beings, animals, and ethics in a manner that radically displaces human beings from the center of ethical reflection” – indistinction is, in other words, a question of “the specific ways in which difference is articulated in and through the human / animal distinction.”²⁶ Calarco’s proposal resonates with pedagogical tenets and methodologies, especially those informed by disability studies, and gender or queer studies, where techniques of dramatization and de-dramatization have been used to think differences differently.²⁷ Instead of arguing for or against ontological differences, we require teaching methodologies that both stress and leave behind a certain line of difference and, in doing so, do better justice to the fundamental ambiguity of literary animality while also sensitizing pupils for the contexts of its articulation.

And yet, in my estimation, education sells itself short if it views its prerogative as one of “presencing” alone. When teaching human-animal studies, we cannot ignore that we are teaching *literary* animals – and that the mediating processes that engender literary animals in the first place are exciting and important. In order to map the imaginative cartographies of literary semiodiversity,

23 David Herman (ed.): *Creatural Fictions: Human-Animal Relationships in Twentieth- and Twenty-First-Century Literature*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-51811-8> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Roman Bartosch / Dominik Ohrem (eds): *Beyond the Human-Animal Divide: Creaturely Lives in Literature and Culture*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-93437-9> (accessed: January 24, 2022); *European Journal of English Studies* 19:2 (2015): Modern Creatures, ed. by Virginia Richter / Pieter Vermeulen.

24 Michael Lundblad: *The Birth of a Jungle: Animality in Progressive-Era U. S. Literature and Culture*. Oxford: Oxford UP 2013. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199917570.001.0001> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Timothy C. Baker: *Writing Animals: Language, Suffering, and Animality in Twenty-First-Century Fiction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03880-9> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

25 Matthew Calarco: *Thinking through Animals: Identity, Difference, Indistinction*. Stanford: Stanford UP 2015, p.49 (emphasis in original). <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804796538> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

26 Ibid., p. 50.

27 See Jürgen Budde: Dramatisieren – Differenzieren – Entdramatisieren: Männlichkeitskonstruktionen im Unterricht. In: *Der Deutschunterricht* 1 (2006), pp.86–91.

animals need to be read and recognized in texts in more just and alert ways. This is especially the case in K-12 classroom situations that are different from the academic ones in which the above suggestions have been formulated. It might be hard to convince academics of the ethical importance of human-animal studies and the relevance of reading animals not as metaphors or symbols but *as* animals. But it is a different matter when it comes to pupils and their conviction that animals are worthwhile topics as well as real presences in fiction. In my experience, pupils always find the topic relevant and never have any difficulty in accepting animal presence. On the contrary, they might find it difficult *not* to since they are only at the beginning of a socialization process that eventually produces the kinds of anthropocentrism human-animal studies is writing against. This is not to romanticize children but to pay attention to their forms of reception and to the idea that an identificatory reading might be enriched by pointing to the complexity of the semiodiversity within which human and nonhuman animals are enmeshed.

As Ursula Heise, writing about the plethora of computer-generated animals in popular film and video games, reminds us:

Not infrequently, electronically and genetically engineered animals in literature and film appear alongside humans whose bodies and minds have been altered by similar techniques, and thereby raise complex questions about the relationship between humans, animals, and machines and their respective status in worlds where little that is purely “natural” is left.²⁸

My concern here is not the implications of this messy situation for “cyborg environmentalism”²⁹ but taking it as a cue for processes of literary learning that take full(er) advantage of the semiotic richness of naturalcultural environments by getting pupils to understand the complex mesh of meaning in which they are always situated. While Rosi Braidotti suggests “neoliterary readings” for academics long convinced there is nothing outside of a text, communities of practice in K-12 education might instead need to engage with the multitude of literary meaning in the first place.³⁰

28 Ursula K. Heise: *From Extinction to Electronics: Dead Frogs, Live Dinosaurs, and Electric Sheep*. In: Cary Wolfe (ed.): *Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal*. Minneapolis / London: U of Minnesota P 2003, pp. 59–81, here p. 60.

29 Ibid., p. 74.

30 Rosi Braidotti: *Posthuman, All Too Human: Towards a New Process Ontology*. In: *Theory, Culture & Society* 23:7–8 (2006), pp. 197–208; idem: *Animals, Anomalies, and Inorganic Others*. In: *PMLA* 124:2 (2009), pp. 526–532.

Inasmuch as biodiversity loss and the climate crisis are confronting us with the impoverishment of life, thinking about approaches to teaching “semio-diversity” and to finding pathways to literary and cultural enrichment is a small but meaningful measure against imaginative impoverishment. Literary education might therefore see as its main task the cultivation of an interest in acts of relating animality and textuality in ways that open up ambiguity and, thus, imaginative spaces for potential conviviality and flourishing. In order for this to come to fruition, we have to turn away from texts that render animals “more real” and learn to make sense of those that deliberately refrain from doing so.³¹ Max Porter’s *Grief is the Thing with Feathers* (2015),³² for instance, is all about a crow – however, this crow isn’t made of flesh and blood alone, but comes with a splendid plumage of intertextual and cultural allusions that help to resist compartmentalization into either the zoological or the symbolic. In literature’s in-betweenness lies a wealth of creative responses that are much needed in times of extinction and impoverished lives. Let us now ponder the promises such in-betweenness holds for teaching processes by looking at a literary example and its creative take on animality.

Exploring semio-diversity with Crow

Max Porter’s 2015 experimental novel *Grief Is the Thing with Feathers* tells the story of a family ravaged by the death of the mother. A slim volume of a good hundred pages, the novel’s lyrical and multiperspective narration render it both challenging and rewarding. The loss and grief around which the story revolves are explored from the perspectives of “Dad” and two “Boys,” and processes of trauma and healing are instigated with the perspective of “Crow,” who simply appears at the door one day: “*I won’t leave until you don’t need me anymore*” (GTF, p. 7, emphasis in original). Part trauma-therapeutic externalization, part familiar and literary fantasy, Crow thus enters the lives the Boys,

31 In this context, I have pointed to several other ways in which animality and creativity can inform educational practice, see Roman Bartosch: Augmented Animality: Immersion and Participation in Digital Environments. In: Christian Ludwig/ Claudia Deetjen (eds): *The World Beyond: Developing Critical Environmental Literacies in EFL*. Heidelberg: Winter 2021, pp. 143–162. For the inspirational potential of digital *animaux*, see Gretchen McCullough: A Linguist Explains the Grammar of Doge: Wow. In: *The Toast*, February 6, 2014. <https://the-toast.net/2014/02/06/linguist-explains-grammar-doge-wow/> (accessed: December 15, 2020).

32 Max Porter: *Grief Is the Thing with Feathers*. London: Faber & Faber 2015. Hereafter cited as GTF.

who have no problem accepting this otherworldly appearance as reality, and Dad, who happens to be a literary scholar writing on the crow symbol in Ted Hughes's poetry and has a harder time accepting the strange appearance of the mysterious Crow: "I wished I wasn't lying terrified in a giant bird embrace in my hallway" (GTF, p. 9). The text suggests that Dad had been "obsessing about this thing just when the greatest tragedy of [his] life occurred" (ibid.) – so his interest in symbolic crows coincides and is being linked to the fatality at the center of the narrative. At the same time, it is precisely the literary ambiguity of Crow that engenders healing. Ambiguities are thus the name of the game but seem to have an easier time with the Boys: it is they who sometimes still see their deceased mother and who cannot even be distinguished easily as characters themselves, which is made clear by the fact that their perspective is always rendered in the double focalization of "Boys." Even before Crow enters the family abode, we encounter some intertextual foreshadowing: the novel's title alludes to Emily Dickinson's poetry, and the narrative includes an epigraph of said poetry, graphically redesigned so as to make space for this naturalcultural beast:

That ~~love~~ CROW is all there is,
 Is all we know of ~~love~~ CROW;
 It is enough, the ~~freight~~ CROW should be
 Proportioned to the ~~groove~~ CROW.

Emily Dickinson

(GTF, epigraph)

The insertion of CROW here certainly presents the animal. However, it does not do so realistically but more in the manner of a highly stylized rearticulation of crow's "kraah-kraah-kraah" sound, which occurs repeatedly in the subsequent narrative as well.

None of the characters can really make sense of Crow, who, at times, is an allusion, a trickster, a fantasy to heal trauma – or even another human character, it seems. In one scene, the Boys listen to Crow, but the reader wonders if it is not Dad they hear:

Dad has gone. Crow is in the bathroom,
 where he often is because he likes the
 acoustics. We are crouched by the closed

door listening. He is speaking very slowly, very clearly. [...] he says SUDDEN. He says TRAUMA. He says Induced ... he coughs and spits and tries again, INDUCED. He says SUDDEN TRAUMA INDUCED ALTERATION OF THE ALERT STATE.
(GTF, p. 23)

It is through (Crow's?) croaky voice that the unspeakable is processed and Dad's book project, "Ted Hughes's Crow on the Couch: A Wild Analysis" (GTF, p. 27) takes shape. The point is, of course, that the text does this very self-consciously, mixing the obviously literary with the unsettlingly ambiguous, thus inviting readers to reflect on the unstable boundary between "real" animals and human cultural production.

Timothy Baker looks at this in-betweenness of Crow by focusing on the enormously productive tradition of animal figures onto which humans have projected emotions and suffering. He writes that "unlike such figures in many other texts, who exist entirely in relation to the human protagonists, Crow revels in this anthropocentric interpretation: he both accepts and exploits his enforced tradition."³³ By consciously foregrounding its intertextuality, Crow invites reflection on the semiodiversity that always underlies animal narratives but only rarely turns out to be a starting point for pedagogical interventions. In this case, interrogating culture through the slippery figure of the animal also reveals the limits of anthropocentrism, as Baker suggests:

The central paradox of Porter's novel is [...] that Crow is not "real" in any traditional sense, yet is successfully able, in both comic and horrifying ways, to guide the family through their grief. Literary texts cannot straightforwardly grant access to non-human consciousness as anything but a construct, but for Porter this is not a failure: rather, the nonhuman animal, when known in relation to the human, reveals something new and distinctive about human ways of imagining.³⁴

33 Baker: *Writing Animals*, p. 21.

34 Ibid. For a more detailed analysis of such literary agency, see Rita Felski: *Hooked: Art and Attachment*. Chicago / London: U of Chicago P 2020. <https://doi.org/10.7208/9780226729770> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Roman Bartosch: Forms of Agency, Agency of Forms: Reading and Teaching More-Than-Human Fictions. In: Bettina Burger / Yvonne Liebermann / Judith Rahn (eds): *Nonhuman Agencies in the Twenty-First-Century Anglophone Novel*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2021, pp. 27–43. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79442-2> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

One approach to teaching texts such as *Grief is the Thing with Feathers* would therefore be less concerned with zoological birds than with cultural nesting.³⁵ As Baker notes, the tradition of nesting animality within complex language games “stretches back to Aristotle.”³⁶ Given this productivity and abundance, a semiodiverse environment does not even have to be confined to single literary examples. The contemporary internet culture of memes in particular provides a fertile niche for playful hybrids of languaged and cultured animals that can be encountered in multimodal, mixed-ability classrooms, and that can further enrich learning environments with and through literary animality. Joela Jacobs rightly points to the “playful approach to language” and “ungrammatical utterances of animals” we find in “doge” memes – very syntax! so linguistics! many spelling! – and thus suggests how both contemporary and traditional texts can be integrated into a larger ecology of cultured ways of (re-)thinking animalities in education.³⁷

Such ecologies of meaning might also help to address a prevailing problem of scale. Porter’s novel, like many others, is primarily concerned with an individual death and its implications for family members and lovers. However, thinking extinction requires a different scope and different narratives, sometimes referred to as focusing on a “species scale.”³⁸ It is therefore necessary to reframe it within its semiodiverse environment and to reconsider our take on species when reading for animalities. I am much indebted to the newly emerging field of extinction studies in the environmental humanities when

35 Anthony Lioi: Teaching Green Cultural Studies and New Media. In: Greg Garrard (ed.): *Teaching Ecocriticism and Green Cultural Studies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012, pp. 133–143. Drawing on educational suggestions made by Joni Adamson, Lioi describes nesting as a practice “in which literary materials from the traditional canon are radically recontextualized through connections with contemporary media” (ibid., p. 136).

36 Baker: *Writing Animals*, p. 8.

37 Joela Jacobs: The Grammar of Zoopoetics: Human and Canine Language Play. In: Kári Driscoll / Eva Hoffmann (eds): *What Is Zoopoetics? Texts, Bodies, Entanglement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2018, pp. 63–79. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64416-5> (accessed: January 24, 2022). See also McCulloch: A Linguist Explains the Grammar of Doge.

38 See, for instance, David Farrier: *Anthropocene Poetics: Deep Time, Sacrifice Zones, and Extinction*. Minneapolis / London: U of Minnesota P 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14688417.2019.1639973> (accessed: January 24, 2022). The demand for species scale can be found in David Herman: *Narratology beyond the Human: Storytelling and Animal Life*. Oxford: Oxford UP 2018, p. 249. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190850401.001.0001> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

I speculate about how thinking about species scales plays out in the contexts of primary and secondary education.³⁹ If serene hopelessness in the classroom requires active contemplation and should be geared toward collaborative, creative means of engaging semiodiversity, one such avenue for finding common communicative ground is talking about literary experiences. Instead of interpretive readings that either domesticate animal characters into trite symbols or neoliteral readings that excitedly unearth animal remains in literary fiction, the main task would be to create textual environments not for animals but for the ubiquitous *animot*.⁴⁰ Conducting research on beloved animal characters would, then, not just mean checking on biological sites or carrying out a transnational habitat comparison, but looking out for and including in any presentation as many cultural references as possible, much in the sense of Porter's naturalcultural crow.⁴¹ Because aesthetic experience is an exercise in relating,⁴² talking about literary texts and the way they nest within media ecologies ought to be conceptualized as the task of giving voice to such relationalities. It is when pupils understand the ubiquitous nature of these relationalities that they begin to explore semiodiversity on a species scale.

A second conclusion also pertains to creativity and collaboration, and draws on Robert Macfarlane's idea of a "desecration phrasebook." In these unprecedented times, Macfarlane contends, we lack "a lexicon recording the particularities of the environments and phenomena that our actions as a species are bringing into being."⁴³ His claim that we need terms for "a heavily harnessed or drastically deranged 'nature': a 'Desecration Phrasebook', as it were," already sounds like a task for environmental learning as conceptualized here:

39 See Deborah Bird Rose / Thom van Dooren / Matthew Chrulew (eds): *Extinction Studies: Stories of Time, Death and Generations*. New York: Columbia UP 2017. <https://doi.org/10.7312/van-17880> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Genese Marie Sodikoff (ed.): *The Anthropology of Extinction: Essays on Culture and Species Death*. Bloomington / Indianapolis: Indiana UP 2012.

40 As per Jacques Derrida's *The Animal That Therefore I Am* (ed. by Marie-Louise Mallet, transl. from the French by David Wills. New York: Fordham UP 2008).

41 For more examples, see Bartosch: Augmented Animality.

42 Felski: *Hooked*, pp. 121–163.

43 Robert Macfarlane: Desecration Phrasebook: A Litany for the Anthropocene. In: *New Scientist*, September 15, 2015. <https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22830523-200-desecration-phrasebook-a-litany-for-the-anthropocene/> (accessed: December 15, 2020).

Is there a word yet for the post-natural rain that falls when a cloud is rocket-seeded with silver iodide? Or an island newly revealed by the melting of sea ice in the North-West Passage? Or the glistening tidemarks left on coastlines by oil spills?⁴⁴

To work on such a desecration phrasebook in the context of *animots* and their uncountable ways of extinction and attempts at de-extinction, and genetic and memetic revival, brings us closer still to the question with which this article began: What do we in literary and cultural education have to offer in times of extinction? How can we help learners to rethink what it means to “learn to die” in these perilous times? Maybe one way is to sit together and ponder what we have lost and are about to lose – in order to rein in denial but, most importantly, to also bring learners’ demands for meaningful content and pedagogical demands for meaningful communication into fruitful conversation. This might entail putting our languages and narratives to work: What do we call the last remaining specimen of a soon-to-be-extinct animal? How do we refer to those genetically brought back from the dead? And how might extinction *feel* for the last Kaua‘i ‘ō‘ō bird, singing its mating song for no one? Does that song have a name?⁴⁵

Such potential forms of creative pedagogical engagement are extinction learning in a twofold sense. In line with research in behavioral psychology and the neurosciences, extinction learning can be described as a way of unlearning – the letting-go of outdated information or the reassessment of prior knowledge in new and more complex reconfigurations. It is clear that what some call the Anthropocene requires exactly such kinds of reassessment and unlearning, and the same is, of course, true with regard to human-animal relationships, ontologies grounded on human exceptionalism, and the violent hierarchies of human / nonhuman binaries in everyday social and cultural practice. Secondly, extinction learning could and should be actively reframed as an effort to “[tell] extinction stories”⁴⁶ – not in the sense of fetishizing impoverishment but by aiming at surprising entanglements instead. Just think of Latour’s ANT “work-nets” that Felski mobilizes for classroom practice.⁴⁷ Constructions of

44 Macfarlane: Desecration Phrasebook.

45 Recordings of this song have found their way onto YouTube and can be accessed there.

46 Deborah Bird Rose / Thom van Dooren / Matthew Chrulew: Telling Extinction Stories: An Introduction. In: Idem (eds): *Extinction Studies*, pp. 1–17.

47 Felski: *Hooked*, pp. 143–146.

complex, naturalcultural webs of meaning in the classroom can be modelled upon such efforts to take into full consideration the complexity of the more-than-human (and human!) world.

The end of competence acquisition

As we move from individual deaths to the scale of extinction, we must call into question the notion of education, especially its individualist, optimist, and anthropocentric bias. Existing critical works on the omnipresent and powerful notion of competences in education have pointed to the limitations of the concept when it comes to individual and enduring learning processes that cannot be structured on the premises of observable action and problem-solving.⁴⁸ The short-sightedness of measuring performance in order to get to the heart of learning is powerfully underscored in the context of learning in times of climate catastrophe and extinction. There is just not much that most individual children can do about the agency of humanity as a whole. But learn they must, and they are dying to learn more. This, however, must not be taken as a call for greater complacency or giving up in the face of imminent disaster. After all, youth movements *are* making a difference, and it is indeed individual and collective agency that will do the trick. When we ask about the specific contours of teaching human-animal studies in the face of extinction, however, serene hopelessness is and will become, as I have argued, just as necessary as engaged activism.

But the nature of such learning processes may no longer be operationable under the moniker of competence orientation. It is radically subject-specific (in the twofold sense of catering to individuals and building on knowledge and practices in literary hermeneutics, philosophy, and pedagogy) as well as all about collaborative flourishing and play instead of measurable and problem-solving output. Over and against extant notions of more instrumentalizing forms of competence, this kind of flourishing is closer to the ideas that Jem Bendell sketches using the phrase “doom and bloom,”⁴⁹ or what

48 Richard Kahn: Towards Ecopedagogy: Weaving a Broad-Based Pedagogy of Liberation for Animals, Nature, and the Oppressed People of the Earth. In: Antonio Darder / Marta P. Baltodano / Rodolfo D. Torres (eds): *The Critical Pedagogy Reader*. London / New York: Routledge 2008, pp. 522–540.

49 Jem Bendell: Doom and Bloom: Adapting to Collapse. In: Extinction Rebellion (eds): *This Is Not a Drill: An Extinction Rebellion Handbook*. London: Penguin 2019, pp. 73–80.

Martha C. Nussbaum has discussed, together with Amartya Sen, under the heading of a “capabilities approach.”⁵⁰ The core capabilities Nussbaum refers to – life, bodily health, and integrity, sense and imagination and so forth – are by no means restricted to *homo sapiens*, and her concern for convivial relationships with other species underlines this point. Capabilities, resilience, and multispecies flourishing might advance as key terminological and conceptual cues for sustainability education in perilous times. Such education needs the literary imagination and aesthetic play.

In his magisterial *Narratology Beyond the Human*, David Herman charts a future path for narrative analysis “at species scale”: “Multiscale storytelling [...] has the potential to foster keener recognition of our inextricable interconnectedness with the larger biotic communities [...] on whose survival [...] our own survival depends.”⁵¹ And he concludes by saying, “Maximizing that potential is the overarching goal of [...] the project of developing a narratology beyond the human.”⁵² With his insightful study as well as many others in the field of literary and cultural human-animal studies, and with an ever-growing library of research publications in educational fields interested in “the animal question,” I hope it will become possible to rephrase Herman’s words with an eye to classroom practices. Maximizing the potential of storytelling is the overarching goal of the project of developing a pedagogy beyond the human.

50 Martha C. Nussbaum: *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2000; idem: *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2006, pp. 69–81.

51 Herman: *Narratology Beyond the Human*, p. 294.

52 Ibid.

Liza B. Bauer

Reading to Stretch the Imagination

Exploring Representations of “Livestock” in Literary Thought Experiments

1. Thought experiments in science and speculative fiction, and human-animal relationships

Her mind raced. She pictured a million steps in an endless meadow, her hoof planting itself again and again in the soft ground, an endless messy line showing only that she once took another step, that she once walked, that she once was. And then she watched the hoofmarks disappearing, washed over by the rain and the sun, washed over by the markings of other animals, maybe humans – bigger, stronger, faster animals, until the proof she had stepped was gone forever.¹

After acquiring human-like consciousness, the focalizer “Pig 323” in *The Awareness* (2014) is plagued by confusion and self-doubt. In contrast to an unnamed bear, a circus elephant called Nancy, and pet dog Cooper, her knowledge about her position in society as a “livestock” animal puts the pig in state of depression and even sparks a desire to become human. Her sentimental reflections on a lack of meaning in her life juxtapose her literal, creaturely “hoofmarks” with the more metaphorical “markings” that other animals, “maybe humans,” are able to leave on the world.² Similar to the *living* “livestock” animals, the “absent referents” in modern meat culture, Pig 323’s

1 Gene Stone / Jon Doyle: *The Awareness*. New York: Stone Press 2014, p. 114.

2 Ibid. See Anat Pick: *Creaturely Poetics: Animality and Vulnerability in Literature and Film*. New York: Columbia UP 2011.

bodily marks disappear “until the proof she had stepped was gone forever.”³ Yet this fictional pig eventually uses her “mind, [...] body [and] hooves” to reclaim control over her own fate as well as that of several other pigs, thus reinstating the significance of her piggish, albeit anthropomorphized steps.⁴ Science and speculative fiction (SF) storyworlds⁵ provide multiple access points to discuss human-animal relationships – especially as they can redefine, according to their own rules, who is facing whom in their portrayals. Nowadays, animal theorists, researchers, and activists are increasingly challenging conventional assumptions about a concrete human-animal boundary.⁶ Among these voices, literary animal studies (LAS) scholars are exploring the interrelations between textual animals and the living nonhumans they represent, thereby advocating the ability of literary texts to challenge anthropocentric or species-oriented ways of thinking.⁷ Connecting this to the human-animal studies’ (HAS) focus on relationality, the SF genre performs these functions effectively, as Sherryl Vint notes in *Animal Alterity* (2010):

In SF, the animal is us and we are the animal, all continually involved in a never-ending process of becoming, of imagining new ways of conceiving humans and animals, new ways of organising our social relations, new futures to inhabit.⁸

3 The concept of the “absent referent” is based on Carol J. Adams: *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory*. New York / London: Continuum 1990. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781501312861> (accessed: January 24, 2022). See also Annie Potts: What Is Meat Culture? In: Idem (ed.): *Meat Culture*. Leiden: Brill 2016, pp.1–30. <https://doi.org/10.52537/humanimalia.9532> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

4 Stone / Doyle: *The Awareness*, p. 193. See section 5 in this article.

5 See David Herman: Storyworld. In: Idem et al. (eds): *Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory*. London / New York: Routledge 2005, p. 570.

6 See Björn Hayer / Klarissa Schröder: Vorwort. In: Idem (eds): *Tierethik transdisziplinär: Literatur–Kultur–Didaktik*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2019, pp. 9–22, here p. 10. <https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839442593-017> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

7 See Seán McCorry / John Miller (eds): *Literature and Meat Since 1900*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2019, p. 8. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26917-3> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Roland Borgards: Tiere und Literatur. In: Idem (ed.): *Tiere: Kulturwissenschaftliches Handbuch*. Stuttgart: Metzler 2016, pp. 225–240. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05372-5> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

8 Sherryl Vint: *Animal Alterity: Science Fiction and the Question of the Animal*. Liverpool: Liverpool UP 2010, p. 227. <https://doi.org/10.5949/upo9781846316135> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

While SF has always explored questions of alterity – whether it manifests itself in aliens or the animal-aliens on our own planet – SF “thought experiments” have been increasingly imagining alternative models of human-nonhuman coexistence in recent decades.⁹

This article thus brings the SF genre to the fore in order to explore how literary texts can be productively taught in the light of HAS. In their contribution to discussions about animal rights,¹⁰ Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka advocate exploring and embracing the myriad potentials inherent in human-animal connections instead of cutting them off.¹¹ Literature invites readers to undertake such exploratory ventures: *What* would happen *if* animals could communicate in human language, for example, or were superior to humans in their intelligence? Would they subdue humankind, domesticate it, or coexist harmoniously? *What* would future animals look like *if* genetic engineering and tissue culture technologies advanced further? These and other scenarios can be enacted in literary storyworlds to yield insights into the current and future challenges of coexistence.¹² What would happen if humans stopped consuming animal products altogether? Would all cows, pigs, chickens, etc. become extinct? Narratologist Brian McHale has famously claimed that SF often envisions highly unlikely worlds that can encourage readers to critically reflect on current realities:

9 Ibid., p. 1. On the concept of literary thought experiments, see Brian McHale: *Science Fiction, Or, the Most Typical Genre in World Literature*. In: Pirjo Lyytikäinen / Minna Mäkelä (eds): *Genre and Interpretation*. Helsinki: Department of Finnish, Finno-Ugrian and Scandinavian Studies & The Finnish Graduate School of Literary Studies 2010, pp. 11–27; see also Frank Bornmüller / Johannes Franzen / Mathis Lessau (eds): *Literature as Thought Experiment? Perspectives from Philosophy and Literary Studies*. Paderborn: Fink 2019. <https://doi.org/10.30965/9783846764299> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

10 See Tom Regan: *The Case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley / Los Angeles: U of California P 1983; idem: *Von Menschenrechten zu Tierrechten*. In: Frederike Schmitz: *Tierethik: Grundlagentexte*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2014, pp. 88–114; Reingard Spannring / Reinhard Heuberger / Gabriela Kompatscher / Andreas Oberprantacher et al. (eds): *Tiere – Texte – Transformationen: Das Mensch-Tier-Verhältnis im Wandel*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2015.

11 Sue Donaldson / Will Kymlicka: *Zoopolis: Eine politische Theorie der Tierrechte*. Berlin: Suhrkamp 2013, p. 255.

12 See Catherine Z. Elgin: *The Laboratory of the Mind*. In: John Gibson / Wolfgang Huemer / Luca Poggi (eds): *A Sense of the World: Essays on Fiction, Narrative and Knowledge*. London: Routledge 2007, pp. 43–54.

Science fiction serves the valuable function of enabling us to imagine alternatives to received reality, empowering us to think of the world as *otherwise than it currently is*. By projecting new models, not just individuals, science fiction throws our own received reality-models into high relief; it estranges them, and encourages us to reflect on them.¹³

Along similar lines, Donna Haraway stresses that “SF is storytelling and fact telling; it is the patterning of possible worlds and possible times, material-semiotic worlds, gone, here, and yet to come.”¹⁴ Since they both estrange and release readers from the governing principles of their actual worlds, these strictly fictional models reveal the very *imaginary* space needed to think beyond the constraints of speciesism or livestock animal exploitation.

2. Bringing textual and living animals into dialogue

To render this space productive for teaching HAS (THAS), the study of literary animal representations needs to connect to living animals in a meaningful way. Literary scholars in HAS assume that “real” animals’ behavior shapes emergent literary animal portrayals, while these texts, vice versa, shape our knowledge about and the treatment of them.¹⁵ Roland Borgards argues that textual animals are always “material-semiotic hybrids” – human-made representations of living beings and simultaneously the result of a multitude of social, political, and cultural, discursive processes.¹⁶ Discussing with students how famous films and novels, such as *Babe*,¹⁷ *Jaws*,¹⁸ or *Black Beauty*,¹⁹ have shaped human attitudes toward pigs, sharks, or horses can teach them about this reciprocal relationship.²⁰ Such critical reflections on the constructed and therefore modifiable nature of animal conceptions should always include a

13 McHale: Science Fiction, p. 23.

14 Donna Haraway: *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*. Durham: Duke UP 2016, p. 31. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv11cw25q> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

15 Gabriela Kompatscher: Literary Animal Studies: Ethische Dimensionen des Literaturunterrichts. In: Hayer / Schröder (eds): *Tierethik*, pp. 295–310, here p. 289. <https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839442593-017> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

16 Borgards: *Tiere*, p. 240.

17 *Babe* (AU / US 1995, D: Chris Noonan).

18 *Jaws* (US 1975, D: Steven Spielberg).

19 Anna Sewell: *Black Beauty* [1877]. London: Penguin 2007.

20 See Kompatscher: *Literary*, p. 297.

self-conscious acknowledgement of the students' own, inherently anthropocentric perspective. Hence, by recognizing that signifiers such as "human" and "animal" are performative instead of static ontological categories, they can eventually gain a reflective perspective as privileged, advanced, and therefore responsible human *animals*.

A two-dimensional approach to THAS thus emerges that fosters students' sense of relationality to the more-than-human world and encourages them to question human-animal binaries.²¹ Gabriela Kompatscher's animal-sensitive approach to teaching literature focuses on a pedagogy that recognizes the intrinsic value of animals, draws attention to their needs, and thus sets the course for fair future human-animal relations.²² Lauren Corman's and Tereza Vandrovcová's critical animal pedagogy emphasizes the value of practically involving living nonhuman animals in teaching contexts to raise students' awareness of the exploitative structures in which these are caught up.²³ For example, field trips to animal sanctuaries or farms, or keeping diaries about everyday animal encounters can certainly enrich THAS models.²⁴ The approach suggested here, however, involves nonhuman animals in the classroom more indirectly: by complementing narratological analyses of animal representations with discussions on questions relating to animal ethics that emerge from the novels' content, the living models for the fictional characters are brought to the table.

21 For a more in-depth depiction of this approach, see Liza B. Bauer: Mit anderen Tieren leben: Lernen an der Schnittstelle zwischen fiktiven Tiertexten, lebendigen Tieren und tierethischen Bestrebungen. Eine literaturwissenschaftliche Perspektive. In: Simone Horstmann (ed.): *Interspezies Lernen: Grundlinien interdisziplinärer Tierschutz- und Tierrechtsbildung*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2021. <https://doi.org/10.14361/97838389455227> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

22 Kompatscher: *Literary*, p. 310; see also idem: „Wir knieten um dich, alle im Rund, / Und keiner dachte: da stirbt nur ein Hund“ (F. Avenarius): Literarische *companion animals* des 19. Jahrhunderts als Subjekte tiersensibler Didaktik. In: Klarissa Schröder / Björn Hayer (eds): *Didaktik des Animalen: Vorschläge für einen tierethisch gestützten Literaturunterricht*. Trier: WVT 2016, pp. 17–28.

23 Lauren Corman / Tereza Vandrovcová: Radical Humility: Toward a More Holistic Critical Animal Studies Pedagogy. In: *Counterpoints* 448 (2014), pp. 135–157, here p. 149.

24 The relatively young field of environmental education often stresses the value of human-animal encounters. See Jan Oakley / Gavan Peter Longley Watson / Constance Russell / Amy Cutter-Mackenzie-Knowles: Animal Encounters in Environmental Education Research: Responding to the "Question of the Animal." In: *Canadian Journal of Environmental Education* 15 (2010), pp. 86–102; see also: June Bane: The Animal as Fourth Educator: A Literature Review of Animals and Young Children in Pedagogical Relationships. In: *Australasian Journal of Early Childhood* 38:2 (2013), pp. 57–64.

Despite being distanced from reality, SF storyworlds are not at all detached from the contemporary socio-political discourses from which they emerge. Narratological analyses of Margaret Atwood's representations of genetically modified pigs (Pigoons), for instance, may examine the narrative situation (is the text narrated by or the story world perceived through the eyes of an animal character?), the degree of agency the Pigoons have (do they actively shape the story and their own fates?), or how strongly anthropomorphized they are (can we detect the real animal behind its human-like representation?). If the effects that these narrative forms have on readers are discussed further (does the text invite readers to take a nonhuman's perspective? Does it encourage empathy for animal characters?), it quickly becomes obvious that such analyses of textual animals rarely remain on a strictly formal level but always bear traces of their material counterparts.²⁵ To make these explorations even less abstract, questions that go beyond the text can be addressed: does the text reflect contemporary biological knowledge on the respective species?²⁶ How does it portray inter- and intraspecies relationships – does the story leave human-animal binaries intact, blur, or question them? Additionally, ethical discussions on genetic manipulation or farming practices can be triggered by these texts, which teach students about the realities that real nonhumans are facing and help them to develop their attitudes toward such topics in conversation with one another. In a condensed manner, the following examples show how animal-sensitive readings of SF encourage students to critically explore human-animal relations from perspectives that invent new subject forms (3), reverse species hierarchies (4), and blur human-animal distinctions (5).

25 See: Wojciech Małecki / Bogusław Pawłowski / Piotr Sorokowski / Anna Oleszkiewicz: Feeling for Textual Animals: Narrative Empathy Across Species Lines. In: *Poetics* 74 (2019), pp. 101–334. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2018.11.003> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Wojciech Małecki / Piotr Sorokowski / Bogusław Pawłowski / Marcin Cieński: *Human Minds and Animal Stories: How Narratives Make Us Care About Other Species*. New York / London: Routledge 2019. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429061424> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Alexandra Böhm: Limitrophe Mensch-Tier-Begegnungen: Empathie für tierliche Nicht-Personen in Karen Joy Fowlers *We Are All Completely Besides Ourselves*. In: Stephanie Catani / Stephanie Waldow (eds): *Non-Person: Grenzen des Humanen in Literatur, Kultur und Medien*. Leiden / Paderborn: Brill / Fink 2020, pp. 247–268. https://doi.org/10.30965/9783846764428_015 (accessed: January 24, 2022).

26 See, for example, Borgards' process of historicizing the animal text (Borgards: *Tiere*, p.231).

3. Redistributing agency in Margaret Atwood's *MaddAddam Trilogy* (2003–2013)

Most LAS scholars understand animal agency as something that unfolds in cause-and-effect relationships that emerge in interactive networks of humans, nonhumans, plants, and other entities described as agents or actants in new materialist thinking.²⁷ If nonhuman animals are understood as having an impact on the production of literary texts, taking these literary forms seriously can shed light on their impact in the real world, too.²⁸ Students thereby learn that nonhuman animals are individuals with their own subjective experience, interests, and sensations, who significantly shape history and society, even though their agency often remains hidden in consumer culture.²⁹ The corona crisis has made it painfully clear that, as significant agents in complex relational networks, nonhuman animals can become part of a global phenomenon that puts entire societies on hold.³⁰ The pedagogic potential of animal texts lies in their ability to dynamically redefine which human / nonhuman or even organic / inorganic individuals have which degrees of agency.

A particularly dynamic case of this manifests itself in the aforementioned Pigoons. These biotech pigs develop from being perceived as mere commodities at the beginning into being fully acknowledged as social agents of a multi-species society at the end of Atwood's trilogy.³¹ This mostly unfolds in the plot,

27 See Susan McHugh: Literary Animal Agents. In: *PMLA* 124:2 (2009), pp. 487–495. <https://doi.org/10.1632/pmla.2009.124.2.487> (accessed: January 24, 2022); idem: *Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P 2011. <https://doi.org/10.5749/minnesota/9780816670321.001.0001> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Bruno Latour: *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*. Oxford / New York: Oxford UP 2005.

28 Gabriela Kompatscher / Reingard Spannring / Karin Schachinger: *Human-Animal Studies: Eine Einführung für Studierende und Lebende*. Münster / New York: Waxmann 2017, p. 220. <https://doi.org/10.36198/9783838556789> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

29 See, e.g., Gesine Krüger / Aline Steinbrecher / Clemens Wischermann (eds): *Tiere und Geschichte. Konturen einer „Animate History“*. Stuttgart: Steiner 2014.

30 See, e.g., a webinar hosted by *Compassion for World Farming* on June 2, 2020: https://www.ciwf.eu/news/2020/06/jane-goodall-tells-eu-if-we-dont-do-things-differently-were-finished?utm_campaign=factoryfarming&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=ciwf&fbclid=IwAR2E7fRSqnAwJRwqZlPcMPUcjvyZgpKH0EXO3MW5IyoLKV4ZKIR6TbVUnPM (accessed: January 18, 2021).

31 See Liza B. Bauer: Eating Kin or Making Kin? Farm Animal Representations in Twenty-First Century Fiction. In: Ansgar Nünning / Vera Nünning / Alexander Scherr (eds): *Literature and Literary Studies in the 21st Century: Cultural Concerns – Concepts – Case Studies*. Trier: WVT 2021, pp. 297–314.

but in some instances becomes visible in the narrative form as well.³² Whereas the fictional society considers the Pigoons to be a mere source of organs and research objects at first, the text implies their covert, threatening agency from early on³³:

The pigoons were much bigger and fatter than ordinary pigs, to leave room for all the extra organs. They were kept in special buildings, heavily secured: the kidnapping of a pigoon and its finely honed genetic material by a rival outfit would have been a disaster [...]. [T]he adults were slightly frightening, with their runny noses and tiny, white-lashed pink eyes. They glanced at him *as if* they saw him, really saw him, and *might* have plans for him later.³⁴

On their hunt for the human protagonist in the post-apocalyptic storyworld later on, their full capacity to act unfolds:

They've nosed the door open, they're in the first room now, twenty or thirty of them, boars and sows but the boars foremost, crowding in, grunting eagerly, snuffling at his footprints. [...] *What they see is his head, attached to what they know is a delicious meat pie just waiting to be opened up.* The two biggest ones, two boars, with – yes – sharp tusks, move side by side to the door [...].³⁵

The focalization – the perspective from which the narrative is perceived – briefly switches from Jimmy to the Pigoons as the conditional “as if” from the earlier passage is replaced by the indicative “they see” here.³⁶ Yet at no point does the novel fully humanize the Pigoons or grant direct access to their thoughts, as the following depiction of them joining forces with the humans

32 See also: Anne F. Pusch: Splices: When Science Catches up with Science Fiction. In: *Nanoethics* 9:1 (2015), pp. 55–73. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-014-0216-8> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

33 Helen Tiffin: Pigs, People and Pigoons. In: Laurence Simmons / Philip Armstrong (eds): *Knowing Animals*. Leiden: Brill 2007, pp. 245–654. <https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004157736.i-296.84> (accessed: January 24, 2022); see also Susan McHugh: Real Artificial: Tissue-Cultured Meat, Genetically Modified Farm Animals, and Fictions. In: *Configurations* 18:1–2 (2010), pp. 181–197. <https://doi.org/10.1353/con.2010.0006> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

34 Margaret Atwood: *Oryx and Crake*. London: Virago 2003, pp. 29–30 (emphasis added).

35 Ibid., p. 314 (emphasis added).

36 See William Nelles: Beyond the Bird's Eye: Animal Focalization. In: *Narrative* 9:2 (2001), pp. 188–194.

reveals: “The Pigoons alongside tilt their heads to look up at their human allies from time to time, but their thoughts can only be guessed. [...] Are they irritated? Solicitous? Impatient? Glad of the human support?”³⁷ Yet they still manage to integrate into the emerging collective of humans and Crakers (a posthuman race) as the latter are able to communicate with them. Their social agency becomes visible during a group vote near the end of the novel: “The Pigoons vote collectively, through their leader, with Blackbeard as their interpreter. ‘They all say *dead*,’ he tells Toby.”³⁸ Further underlining this development, it is striking that their name is capitalized for the first time at this point. The Pigoons have gradually transformed from “transgenic knockout pig hosts”³⁹ in part one, to “frankenbacon”⁴⁰ in part two, to celebrated heroes of the collective in the trilogy’s final part:

[T]he Pigoon in question flew like the wind. The telling was complicated by the fact that Toby could not pronounce the flying Pigoon’s name in any way that resembled the grunt-heavy original. [...] The children made up a game in which one of them played the heroic Pigoon flying like the wind, wearing a determined expression, and a smaller one played Snowman-the-Jimmy, also with a determined expression, clinging on its back. *Her* back. *The Pigoons were not objects. She had to get that right. It was only respectful.*⁴¹

By analyzing passages in which animal characters speak, express their thoughts, or either reveal or hide their agency, students’ further sharpen their critical reading skills.

Going beyond the text itself, such examinations invite students to reflect on the forced passivity to which consumer culture condemns most cows, pigs, or chickens. Their representations outside of literature – in newspaper articles, agricultural manuals, advertising, etc. – often depict them as mere commodities. Accordingly, the term “livestock” literally describes them as “stock” that is “alive.” When teaching HAS, this can be used to invite students to contemplate their own habits of representing animals in their everyday speech: Do they, for example, tend to anthropomorphize their pets or other animals? Do

37 Margaret Atwood: *MaddAddam*. London / New York: Bloomsbury 2013, p. 424.

38 Ibid., p. 450.

39 Atwood: *Oryx*, p. 25.

40 Margaret Atwood: *The Year of the Flood*. New York: Doubleday 2009, p. 65.

41 Atwood: *MaddAddam*, pp. 426–427 (emphasis added).

they speak of pork or pigs, veal or lambs, cattle or cows? And do they use these nouns in connection with active or passive verb constructions? After experiencing the impact of narrative forms in the novel, students are thus invited to critically reflect upon cultural filters and categories of species such as livestock, pet, or vermin, and to deconstruct them along the way.⁴² It has been argued that such learning processes could change students' perception of animals in the long term.⁴³ Whereas these shifts are directed at acknowledging the individuality and autonomy of living nonhuman animals, the next example focuses more strongly on students' perceptions of human-animal relations.

4. Domesticating humans through vegetal eyes in Sue Burke's *Semiosis* (2018)

I wanted more service animals so that the city could prosper, so that someday we could go to the stars. Instead, I could not control the situation. I failed my animals and myself.⁴⁴

Sue Burke's *Semiosis* (2018) takes the perspective of plants on an alien planet, describing humans as particularly useful "service animals" within a multi-species society. While the vegetal narrator⁴⁵ Stevland considers Fippocats,⁴⁶ Fippolions,⁴⁷ Glassmakers,⁴⁸ and Pacifists⁴⁹ to be diversely gifted at tending

42 Kompatscher: Literary, p.304; see also: Miriam Lind (ed.): *Mensch – Tier – Maschine: Sprachliche Praktiken an und jenseits der Außengrenze des Humanen*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2022. <https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839453131> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

43 Aaron M. Moe: The Cultural Work of Literature in a Multispecies World. In: Suzanne Rice / A. G. Rud (eds): *The Educational Significance of Human and Non-Human Animal Interactions: Blurring the Species Line*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2016, pp. 133–150, here p. 144. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137505255_9 (accessed: January 24, 2022).

44 Sue Burke: *Semiosis*. London: Harper Voyager 2018, pp. 299–300.

45 See Erin James: What the Plant Says: Plant Narrators and the Ecosocial Imaginary. In: Monica Gagliano / John C. Ryan / Patrícia Vieira (eds): *The Language of Plants: Science, Philosophy, Literature*. U of Minnesota P 2017, pp. 253–272.

46 Fippocats are described as easily tamed and playful creatures who remind of hybrids between rabbits and cats.

47 Fippolions are related to the Fippocats, but due to their horse-like size, these collaborating creatures are treated with caution.

48 The Glassmakers are a native alien species on the planet Pax.

49 The humans who fled from Earth committed themselves to living in harmony with the alien ecosystem, hence labeling themselves as Pacifists.

to his and several other plants' needs, he concludes that they are all "only animals" in need of domestication.⁵⁰ The author thus not only reverses hierarchies between humans and plants but also dissolves – at least in the passages narrated by Stevland – human-animal distinctions, hence facilitating a powerful thought experiment. Strictly speaking, the novel even reconfigures *inter-* into *intra-*species relationships as animal-like creatures, humans, and aliens are all referred to as "animals" by the plants. Other passages are narrated by humans and leave species boundaries more intact, but most of the characters still seek symbiotic relationships with the other members of the collective.⁵¹ Eco-pedagogical approaches call for learning processes to foster feelings of responsibility and relatability to the more-than-human world to ensure the continuing well-being of humans and the entire planet.⁵² *Semiosis* can be understood as a challenge to the anthropocentric premises of most current realizations of both human-animal encounters and ecosystem management to an extent that demolishes human-animal binaries.⁵³ Staging a nonhuman, first-person narrator is an effective narrative strategy to draw readers in.⁵⁴ Nonhuman narrators encourage readers to step into a nonhuman's paws, hooves, or into a bamboo stem, as is the case here, while immersing themselves in the novel. This can provide them with both an outsider's perspective on humanity as well as with an insider's perspective on

50 Burke: *Semiosis*, pp. 123, 247.

51 Applying Donna Haraway's theoretical concepts of entangled, co-shaping relationships in what she calls "naturecultures" or companion species relations lends itself to more advanced analyses. See Donna Haraway: *How Like a Leaf*. New York: Routledge 2000. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315022888> (accessed: January 24, 2022); idem: *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness*. Chicago / Bristol: Prickly Paradigm 2003.

52 Richard Kahn: *Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement*. New York: Lang 2010. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-012-9267-7> (accessed: January 24, 2022); see also the approach toward "interspecies education": Julie Andrzejewski / Helena Pedersen / Freeman Wicklund: Interspecies Education for Humans, Animals, and the Earth. In: Julie Andrzejewski / Marta Baltodano / Linda Symcox (eds): *Social Justice, Peace, and Environmental Education*. London: Routledge 2009, pp. 136–154. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203879429-16> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

53 See further examples in Vint: *Animal*, ch. 6 and 7.

54 Alternatively, texts can be narrated in the third person while being perceived through a nonhuman focalizer, or they can focus on the narration or perceptions of humans and merely have nonhumans appear in the story, as is the case in Atwood's trilogy. See also Frederike Middelhoff: *Literarische Autozoographien: Figurationen des autobiographischen Tieres im letzten 19. Jahrhundert*. Stuttgart: Metzler 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05512-5> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

nonhuman experientiality.⁵⁵ Notwithstanding such narrators' obvious shortcomings in terms of portraying any accurate *what-is-it-likeness*⁵⁶ of nonhuman experience, such reading experiences create emotional links between human readers and nonhuman narrators.⁵⁷ Stevland's vegetal perspective on the human settlers is rendered possible by the SF novum – the specific novelty on which the construction of the SF world depends⁵⁸ – according to which these alien plants possess central nervous systems that resemble human ones. Thus, by adding innovative variants to a long literary history of nonhuman narrators and focalizers, SF novels are increasingly portraying their storyworlds through unfamiliar eyes.⁵⁹

Reflecting on the concept of domestication is a way to connect this formal reading with more contextual analysis. Domestication processes can be regarded as one of the roots of exploitative human-animal relationships, which means that it seems essential to explore them when teaching HAS. The novel sheds light on such processes from two sides: firstly, despite the aforementioned symbiotic and non-exploitative approach, the narrative repeatedly reveals a lack of innocence in each species' motivations and acts.⁶⁰ As

55 See Lars Bernaerts / Marco Caracciolo / Luc Herman / Bart Vervaeck: The Storied Lives of Non-Human Narrators. In: *Narrative* 22:1 (2014), pp. 68–93. <https://doi.org/10.1353/nar.2014.0002> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Margo DeMello (ed.): *Speaking for Animals: Animal Autobiographical Writing*. New York / London: Routledge 2012. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203085967> (accessed: January 24, 2022); David Herman: Animal Autobiography; Or, Narration Beyond the Human. In: *Humanities* 5:82 (2016), pp. 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.3390/h5040082> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

56 See David Herman: *Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT 2013. <https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9547.001.0001> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

57 According to Andrea Klatt, teaching texts which attribute language capacities to non-human animals helps to acknowledge them as members of the ethical community (Andrea Klatt: Can the Animal Speak? Sprechende "Tiere" in literarischen Texten. In: Hayer / Schröder (eds): *Tierethik*, pp. 231–246. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839442593-013> (accessed: January 24, 2022)).

58 See Darko Suvin / Gerry Canavan: *Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre* [1979]. Oxford: Lang 2016. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3507501> (accessed: January 24, 2022), qtd. in McHale: Science Fiction, p. 16.

59 See, for example, the bird-quid-human hybrid focalizer in Jeff VanderMeer's *The Strange Bird* (New York: MCD X Fsg Originals 2017) or the postanimal narrator of Adam Roberts' *Bête* (London: Gollancz 2014), analyzed in Liza B. Bauer: "Four Legs in the Evening": Post-animal Narration in Adam Roberts' *Bête* (2014). In: *SubStance* 50:3 (2021): Ecocriticism & Narrative Form, pp. 53–73. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sub.2021.0028> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

60 Barbara Noske refers to a well-known example of ant societies domesticating aphids, a mutualistic relationship. See Noske's take on symbiotic or mutualistic domestication practices in: *Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals* [1989]. Montreal / New York: Black Rose

the Rainbow Bamboo (Stevland) is by far the most intelligent plant on the planet, he manages to communicate with the human settlers from Earth and makes them believe they are forming an alliance of equals. In fact, the humans become highly efficient, obedient laborers by eating different varieties of Stevland's hallucinogenic fruit and farm the land in line with the ecosystem that is entirely managed by the bamboo:

Meanwhile, I contact the pineapples. They are intelligent but stubborn. The agreement I brokered long ago between them and the humans was simple. The pineapples produce terminal tuft fruit in the spring and fall. Spring fruit must be replanted by the humans. Fall fruit may be harvested. Humans provide protection, cultivation, and labor. The pineapples add flavors and nutrients to fall fruits in exchange. But now their fruit is being harvested even though it is spring, and they are furious. *I suggest drugging the spring fruit [...]*.⁶¹

Similar tactics are applied by the humans as well, who do not always remain true to the pacifist ideals to which they have committed themselves. Due to the novel's polyphonous form, which provides numerous instances of human first-person narration alongside Stevland's telling of the story, students can easily adopt these perspectives. They are thus invited to both imagine the reversal of domesticating processes and to critically reflect on the underlying mechanisms of the real-world domestication of animals and plants.

Secondly, the novel exemplifies the reciprocity inherent in this facet of human-animal relationality by exemplifying how human and nonhuman agents actively co-shape one another in such encounters. In collaboration with "his" human service animals, Stevland initiates a second process of domestication – this time directed at the native aliens, the Glassmakers:

Lentils [...] are hapless plants that need assistance to determine the best way to arrange their leaves to gather sunlight. "Help me." "Prune me," the trees beg. Glassmakers are ignoring the lentils, although their buds and twigs are edible, as humans and scorpions know. I wish it were different.⁶²

1997, pp. 1–21, here pp. 3, 10. Haraway famously addresses the inability to fully overcome violence in multispecies co-flourishing: "There is no way to eat and not to kill, no way to eat and not to become with other mortal beings to whom we are accountable, no way to pretend innocence and transcendence or a final peace." (Donna Haraway: *When Species Meet*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P 2007, p.295.)

61 Burke: *Semiosis*, p.244 (emphasis added).

62 Ibid., p.243.

Whereas the other plants want Stevland to kill these unhelpful “pests,” Stevland convinces the pineapples, locustwoods, etc., that the Glassmakers will be of value once they are domesticated and taught “how to make contracts.”⁶³ Several human-narrated passages reveal that they mistake themselves to be superior, domesticating subjects who rely on Stevland’s help as well as the help of the other animals to domesticate the Glassmakers: “They wouldn’t care, and besides, children and [Fippo]kats were waiting to dance for them. Our message couldn’t be clearer: *We want to be your friends, so get domesticated*. And their answer was clear: *Drop dead*.”⁶⁴ Burke’s novel thus imagines a world in which humans are not only domesticating but simultaneously domesticated subjects – the latter quite tellingly taking place without their knowledge. This shift in perspective points out the difference between an ecocentric and an anthropocentric conception of domestication: the former views domestication as the starting point of a reciprocal relationship, whereas the latter sees domestication as something that is initiated in *human* society alone. The second understanding, which *Semiosis* addresses critically, sets domesticating human subjects in opposition to domesticated animal objects. Recognizing reciprocity in domestication can teach students that not only domesticated animals but also plants are subjective beings that co-shape these processes alongside humans and deserve their respect.

5. Blurring divides between anthropomorphized animals in Gene Stone and Jon Doyle’s *The Awareness* (2014)

Moreover, learning how to read and evaluate anthropomorphic animal representations can benefit students’ understanding of the reciprocal dynamics at work in human-animal relationships in another way.⁶⁵ Whether as a research strategy or a literary motif, attributing human-like emotions, behaviors, or motivations to nonhuman animals suggests a relatability or likeness between human and nonhuman animals, and thus bridges perceptual and conceptual gulfs.⁶⁶ At the same time, however, it imposes human frameworks on the

63 Burke: *Semiosis*, pp. 144–245.

64 Ibid., p. 256.

65 The term and concept lead back to ethological research in biology, particularly to Frans de Waal: Anthropomorphism and Anthropodenial: Consistency in Our Thinking About Humans and Other Animals. In: *Philosophical Topics* 27:1 (1999), pp. 255–280.

66 See Roman Bartosch: Storying Creaturely Life. In: Idem / Dominik Ohrem (eds): *Beyond the Human-Animal Divide: Creaturely Lives in Literature and Culture*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2017, pp. 153–66, here p. 157. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-93437-9_8

latter. In terms of representations of livestock animals, it becomes particularly relevant that, while an anthropomorphized pig in a slaughterhouse might trigger an inconvenient empathetic reaction in readers, it simultaneously provides an easy way out of this sensation as it stresses the fictionality of the suffering animal. Strictly speaking, language-based representations of nonhuman animals in and outside of literature cannot *not* anthropomorphize; students of HAS must therefore learn how to assess these anthropomorphic forms. They can do so by searching for the “real” animals behind the human-made symbols by taking their material traces seriously into account.⁶⁷ For example, comparisons drawn between the portrayed animal behavior and factual accounts from animal research or the students’ own animal observations help to determine whether a text remains in line with these factual accounts or not.⁶⁸ Besides learning to respect the animals’ perspectives, they learn to critically assess textual animal representation in and outside of literature, ethological studies, for example, carry an anthropocentric bias as well.

In order to evaluate textual anthropomorphization, LAS scholars have developed various strategies: Kari Weil’s critical anthropomorphism in particular has prevailed among various sub-categories seeking to differentiate between anthropomorphic forms that encourage empathy for nonhuman animals and others that lead to their Disneyfication.⁶⁹ The key to the ethically responsible and attentive representation of animals seems to be

remind[ing] the reader of the real animals that hover outside the human-created text, both inviting the reader to identify with the nonhuman animal as a fellow living being and reminding him or her of the inevitable differences between humans and other species,

(accessed: January 24, 2022); see also Vinciane Despret: *What Would the Animals Say If We Asked the Right Questions?*, transl. from the French by Brett Buchanan. Minneapolis / London: U of Minnesota P 2016. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5749/minnesota/9780816692378.001.0001> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

67 Björn Hayer, for example, demonstrates how animal fables can invite critical reflections on speciesism through a therio-centric reading practice. See: Björn Hayer: Gegen den Strich gelesen: Gorthold Ephraim Lessings Fabeln aus Sicht der Literary Animal Studies. In: Idem / Schröder (eds): *Tierethik*, pp. 281–291, here p. 283. <http://dx.doi.org/10.14361/9783839442593-016> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

68 See Kompatscher: *Literary*, p. 299.

69 Bartosch: *Storying*, p. 154; Kari Weil: *Thinking Animals: Why Animal Studies Now?* New York: Columbia UP 2012, p. 20.

as Karla Armbruster puts it.⁷⁰ By examining how closely an animal text adheres to human frameworks, students can gain an understanding of these nuances.

Narratologist David Herman has developed a useful, open-ended continuum, which seeks to reflect degrees of anthropocentrism in animal representations.⁷¹ At the more anthropocentric end, he places the animal allegory (human figures being narrated through animal forms⁷²), while he labels the least anthropocentric category as *Umwelt* modeling⁷³ – finely-grained representations of the respective real animal’s lifeworld.⁷⁴ In his human-source-animal-target projections (HSAT), human behavior or experientiality is transferred onto animal representations, as, for instance, in the human-like sentimentalities expressed by the horse narrator in *Black Beauty*. In contrast, animal-source-human-target projections (ASHT) apply the lifeworlds of non-human animals to representations of *humans*, as the oppressed and abused humans in Dietmar Dath’s *Die Abschaffung der Arten*⁷⁵ exemplify. Herman emphasizes that most texts oscillate between these points of orientation to avoid static categorizations.⁷⁶

In Gene Stone und Jon Doyle’s *The Awareness* (2014), anthropomorphization not only serves as an overarching theme but allows the entire plot to unfold. As hinted at in the introduction, all animals on this fictional planet Earth suddenly gain human-like consciousness as well as the capacity to speak – how exactly this SF novum is facilitated remains opaque. In a climactic scene, Pig 323 goes about exploring the home of a farming family and wishes that she was human:

70 Karla Armbruster: What Do We Want from Talking Animals? Reflections on Literary Representations of Animal Voices and Minds. In: DeMello (ed.): *Speaking for Animals*, pp. 17–35.

71 David Herman: *Narratology Beyond the Human: Storytelling and Animal Life*. Oxford: Oxford UP 2018, pp. 139–141. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190850401.001.0001> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

72 E.g., Art Spiegelman’s graphic novel *Maus: A Survivor’s Tale*. New York: Pantheon / Random House 1973.

73 Herman refers to Jakob von Uexküll’s concept of *Umwelt* here, which was coined in *Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere* [1909]. Berlin / Heidelberg: Springer 2014.

74 E.g., Virginia Woolf: *Flush: A Biography*. New York: Harcourt 1933; or Laline Paull: *The Bees*. New York: HarperCollins 2014.

75 Dietmar Dath: *Die Abschaffung der Arten*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2008.

76 Herman: *Narratology*, p. 140.

In her mind, babies were crying. She could hear them in the rooms down the hall. “They must be hungry,” a pig said to her. [...] “Father will be home soon, child,” 323 said to the boy pig. [...] “Can you believe she is getting married?” 323 said, stifling a cry. [...] “Oh I know. But you have to let me be a silly old pig, with silly old emotions.” The young female pig came out of her old room with the knowing glance of a full-grown animal. [...] 323 opened her eyes and studied herself. A wave of silliness passed over her. The fantasies drifted away, but they left something within. [...] How must it feel then to rest under blankets after the day’s toil?⁷⁷

While this embedded narration mainly makes use of Herman’s HSAT projections, a meta-reflective doubling of this anthropomorphic practice occurs: as Pig 323 imagines being an even more thoroughly anthropomorphized version of herself, species boundaries are blurred to the point that it becomes unclear whether boy pig, silly old pig, father, child, full-grown animal, etc. are zoomorphic representations of humans or doubly anthropomorphized replicas of Pig 323.⁷⁸ Consequently, Herman’s HSAT projection entails concurrent ASHT projections here, revealing that anthropomorphic animal representation functions both ways and leaves neither the “animal” nor the “human” entirely intact in the process.⁷⁹

If humans depend on anthropomorphic frameworks in their attempts to understand animal behavior, the irreducible otherness of animal experience must be acknowledged in respectful interpretations. Children’s stories in particular, like A. A. Milne’s *Winnie-the-Pooh*, tend to cause real animals to vanish from sight in their intensively anthropomorphic animal characters. In fact, this story imagines Piglet, Pooh Bear, and Eeyore in the shapes of stuffed animals, which distances them even further from the material creatures they represent.⁸⁰ Such texts may contribute to the perception of animals

77 Stone / Doyle: *The Awareness*, pp. 112–113.

78 Zoomorphization can be understood as the opposite of anthropomorphization as in this practice, animal attributes are transferred onto human characters. See Nanay Bence: Zoomorphism. In: *Erkenntnis* (2018). <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-018-0099-0> (accessed: January 13, 2021); see also Herman’s concept of “zoomorphic projections,” on which he elaborates in his introduction to *Multispecies Storyworlds in Graphic Narratives*. London / New York: Bloomsbury 2017, pp. 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350015340> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

79 See also Bartosch: Storying, pp. 157–158.

80 The stuffed animal shapes simultaneously emphasize the characters’ fictionality and human origin, which mitigates their intensive anthropomorphisation once again. However, this might not play much of a role in a child reader’s experience of the story.

as mere templates, symbols, or metaphors – empty and passive containers for human meaning-making – despite being material, living, thinking beings themselves. It thus seems urgent that humans learn to open themselves “to touch and be[ing] touched” by these unknowable “others” respectfully, so that human-animal bonds can be conceived of in ways that enable peaceful coexistence.⁸¹ The degrees of anthropomorphic animal portrayal in SF texts – and other literary genres, for that matter – reveal that the multiple, individual differences and similarities between human and nonhuman animal species demand critical attention.⁸² Examining how these differences and similarities find their way into literary representations and in turn inform readers’ understanding of real animal species can thus counteract conceptions of a cemented human-animal divide.

6. Learning to stretch the imagination

Both in theory and practice, human-animal relationships are the result of reciprocal processes of negotiation between living and acting, human and nonhuman, subjective beings. Learning how to acknowledge, engage with, and talk about the nonhuman side of these co-shaping dynamics in an attentive and respectful manner seems to be a core goal of THAS. Physical encounters with living nonhuman animals might automatically lead students to recognize there is “someone” reaching out to us with his or her nuzzle, breathing us in, watching us through eyes that seem full of curiosity. In contrast, the potential of literature – SF texts particularly – lies in the way that it can detach readers from such real-world experience and encourage experimental thinking: What if these breathing beings started talking, what would they have to say? What if chickens, cows, or pigs had the chance to exist for their own ends? As humans will never truly know what is happening in the animals’ minds, immersing themselves in fictional worlds to practice multispecies living does not seem too far removed from reality. SF explores this very nexus between the impossible yet conceivable, thus providing students’ imaginations with instructive exercises.

81 Weil: *Thinking*, p. 20.

82 See Jacques Derrida: The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow). In: *Critical Inquiry* 28:2 (2002), pp. 369–418.

By involving “real” animals indirectly, these SF scenarios highlight the constructed nature of “animals” as they appear in human imaginations. This two-dimensional approach to THAS complements formal textual analyses with thematic and ethical reflections on human-animal relations in practice. Following this approach, Atwood’s re-distribution of animal agency demonstrates that the passivity to which most real animals are condemned in human societies is not irrevocable. Likewise, Burke’s outsider’s perspective on domestication processes reveals that hierarchical conceptions of real human-animal relationships are not immutable. The post-anthropocentric examination of Stone and Doyle’s anthropomorphic animal representations gradually reveals that the presumed human-animal divide is not unshakable. Yet these examples represent merely a fraction of what literary texts can do. Some scholars convincingly argue that the well-being of both human and nonhuman animals depends on theoretically and practically expanding students’ understanding of their entanglements with the more-than-human world.⁸³ In this multifaceted task of THAS, encouraging students to reflect on alternatives to animal exploitation and commodification in experimental SF storyworlds is a small but perhaps significant step.

83 Andrzejewski / Pedersen / Wicklund: Interspecies Education, p. 136.

Michaela Keck

Of Birds and Men

Lessons from Mark Cocker's *Crow Country*

1. Introduction: New British nature writing and the animal turn

Since the early 2000s, nature writing in Britain has been witnessing a noteworthy renaissance. Readers, critics, and scholars have favorably received writings by Robert Macfarlane, Kathleen Jamie, Jean Sprackland, Richard Mabey, Helen Macdonald, and Mark Cocker – to name perhaps the most prominent new British nature writers. Even though these authors by no means constitute a unified literary movement, they all share a concern for the everyday connection with local and regional environments, and their human and nonhuman inhabitants. Despite their vastly different styles and foci, they are deeply committed to critically engaging with the poetics and politics of their predecessors. On these grounds, their writings lend themselves perfectly to the study and teaching of central approaches, issues, and aims in ecocriticism as well as in human-animal studies (HAS).

When considering the more recent animal turn, Macdonald's prizewinning *H is for Hawk* (2014) immediately comes to mind. In my article, however, I want to direct my attention to Cocker's lesser-known *Crow Country: A Meditation on Birds, Landscape and Nature* from 2007. In his account of years of observing rooks in the Norfolk Broads, those members of the corvid family that are among "the most [...] ubiquitous birds in the British countryside,"¹ Cocker invokes regional animal life in its familiarity and vastness, which is why I consider it a particularly suitable text for exploring the key concerns

1 Mark Cocker: *Crow Country: A Meditation on Birds, Landscape and Nature*. London: Vintage 2008, p. 43.

of HAS. One reason for the scholarly neglect of *Crow Country* may be that it does not feature a traditional British flagship species, such as the hawk. Another reason may be the book's academic reception, which has placed *Crow Country* alongside other environmental non-fiction without evincing much interest in its human-animal relationships. Deborah Lilley's introduction to new British nature writers is a case in point: while she provides brief analyses of "key works"² by Roger Deakin, Robert Macfarlane, Helen Macdonald, Kathleen Jamie, and Paul Farley and Michael Simmons Roberts, she mentions Cocker merely in passing. Stephen E. Hunt and Joe Moran, who grant *Crow Country* slightly more attention, identify the crows as inspirational objects for Cocker's ruminations on the Yare Valley and the larger relationship between humans and the natural world.³ Isabel Galleymore's model for an environmental writing pedagogy, although likewise brief in her mention of *Crow Country*, nevertheless indicates its greater potential. In her model of teaching environmental writing, she reads Cocker's "study of one species as a hymn to ecology"⁴ in the sense of opening up diverse perspectives, including those of humans and animals.

This chapter's in-depth reading of *Crow Country* outlines strategies for teaching some of the core ideas of HAS. The chapter is divided into two main parts: the first section, "Rooks as social constructs and agents," focuses on the importance and difficulty of understanding animals as cultural constructs *and* autonomous subjects. Here, I will consider the micro level, or individual engagement, as well as the macro level, or larger social human-animal relationships, while also taking into account the text-specific genre conventions and modes of narration. The second part, "Rooks anthropomorphized and reconfigured," tackles the double-edged sword of anthropomorphism, which in literary representations of animals is as inevitable as it is problematic. Furthermore, this second section asks what stories we tell, or do not tell, about

2 Deborah Lilley: New British Nature Writing. In: Greg Garrard (ed.): *Oxford Handbooks Online: Ecocriticism*. Oxford: Oxford UP 2017, pp. 1–18, here p. 1. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935338.013.155> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

3 Stephen E. Hunt: The Emergence of Psychoecology: The New Nature Writings of Roger Deakin, Mark Cocker, Robert Macfarlane and Richard Mabey. In: *Green Letters: Studies in Ecocriticism* 10:1 (2009), pp. 70–77, here p. 70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14688417.2009.10589045> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Joe Moran: A Cultural History of the New Nature Writing. In: *Literature & History* 23:1 (2014), pp. 49–63, here p. 53.

4 Isabel Galleymore: *Teaching Environmental Writing: Ecocritical Pedagogy and Poetics*. London / New York: Bloomsbury 2020, p. 31. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350068445> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

animals, and what Cocker's story about rooks reveals about personal, social, and ecological relations among humans and other animals. In the conclusion, I will briefly address another related point in the study of ecocriticism and HAS, namely the continued relevance of mourning inherent in the tradition of nature writings like *Crow Country* in the way that the genre broaches the issue of dealing with loss and grief in times of environmental crisis and species extinction.

2. Rooks as social constructs and agents

For students of English literary and cultural studies who have been taught about the social constructedness of literary texts – like my students at Oldenburg University – it may seem obvious that the representation of human-animal relationships always involves a human-centered perspective. However, the aim of HAS is, as Margo DeMello puts it, “to understand [animals] in and of themselves,”⁵ which requires us to recalibrate our approach and comprehension of nonhuman animals as sentient, conscious, and agentive beings. Kenneth Joel Shapiro even suggests distinguishing “between ‘animals as constructed’” and “animals as they live and experience the world independently of our constructions of them.”⁶ This is quite a daunting task in literary and cultural studies since any attempt to know the world through other animals' cognitive or sensual experiences and knowledge is always a cultural translation, mediation, and representation to begin with. Therefore, it is, as DeMello reminds us, “inevitably enmeshed in conditions of power.”⁷

When examining the human-rook relationships in *Crow Country*, students may notice that halfway through the book, Cocker himself insists on differentiating between rooks in and of themselves and their socially constructed and mediated representations:

It's certainly *the black bird of flesh and blood* keeping me out on the marsh until the sun sinks to its rose-tainted grave on an autumn evening, but it's *an entirely different creature that had me scouring through the literature*.⁸

5 Margo DeMello: *Animals and Society: An Introduction to Human-Animal Studies*. New York: Columbia UP 2012, p. 19.

6 Kenneth Joel Shapiro: *Human-Animal Studies: Growing the Field, Applying the Field*. Ann Arbor: Animals and Society Institute 2008, p. 5.

7 DeMello: *Animals and Society*, p. 19.

8 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p. 107 (emphasis added).

According to Cocker, the type of rook he experiences in the Yare Valley is “anchored in a great body of observed detail”⁹ whereas “the rook of our imagination,”¹⁰ the “inner rook”¹¹ is “more expressive” and “graced with much more magic.”¹² As he concludes:

The two types of birds occasionally mingled, but gradually I began to see this imagined rook of folklore and myth, the rook encountered in poetry and nature writing, as an animal with an independent life and ecology that was every bit as interesting as its real-life shadow.¹³

It seems, then, as if he considers *both* types of rooks, “the real-life rook” and “the rook of the imagination” as valuable and autonomous. Or does he? To better grasp the lives of “the real” and “the inner” rooks, I redirect the students’ attention to one of the core concerns of HAS, namely, critically examining the ways in which animals are shown as individual agents. In what ways does Cocker represent rooks as subjects capable of shaping, challenging, and even altering his understanding of them and their being in the world? Shapiro further elucidates this critical task, helping us assess “the degree to which the author presents the animal [...] both as an experiencing individual and as a species-typical way of living in the world.”¹⁴

Obviously, Cocker’s “inner rook” is rooted in his personal memories as well as in a larger Western, specifically British, cultural memory. While his childhood memories have been passed on to him by his father, British culture knows the birds in numerous ways, ranging from feathery friends in sentimental children’s classics to the status symbols of the nineteenth-century “landed gentry,”¹⁵ and from uncanny Romantic prophets of death to agricultural pests for twentieth-century farmers. Moreover, the symbolic rooks of British collective culture are steeped in “deeply held [national] ideals about landscape” in contrast to Cocker’s “great body of observed detail.”¹⁶ Even so, students may rightly object that Cocker translates his experience of the “rooks in flesh and

9 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p. 120.

10 Ibid., p. 110.

11 Ibid., p. 107.

12 Ibid., pp. 119–120.

13 Ibid., p. 107.

14 Shapiro: *Human-Animal Studies*, p. 8.

15 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p. 116.

16 Ibid., p. 120.

blood” into nature writing and thus into “inner rooks.” Indeed, constructing them from the perspective of the nature-loving rook expert brings along its own set of problems.

According to DeMello, it is the scientific perspective of natural history writing in particular that runs the risk of contributing to a reductionist “objectification of animal[s].”¹⁷ Like other new British nature writers, Cocker carries on the established European-British tradition of natural history writing and its observations of nature and animals – especially birds – seeming to suggest that it is a particularly apt mode of representing the rooks and the Yare Valley. However, scholars like Moran, Hunt, Jos Smith, and Lilley have noted that, alongside their commitment to the “scientific, scholarly observation of nature,”¹⁸ this generation of British nature writers also shows an awareness of the “familiar phenomenological predicament”¹⁹ of the constructedness of nature and culture and, as I want to add, human-animal relationships. Cocker revises, for instance, the use of an impersonal, apolitical, yet authoritative naturalist’s view that is supposedly free from class, race, or gender biases by stressing autobiographical elements in order to make visible his selective vision while he simultaneously creates his own multifaceted authorial persona. He is a son, husband, and “busy father of two with a run-down cottage to repair”²⁰; a self-employed non-fiction prose writer without any regular, much less sizable, income; and a “rook-following man”²¹ in the Norfolk Broads. Furthermore, he interweaves his various experiences with the rooks and his personal life so that readers can relate to the naturalist of *Crow Country* in an intimate manner. According to Lilley, a “pervasive current of self-consciousness sets ‘the new nature writing’ apart.”²² This self-reflexivity defines human-rook relationships as much as it defines writing about them. Daniel Weston has characterized this self-awareness as “akin to a certain kind of postmodern metafiction,”²³ which Cocker’s reflections on bird identification aptly demonstrate:

17 DeMello: *Animals and Society*, p. 19.

18 Moran: *A Cultural History*, p. 59.

19 Hunt: *The Emergence of Psychoecology*, p. 72. See also Jos Smith: *The New Nature Writing: Rethinking the Literature of Place*. London / Oxford / New York / New Delhi: Bloomsbury 2017, pp. 14–15.

20 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p. 137.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 56.

22 Lilley: *New British Nature Writing*, p. 2.

23 Daniel Weston: *Nature Writing and the Environmental Imagination*. In: David James (ed.): *The Cambridge Companion to British Fiction since 1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2015, pp. 110–126, here p. 121. <https://doi.org/10.1017/cc09781139628754.009> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

I've come to realise that [...] [the] exercise [of bird identification] [...] carries within it a subtle kind of complacency, a curious intellectual sleight of hand, because every time you pin a label on a living creature it reaffirms a sense of mastery over it. The naming of the thing gives you the wonderfully reassuring illusion that you know it. You don't. [...] In a bizarre way, the process of recognition can actually be a barrier rather than a doorway to genuine appreciation.²⁴

Here, Cocker criticizes bird identification as an exercise in human self-absorption and as a pseudo-naturalist authority that lacks any meaningful interaction with, let alone consideration of, the birds in and of themselves. Although he does not use the term speciesism, he reveals bird identification to be a speciesist practice by exposing it as a method of subordination and as a means of devaluating birds as the Other.²⁵

Other speciesist pitfalls arise in his observations of rooks in flocks as opposed to, for example, Macdonald's (single) female goshawk Mabel. As an entire flock of rooks and jackdaws, which together often number at least 2,000 birds, the rooks are an abstraction rather than relatable individuals. When watching this assembly in the daily "drama" of their ritualistic evening flight to their roosts alongside other corvids, Cocker admits that he "fail[s] to absorb the trajectory followed by any one individual."²⁶ In his imagination, they become moving geometrical objects as well as autopoietic cellular organisms, which elicit wonder as well as confusion: "Quite simply I am at the limits of what my mind can comprehend or my imagination can articulate."²⁷ Moments such as these clearly challenge, even exceed, human consciousness and are therefore useful examples for discussing with students *Crow Country*'s potential and its limitations for reflecting on the connectedness and/or alterity of humans and animals, and for interrogating or even "disrupting the human / animal divide,"²⁸ as advocated by animal studies scholars and animal activists.

24 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p. 39.

25 Cocker elaborates that the "underlying factor" of the "larger processes of natural history" is the scarcity principle, so that they become quests "for the unusual" (ibid., pp. 39–40). Since, however, rooks are one of the most numerous and commonplace birds in the British Isles, they had "subverted [his] whole approach to birds" (ibid., p. 39) according to the tradition of Western natural history.

26 Ibid., p. 2.

27 Ibid., p. 5.

28 Sam Cadman: Reflections on Anthropocentrism, Anthropomorphism and Impossible Fiction: Towards a Typological Spectrum of Fictional Animals. In: *Animal Studies Journal* 5:2 (2016), pp. 161–182, here p. 167.

As a contemporary British nature writer, Cocker is perhaps at his speciesist when he describes “the rooks of flesh and blood” as an abstract mass or identifiable taxon, while his comments about the periods he spends waiting futilely in torrential rain or freezing temperatures “until a flock of birds decides it’s time for bed”²⁹ self-deprecatingly and self-consciously showcase speciesist behavior. Indeed, it is in moments of failure, or near failure, that the rooks emerge as powerful co-actors and agents:

There would be no discovery tonight. No hard-won piece of the jigsaw would drop into place. [...] The whole thing had failed completely and I headed for the car. [...] but on a whim I decided to put off the retreat [...] Just possibly [...]

[...] there suddenly were the birds, dipped down below the ridge in a way that meant I might never have seen them earlier. [...] And here I was. And here were they. A long looping windstretched line, mainly of jackdaws, which maintained an irrepressible *jak-jak-jak-jak* conversational merriment. It created its own sphere of joy in that acid-cold night. It was wonderful and I felt exultant.

The wind teased them out into one long rope of birds, perhaps 2000 in total [...] no matter how hard the wind smashed at them [...] they were irrepressible. And back they came.

I watched for ten, fifteen, minutes with this wind caravan of birds swirling and dipping towards me. [...] I wondered if they could see me – a strange illuminated figure looking up into the night from that wet black road, alone, car door flung wide open where I’d leapt out, engine running, headlights still tunneling vacantly into the dark.³⁰

In this unexpected sighting of the birds, the centrality of Cocker’s human perspective diminishes alongside theirs, and the birds’ collective flight opens up a multiplicity of relations, sensations, and possible visions.

While this is one of many instances in which Cocker presents rooks as subjects who actively shape his life, his representation of their agency culminates in a moment when their animal vision alters his, when he imagines the “unfolding roost process [...] as seen by the birds themselves.”³¹ Importantly, theirs is night vision, which loosens the “visual grasp on the world” as humans know it:

29 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p.44.

30 Ibid., pp. 53–55.

31 Ibid., p.131.

Suddenly, the Yare valley had become a completely different landscape. It was not mine, it was not even *ours*. It was theirs. I tried to imagine it as they saw it, viewing it through some magical form of heat-imaging equipment. Instead of trees and fields and earth, one saw the place as a sequence of colours. The red areas, the hottest, the most significant spots, were those places loaded with power for rooks, and between them stretched long bright strands, the flight lines that connected a roost with its outlying parish and sketched the routes across the sky. Tunnels of air became causeways as real and palpable as any human path or road, and some of these invisible threads of connection did not just extend through space, but arced through time.³²

Considering the web of interconnected flight-lines, roosts, and air tunnels, this momentary “rook vision” possesses a remarkable spatial, physical, mental, cultural, and temporal complexity, which reveals that the rooks are indeed subjects in their own right. Although their view differs from that of human animals, the passage nevertheless represents the birds in ways not so different from humans, so that clear-cut species distinctions and ontologies are reconfigured “in terms of processes, dynamics, and relations.”³³

Both instances – the failure in Cocker’s performance as an authoritative rook expert and his “rook vision” – allow a broader discussion with students regarding alternative ways of watching and interacting with animals, and of examining the ways in which such different perspectives decenter the human. What are the effects of these examples, that is, of the human diminishment, or even lack, of authority and mastery in human-animal relationships? And what are the effects of envisioning other-than-human ways of experiencing and knowing the world? What novel ways of understanding humans and animals do they open up? Which human values do they challenge, and which alternative values can replace them? Questions such as these bring up key concerns of larger philosophical, ethical, and pedagogical debates, involving concepts such as humility and vulnerability, empathy and compassion, as well as a shared bodily experience across species.³⁴

32 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p. 132 (emphasis in original).

33 Cary Wolfe: Moving Forward, Kicking Back: The Animal Turn. In: *Postmedieval: A Journal of Medieval Cultural Studies* 2:1 (2011), pp. 1–12, here p. 3. <https://doi.org/10.1057/pmed.2010.46> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

34 For an overview of animal ethics from Peter Singer to Tom Regan as well as more recent thinkers, including Ralph Acampora and Matthew Calarco, whose phenomenological approaches focus on the shared human and animal “experience of living in bodies” as “a new form of interspecies relationship based on shared understanding,” see DeMello: *Animals and Society*, pp. 386–391, here p. 390. Regarding the importance of vulnerability for an ethical

3. Rooks anthropomorphized and reconfigured

As we have seen, Cocker's representations of rooks at times hinder and at other times advance an understanding of their lives and interactions with humans, thus emphasizing their subjecthood and agency in varying degrees of human-animal involvement. For example, Cocker's reaction to the rooks' ritualistic nightly descent on their roosts demonstrates at times an involvement that does not envision a human-rook community but rather a connectedness within overarching ecological webs, within which humans and animals seem to occupy separate spheres. Similarly, his critical use of bird identification insists that rooks are a distinctly recognizable unit among other members of the corvid family and hence a distinct species. In contrast, their "jak-jak-jak-jak conversational merriment"³⁵ and their vision above their night roosts suggest a human-animal continuum and relational connectedness.

The analysis of all of these representations inevitably leads to the vexed issue of anthropomorphism, meaning the application of human awareness, feelings, intentions, or characteristics to nonhuman animals. Ethologists like Samuel A. Barnett and Clive D. L. Wynne, or neuroscientist Mark S. Blumberg, have long criticized anthropomorphism as erroneous and unscientific while also obscuring deeper knowledge about nonhuman experiences, behaviors, and capabilities.³⁶ The term still carries pejorative connotations, even though ethologists have come to concur that a "careful [and] constructive"³⁷ or, to use literary and cultural studies scholar Bernd Hüppauf's term, "self-conscious"

history of animals, see Erica Fudge: *A Left-Handed Blow: Writing the History of Animals*. In: Nigel Rothfels (ed.): *Representing Animals*. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana UP 2002, pp. 3–18, here pp. 14–15. On empathy for and in animals, see Ashley Young/Kathayoon A. Khalil/Jim Wharton: *Empathy for Animals: A Review of the Existing Literature*. In: *Curator: The Museum Journal* 61:2 (2018), pp. 327–343. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cura.12257> (accessed: January 24, 2022). And on the importance of compassion and humility in human-animal relationships, see Marc Bekoff: *Increasing Our Compassion Footprint: The Animals' Manifesto*. In: *Zygon. Journal of Religion and Science* 43:4 (2008), pp. 771–781. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2008.00959.x> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

35 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p. 54 (emphasis in original).

36 See Domenica Bruni/Pietro Perconti/Alessio Plebe: *Anti-Anthropomorphism and Its Limits*. In: *Frontiers in Psychology* 9:2205 (2018), pp. 1–7, here p. 5. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02205> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

37 Bruni/Perconti/Plebe: *Anti-Anthropomorphism*, p. 7. See also Michal Arbilly/Arnon Lotem: *Constructive Anthropomorphism. A Functional Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Human-Like Cognitive Mechanisms in Animals*. In: *Proceedings of the Royal Society: Series B* 284 (2017), pp. 1–8, here p. 2. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1616> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

(as opposed to “sentimental and naïve”³⁸) anthropomorphism can help bring about a better understanding of nonhuman animals while also recognizing their alterity. In fact, in literary representations, anthropomorphism is unavoidable. While there is, as Sam Cadman points out, “considerable uncertainty” as to “precisely what stylistic techniques this idea refers to,”³⁹ he argues for an anthropomorphism that challenges the human / animal binary, disrupts human practices of dominating and subordinating animals, reconceptualizes human-animal relationships, and promotes animal subjectivity.⁴⁰

Students will be quick to comment on the fact that the rooks in *Crow Country* are clearly different from the fictional talking birds of the ancient fables: Edgar Allan Poe’s famous Gothic raven or Ernest Thompson Seton’s wise old Silver-spot, who commandeers his fellow crows like a well-seasoned human military leader.⁴¹ In contrast, attributions of human consciousness, perspectives, and traits are not prominently displayed in *Crow Country*. Indeed, Cocker repeatedly juxtaposes “the rook of his imagination” with the anthropomorphic projections of other writers, be they poets, songwriters, or naturalists.⁴² And yet, an attentive student may remind us of our earlier insight, namely that the rooks in *Crow Country* are represented as agents whose actions are subjectively meaningful and, to some extent, relatable from a human perspective, so that the crows emerge as intelligent, cheery, and sociable beings who follow rituals in their roosting behavior and routinely traverse a sophisticated network of airways.

Significantly, these relatable characteristics result from the actions and behaviors that Cocker – and by implication his readers – observes and experiences in his encounters with them. As Eileen Crist notes, anthropomorphic

38 Bernd Hüppauf: *Vom Frosch: Eine Kulturgeschichte zwischen Tierphilosophie und Ökologie*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2011, p. 28 (transl. M. K). <https://doi.org/10.14361/transcript.9783839416426.295> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

39 Cadman: Reflections on Anthropocentrism, p. 168.

40 Ibid., p. 178; see also Hüppauf: *Vom Frosch*, pp. 27–28; and Gabriele Kompatscher / Reinhard Spannring / Karin Schachinger: *Human-Animal Studies: Eine Einführung für Studierende und Lehrende*. Münster / New York: Waxmann 2017, pp. 36–53. <https://doi.org/10.36198/9783838556789> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

41 Ernest Thompson Seton, who was born in England in 1860 and who grew up in Canada, is well known for his animal stories and the illustrations he drew from the late 1890s to the late 1910s. “Silver-spot, the Story of a Crow” is included in one of his most popular books *Wild Animals I Have Known* (1898).

42 Numerous examples can be found in chapter 13, ranging from his father’s tale of a rook court to various British poets to the New Wave Band XTC to several natural history writers, see Cocker: *Crow Country*, pp. 107–120.

descriptions in “naturalist portrayals [...] do not appear as attributions *in* the writing, as much as they emerge as the effects *of* the writing.”⁴³ Crist further explains that the latter can be achieved by using active verbs and graphic imagery, so that animals are shown as active subjects of their lifeworld, which mirrors but does not “collapse into”⁴⁴ the human world. *Crow Country* makes generous use of this form of anthropomorphism. For example, when recounting three historical nineteenth-century plagues of locusts, caterpillars, and voles, Cocker visualizes the rooks in action, imagining them riding into the devastated regions of Britain “like cavalry to the rescue.”⁴⁵ He also describes them as “freebooters on waste tips,” based on his observation, and aesthetic and poetic appreciation of their “glossy iridescence and [...] rainbow sweep of color among the rotting detritus.”⁴⁶ And he notices their superior “spadework” with their “stiletto-like bill[s]” as outstripping “the spadework of any professional gardener” when “work[ing] the ground.”⁴⁷ Now, what insights and knowledge do we gain about rooks and their lives from such anthropomorphisms?

Here are a few tentative answers: the rooks Cocker presents are valuable and deadly agents in the fight against pests; they are defiant and beautiful adventurers in the face of death and destruction; and they are meticulous cultivators of the soil, accessorized with remarkable extravaganza. They are at once familiar and unfamiliar – familiar, in that Cocker’s anthropomorphisms allow us to relate to the rooks on our terms as forceful soldiers, brazen survivors, and flamboyant gardeners; unfamiliar, in that we see them acting in unexpected ways and contexts. In this way, Cocker shows the rooks as actively shaping his and other people’s lives as pest police, landfill buccaneers, and glamorous cultivators of the earth while underscoring a relational understanding that acknowledges their differences.

Cocker, then, oscillates between varying degrees of human-rook relations. On the one hand, he distinguishes between humans and animals, albeit critically and self-consciously. On the other hand, he underscores species-relatedness. I want to suggest that this species-relatedness at times comes close to Cary Wolfe’s understanding of posthumanism, not in the sense of “that which transcends or escapes the bounds of the human,” but as

43 Eileen Crist: *Naturalists’ Portrayals of Animal Life: Engaging the Verstehen Approach*. In: *Social Studies of Science* 26:4 (1996), pp. 799–838, here p. 831 (emphasis in original). <https://doi.org/10.1177/030631296026004004> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

44 *Ibid.*, p. 807.

45 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p. 58.

46 *Ibid.*

47 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

that which is posthumanist (that which thinks fundamental social and cultural questions outside of or at least askance to the humanism that we have inherited in our philosophical habits, political institutions, cultural and religious conventions, and much else) [...] [and as that which does not] flatter the actual complexity and multidimensionality of what are, in fact, many different ways of being in the world that are shared in myriad particular ways across species lines.⁴⁸

Such a posthumanist stance, I contend, emerges in Cocker's "rook vision." Without discarding the human perspective "of trees and fields, heat-imagining equipment, [or] the human path or road,"⁴⁹ he offers a complex and multidimensional experience of being in the world that both humans and rooks share, albeit in different ways.

In my seminars, I ask students what stories our reading materials tell, or do not tell, and how these stories reconfigure our knowledge of and about animals. Indeed, students may have long spotted that Cocker's rook story does not rehash the familiar formulae of crow or raven narratives that, first and foremost, rank them among the most highly evolved bird species due to their cognitive abilities. Without downplaying their intelligence, Cocker stresses the birds' sociable and life-affirming characteristics. "Rooks," he writes,

live, feed, sleep, fly, display, roost, recreate, fall sick and die in the presence of their own kind. Their whole lives are enfolded in the flock [...] a self-perpetuating inner universe of rook sounds and rook gestures that the birds carry with them, like an enveloping microclimate or a bubble of atmospheric oxygen, wherever they go. [...]

I've saved the rook's gregariousness until last [...] because it was the aspect of the species by which I was most captivated. [...] That plume of raw energy was more than simply a latch-key to the unconscious; it opened the cellar door beneath my whole interest in birds.⁵⁰

Instead of reiterating the common knowledge of their great intelligence and evolutionary development – which tacitly assumes an evolutionary ranking spearheaded by humans as the most intelligent of animals – Cocker unabashedly adheres to his own predilections. At the same time, he openly acknowledges that, in spite of all his detailed observations, "I don't believe

48 Wolfe: *Moving Forward, Kicking Back*, pp. 2–3 (emphasis in original).

49 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p. 132.

50 Ibid., pp. 37–38.

for one moment that I understand even a third of what there is to know.”⁵¹ And he adds: “Nor do I really mind that I shall never arrive at a definitive understanding.”⁵²

What is more, and contrary to the traditional popular cultural stories of rooks as uncanny messengers of doom, Cocker’s is a story of appreciation. He values the “fantastic tumult” and “protean swirls”⁵³ of their evening flights as they generate in him a profound “joy” and “*frisson*,”⁵⁴ a term that signifies the thrill and excitement of feeling intensely alive, “engaged [...], absorbed and fulfilled.”⁵⁵ Relating to rooks, *Crow Country* suggests, can be “a deeply restorative process,”⁵⁶ an idea to which I shall return in my concluding remarks. There is another aspect that I put up for discussion if students do not make the connection: for Cocker, the “scaly” and “reptilian”⁵⁷ skin around the rooks’ eyes and their habit of passing on the knowledge about the location of their roosts “from one generation to the next”⁵⁸ “speaks of deeper ecological”⁵⁹ processes that involve the lives of rooks and humans alike despite the – geologically speaking – fleeting time they reside on earth:

Rooks were dependent upon the westward spread of stock grazing and cereal agriculture from their original Middle Eastern settings to make their own entry into Europe. So when you next pass a rookery remember to stop and listen. Among the spring-summoning cacophony you’ll hear the faintest echo of a Neolithic axe. [...] Yet wherever we’ve replaced trees with grassland or arable, even in the chemical-drenched monocultures of the twenty-first century, rooks make a healthy living.⁶⁰

This means that Cocker is also telling us a success story of rook migration, adaptation, and growth. In fact, between 1995 and 2004, the number of pairs of breeding rooks that he counted in the region of the Yare and the Waveney

51 Ibid., p. 168.

52 Ibid., p. 169.

53 Ibid., p. 4.

54 Ibid., p. 5 (emphasis in original).

55 Ibid., p. 186.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., p. 34.

58 Ibid., p. 50.

59 Ibid., p. 73.

60 Ibid., pp. 61–64.

showed an impressive “rise of 47.3 per cent.”⁶¹ Their ascent, however, means a decline in the numbers of other birds. As Cocker explains, rooks have come into the British Isles and the Norfolk region because of the anthropogenic changes that made the land attractive to them in the first place. By transforming the land into “open grassland[s]”⁶² through “agricultural intensification” and “chemical farming,” humans have made some areas “virtually birdless.”⁶³ The rooks’ success story thus stands alongside a history of bird extinction on the British Isles:

Even in the short period since the first 1968 census – effectively, in my own lifetime – I’m aware that the birds of my Yare have sunk lower. I know it not simply because of the BTO’s [British Trust for Ornithology] work, but because my neighbour Billy Driver told me so. [...] Billy’s diaries [...] serve as a highly magnified and intensely personal prism through which one can observe nationwide changes in bird numbers between the 1960s and the 1980s. For some species, Billy’s counts become imperceptibly smaller [...] until they vanish from his diary altogether. In the twenty years of the journals, species he would once have counted among the most common and typical of the farmlands he worked – grey partridge, snipe, cuckoo, turtle dove, skylark, yellow wagtail, meadow pipit, reed bunting and tree sparrow – disappeared almost completely.⁶⁴

The loss of a formerly diverse bird population takes the form of the familiar story of extinction with its “gloom-and-doom statistics”⁶⁵ and “nature nostalgia.”⁶⁶ However, even though Cocker mourns the decline of rich, variegated, and aesthetically appealing birdlife in the Norfolk Broads, he also recounts – with great eloquence, enjoyment, and humor – the story of the ascent of a bird population that is neither rare nor endangered nor particularly attractive in appearance or taste. As Ursula Heise puts it in *Imagining Extinction: The Cultural Meanings of Endangered Species*, Cocker tells a more complicated story

61 Cocker: *Crow Country*, p. 102.

62 Ibid., p. 60.

63 Ibid., p. 45.

64 Ibid., pp. 96–97.

65 Peter Kareiva, qtd. in Ursula K. Heise: *Imagining Extinction: The Cultural Meanings of Endangered Species*. Chicago / London: U of Chicago P 2016, p. 11. <https://doi.org/10.1515/ang-2018-0029> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

66 Heise: *Imagining Extinction*, p. 11.

about “how biodiversity is currently changing.”⁶⁷ Altogether, *Crow Country* oscillates between elegiac lamentations about bygone birdlife in the Yare Valley and exhilarating observations of the rooks’ increasing abundance.

4. Conclusion:

Living with extinction and grief in the Anthropocene

When studying *Crow Country* alongside J. A. Baker’s classic *The Peregrine* (1967) and Macdonald’s *H is for Hawk*, students will likely consider the latter, with its focus on gender, class, power, and violence, as the timeliest of these reading materials.⁶⁸ Notably, all authors, including Baker, a member of the older generation of British naturalists, employ the tropes of death, sorrow, and mourning characteristic of pastoral literature. In doing so, as Heise states, many “popular-scientific and creative writings” about the decline of species and ecosystems tell stories about “an irreversible loss in the breadth and depth of human experience and culture.”⁶⁹ Indeed, all three writings emphatically link anthropogenic changes with their narrators’ emotional and mental well-being or lack thereof.

The Peregrine, which Baker wrote when he himself was “under a possible sentence of death” due to a serious illness, can be called a “requiem”⁷⁰ to the British hawks, whose extinction he anticipated as a result of the common agricultural use of DDT in the 1960s. Macdonald’s story of taming Mabel is also the story of the narrator grieving her father’s death by withdrawing from human society. When she finally returns to her Cambridge social life, she has worked through her loss, having gained a new understanding of herself in relation to Mabel and the world. In *Crow Country*, Cocker links his budding relationship

67 Ibid., p. 23.

68 Cocker’s *Crow Country* can, of course, also be fruitfully taught alongside stories of human encounters with animals other than birds as well as students’ own creative environmental writing. Moreover, juxtaposing *Crow Country* with human and animal autobiographies may prove productive, allowing students to explore the diverse ways in which species lines are constructed, maintained, and crossed. Given *Crow Country*’s emphasis on loss and grief, studying it alongside works of such creative non-fiction as Danielle Celermajor’s *Summertime: Reflections on a Vanishing Future* (2021) can provide particularly illuminating perspectives on grief as an experience shared by humans and other animals in the face of environmental crisis and species extinction.

69 Heise: *Imagining Extinction*, p. 28.

70 Robert Macfarlane: Introduction. In: J. A. Baker: *The Peregrine*. New York: Review 2005, pp. vii–xv, here pp. x–xi.

with the rooks to his depression. Like Macdonald, he gives a clear reason for his melancholy, which he thinks is the stress of moving house. The distress and sense of bereavement expressed by these writers is an important part of human and nonhuman lives in the Anthropocene, even though anthropogenic disruptions differ greatly across regions, countries, and continents. Indeed, the struggle with the mental and emotional impacts of anthropogenic interventions, destruction, and the extinction of animals and their living spaces continues to pose unprecedented challenges, such as how to deal with individual and collective pain and loss, what rituals to engage in, who to turn to, or how to gain – at least temporary – solace.⁷¹ *Crow Country* addresses these adversities by finding some consolation in the rooks’ “rituals,” a term that Cocker employs repeatedly. Moreover, he also finds comfort in his relationships with the rooks, who emerge as skilled survivors and sociable migrants with an unquenchable joie de vivre, even in times of environmental crisis. Here, then, is one more important lesson to be learned from Cocker’s story: however elusive the rooks’ will to life may prove for humans, it is the engagement with other-than-human animals that provides humans with a corrective to the overwhelming sense of loss and a vital means of staying alive in the Anthropocene.

71 See Ashlee Cunsolo: Prologue: She was Bereft. In: Idem / Karen Landmann (eds): *Mourning Nature: Hope at the Heart of Ecological Loss and Grief*. Montreal / Kingston: McGill-Queen’s UP 2017, pp. xiii–xxii, here p. xvi. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1w6t9hg.5> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

Alexandra Böhm

Teaching Empathy and Emotions

J.M. Coetzee's *The Lives of Animals*
and Human-Animal Studies

1. Introduction

Although J.M. Coetzee's animal narrative *The Lives of Animals* is fundamentally a text about empathy and emotions, most vividly embodied by the main protagonist Elizabeth Costello, it is far from a sentimental indulgence in the question of the animal – a common criticism of emotional approaches to animals by animal rights spokespeople such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan in the 1980s. As Lori Gruen and Fiona Probyn-Rapsey remind us in a recent publication on gender and animals, the traditional theorists of the animal rights movement were at pains to distance their cause from sentimental “old ladies in tennis shoes” who were fond of animals.¹ In his 1975 introduction to *Animal Liberation*, Peter Singer claims that the

portrayal of those who protest against cruelty to animals as sentimental, emotional “animal lovers” has had the effect of excluding the entire issue of our treatment of nonhumans from serious political and moral discussion.²

If the animal cause is to be taken seriously, Singer and Regan argue, it needs to be firmly grounded in rationality. According to Singer, the application of basic moral principles is “demanded by reason, not emotion.”³ He makes it

1 Lori Gruen / Fiona Probyn-Rapsey: Distillations. In: Idem (eds): *Animaladies: Gender, Animals, and Madness*. London: Bloomsbury 2018, pp. 1–8, here p. 4. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781501342189.ch-001> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

2 Peter Singer: *Animal Liberation*. New York: Avon 1975, p. ix–x.

3 Ibid.

clear to the readers of *Animal Liberation* that the book “makes no sentimental appeals for sympathy toward ‘cute’ animals.”⁴

Since the end of the twentieth century, an increasing interest in human-animal studies has led to the development of new perspectives, especially with regard to the concept of sympathy, which has become – along with its more recent term, empathy – one of the key concepts within an ecofeminist approach to animal studies.⁵ Specifically in animal ethics, but also in analyses of literature, film, and the arts, empathy has come to play a major role.⁶ Whereas animal rights ethics emphasize theory, principles, reason, and speaking for the animal, scholars who argue from a feminist care ethics position – for instance Carol Adams, Josephine Donovan, Brian Luke, and Lori Gruen – stress the role of emotions and the body in our relationship to nonhuman animals.⁷ Gruen firmly situates her concept of entangled empathy within this tradition of care ethics:

Entangled Empathy [...]: a type of caring perception focused on attending to another’s experience of wellbeing. An experiential process involving a blend of emotion and cognition in which we recognize we are in relationships with others and are called upon to be responsive and responsible in these relationships by attending to another’s needs, interests, desires, vulnerabilities, hopes, and sensitivities.⁸

4 Singer: *Animal Liberation*, p. ix–x.

5 See Josephine Donovan who argues for a sympathetic approach toward non-human animals (Josephine Donovan: *Attention to Suffering: Sympathy as a Basis for Ethical Treatment of Animals* (1994). In: Idem / Carol J. Adams (eds): *The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics: A Reader*. New York: Columbia UP 2007, pp. 174–197; idem: *The Aesthetics of Care: On the Literary Treatment of Animals*. New York: Bloomsbury 2016). With reference to Jacques Derrida, Carol J. Adams stressed in 2007 our war against compassion that allows horrors such as genocide and species extinction to go on (Carol J. Adams: *The War on Compassion*. In: Idem / Donovan: *The Feminist Care Tradition*, pp. 21–38, here p. 32).

6 Lori Gruen focuses on empathy and animal ethics in her study *Entangled Empathy: An Alternative Ethic for Our Relationships with Animals*. New York: Lantern 2015; more recently, Elisa Aaltola recapitulated similar arguments in *Varieties of Empathy: Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics*. London / New York: Rowman & Littlefield 2017. For empathy with the more-than-human world in film, see Alexa Weik von Mossner: *Affective Ecologies: Empathy, Emotion, and Environmental Narrative*. Columbus: Ohio State UP 2017. For interspecies empathy in literature, see my forthcoming study, *Narratives of Empathy: Literary Human-Animal Encounters from the 18th Century to the Present*.

7 See, e.g., Brian Luke, who argues for animal liberation from a decidedly anti-rationalist ethics of care position (Brian Luke: *Taming Ourselves or Going Feral? Toward a Nonpatriarchal Metaethic of Animal Liberation*. In: Carol J. Adams / Josephine Donovan (eds): *Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations*. Durham: Duke UP 1995, pp. 290–319).

8 Gruen: *Entangled Empathy*, p. 3.

Gruen uses several key words in her definition of entangled empathy that we should keep in mind when discussing Coetzee's main character, Elizabeth Costello: 1) a caring perception, 2) another's experience, 3) a blend of emotion and cognition, 4) being in relationships with others, and 5) being responsive and responsible. These terms also coincide with the core issues of care ethics: attentiveness, situatedness, relationships, responsiveness, particularism, and emotion.⁹ Both the complexity of Coetzee's semi-fictional text and Costello's imperative concern with empathy make *The Lives of Animals* particularly apt for a detailed and careful discussion of the concept, which current debates on ethical relationships between human and nonhuman animals use extensively but often quite vaguely. Published in 1999, Coetzee's novella preceded the animal turn – at least in Germany – by over a decade and counts as one of the foundational texts of human-animal studies – together with Jacques Derrida's ground-breaking essay *L'Animal que donc je suis (à suivre)* (*The Animal That Therefore I Am*), which was first published in the same year as *The Lives of Animals*.¹⁰

Originally, Coetzee presented his text at the renowned Tanner Lectures (founded in 1978) at the Princeton University Center for Human Values in 1997 and 1998. However, Coetzee composed his text not as a classical lecture; instead, he told the fictional story of an Australian writer, Elizabeth Costello, who was invited to (the fictional) Appleton College in the United States “to deliver the annual Gates Lecture and meet with literature students.”¹¹ The self-reflexive character of the text – both authors, Coetzee and Costello, are asked to give a prestigious lecture at an American university – opposes and fractures clear-cut generic attributions, such as fictive, real, public, private, and political.¹² Accordingly, critics have been uncertain whether the text is

9 For an overview of the core positions of care ethics, see Maurice Hamington: *Empathy and Care Ethics*. In: Heidi L. Maibom (ed.): *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy*. New York: Routledge 2017, pp. 264–272.

10 The publication history of Derrida's text is complicated. The text first appeared in the context of Marie-Louise Maller's edition of *L'Animal autobiographique* (Paris: Galilée 1999), which presents Derrida's ten-hour lecture on the autobiographical animal at the Cerisy conference in 1997. As an independent text, Derrida's *L'animal que donc je suis (à suivre)* first appeared in David Wills' translation “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” in *The Critical Inquiry* from 2002.

11 J. M. Coetzee: *The Lives of Animals*, ed. by Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton UP 1999, p. 16.

12 For a discussion of the tension between ethical-political commitment and aesthetic autonomy in *The Lives of Animals*, see my article: „Anwälte“, Intellektuelle, Schriftsteller: J. M. Coetzee's *The Lives of Animals* zwischen Engagement und Autonomie. In: *Journal for Literary Theory* 9:2 (2015), pp. 186–211.

a novella, an essay, or a disguised animal manifesto by the vegetarian author Coetzee. In his discussion of *The Lives of Animals*, the ethicist and moral philosopher, Peter Singer, for instance, takes Elizabeth Costello as Coetzee's *alter ego*. He and his coauthor Karen Dawn compared interviews by the author with statements made by his characters and concluded that Costello speaks with the voice of the author.¹³ There is indeed evidence that supports this assumption: both Coetzee's and Costello's surnames start with the same initial; both writers live in Australia; and both became famous with similar novels. However, this mirroring reduces the complex aesthetic structure of both the text and its protagonist, the enigmatic Australian writer who also plays a major role in other texts by Coetzee.¹⁴

In my experience teaching J. M. Coetzee's *The Lives of Animals* in undergraduate as well as graduate courses, the novella quite often meets with confusion, perplexity, and even resentment.¹⁵ This is, I would like to suggest, due to several causes that concern the narrative's structure and content. First, Elizabeth Costello appears bizarre and eccentric, and offers little potential for reader identification. In addition, on the intradiegetic level, Costello earns empathy neither from her son John, the focalizer of the story, nor from her daughter-in-law Norma – although Costello is obviously a troubled old lady or, as the philosopher Cora Diamond describes her, a “wounded animal.”¹⁶ Another important obstacle is the multilayered narrative structure itself, which, in addition, is polyphonic and dialogic. Thus, students often feel perplexed and disoriented as they cannot make out an authorial voice in the text and easily lose track of who is talking.

13 Karen Dawn / Peter Singer: Converging Convictions: Coetzee and his Characters on Animals. In: Anton Leist / Peter Singer (eds): *J. M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature*. New York: Columbia UP 2010, pp. 109–118.

14 In 2003, Coetzee published *Elizabeth Costello*, a novel that consists of eight lectures and a postscript by the Australian writer.

15 This observation coincides with that of South African scholar Wendy Woodward, who commented on the “[s]trong emotions” *The Lives of Animals* excites in students (though, of course, she focuses on the specific South African situation of racism and post-apartheid). Woodward's contribution is part of a recently edited volume that deals specifically with the question of “How to teach Coetzee.” See Wendy Woodward: Pedagogies of Discomfort: Teaching Coetzee's *The Lives of Animals*. In: Laura Wright / Jane Poyner / Elleke Boehmer (eds): *Approaches to Teaching Coetzee's Disgrace and Other Works*. New York: The Modern Language Association of America 2014, pp. 139–145, here p. 139.

16 Cora Diamond: The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy. In: Idem / Stanley Cavell / John McDowell / Ian Hacking / Cary Wolfe: *Philosophy and Animal Life*. New York: Columbia UP 2008, pp. 43–89, here p. 46.

In view of the question of how to teach human-animal studies – i. e., which texts, which methods, and which concepts can introduce students to an (ethical) engagement with the more-than-human world – I will present a practical didactic model for teaching Coetzee’s multifaceted, provocative, and difficult-to-grasp text in literature, human-animal studies, and gender and animals courses. With regard to empathy and emotions in *The Lives of Animals*, I will focus on questions such as:

- 1) How does the text provoke reader emotions? To what extent is the text based on a violation of emotional rules?
- 2) How does the vegetarian Elizabeth Costello represent an ethics of care for the more-than-human world? And how, in her position as a writer, does she demand an aesthetic that engenders, prompts, and provokes empathetic engagement with the “animal other” that counters rational approaches?¹⁷
- 3) Does the text ask the reader to feel empathy for Costello? How might text-generated emotions allow for an “encounter” with Costello, the “wounded animal”?
- 4) Finally, does the narrative support empathy on a metadiegetic level?

To answer these questions in class, I suggest two sequential modules for teaching empathy and emotions: one that deals with students’ emotional reactions to *The Lives of Animals* and one that focuses on the emotions represented in the text. As a didactic tool for the first part, I propose that students keep an emotions journal to document their responses while they read the text. The aim of keeping a journal is, on the one hand, to gain some distance from an overwhelming direct emotional response to controversial and provocative issues; on the other hand, to facilitate an awareness of the mechanisms and structure of the text that may allow access to its difficult protagonist. For human-animal studies, I suggest as a learning target texts that raise the students’ awareness of the logocentric tradition that denounces and rejects emotions, for instance, excerpts from Derrida’s *The Animal That Therefore I Am*. A further goal is to acquaint students with concepts of care theory, especially empathy and emotions, attentiveness, response, and responsibility, and to situate Costello within this context.

17 Care ethics often links vegetarianism and empathy; see, e.g., Lori Gruen: Empathy and Vegetarian Commitments. In: Steve F. Sapontzis (ed.): *Food for Thought: The Debate over Eating Meat*. New York: Prometheus 2004, pp. 284–294.

Next, I ask students to chronicle striking emotions in the narrative, i. e., to describe characters and their emotions on the diegetic level. In their journal, students should keep a record of their problems and ideas with regard to instances of empathic and rational knowledge. The goal here is for students to become aware of how the text associates empathic knowledge with the situational and bodily, whereas rational knowledge is associated with the abstract, mental, and general. As a further didactic tool, I then suggest the method of role-play. Students choose and discuss a conflictual situation, develop roles, and perform them in class. Acting out certain passages from the text is intended to lead to new perspectives and thus to enhance empathy. As a learning target for human-animal studies, I propose juxtaposing the different ways in which philosophy and empathic poetry access the animal other.

2. Documenting affective responses: The emotions journal

When teaching *The Lives of Animals*, I have repeatedly noticed the strong emotions the text excites. Accordingly, keeping an emotions journal seems particularly apt. The students' task here is to record their emotional responses in detail during the reading process. Preferably, this process takes place directly after reading the text since memories, emotions, and impressions are more detailed the shorter the interval is between reading and writing.¹⁸ In addition, the passing of time encourages reflective processes that might superimpose themselves onto immediate emotional responses. This is especially problematic when students feel the need to correct their reactions to events that take place in the narrative in accordance with culturally accepted social and emotional rules, thereby distorting their initial impressions and passions.¹⁹ The aim is to generate a range of emotions based on the students' initial responses to their reading, which, in a second step, they discuss and analyze in class. This part focuses not so much on understanding the text but rather on developing student competence. The learners and their reading experiences become the

18 Barbara Frieberthäuser: Anregungen zum Studieren mit einem Forschungstagebuch. In: *Uni Frankfurt*, n. d. https://www.uni-frankfurt.de/60356661/BF_Anregung_Forschungstagebuch.pdf (accessed: February 1, 2021).

19 For the cultural, historical, and political dimension of emotions, see Ute Frevert: *Defining Emotions: Concepts and Debates over Three Centuries*. In: Idem / Christian Bailey / Pascal Eitler / Benno Gammerl et al. (eds): *Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling 1700–2000*. Oxford: Oxford UP 2014, pp. 1–31.

material that they evaluate together in a second step. In their analysis, they can ask meta-reflexive questions, for instance, about why a certain number of fellow students had similar emotional responses.

The benefit of keeping an (emotions) journal lies in the gradual approach to the text that it provides.²⁰ In the first instance, students are not only reading about the characters' emotions, but – in the process of writing – they become aware of their own sensibilities. Ideally, the journal will enable students to clarify their emotions and to take a reflective stance toward them, thereby challenging them to take responsibility for their own positions and perspectives.²¹ Teachers also benefit from the journal method as it spotlights ideas, questions, and problems that warrant further discussion. Furthermore, this approach significantly increases students' motivation to participate in classroom debates.

I will now discuss two examples that are likely to perplex students on the level of the narrative's diegesis and excite feelings of discomfort, unease, or even denial. Part of this response, I suggest, is due to the rhetoric of Costello's lectures, which works against what the philosopher Cora Diamond has called "deflection." Diamond uses the "notion of deflection, for describing what happens when we are moved from the appreciation, or attempt at appreciation, of a difficulty of reality to a philosophical or moral problem."²² Philosophy, in other words, deflects from unbearable or appalling issues, such as suffering or vulnerability, and transforms them into abstract moral problems. Costello, however, exposes and appreciates such "difficulties of reality" that run counter to our ordinary mode of thinking. According to Diamond, "to appreciate the difficulty is to feel oneself being shouldered out of how one thinks, how one is apparently supposed to think, or to have a sense of the inability of thought to encompass what it is attempting to reach."²³ Diamond's image of being

20 For a detailed description of the journal method, see Kersten Reich: Tagebuchmethode. In: *Methodenpool*, n.d. http://methodenpool.uni-koeln.de/tagebuch/frameset_tagebuch.html (accessed: January 28, 2021).

21 For the effects of keeping a journal, see: Friebertshäuser: Anregungen zum Studieren; Sabine Liebig: Ein anderer Blick auf Unterricht: Das Lerntagebuch. In: *Yumpu*, n.d. <https://www.yumpu.com/de/document/read/51436051/ein-anderer-blick-auf-unterricht-das-lerntagebuch-lo-net-2> (accessed January 14, 2021); Dietlind Fischer: Das Tagebuch als Lern- und Forschungsinstrument. In: Barbara Friebertshäuser / Annedore Prengel (eds): *Handbuch qualitative Forschungsmethoden in der Erziehungswissenschaft*. Weinheim / Munich: Juventa 2003, pp. 693–703.

22 Diamond: The Difficulty of Reality, p. 57.

23 Ibid.

“shouldered out” of one’s normal habits and ideas implies a forceful, surprising act that describes exactly what students with strong emotions of resistance or denial might experience during their reading. Diamond’s concept of deflection helps to explain and analyze those responses. When students come to understand the tendency of Costello’s rhetoric to thwart abstraction, they achieve one of the main learning targets. For instance, her talk repetitively alludes to bodily vulnerability, mortality, and creatureliness. Right at the beginning of her talk, she identifies with the wounded ape Red Peter from Kafka’s *Report to an Academy*. Her son John, a professor of astrophysics, who is both the focalizer of the narrative and the reader’s proxy, feels uncomfortable with what he calls his mother’s “death-talk.”²⁴ The narrative *mise en abyme* structure of John listening unwillingly and with “dis-ease” to his mother’s talk mirrors and metafictionally comments on the reader’s own reception of her talk. The “awareness we each have,” as Diamond writes, “of being a living body [...] carries with it exposure to the bodily sense of vulnerability to death, sheer animal vulnerability, the vulnerability we share with them.”²⁵ This exposure Diamond sees as capable of panicking us.

In view of this general sense of great unease and discomfort when reading *The Lives of Animals*, I propose next taking a closer look at specific textual issues that might cause strong emotions. Here, the idea of threshold concepts is helpful. As Wendy Woodward claims in her insightful contribution on teaching *The Lives of Animals* at a South African university, Coetzee’s text operates with threshold concepts, which she sees for example in Costello’s notion that animals are souls.²⁶ As Jan Meyer and Ray Land put forward in their report on teaching environments, a threshold concept “is akin to a portal, opening up a new and previously inaccessible way of thinking about something.”²⁷ Moreover, they maintain that threshold concepts are transformative in that they contribute to a changed perception of the world. Meyer and Land further state that the “shift in perspective may lead to a transformation of personal identity, a reconstruction of subjectivity. In such instances a transformed perspective is likely to involve an affective component – a shift in values, feeling

24 Coetzee: *Lives*, p. 19.

25 Diamond: *The Difficulty of Reality*, p. 74.

26 See Woodward: *Pedagogies of Discomfort*, p. 143.

27 Jan Meyer / Ray Land: *Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge: Linkages to Thinking and Practice within the Disciplines*. ETL Project. In: *Occasional Report 4* (May 2003). <http://www.etl.tla.ed.ac.uk/docs/ETLreport4.pdf> (accessed: February 2, 2021).

or attitude.”²⁸ However, this knowledge can prove troublesome as it might appear “alien,” “counter-intuitive,” or “incoherent” to students.²⁹ The acquired knowledge is also irreversible, meaning that the understanding of a threshold concept cannot easily be reversed once achieved.

Meyer and Land’s description of understanding threshold concepts in learning processes that force students into new perspectives and even to remodel their long-held assumptions is remarkably suitable for explaining students’ responses to Coetzee’s narrative. Here, I have identified at least two major threshold concepts on which the discussion in class should focus with respect to its potential for being “troublesome knowledge.”³⁰ Both threshold concepts relate closely to the notion of empathic engagement with the text. This is, firstly, the analogy Costello draws between the Holocaust and the industrial mass slaughter of animals. She likens the horror of the abattoirs and their disavowal by most citizens to the denial of the concentration camps during the Third Reich. For her, the crime in both instances is the pretense of not knowing: “They lost,” she asserts, “their humanity, in our eyes, because of a certain willed ignorance on their part.”³¹ Costello’s Holocaust comparison breaches the culturally accepted way of speaking about the Nazi mass murder of Jews, to which students will react with discomfort. Coetzee’s protagonist violates a taboo when she questions the uniqueness of the unfathomable historic event and its unrepresentability by implicitly likening industrially slaughtered animals to the victims of the Shoah. Again, the figure of the Jewish writer Abraham Stern, who is appalled by Costello’s comparison, serves as a culturally acknowledged intratextual reaction to her provocative analogy. Here it is interesting to compare students’ reactions with Stern’s answer to Costello. To understand the full nature of Costello’s argument, it is necessary to consider another passage, in which she returns to the death camps once more. “The particular horror of the camps,” Costello emphasizes, is not the animalization of the Jews that allowed their killers to treat them “like lice”³² despite their shared humanity.³³ For her, this intersectional argument

28 Ibid., p. 4.

29 Ibid., p. 5.

30 Ibid.

31 Coetzee: *Lives*, p. 20.

32 Ibid., p. 34.

33 See, e.g., Jobst Paul, who shows how different discourses use animalization for racial or ethnic discrimination in: *Das [Tier]-Konstrukt – und die Geburt des Rassismus: Zur kulturellen Gegenwart eines vernichtenden Arguments*. Münster: Unrast 2004.

is “too abstract.”³⁴ According to Costello, the monstrosity lies in the failure to engage with the other, to empathize with the victims:

The horror is that the killers refused to think themselves into the place of their victims, as did everyone else. They said, “It is *they* in those cattle cars rattling past.” They did not say, “It is I who am in that cattle car.” They said, “It must be the dead who are being burned today, making the air stink and falling in ash on my cabbages.” They did not say, “How would it be if I were burning?” They did not say, “I am burning, I am falling in ash.”³⁵

The crucial point here is to make students understand the way in which empathy works. Costello asks her audience to change perspectives, to see the world through the eyes of the other, the other who is not an object but a subject. In a discussion of this passage, the seminar can analyze to which extent Costello’s description matches the central criteria of care ethics: firstly, attentiveness and responsiveness instead of indifference; secondly, the acknowledgement of a relationship between the beings in the wagons and oneself (instead of drawing a demarcation line between the individual and the other); and thirdly, an insistence on the literalness of the image “I am burning, I am falling in ash.” This phrase not only emphasizes an embodied resonance with the pain of the other but also incites the reader to take ethical responsibility for the other’s suffering through perspective-taking. Costello demands the empathetic engagement with the other, irrespective of their species: “there is no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of another,” she claims.³⁶ This insight into one’s interconnectedness with and personal responsibility for multispecies others can act as troublesome knowledge for students, an emotion that comes with the threshold concept.

Students can now contemplate whether Costello’s disconcerting comparison is productive when it allows the mechanism of blocked empathy, which draws a line between a fictive “them” and “us,” to become visible at the heart of violent systems of power.³⁷ There might be room here for discussing other examples of the mechanism of blocked empathy, e. g., environmental concerns such as

34 Coetzee: *Lives*, p. 34.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid, p. 35.

37 See Fritz Breithaupt on strategies of empathy blockade in: *Die dunklen Seiten der Empathie*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2017, pp. 86–100.

species extinction or climate change. Students should, however, be reminded that Costello's propensity to empathize with the other also runs the danger of losing the self.³⁸ Coetzee's narrative points to this possibility in its unsettling final scene, in which the Australian writer suffers a breakdown of the border between inside and outside, between imagination and reality. She perceives signs of "a crime of stupefying proportions"³⁹ everywhere and asks herself whether she is mad.⁴⁰

The second example of a threshold concept in *The Lives of Animals*, which I suggest debating in class, is also about empathy and perspective-taking. Costello talks about Kafka's ape Red Peter and his supposed prototype, Sultan, from Wolfgang Köhler's ape colony on Tenerife, where Köhler was conducting experiments on apes on behalf of the Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1912. When Köhler tested the apes' mental capacities, Costello implies, he was treating them as objects, as instinct-driven machines. Costello opposes this discourse, instead giving Sultan a voice with his own point of view. In her empathic speech, she shows Sultan as an actor who has a much more complex mind than Köhler's experimental set-up permits. Sultan's view of an experiment with crates and bananas goes as follows:

Sultan knows: Now one is supposed to think. That is what the bananas up there are about. The bananas are there to make one think, to spur one to the limits of one's thinking. But what must one think? One thinks: Why is he starving me? One thinks: What have I done? Why has he stopped liking me? One thinks: Why does he not want these crates any more? But none of these is the right thought. [...] The right thought to think is: How does one use the crates to reach the bananas?⁴¹

The Belgian philosopher and ethologist Vinciane Despret recently dedicated a whole book to the question of "What would animals say, if we asked the right

38 On potential "dark sides" of empathy like the loss of one's identity, see *ibid.*, pp. 44–78.

39 Coetzee: *Lives*, p. 69.

40 The notion of dissolving borders between inside and outside becomes especially salient in the "Postscript" to Coetzee's novel *Elizabeth Costello*, which gives an imagined letter by "Elizabeth, Lady Chandos to Francis Bacon." The fictive wife, who is an intertextual reference to Hugo von Hofmannsthal's Chandos letter, writes: "But how I ask you can I live with rats and dogs and beetles crawling through me day and night, drowning and gasping, scratching at me, tugging me, urging me deeper and deeper into revelation – how?" (J. M. Coetzee: Postscript. In: Idem: *Elizabeth Costello*. London: Vintage 2003, pp. 226–230, here p. 229.) Elizabeth posits similar questions as Costello – how can you go on living with this insight into things?

41 Coetzee: *Lives*, p. 28.

questions?” Despret argues that from an anthropocentric standpoint, human subjects cannot ask the right questions; these can only result from an interspecies attunement guided by an empathic openness to the complexity of the other’s situated being.⁴²

When analyzing this scene, students can relate their affective, situational approach to the text to two opposing ways of looking at the animal, which for Derrida are poetry on the one hand and philosophy on the other. The most common practice in scientific experimentation but also in everyday encounters – for instance, in zoos – is looking at animals. Scientists like Köhler claim that they know the animal by looking *at* it. What science forgets, however, is the animal’s capability of looking back. At this point, it might be productive to complement Coetzee’s text with Jacques Derrida’s *The Animal that Therefore I Am*. In his fundamental critique of Western metaphysics with respect to human-animal relationships, Derrida describes the unsettling experience of being looked at by his cat while standing naked in his bathroom. Insofar as the cat is a being *in front* of him, it can be looked at; however, and this is the crucial point, Derrida says, “it can [also] look at me. It has its point of view regarding me.” It is this fact, Derrida claims, that the philosophical tradition from Aristotle to Levinas has ignored.⁴³ The sudden awareness that animals can look back at us is transforming knowledge as described by Jan Meyer and Ray Land, who claim it “is like a portal opening up a new [...] way of thinking about something.”⁴⁴ This can be quite confusing for students as the recognition that animals are something other than objects or resources for humans to exploit and are instead beings who have their own perspective, needs, and desires fundamentally questions acquired habits and assumptions. Derrida also points to the primal significance of this understanding when he writes about recognizing the other as an agential subject: “The animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking perhaps begins there.”⁴⁵ Derrida opposes the act of *thinking* to logocentric *knowledge*, which for him is in its nature arresting. Thinking, in contrast, connotes a poetic, dialogic, and potentially endless process for Derrida. Instead of knowledge’s “philosophical, social, and political naming and classification of *things*” and the humanist subject’s

42 Vinciane Despret: *What Would Animals Say If We Asked the Right Questions?*, transl. from the French by Brett Buchanan. Minneapolis / London: U of Minnesota P 2016.

43 Jacques Derrida: *The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)*, transl. from the French by David Wills. In: *Critical Inquiry* 28 (2002), pp. 369–418, here p. 380.

44 Meyer / Land: *Threshold Concepts*, p. 1.

45 Derrida: *The Animal*, p. 397.

confronting the world as a separate, inanimate object, poetic thinking implies a nonhierarchical relational “entanglement, a kinship, with ‘things.’”⁴⁶ The target of the journal method is to make students aware of their own emotions by writing down their affective responses to Coetzee’s text. Class discussion can range from negative or even hostile reactions to Costello and her animal discourse, to the notion of threshold concepts that contain troublesome knowledge. This notion enables students to understand and reflect upon their emotional response to Coetzee’s female protagonist. Finally, the class can debate whether Costello’s idea of empathy represents such a threshold concept as it stresses the ineluctable relational entanglement with other (multispecies) beings – a potentially troublesome awareness.

3. Emotions in the text: Role-play and empathy

The second part of the module for teaching *The Lives of Animals* addresses the representation of emotions *in* the text. The core question with regard to emotions in the diegetic world is what kind of feelings the characters develop for Elizabeth Costello. Do they empathize with her? What mechanisms and aspects block the other characters from empathetically engaging with her? And, more generally, how can empathy be enhanced?

First, students should focus on the character constellation in the text and find suitable passages with which to contrast the conflicting parties. There are two main responses toward Elizabeth Costello: from Costello’s family – her son John and his wife Norma – and from the academic audience. The text contrasts Costello with John, an assistant professor of physics and astronomy, and Norma, who holds a PhD in philosophy and specializes in the philosophy of mind. John and Norma value a rational take on the world. They dismiss everything associated with the body and its vulnerability, and everything that deviates from the norm makes them feel uncomfortable. This is especially true of Norma, whose name emphasizes the “normal,” an adherence to the “norm.” Costello, in contrast, points to her body quite bluntly. She not only refers to her age, but also to her vulnerability, to her wounded body, which she compares to the wounded ape Red Peter. Her speech is, at times, more of a rant, constantly violating norms as well as decorum.⁴⁷

46 Jodey Castricano: Rampant Compassion: A Tale of Two Anthropomorphisms and the “Trans-Species Episteme” of Knowledge Making. In: Idem / Lauren Corman: *Animal Subjects 2.0*. Waterloo, ON: Laurier UP 2016, pp. 249–268, here p. 260.

47 For a more detailed account of the text’s characters, see Böhm: „Anwälte“, Intellektuelle, Schriftsteller, pp. 201–202.

Costello's audience reacts much the same way as her family. The listeners, too, are uneasy and respond with incomprehension. The way she exposes emotions is not culturally accepted – at least not in an academic environment. She constantly violates “tacit rules which indicate what is regarded as an adequate expression of emotional responses in a specific culture and what is not.”⁴⁸ Students should realize that all characters show a total lack of understanding of, and hence empathy for, the Australian writer. A question from the audience after Costello's talk is indicative of their utter lack of comprehension: “What wasn't clear to me,” one of the listeners says,

is what you are actually targeting. Are you saying we should close down the factory farms? Are you saying we should stop eating meat? Are you saying we should treat animals more humanely, kill them more humanely? Are you saying we should stop experiments *on* animals? Are you saying we should stop experiments with animals, even benign psychological experiments like Köhler's? Can you clarify?⁴⁹

The man is obviously puzzled by her display of feeling that for him denotes a lack both of rational arguments and normative statements. Costello's supposed “inconsistency,” Sharon Payne writes, “is a challenge for students”⁵⁰ – not only for her fictive audience and family members. The frustration of not being able to discern clear ideological positions and moral guidelines governs responses in and outside the text. This is, however, due not only to the conflicting figure of the Australian writer but also to the text's narrative structure. A substantial part of *The Lives of Animals* is direct speech – either monologic in Costello's lectures or dialogic in instances such as the dinner at the Faculty Club, the student seminar, and the debate between Costello and the philosophy professor Thomas O'Hearne. The dialogism of the spoken word that dominates the text also shows in the structure of the two related parts “The Philosophers and the Animals” and “The Poets and the Animals.” Due to this structure, the text has a dramatic quality, making it especially suitable for its adaptation in role-play.

48 Vera Nünning: *Reading Fictions, Changing Minds: The Cognitive Value of Fiction*. Heidelberg: Winter 2014, p. 116.

49 Coetzee: *Lives*, p. 36.

50 Shannon Payne: Teaching Coetzee's *The Lives of Animals* in the First Year Composition Class Room. In: Wright / Poyner / Boehmer (eds): *Approaches*, pp. 174–179, here p. 177.

As opposed to a more discussion-based approach, role-play allows students to analyze difficult situations or conflicts. By taking up different perspectives, students get closer to the characters, learn about their motives for acting, their emotions and ideas. Assuming the role of a character compels students to take a position; they cannot remain indifferent. According to didactics research, role-play significantly increases openness and empathy as well as the ability to observe oneself and others.⁵¹

Numerous situations in Coetzee's narrative lend themselves to reenactment. For example, students can either focus on Costello's dinner with her family, the discussion of her talk, the dinner at the faculty club, the letter from Abraham Stern, or the debate with Thomas O'Hearne. In groups, the class should discuss and analyze one of the central conflicts as well as develop and write their own scripts for the roles in specific scenes, which might also mean gathering background material and additional information. This promotes not only a broader understanding of Costello and what she opposes, but also students' reflection on their own attitudes. After students have worked on a specific conflict and have established their roles, they can move on to performing a given situation.⁵²

Critics have described the affinity between acting and empathy. Susan Verducci shows that dramatic acting can foster empathy. She argues that the same type of empathy that an ethics of care requires is needed to embody convincing characters on stage.⁵³ This is especially true of the technique of method acting, which the Russian actor Konstantin Stanislavski (1863–1938) introduced to the theory of authentic, naturalist acting. For him it was important that fictional characters express real emotions, achieved by the actor's empathy that "allows the actor to see a character as if it were she (the actor) faced with the different circumstances that characterize the character's life."⁵⁴

51 See, e.g., Daniela Köster / Helley Fazli / Kersten Reich / Stefanie Nölke: Rollenspiele. In: *Methodenpool*, n. d. http://methodenpool.uni-koeln.de/rollenspiel/frameset_rollenspiel.html (accessed: January 30, 2021); Wolfgang Mattes: Rollenspiel. In: Idem: *Methoden für den Unterricht. Kompakte Übersichten für Lehrende und Lernende*. Braunschweig: Schöningh 2011, pp. 62–163.

52 It might also be worth discussing that, although the text has a strong dramatic quality, there do not seem to have been any significant performances of it so far.

53 See Susan Verducci: A Moral Method? Thoughts on Cultivating Empathy Through Method Acting. In: *Journal of Moral Education* 29:1 (2000), pp. 87–99, here p. 88.

54 Shaun Gallagher / Julia Gallagher: Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor's Empathy for her Character. In: *Topoi* 39 (2020), pp. 779–790, here p. 786.

When discussing students' performance in class, it is interesting to see whether the role-play – with its assumption of different perspectives – encourages an empathic approach toward Costello or whether students develop alternative patterns of action. In any case, the role-play tends to enhance students' ability to perceive not only themselves but also the other.

4. Conclusion

Scholars have profoundly criticized Coetzee's figure Elizabeth Costello for her sentimental views, her hysterical rants, and the inefficacy of her presentation. Costello meets with a particularly empathic response neither from the diegetic world nor from the reader of the text. Vera Nünning maintains that "the use of narrative conventions and aesthetic devices in fictional stories plays a role in encouraging or blocking empathic responses."⁵⁵ The most common aesthetic device to encourage empathy with a particular character is the internal perspective from which the reader gains direct insight into the character's thoughts and emotions. In *The Lives of Animals*, however, the reader's knowledge is strictly limited to the perspective of Costello's son John. When he is late for her poetry class, the reader misses the class with him. Also, John is skeptical of his mother and assesses her from a primarily rationalist, non-affective point of view. The narrative thus deliberately blocks, or at least hinders, an empathic response to its main protagonist. For critics of Costello, this is evidence that Coetzee meant to distance himself from his protagonist. Such an assessment, I suggest, is representative of an attitude that links female gender, animals, and maladies. Costello belongs to those gendered women who Lori Gruen and Fiona Probyn-Rapsey have recently termed "animaladies."⁵⁶ From a hegemonic male perspective, female characters who align themselves with the more-than-human world are often stigmatized as mad and overly emotional.⁵⁷

While the reading journal as a methodological tool helps assess students' emotional responses to the text, role-play enables them to assume a perspective potentially different from their own, thus allowing them to connect with the

55 Nünning: *Reading Fictions*, p. 108.

56 Gruen / Probyn-Rapsey: *Distillations*, p. 1.

57 Another prominent example from recent fiction is the female protagonist from Han Kang's *The Vegetarian* (2015), who affiliates with plants and resists violent and hegemonic systems of power. As a result, her social environment regards her as insane and finally sends her to a mental hospital.

characters and their emotions. Both teaching methods can encourage empathy and thus advance a deeper understanding of the text. This may allow students to encounter Costello from a new, empathic perspective.⁵⁸ Readers have no more access to Costello's thoughts and feelings than to that of Thomas Nagel's famous bat – there is only an external view that draws conclusions from signs, gestures, and words. Thus, Coetzee's protagonist asks readers to practice empathy irrespective of their species – not only with her lectures but also through the texts' representation of her character. This is our responsibility as readers.

58 "Encounter" in the sense of genuinely *seeing* the other, of being surprised and shocked into a new way of thinking. For this empathic sense of an encounter see Derrida: *The Animal That Therefore I Am*; Donna Haraway: *When Species Meet*. Minnesota: U of Minnesota P 2008; as well as the introduction to the volume *Animal Encounters*, which I co-authored with Jessica Ullrich: Introduction – Animal Encounters: Contact, Interaction and Relationality. In: Idem (eds): *Animal Encounters: Kontakt, Interaktion und Relationalität*. Berlin: Metzler 2019, pp. 1–21.

Maria Moss

“The skin and fur on your shoulders”

Teaching the Animal Turn in Literature

1. Introduction

The quote in the title comes from the foreword to the 1971 poetry collection *The Broken Ark: A Book of Beasts* by Michael Ondaatje, in which Ondaatje makes a claim for animal-centered poetry by exchanging the routinely anthropocentric view of animals for an animal-focused perspective:

These are poems that look at animals from the inside out – not the other way round. We don’t want to classify them or treat them as pets. We want you to imagine yourself pregnant and being chased and pounded to death by snowmobiles. We want you to feel the cage, and the skin and fur on your shoulders.¹

By seriously challenging the privileged status of the human, human-animal studies (HAS) attempts to reverse the notion of human exceptionalism and the dictum that cognitive domains – such as communication, emotion, and tool use – are reserved for humans only. By viewing animals as independent actors, HAS requires us to think beyond ourselves and include the perspective of the animal. When teaching human-animal studies, I focus on different modes of relating to animals (for instance through theoretical and/or literary texts, creative writing exercises, and practical experiences), thus enhancing

1 Michael Ondaatje: Introduction. In: Idem: *The Broken Ark*. Ottawa: Oberon 1971, pp. 5–9, here p. 6.

the possibility of building a relationship with them.² However, there is still widespread denial that animals can lead complex lives, and depictions of animals as emotional and rational beings always run the risk of being dismissed as unscientific. “This situation,” write Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin,

is further complicated by two factors. First, hesitant as we are to accord complex emotions to animals, we are equally reluctant to admit our own involvement with them. We may acknowledge our love for particular pets [...] but we *necessarily* disguise our feelings toward animals from ourselves. If we did not, the structure of most human societies, dependent as they are on animal products, would collapse.³

At a time of mass species extinction, as well as pervasive cruelty in factory farms and laboratories, we need to confront the contradictions in our relationships with animals who are often “both cherished family members and factory-raised and slaughtered food on the table – at times loved and wept over; at other times ignored.”⁴ Indeed, incontrovertible evidence of both wild and domestic animal emotions and rational behaviors has led many to reconsider their complex relationships with animals. If great apes are capable of serious reflection and social behavior, if dolphins and whales enjoy an elaborate social networking system, and if ravens exhibit a degree of intelligence previously thought impossible, is it still possible for us humans to consider them the “other”?

In this article, I address the various ways in which animals appear in literature and how university instructors could go about “teaching the animal.” Due to constraints in length, this article can only present a limited selection of tasks and texts.⁵ After introducing material that raises such questions as, “What are we talking about when we talk about animals?” and “How do we as individuals / as a society relate to and interact with animals?,” I will present background material explaining terms crucial for discussing human-animal

2 Although I find the terms “animal” and “human animal” more appropriate, in this article, I will use the terms most commonly used: nonhuman animals and human animals.

3 Graham Huggan / Helen Tiffin (eds): *Postcolonial Ecocriticism: Literature, Animals, Environment*. London / New York: Routledge 2010, p. 194 (emphasis in original). <https://doi.org/10.4000/ces.5990> (accessed: June 1, 2021).

4 Janice Fiamengo: The Animals in This Country. In: Idem: *Other Selves: Animals in the Canadian Literary Imagination*. Ottawa: U of Ottawa P 2007, pp. 1–25, here p. 3.

5 I use the texts presented in seminars for general education students as well as for introductory to intermediate-level courses in the English major.

relations, e. g., *speciesism* and the *animal turn*. I have chosen texts that tend to initiate controversial discussions and encourage students to not only employ some of their reflections on characters and situations in their daily lives but also – and most importantly – assume the perspective of the animal(s) they read about. As a next step, I will introduce a number of literary texts – from poetry to short fiction and novels. These texts present animals as seen both through the eyes of humans and through the eyes of animals. Lastly, I will touch on “chimp fiction” and briefly discuss the issue of animal narrators. By working with these various texts, students will hopefully develop

reading practices which make possible the formulation of difficult questions, give shape to indistinct or fraught conditions in fictional animal representations, and engage with fictional animals to consider how the textural politics of literary representation might enable more just and thoughtful, and less harmful and anthropocentric, ethical relationships between humans and other species.⁶

As disparate as they might initially appear, all of the texts have one thing in common: they express, in various ways, pro-animal intentions – that is, they raise awareness of anthropocentrism in their content and/or narrative form, draw critical attention to fictional animals in their various entanglements with humans, and offer representations of animals – sometimes even as a disruptive presence – that are different from the essentially voiceless animals we often encounter in literary and cinematic material.⁷

6 Catherine Parry: *Other Animals in Twenty-First Century Fiction*. London: Palgrave 2017, p. 4.

7 Since most animal narratives more often than not end in tragedy, here are two examples that do not: Ann Patchett’s *This Dog’s Life* is a beautifully written story about the close relationship between a young woman and her dog. Initially published in the collection of dog stories, *Dog is My Co-Pilot*, the story takes up, in a highly ironic way, the prejudice that every woman of childbearing age who decides to get a dog would in fact much rather have a baby. It is a thoroughly enjoyable story. See Ann Patchett: *This Dog’s Life*. In: *NPR*, September 30, 2003. <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1446804> (accessed: March 17, 2021). An equally upbeat text – again by an American writer – is Lawrence Ferlinghetti’s poem, *Dog*, about a dog who enjoys a range of freedoms most readers would love to have. See Lawrence Ferlinghetti: *Dog*. In: *Poetry Foundation*, n. d. <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/53076/dog-56d2320f90631> (accessed: March 14, 2021).

2. Teaching human-animal studies

2.1 Introductory material

As a first step in a HAS seminar, the students and I tackle the question of the animal itself. What exactly do we mean when we speak of animals? Undergraduates need to understand the ways in which animals are socially constructed and thus take on human categories. Often, those categories are based on their value to humans, for instance, as pets, livestock, marketing tools, or laboratory or zoo animals. In *Teaching the Animal: Human-Animal Studies Across the Disciplines*, Margo DeMello suggests showing a picture of a rabbit and letting students come up with ideas of what they see: A cute bunny? A laboratory animal? One of Hugh Hefner's playmate? A Sunday roast? The list is endless. At some point, however, it becomes clear that all of these depictions are human constructions of the animal that have nothing to do with the animal itself. In order to further ease into the subject, I often ask students to describe one of their most significant encounters with an animal, be it from their childhood; with a companion animal; with animals used in sports or hobbies (e.g., horseback riding, hunting, agility training, falconry), or for cultural / ceremonial reasons (e.g., bullfights, wolves in fairy-tales); or roadkill.⁸ At times, I will ask students to create animal haikus⁹ or to write a response diary recounting their encounters.¹⁰

8 Margaret Atwood's poem *The Animals in That Country* is a perfect example of the many uses and abuses of animals in such contexts. The poem's beginning is often interpreted as showing the worth people attribute to animals in "that country," that is, in Europe; yet, it also reveals the ceremonies and sports traditions in which animals were forced to participate. The end of the poem, which is indented in order to further demonstrate the difference between "that country" and "this country" (Canada), delineates the reality of the animals' lives in "this country" and most likely also in "that country." See Margaret Atwood: *The Animals in That Country*. In: Idem: *Eating Fire: Selected Poetry 1965–1995*. London: Virago 1991, pp. 30–31; or on the website of the Poetry Foundation: <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/47791/the-animals-in-that-country> (accessed: February 17, 2021).

9 For more information on how to teach haikus, see my article: Writing Creatively in a Foreign Language: Vignettes, Haikus, and Poetry. In: *ZIF (Zeitschrift für interkulturellen Fremdsprachenunterricht)* 25:2 (October 2020), pp. 29–53. <https://tujournals.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/index.php/zif/article/view/1086> (accessed: June 1, 2021).

10 HAS seminars attract students who have companion animals; thus, besides a number of dogs in class, we normally also have a fair share of hamsters and rats – we just need to decide beforehand who brings which animal when. For other interesting ways to engage students, see the article by Pamela Steen, in this volume.

Another general introduction to HAS are EGO / ECO pyramids.¹¹ While students are not surprised to see a man at the very top of the ego pyramid (an issue that often initiates discussions about equal pay and the #MeToo debate), it is less obvious why the woman is situated next to a whale and other beings that we, as a society, consider valuable and/or worthy of protection. Heated discussions are pre-programmed.

The Harold Herzog Animal Attitude Scale is another source that works well as a general introduction to the field of human-animal relations.¹² The survey features over twenty statements that students can rank from “strongly agree with” to “strongly disagree with.” I find it best to have students work on their own, and then in groups of two to three, to discuss the individual questions with the goal of trying to convince other students of their opinion. If this is not possible, they should write down their answers in different colors. I also ask each group to come up with two additional statements. Here are some (adapted) sample statements:

- It is unethical to drink milk since it rightfully belongs to calves.
- Eating the meat of animals that you have killed yourself is better than buying packaged meat.
- If you can't kill animals, you shouldn't eat them.
- Wearing leather, such as boots or jackets, is unethical.
- Horse-drawn carriages should be outlawed.
- Testing medication on animals is more ethical than testing it on humans.
- Keeping pets is a glorified form of slavery.
- I find the meat aisles in supermarkets disturbing.

When American historian Harriet Ritvo observed “an increasing scholarly interest in *animals*, in the relationships between humans and other *animals*, and in the role and status of *animals* in (human) society,”¹³ she coined the term *animal turn*. What the animal turn has done and continues to do is to respectfully take into account the omnipresence and the significance of the

11 For a creative commons image of the pyramids, see *Mother Pelican: A Journal of Solidarity and Sustainability* 10:11 (November 2014). <http://www.pelicanweb.org/solisustv10n11page1.html> (accessed: March 2, 2021).

12 Harold Herzog / Stephanie Grayson / David McCord: Brief Measures of the Animal Attitude Scale. In: *Anthrozoös: A Multidisciplinary Journal of the Interactions of People and Animals* 28:1 (2015), pp. 145–152, here p. 148. <https://doi.org/10.2752/089279315X14129350721894> (accessed: June 1, 2021).

13 Harriet Ritvo: Species. In: Lori Gruen (ed.): *Critical Terms for Animal Studies*. Chicago / London: U of Chicago P 2018, pp. 383–394 (emphasis in original).

other animals with whom we share our time and space.¹⁴ After showing the brief video of Ritvo's explanation of the *animal turn* as something that recognizes that research and teaching should not only encompass but also emphasize nonhuman animals, I ask students to fill out a worksheet. Here are some sample questions:

- What does the term *animal turn* refer to?
- Are "human" and "nonhuman animal" adequate terms? Why / why not? Can you think of any better terms? (Students will routinely ask: why not animals and human animals? Yes, indeed. Why not?)
- What does "intrinsic value" mean? And why do humans hesitate to apply this term to animals?

Besides the "animal turn," another term that needs explanation is "speciesism." In his article, "Who lives, who dies, and why?," ethologist Marc Bekoff claims that "speciesism is the main culprit in our interactions with other animals [and] reinforces the property status of nonhuman animals [...]."¹⁵ He asserts that "speciesist arguments ignore or violate well-accepted evolutionary theory and result in the establishment of false boundaries that have dire consequences for species deemed to be 'lower than others.'"¹⁶ In debating teams, I invite students to discuss the following statement: "There aren't any 'lower' or 'higher' species. We make this differentiation because it serves us well and makes life easier when deciding who lives and who dies."¹⁷

By this point, students have a general idea of the wide range of human-animal relations, their own involvement with animals, and some of the difficulties encountered in such relationships.

2.2 Theoretical / philosophical background material

After the "fun" part spent looking at pyramids and bunnies, I provide students with texts by philosophers such as René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, John Bentham, and Jacques Derrida, who have helped to shape our Western

14 Harriet Ritvo: Defining the Animal Turn. In: *Animals and Society*, n.d. <https://www.animalsandsociety.org/human-animal-studies/defining-human-animal-studies-an-asi-video-project/defining-the-animal-turn-with-harriet-ritvo/> (accessed: February 27, 2021).

15 Marc Bekoff: Who Lives, Who Dies, and Why? How Speciesism Undermines Compassionate Conservation and Social Justice. In: Raymond Corbey / Annette Lanjouw (eds): *The Politics of Species: Reshaping our Relationships with Other Animals*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2013, pp. 15–20, here p. 16.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 17.

tradition in terms of how we behave toward animals, and who have thus influenced our ideas about animals in the areas of language capacity, reason, and natural hierarchy.¹⁸ It was Descartes who not only refused to grant animals the capacity to experience pain but also established the superiority of rational thought, of which only humans are supposedly capable.¹⁹ Moreover, he claimed that – unlike humans who, even if disabled, can create words and sentences – “no animal however perfect or well-bred can do anything of the sort.” This is not simply “because they lack the right organs,” Descartes continued, but is rather due to their souls, which are “of an entirely different nature from our own.”²⁰ In the Cartesian framework, rationality is cut off from nature, and since humans are defined by their capacity to think, it follows that they, too, are necessarily separate from nature and thus also from nonhuman animals. The influence of the Cartesian rationalist tradition, Mary Midgley notes, paved the way for the perceived need to counter “primitive paganism”²¹ and nature worship.²²

Although Kant did not deny animals the capacity to feel pain and urged people to not mistreat animals, his concern always lay with people. In Kantian philosophy, self-consciousness is one of the most important aspects of a person’s duty, and because animals – in the Kantian view – cannot be self-conscious, we do not have any obligations or duties toward them. Instead, they are a mere means to an end (the end being us). The only reason that Kant gives against being cruel toward animals is that cruel behavior might lead to a disposition toward cruelty in general, e.g., toward humans:

18 See Carrie Rohman: *Animal Writes: Literature and the Discourse of Species*. In: Margo DeMello (ed.): *Teaching the Animal: Human-Animal Studies Across the Disciplines*. New York: Lantern 2010, pp. 48–58, here p. 51. This is an especially helpful book for THAS because all the contributors include course syllabi and assignment choices.

19 Elizabeth Costello, protagonist of J.M. Coetzee’s *The Lives of Animals*, sarcastically points to the paradox of the totality of reason introduced by the philosophers of the Enlightenment: “[R]eason is simply a vast tautology. Of course reason will validate reason as the first principle of the universe – what else should it do? Dethrone itself?” (J.M. Coetzee: *The Lives of Animals*. Princeton: Princeton UP 1999, p. 25.)

20 René Descartes: *Discours de la méthode*, p. 5, qtd. in Marjorie Spiegel: *The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery*. Michigan: Mirror 1996, p. 26.

21 Mary Midgley: *Beast and Man*. London: Routledge 1995, p. 219.

22 Students might like to listen to the Cartesian view of animals according to Gregory B. Sadler: *Core Concepts in Philosophy: Descartes – Discourse on Method (Part V) Machines, Animals, and Rational Beings*. In: *YouTube*, May 1, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ESfq4cQD0fs> (accessed: February 4, 2021).

Yet it cannot be denied that a hard-heartedness towards animals is not in accordance with the law of reason, and is at least an unsuitable use of means. Any action whereby we may torment animals, or let them suffer distress, or otherwise treat them without love, is demeaning to ourselves.²³

In contrast to the Cartesian view of animals as machine-like, unfeeling beings, and Kant's denial of animals as self-conscious beings, Bentham focused on animals' ability to suffer: "The question is not, Can they reason nor Can they talk but, Can they suffer."²⁴ In his treatise, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*,²⁵ Derrida repeatedly returns to Bentham's quote in his thoughts on the animal in Western culture. Struck by his recognition of his own cat's nonhuman cat perspective, Derrida identifies Western animal representations as a precursor to violence against animals.

J.M. Coetzee's novella *The Lives of Animals* becomes extremely helpful at this point as it depicts the debate between the protagonist Elizabeth Costello – a modern-day novelist and animal rights activist – and canonical philosophers such as René Descartes and Immanuel Kant,²⁶ as well as their modern-day followers, for instance Thomas Nagel. In his celebrated 1979 article, "What Is It like to Be a Bat?," Nagel argues that, although it is possible to give a scientific, objective account of the bat's visual mechanism, this achievement will not capture what it is like to live in a bat-like way. We cannot know, Nagel argues, what it is like as we cannot imagine ourselves living a bat-like existence. This is because we do not have the sensory equipment required to do

23 Immanuel Kant: *Lectures on Ethics*, transl. from the German by Peter Heath, ed. by Peter Heath / J.B. Schneewind. New York: Cambridge UP 1997, p. 434; Christine M. Korsgaard, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University and a Kantian scholar, offers a different view of our obligations to animals in: Christine M. Korsgaard: A Kantian Account of Our Obligation to Animals. In: *YouTube*, February 28, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bn3-qffqiAc> (accessed: January 19, 2022).

24 Jeremy Bentham: *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, qtd. in Karla Armbruster: Thinking with Animals: Teaching Animal-Based Literature Courses. In: Laird Christensen / Mark C. Long / Fred Waage (eds): *Teaching North American Environmental Literature*. New York: MLA 2008, pp. 72–90, here p. 76.

25 Jacques Derrida: *The Animal That Therefore I Am*. New York: Fordham UP 2008. A great starting point for Derrida's treatise is the excellent foreword by the collection's editor: Marie Luise Mallet: Foreword. In: *Ibid.*, pp. ix–xiii.

26 Richard Alan Northover points out that the reliance on Kant is counter-productive since, "for Kant, ultimate value in the universe resides only in the good will of persons, that is, in the autonomous rational individual, and only human beings are capable of personhood." (Richard Alan Northover: *J.M. Coetzee and Animal Rights: Elizabeth Costello's Challenge to Philosophy*. PhD thesis, University of Pretoria 2009, p. 16.)

so.²⁷ Costello disagrees and argues that we *can* and *do* imagine ourselves in any number of situations in which we do not fully share our sensory experience with animals. She suggests that human thought can be better understood in the context of our fundamental human capacity for sympathy, which allows us to “share at times the being of another.”²⁸ Costello rejects reason as not compelling enough, relying instead on the sympathetic imagination. When she asks her audience to walk beside the cattle “flank to flank”²⁹ on their way to the slaughterhouse, she is encouraging everyone to emotionally enter the being of an animal faced with death. “If principles are what you want to take away from this talk,” Costello tells her audience, “I would have to respond, open your heart and listen to what your heart says.”³⁰ Being able to identify with an animal and not, as Nagel proposes, seeking similarities in the realms of reason, self-consciousness, or an afterlife should be the motivating factor in relationships between human and nonhuman animals. Thus, the question should be: what would it be like if I were in their place?

Sympathy has everything to do with the subject and little to do with the object, the “another,” as we see at once when we think of the object not as a bat but as another human being. There are people who have the capacity to imagine themselves as someone else, there are people who have no such capacity (when the lack is extreme, we call them psychopaths), and there are people who have the capacity but choose not to exercise it.³¹

After this brief excursion into the historical debates on human-animal studies, I present students with more current perspectives, for instance from the 2005 publication *In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave*³² by the moral philosopher and animal rights activist Peter Singer, or excerpts from Marjorie Spiegel’s 1988 publication *The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery*. Here, Spiegel presents some astonishing visual and ideological parallels between the treatment of slaves and the treatment of animals. She contends not that the injustice suffered by Black people and animals have taken

27 Thomas Nagel: What Is It like To Be A Bat? In: Idem: *Mortal Questions*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1974, pp. 165–180.

28 Coetzee: *Lives*, p. 34.

29 Ibid., p. 65.

30 Ibid., p. 37.

31 Ibid., pp. 34–35.

32 Peter Singer (ed.): *In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave*. New York: Wiley-Blackwell 1985.

identical forms, but that the relationships between the oppressors and the oppressed show remarkable similarities:

Comparing the suffering of animals to that of blacks (or any other oppressed group) is offensive only to the speciesist: one who has embraced the false notions of what animals are like. Those who are offended by comparison to a fellow sufferer have unquestioningly accepted the biased worldview presented by the masters. To deny our similarities to animals is to deny and undermine our own power.³³

In his ground-breaking treatise, *Animal Liberation*, Peter Singer agrees that the tyranny of human over nonhuman animals “can only be compared with that which resulted from the centuries of tyranny by white humans over black humans.”³⁴ In the introduction to *The Dreaded Comparison*, Pulitzer Prize winner Alice Walker, author of *The Color Purple*, also comments on the enslavement of Black people and the enslavement of animals.³⁵ She points to the analogies between cruelty to animals and slavery, maintaining that animals, just like Black people, have been and are being mistreated on the grounds of morally irrelevant physiological differences:

It is a comparison that, even for those of us who recognise its validity, is a difficult one to face. Especially if we are descendants of slaves. Or of slave owners. Or of both. Especially so if we are responsible in some way for the present treatment of animals – participating in the profits from animal research (medicine, lipstick, lotions) and animal raising (food, body parts). In short, if we are complicit in their enslavement and destruction, which is to say, if we are, at this juncture in history, master.³⁶

In her own short story, *Am I blue?* (1986),³⁷ Walker covers several basic issues relevant to teaching human-animal studies (THAS), such as the parallel oppression of animals and marginalized groups like Indigenous people, Black

33 Marjorie Spiegel: *The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery*. Michigan: Mirror 1996, p. 30.

34 Peter Singer: *Animal Liberation*. New York: HarperCollins 2009, p. 7.

35 PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) has run several very controversial campaigns juxtaposing images of oppression against Black people with images of dead, dying, or captive animals: PETA's “Holocaust on your Plate” Campaign. In: *The Society Pages*, May 5, 2008. <https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2008/05/05/petas-holocaust-on-your-plate-campaign/> (accessed: March 1, 2021).

36 Alice Walker: Introduction. In: Spiegel: *Comparison*, pp. 1–10, here p. 9.

37 Alice Walker: *Am I Blue?* In: *The Westcoast Post*, June 1, 2013. <https://westcoastword.wordpress.com/2013/06/01/am-i-blue-by-alice-walker/> (accessed: March 3, 2021).

people, and recent immigrants to the US; and animal emotion. The California School Board banned this story due to Walker's mention of personal responsibility for meat consumption, arguing that the suggested alternative eating habits were inappropriate information for tenth graders.³⁸

2.3 Teaching the animal in poetry, short fiction, and novels

From childhood on, animals abound in children's stories, fairy-tales, and fables. They talk, argue, and often extend a helping hand to their human cohabitants. All of this makes complete sense – at least to children.³⁹ Only later in life do animals become an apparently insurmountable problem since, as adults, equipped with the considerable baggage that we refer to as literary theory, we become aware that we can only perceive and represent animals through our own eyes, a fact that opens the can of worms called “anthropomorphism.” Although in our digital age, as DeMello reminds us, “social networking sites and blogs are both venues in which animals – primarily pets – speak about their daily lives and interests,”⁴⁰ in academia, it is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to incorporate animal emotions, thoughts, and reflections into fictional texts without resorting to human structures of meaning. Speaking for animals in literature and literary criticism remains a formal and philosophical challenge, and is always a double-edged sword, “both an exploration of the radical otherness of the animal and an intensely human, and human-centred, endeavor.”⁴¹

The animal story is often considered a quintessential Canadian genre. It differs from its American counterpart, Canadian author Margaret Atwood claims, in that its focus is strictly on animals, even if the stories more often than not

38 W.P. Malecki / Alexa Weik von Mossner / Malgorzata Dobrowolska: Narrating Human and Animal Oppression: Strategic Empathy and Intersectionalism in Alice Walker's “Am I Blue?” In: *ISLE: Interdisciplinary Journal of Literature and Environment* 27:2 (2020), pp. 365–384. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isle/isaa023> (accessed: June 1, 2021).

39 Although Indigenous narratives are more often than not tied to the more-than-human world as a setting and to animals as vital characters, I will refrain from discussing them here because they are – to this day – rooted in oral rather than written exchange and proclaim a different worldview. Unlike in Indigenous tales, First Nations author Thomas King reminds us, “talking animals are a problem” in Western writing. Thomas King: *The Truth about Stories*. Toronto: Anansi 2003, p. 23.

40 Margo DeMello: Introduction. In: Idem (ed.): *Speaking for Animals: Animal Autobiographical Writing*. New York: Routledge 2013, pp. 1–14, here p. 1. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203085967> (accessed: June 1, 2021).

41 Fiamengo: *Other Selves*, p. 2.

result in their deaths.⁴² These deaths are “seen as tragic or pathetic, *because the stories are told from the point of view of the animal*.” Consequently, Canadian animal texts “are about animals *being* killed, as felt emotionally from inside the fur and feathers.”⁴³ Like much of Ondaatje’s and Atwood’s poetry, *The Well-Traveled Roadway* by Canadian poet John Newlove exemplifies this. In the first stanza, the lyrical I seems almost shocked by what it sees:

The dead beast, turned up
(brown fur on back and white
on the belly), lay on the roadway,
its paws extended in the air –
worn-out attitude of prayer.

In the second stanza, the narrator is taken by the beauty of the animal, even in death but is – at the same time – shocked by her/his own ignorance:

It was beautiful on the well-travelled roadway
with its dead black lips: God help me,
I did not even know what it was.
I had been walking into the city then,
early, with my own name in mind.⁴⁴

The writings of the South African Nobel Prize winner for literature J. M. Coetzee are a treasure trove for just about every aspect of THAS. His novella, *The Lives of Animals*, consists of two lectures, delivered at fictional Appleton College by Elizabeth Costello, an Australian writer, animal spokesperson, and Coetzee’s probable alter ego.⁴⁵ Though neither of her lectures,

42 For further information on Canadian animal stories, see my article: “Their deaths are not elegant”: Portrayals of Animals in Margaret Atwood’s Writings. In: *Zeitschrift für Kanada-Studien* 35:1 (2015), pp. 120–135. http://www.kanada-studien.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/zks_2015_6_Moss.pdf (accessed: June 1, 2021).

43 Margaret Atwood: *Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature*. Concord, OT: Anansi 1972, p. 74 (emphasis in original).

44 John Newlove: *The Well-Traveled Roadway*. In: Nancy Holmes (ed.): *Open Wide a Wilderness: Canadian Nature Poems*. Waterloo, ON: Laurier UP 2009, p. 257.

45 For an enlightening description of teaching J.M. Coetzee’s *The Lives of Animals*, see the article by Alexandra Böhm: Teaching Empathy and Emotions: J. M. Coetzee’s *The Lives of Animals* and Human-Animal Studies, in this volume.

“The Philosophers and the Animals” nor “The Poets and the Animals,” is successful with her audiences, they provide the reader with a *tour de force* through centuries of philosophy (from Kant to Nagel) and through twentieth-century poetry (from Ted Hughes to Gary Snyder).

Costello’s second lecture, “The Poets and the Animals,” centers on the assumption that, rather than theory, poetry – by addressing the emotional side of an issue – is better suited to both exploring the relationship between human and nonhuman animals and depicting animal presence without colonizing their otherness. Costello uses Hughes’s poems *The Jaguar* (which in class can be contrasted with Rainer Maria Rilke’s *Der Panther*) and *Second Glance at a Jaguar* to demonstrate that, by addressing our power of imagination, poetry enables us to place ourselves outside of any anthropocentric framework and thus share, if only for a short time, the animal’s perspective:

More than to the visionary his cell:
His stride is wildernesses of freedom:
The world rolls under the long thrust of his heel.
Over the cage floor the horizons come.⁴⁶

The poem *Second Glance at a Jaguar* in particular attempts to literally get under the skin of the animal, exploring every aspect of his physical being: “The hip going in and out of joint, dropping the spine / With the urgency of his hurry [...]”⁴⁷ By focusing on the details of the animal’s physical aspects, the poem depicts one way of understanding the jaguar’s complex nature. There are no limits to the human imagination, Costello claims. And since poetry can communicate in a way that theory cannot, it is entirely possible to produce poetry – like Hughes’ jaguar poetry and Rilke’s *Panther* – that “does not try to find an idea in the animal, that is not about the animal, but is instead the record of an engagement with him.”⁴⁸ Although Costello never mentions the term speciesism, it is implicit in many of her arguments:

46 Ted Hughes: *The Jaguar*. In: *The Hawk in the Rain* [1957]. London: Faber & Faber 2003, p. 7.

47 Ted Hughes: *Second Glance at a Jaguar*. In: *Selected Poems: 1957–1967*. London: Harper-Collins 1957, p. 19.

48 Coetzee: *Lives*, p. 51.

To me, a philosopher who says that the distinction between a human and non-human depends on whether you have a white or black skin, and a philosopher who says that the distinction between human and nonhuman depends on whether or not you know the difference between a subject and a predicate, are more alike than they are unlike.⁴⁹

One argument that especially infuriates Costello's audience is her comparison of animal suffering to the suffering of Jews during the Holocaust. However, the animal rights movement has been significantly shaped by those whose advocacy of animals has been influenced by the Holocaust, including survivors and the children of survivors. Both Peter Singer and Isaac Bashevis Singer have origins in European Jewry and lost family members in the Holocaust, yet both – Peter Singer most notably in his seminal volume *Animal Liberation* and I. B. Singer in his novel *Enemies: A Love Story* – repeatedly compare cruelty against animals to the Holocaust. In *Enemies*, Isaac Bashevis Singer tells the story of Herman, an aging Jewish immigrant from Poland who works as a translator for a publishing company. When Herman – who lost his entire family in a Nazi death camp, recovers from a bout of pneumonia – thinks that Huldah, a mouse to which he has become attached, has also died, he laments:

What do they know – all those scholars, all those philosophers, all the leaders of the world – about such as you? They have convinced themselves that man, the worst transgressor of all the species, is the crown of creation. All other creatures were created merely to provide him with food, pelts, to be tormented, exterminated. In relation to them, all people are Nazis; for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka. And yet man demands compassion from heaven.⁵⁰

If HAS seminars include a practical or service-learning component (like, for instance, my project seminar, “Study & Save: Eco-Critical Theories in Action”), J. M. Coetzee's 1999 novel *Disgrace* is a must-read. Set in post-Apartheid South Africa, it is most commonly read and discussed in terms of apartheid issues. However, Coetzee himself has repeatedly called attention to the novel's many contributions to the animal rights debate and the centrality of the animal presence in *Disgrace*:

49 Coetzee: *Lives*, p. 66.

50 Bashevis-Singer, qtd. in Northover: *Coetzee*, pp. 1–2.

The test case is my novel *Disgrace*, in which animals figure quite prominently. Most reviewers have more or less ignored their presence (they mention that the hero of the novel “gets involved with animal rights campaigners” and leave it at that). In this respect they – naturally – mirror the way in which animals are treated in the world we live in, namely as unimportant existences of which we need take notice only when their lives cross ours.⁵¹

Dismissed from his teaching position at a university due to sexual misconduct, David Lurie undergoes a transformation from a glib professor of literature to a person who learns to feel empathy, even for shelter animals. The part toward the end of the novel when he helps to euthanize a dog he had come to like always initiates heated debates: Why doesn’t Lurie at least save this dog who had come to rely on his kindness? Is Coetzee suggesting that Lurie – by killing this specific dog – needs to punish himself? Is there no redeeming sense of compassion? Or is killing the only logical – even humane – thing to do? Whatever the answer, this passage has the potential for rousing, heated debates.

It is not shelter animals but farm animals that figure prominently in the title story of Atwood’s short-story collection *Moral Disorder* (2006). In the story of the same, apt name, *Moral Disorder*, Atwood describes a young couple’s attempt at farming. While Tig takes a farmer’s pragmatic approach to raising and slaughtering animals, Nell experiences serious problems when a lamb she needs to bottle-feed gets so attached to her that he starts attacking Tig. Although she realizes that the lamb is actually trying to protect her from a rather insensitive partner, she eventually agrees to slaughter him. By presenting the animal as the more sensitive companion, Atwood stresses both the limitations of the human and the humanity of the animal.⁵²

Although often described as a dystopian novel, Atwood considers *Oryx and Crake* (2003) to be a piece of speculative fiction, since twenty-first-century humans are already living in the novel’s post-apocalyptic environment of biochemical research – ripe with super pills and pandemics. Eventually, Crake, one of the novel’s protagonists, gets a job at a bioengineering lab, where he helps to create genetically altered animals:

51 J. M. Coetzee: 2004 Interview with a Swedish Newspaper. In: Anton Leist / Peter Singer (eds): *J. M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature*. New York: Columbia UP 2010, pp. 109–118, here p. 110.

52 Margaret Atwood: *Moral Disorder*. In: Idem: *Moral Disorder*. Toronto: Seal 2006, pp. 145–177; for a detailed analysis of this story, see my article: “Their deaths are not elegant.”

“This is the latest,” said Crake. What they were looking at was a large bulblike object that seemed to be covered with stippled whitish-yellow skin. Out of it came twenty thick fleshy tubes, and at the end of each tube another bulb was growing. “What the hell is it?” said Jimmy. “Those are chickens,” said Crake. “Chicken parts. Just the breasts, on this one. They’ve got ones that specialize in drumsticks too, twelve to a growth unit.” “But there aren’t any heads,” said Jimmy. He grasped the concept – he’d grown up with *sus multiorganifer*, after all – but this thing was going too far. At least the pigeons of his childhood hadn’t lacked heads. “That’s the head in the middle,” said the woman. “There’s a mouth opening at the top, they dump the nutrients in there. No eyes or beak or anything, they don’t need those.”⁵³

Oryx and Crake features all of the literary highlights cherished by most students: post-apocalyptic science fiction scenery with youthful characters who go on adventures and undertake life-altering research. The current Covid pandemic, which is threatening to alter people’s lives forever, gives the novel a relevance unimaginable a few years ago.

In recent decades, the genre of “chimp fiction”⁵⁴ has gained attention. Karen Joy Fowler’s *We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves*⁵⁵ and T. C. Boyle’s latest novel, *Talk to Me*,⁵⁶ are examples of this genre. While Fowler’s text is about an experiment in bringing up a chimpanzee as a human while it retains its legal status as an animal, Boyle’s novel resonates with the actual story of Michael, the gorilla who was rescued from poachers and raised in the California Gorilla Foundation. There, he and his companion Koko mastered American Sign Language (ASL) to such a degree that they could actually communicate their feelings as well as past events.⁵⁷ Sam, the young chimpanzee and one of the protagonists in Boyle’s novel, becomes a celebrity because he can sign an impressive number of words, including abstract concepts such as “time” and “love.”

53 Margaret Atwood: *Oryx and Crake*. New York / London: Doubleday 2003, p. 202; for further information on the trilogy, see the article by Liza B. Bauer: Reading to Stretch the Imagination: Exploring Representations of “Livestock” in Literary Thought Experiments, in this volume.

54 Jan Kline: Literary Blog. In: Parry: *Other Animals*, p. 10.

55 Karen Joy Fowler: *We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves*. London: Serpent’s Tail 2013.

56 T. C. Boyle: *Talk to Me*. London: Bloomsbury 2021.

57 Watch the video on Michael’s account on YouTube: Michael’s Story, where he signs about his family. In: *YouTube*, August 4, 2009. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DXXsPqQ0Ycc> (accessed: March 2, 2021).

The girl Rosemary in *We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves* grows up with what she understands to be her twin sister, Fern, who is actually a chimpanzee. Eventually, Fern, who had been part of an animal-human behavioral experiment conducted by Rosemary's psychologist father, is given away, a loss with which Rosemary cannot cope. The novel reflects Rosemary's grief for her missing alter ego. While we never find out what has happened to Fern, it is Rosemary's problems as a young adult that shape the narrative. Looking back at her childhood, Rosemary recalls: "Most home-raised chimps, when asked to sort photographs into piles of chimps and humans, make only the one mistake of putting their own picture into the human pile. This is exactly what Fern did."⁵⁸ Although Fern is given a decisive part in the story, the novel's focus is still on humans and the effects an animal has on their lives. As Parry points out, Fern "is silenced and made absent by the human world into which she has been forcibly imported [...]"⁵⁹

Chimp fiction is not only about raising chimpanzees as humans, but also about the effects that this has on our concept of self. What is so special about us if apes can not only use tools, display emotions, and enjoy elaborate friendships but also communicate? Our hesitancy to attribute narrative capacities to other creatures belies an underlying unease with their capacity for complex thought and language, a cornerstone of the Cartesian doubts about the animal world. Eventually, chimp fiction might actually enable humans to escape their speciesist prejudices and enter more fully into animal experience.

2.4 Animal narrators

Chimp fiction also plays a decisive role in novels that feature animal narrators, such as James Lever's *Me Cheeta: The Autobiography*.⁶⁰ Actually a pseudo animal memoir, *Me Cheeta* initiates a "discussion of the nature of animal life writing, the comic animal, and human intervention into the lives of chimpanzees."⁶¹ By giving a voice to an animal, the novel transforms the biography of a chimpanzee – who may or may not have played the part of Cheeta in Johnny Weismuller's Tarzan films – into a satirical autobiography about how to survive in the "golden age" of Hollywood: "Dearest humans, So, it's a perfect day in Palm Springs, California, and here I am – actor, artist, African,

58 Fowler: *Ourselves*, p. 101.

59 Parry: *Other Animals*, p. 11.

60 James Lever: *Me Cheeta: The Autobiography*. London: Fourth Estate 2008.

61 Parry: *Other Animals*, p. 11.

American, ape and now author – flat out on the lounge by the pool, looking back over this autobiography of mine.”⁶² By featuring our most recent ancestors – in evolutionary terms – chimp fiction allows us to emotionally grasp the absurdity of speciesism, and Sam, Cheeta, and Fern, “without ever being anything but chimpanzees,” Catherine Parry maintains, “call into question the terms of human exceptionalism.”⁶³

Paul Auster’s novella *Timbuktu*⁶⁴ and George Saunders’ story *Fox 8*⁶⁵ also feature animal narrators. While *Fox 8* is narrated by the protagonist, Fox 8, *Timbuktu* features two alternating narrators – the dog narrator, Mr. Bones himself, and Mr. Bone’s former owner. The forty-seven-page story *Fox 8* in particular is always a guaranteed hit with students, regardless of their level or major. Fox 8 is an especially curious animal who has managed to learn the language of “Yumans” and whose malapropisms are often funny. He and his friends live in the woods under the benign supervision of the Grate Leeder, Fox 28. One day, however, they discover “a sine, and upon that sine are some Yuman letters like the ones I had been lerning [...]. What those werds said is: Coming soon, FoxViewCommons.”⁶⁶ When developers start cutting down the forest, Fox 8 has to flee, bypassing a landscape of “mawls” and “rodes” with names like RiverWalkEstates, Hummingbird Way, and Slow Stream Ave. Unlike *Timbuktu* or *Me Cheeta*, *Fox 8* is an environmental tale that describes humanity systematically destroying the natural world it claims to cherish. Fox’s letter to the Yumans ends with a message that sounds childishly sincere, but might be exactly what we need to hear at this point: “If you want your Storys to end happy, try being niser.”⁶⁷

In *Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines*, Susan McHugh argues that literary animals – like Fern, Cheeta, Mr. Bones, and Fox 8 – are key figures in the biopolitical terrain of human-animal relations. She also argues for further articulations of animal knowledge in new and imaginative narrative forms. Such work, she notes, has the potential to change “patterns of engagement between species.”⁶⁸ Instead of solidifying the uniqueness of human aesthetic

62 Lever: *Me Cheeta*, p. ix.

63 Parry: *Other Animals*, p. 11.

64 Paul Auster: *Timbuktu*. New York: Holt 1998.

65 George Saunders: *Fox 8*. New York: Random House 2013.

66 Saunders: *Fox 8*, p. 10.

67 Ibid., p. 49.

68 Susan McHugh: *Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P 2010, p. 23.

forms, she calls for a serious “turn of the imagination.”⁶⁹ Dominik Ohrem in “Animating Creaturely Life” pursues a similar course when he points out that “an important avenue for us to relate to other beings is relating their stories or, to be more to the point, allowing and inviting them to participate in *our* stories [...]”⁷⁰ While allowing animals to be part of our stories is one decisive step, Joshua Russell is willing to go even further. He belongs to the increasing number of scholars claiming that *storying* – experiencing and relating stories – cannot be limited to the sphere of the human. In “Animal Narrativity: Engaging with Story in a More-Than-Human World,” Russell argues that not only should we think of narrativity as “part of our own animality, a process through which we participate in multi-species relationships and communities,” but that we need to broaden our concept of narrativity to include the more-than-human world as well: “Animals may tell stories through echolocation, through scent or other chemical markers, or through dramatic visual displays: our inability to see or hear beyond our own human range does not negate the possibility.”⁷¹

While most strands of narratology focus on the unique linguistic capacities of human animals, the experiences of animal narrativity present us a subversive, counter-hegemonic, and more inclusive approach, recognizing that humans are not the sole subjects, agents, authors, or proprietors of stories. Yet language is typically the realm in which narrative is situated rather than in the complex bodies and minds of storying beings in relation to each other. Since language is still widely considered to be a unique human capacity, animal narrativity requires a wider, more inclusive understanding of language and mind, one that is inherently ecological, relational, and embodied.⁷²

It is rather doubtful, Russell continues, that humans are “the sole proprietors of narratives, the only beings capable of telling tales.” He claims that since stories are “living and communicative events that exist within a vast ecology

69 Ibid.

70 Dominik Ohrem: Animating Creaturely Life. In: Idem / Roman Bartosch (eds): *Beyond the Human-Animal Divide: Creaturely Lives in Literature and Culture*. New York: Palgrave 2017, pp. 3–19, here p. 11.

71 Joshua Russell: Animal Narrativity: Engaging with Story in a More-Than-Human World. In: Jodey Castricano / Lauren Corman (eds): *Animal Subjects 2.0*. Waterloo, ON: Laurier UP 2016, pp. 145–173, here p. 160.

72 Russell: Narrativity, p. 149.

of sights, sounds, and movements,” they seriously “challenge the assumption that narrative is a capacity that distances humans from all other animals and from the natural world.”⁷³ Canadian poet Robert Bringhurst agrees:

Each of us tells stories, and each of us is a story. Not just each of us humans, but each of us creatures – spruce trees and toads and timber wolves and dog salmon. We all tell stories to ourselves and to each other – within the tribe, within the species, and way beyond its bounds. Roses do this when they flower, finches when they sing, and humans when they speak, walk, sing, dance, swim, play a flute [...] or pull a trigger.⁷⁴

Animal narrators spell out for us that their lives are not only unique but also worthy of telling. And if we choose, as Russell says, “to engage with them, our experiences will reveal that our story is, indeed, entwined with their own.” While these relationships may be more practical in lifelong relationships, for instance with companion animals, “they are possible elsewhere given enough attentiveness and imaginative engagement.”⁷⁵ If we accept that our ways of storying the world are inseparable from nonhuman narrative modes, it becomes clear that the poetics of storying should be of crucial concern to post-anthropocentric ontology and interspecies ethics. In arguing for a “narrative ethology,” McHugh writes that storying suggests an “irreducibly relational ethics, a way of valuing social and aesthetic forms together as sustaining conditions of and for mixed communities.”⁷⁶

Focusing on techniques – including the use of animal narrators and/or alternations between human and nonhuman perspectives – many of these texts about and by animals explore how specific strategies for portraying nonhuman agents both emerge from and contribute to broader attitudes toward animal lives and stories. These varied texts thus promise to reshape existing narrative frameworks.

73 Russell: *Narrativity*, p. 149.

74 Robert Bringhurst: *The Tree of Meaning and the Work of Ecological Linguistics*. In: *Canadian Journal of Environmental Education* 7:2 (2002), pp. 9–22, here p. 14.

75 See Russell: *Narrativity*, p. 162.

76 McHugh: *Animal Stories*, p. 5.

3. Conclusion

One of the goals of THAS is achieved when animals are no longer just objects of study but singular and individual subjects – that is, when they are recognized as beings with their own agenda, their own interests, points of view, and emotions. In short, when we perceive them as individuals with intrinsic value who shape the environment we all share. Another more impressive step would be to stop denying animal agency within the narrative form and acknowledge that storying is not specific to humans. It seems that interspecies storied imaginings indeed offer an alternative to the long history of human dominance, and that human exceptionalism, based as it is on strict notions of language, cognitions, and future-thinking – all aspects of narrative as it is traditionally understood in human terms – has to be reconsidered and most likely abolished.

Björn Hayer

Jagd oder die Kultivierung der Gewalt

Tierethische Sensibilisierung anhand
der Filme *Die Spur* und *Auf der Jagd*

Die Jagd als kulturelle und forstwirtschaftliche Praxis fußt auf einem spezie-sistischen Dispositiv, dessen Verankerung in einem Machtgefälle begründet liegt. Um ein vermeintliches ökologisches Gleichgewicht herzustellen, sehen sich JägerInnen in der Pflicht, den Wildbestand zu regulieren. Das Tier wird in diesem hierarchischen System vor allem als Störfaktor bzw. Schädling angesehen. Gegenüber der allgemeinen Ansicht, die Jagd würde einen obligatorischen Teil eines Maßnahmenkatalogs zur Wahrung der Waldfauna darstellen, lassen sich sowohl ökologische als auch tierethische Argumente zu ihrer Begrenzung respektive Abschaffung vorbringen. Da diese zumeist weniger Aufmerksamkeit in der öffentlichen Debatte um das Tierwohl erhalten, bedarf es einer differenzierten, wissenschaftlich fundierten Auseinandersetzung in Bildungsinstitutionen. Nimmt man dabei die Schule in den Blick, so sollte der Diskurs um Legitimität oder Illegitimität der Jagd, wenn er denn überhaupt stattfindet, nicht auf die Fächer Biologie und Religion beschränkt bleiben, sondern kann auch gerade in jenen Unterrichtsrahmen stattfinden, wo Jagd als Sujet präsent wird, nämlich etwa in der Kunst oder in der Literatur. Allen voran der Gegenwartsfilm macht die jahrtausendealte Praxis verstärkt zum Thema. Während manche kinematografischen Werke von Problembewusstsein, insbesondere bezogen auf die inferiore Stellung des Tieres, zeugen, perpetuieren andere klassische, mitunter romantisierende Bilder der Jagd, die zu hinterfragen es eines dekonstruktiven Zugangs bedarf. Vor einer eingängigen Vorstellung und Analyse zweier Filme, die jenen beiden Richtungen zuzuordnen sind, soll zunächst eine knappe Einführung zur kritischen Perspektive auf den Komplex Jagd erfolgen. Diese Überlegungen

erweisen sich leitend für die Filmanalysen. Wie sich anhand der Werke *Pokot* (Die Spur, PL 2017, R: Agnieszka Holland) und *Auf der Jagd. Wem gehört die Natur?* (D 2018, R: Alice Agneskirchner) herausstellen wird, sind zweierlei Erschließungen bestimmend: zum einen eine Perspektive, die zur Sensibilisierung für die Nöte und Bedürfnisse von Tieren beiträgt, zum anderen eine distanzierende Sichtweise, die das Potenzial hat, verdeckte ideologische Auffassungen in Bezug auf animale Mitwesen offenzulegen. Inwiefern die kinematografischen Produktionen einen Mehrwert für eine Didaktisierung bieten, soll in einem letzten Teil thematisiert werden. Zielsetzung des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist es, die tierethische Aufklärung nicht auf einer rein rationalen Ebene zu belassen. Vielmehr können Filme affektive Zugänge unterstützen und ein Problembewusstsein an konkreten, sichtbaren Fällen schärfen. Methodisch abzugrenzen ist die Argumentation dabei von literaturwissenschaftlichen Deutungen vor dem sogenannten *animal turn*, die Tiere vornehmlich in ihrer symbolischen Dimension betrachten. Statt das Tier primär in seiner Spiegelqualität gegenüber dem Menschen wahrzunehmen, verspricht der vorliegende Beitrag einen Perspektivwechsel. Animale Mitwesen als Individuen zu berücksichtigen, lässt sich sowohl als Untersuchungsmaßgabe als auch als relevanter und noch zu elaborierender Erkenntnis-schritt definieren.

I. Problemfeld Jagd

Fragt man nach einer Rechtfertigung der Jagd, so führen deren BefürworterInnen zumeist zwei Gesichtspunkte ins Feld: Zum einen wird sie als kulturell gewachsene Praxis¹ mit spezifischen Riten und Gemeinschaftserfahrungen angesehen, zum anderen wird ihre Notwendigkeit zur Erhaltung bzw. Wiederherstellung eines ökologischen Gleichgewichts hervorgehoben.² Der erste Punkt lässt sich insbesondere auf Basis poststrukturalistischer Methodik dekonstruieren – fußt er doch auf einer rein kulturell konstruierten Unterwerfungslogik. Stabilisiert wird dadurch ein hierarchisches Verhältnis, in dem der Mensch als Sachwalter über Natur und Tier herrscht. Analog

1 Vgl. Erhard Ueckermann: *Kulturgut Jagd. Ein Führer durch die Jagdgeschichte Nordrhein-Westfalens und zu jagdhistorischen Stätten*. Münster: Landwirtschaftsverlag Münster 1994.

2 Vgl. Martin Forstner / Friedrich Reimoser / Wolfgang Lexer / Felix Heckl / Josef Hackl: *Nachhaltigkeit der Jagd. Prinzipien, Kriterien und Indikatoren*. Wien: avBUCH im Österreichischen Agrarverlag 2006.

zu Repressionsmustern wie Rassismus, Sexismus oder Kolonialismus beruht ebenso der Speziesismus³ auf einer essenzialisierenden Dualisierung,⁴ die ein Machtgefälle, eben zwischen JägerInnen und Gejagten, verfestigt.

Diese Behauptung einer scheinbar ‚natürlichen‘ Gegebenheit bedarf vor dem Hintergrund neuerer Forschung jedoch einer Revision. Allen voran die moderne Tierethik insistiert darauf, dass, im Wissen um jüngere neurowissenschaftliche und behavioristische Erkenntnisse, die starre Grenzziehung zwischen vielen animalen Mitwesen und ihren ‚HalterInnen‘ nicht mehr statthaft ist. Daraus ergibt sich nach Tom Regan, einem der führenden US-amerikanischen Tierrechtstheoretiker, die Verpflichtung zur moralischen Beachtung fundamentaler Interessen von Tieren. Er fasst sie als Subjekte auf,⁵ denen u. a. das Recht auf freie Entfaltung, Bewegung und nicht zuletzt jenes auf die Unversehrtheit der körperlichen Integrität gewährt werden sollte. Auch Regan bekräftigt die Idee elementarer Tierrechte. Jedes animale Wesen sei „Subjekt eines Lebens“⁶. Diese Gemeinsamkeit teilt der Mensch mit Tieren, insofern „wir [...] alle der Welt gewahr [sind]“ und das, „was mit uns geschieht, [...] für uns von Bedeutung [ist]“.⁷ Daraus leitet er ab, dass eine Exklusivstellung des Menschen argumentativ nicht vertretbar sei. Stattdessen plädiert er angesichts mangelnder Unterschiede für einen rechtlichen Egalitarismus, der mit einem umfassenden Freiheitsrecht von Tieren einherginge. Aber auch westliche Tierschutzgesetze gewähren schon jetzt vielen Tieren Schutzrechte. Insbesondere Wirbeltieren, „zu denen alle Objekte der Jagd zählen, wird ein hoher Grad von Leidensfähigkeit zugeschrieben.“⁸ Diesem Ansatz steht seitens der JägerInnen die Rede von der Bestandswahrung und dem Waldschutz entgegen. Auch hierzu lassen sich allerdings Gegenstimmen anführen. So betont Friederike Schmitz:

3 Peter Singer: Ethik und Tiere. Eine Ausweitung der Ethik über unsere eigene Spezies hinaus. In: Friederike Schmitz (Hrsg.): *Tierethik. Grundlagentexte*. Berlin: Suhrkamp 2014, S. 77–86, hier S. 81.

4 Vgl. Björn Hayer: Ungleiche Gefährten? Über die ethische Dimension von Sportbeziehungen zwischen Menschen und Tieren. In: Florian Hartnack (Hrsg.): *Tiere im Sport*. Hamburg: Feldhaus 2020, S. 109–115, hier S. 110.

5 Vgl. Tom Regan: Von Menschenrechten zu Tierrechten. In: Schmitz (Hrsg.): *Tierethik*, S. 88–114, hier S. 101.

6 Ebd.

7 Ebd., S. 103.

8 Ursula Wolf: Eine Kritik der Jagd. In: Elke Diehl / Jens Tuider (Hrsg.): *Haben Tiere Rechte?* Bonn: bpb 2019, S. 279–285, hier S. 279.

Ob durch das Abschießen die Populationen überhaupt sinnvoll reguliert werden können, ist außerdem wissenschaftlich umstritten [...]. Man greift damit massiv in bestehende Gruppenstrukturen ein, was z. B. bei Wildschweinen dazu führt, dass mehr Tiere sich fortpflanzen. Zugleich ist die Jagd teilweise selbst eine Ursache der Probleme, die durch Bestandsregulierung behoben werden sollen: Gestresste Rehe brauchen mehr Futter; aus Angst meiden sie offene Grasflächen und fressen daher eher Bäume im Wald an.⁹

Konkret lässt sich hierzu immer wieder beobachten, dass der versehentliche Abschuss der sogenannten Leitbache, also des rudelführenden, weiblichen Wildschweins, eben nicht zu einer Verminderung des Bestands beiträgt. Im Gegenteil: Wenn damit die die Fortpflanzungsaktivität in der Gruppe regulierende Instanz wegfällt, führt die Zerstörung der Rang- und Sozialstruktur gerade zu einer unkontrollierten Vermehrung, weil die männlichen Tiere in ihrem Sexualtrieb dann keinerlei Kontrollen mehr unterliegen.¹⁰

Auch andere Jagdfelder erweisen sich inzwischen als kontraproduktiv, so etwa die Fuchsjagd. Einst eingeführt, um die Ausbreitung der Tollwut zu bannen, hat sie ihre präventive Wirkung längst verloren. Der letzte Infektionsfall trat dem RKI zufolge 2007 auf.¹¹ Inzwischen hat die Bejagung von Füchsen, die somit keinen ökologischen Nutzen mehr zeitigt, zur Folge, dass der Bestand an Feldmäusen exorbitant zugenommen hat. Sie stellen für den Ackerbau und damit für viele Landwirte ein Problem dar, das aus dem Defizit an natürlichen Fressfeinden, eben den Füchsen, resultiert.

Eine weitere Unzulänglichkeit gegenwärtiger Jagdpraxis stellt die Treibjagd dar. Dabei werden die Tiere mithilfe von Hunden und durch mehrere JägerInnen in Bewegung aufgehetzt und zu zentralen bzw. gut einsichtigen Punkten gedrängt, wo sie dann erschossen werden. Wie die Organisation Tierärztliche Vereinigung Tierschutz e. V. belegt, erweisen sich 70 % der Schüsse als nicht unmittelbar tödlich,¹² wodurch das Ausscheiden der Tiere aus dem Leben

9 Friederike Schmitz: *Tiere essen – dürfen wir das?* Stuttgart: Metzler 2020, S. 75.

10 Vgl. Sabrina Servanty / Jean-Michel Gaillard / Carole Toïgo / Serge Brandt et al.: Pulsed Resources and Climate-Induced Variation in The Reproductive Traits of Wild Boar under High Hunting Pressure. In: *Journal of Animal Ecology* 78 (2009), S. 1278–1290.

11 Vgl. Tollwut. RKI-Ratgeber. In: *Robert Koch-Institut*, 13.11.2020. https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/EpidBull/Merkblaetter/Ratgeber_Tollwut.html (Zugriff am 08.02.2022).

12 Tierärztliche Vereinigung für Tierschutz e. V. (TVT): Tierschutz und Bewegungsjagden. In: *Yumpu*, o. D. <https://www.yumpu.com/de/document/read/21569948/stellungnahme-der-tierarztlichen-vereinigung-fur-tierschutz-tvt> (Zugriff am 19.11.2020).

mit erheblichem Leid verbunden ist. Diese Methode steht dem Anspruch des Tierschutzgesetzes entgegen, insofern es an einem vernünftigen Grund für das Leid mangelt. Die Treibjagd müsste daher zumindest durch schonendere Varianten der Bejagung ersetzt werden.

Diese kurze Auffächerung problematischer Effekte einer überdies patriarchal geprägten¹³ Unterdrückungstradition soll dazu dienen, eine kritische Sensibilität für das Jagdgeschehen zu entwickeln. Dies sollte Ziel eines tier- und umweltethisch geleiteten Unterrichts sein. Hierbei geht es um die Erschließung moralischen Einschätzungsvermögens mithilfe von Narration. Lori Gruen konstatiert dazu: „Moral perception helps a person to see what is morally relevant or important in a particular context.“¹⁴ Vermittelt werden dadurch neben philosophischen bzw. ethischen Gesichtspunkten und Faktenwissen zur Jagd auch emotional wichtige Lernkompetenzen. So etwa die gegenseitige Perspektivübernahme entsprechend des „Two-loop rekursive[n] Denken[s]“¹⁵ und die damit verbundene Empathiefähigkeit. Nach Kate Soper ließe sich dann – bezogen auf die Didaktik der Human-Animal Studies – auch von einer Kombination aus „naturalistisch[er] und anteilnehmend[er]“¹⁶ Rezeption sprechen. Darüber hinaus werden Kompetenzen bezüglich des Umgangs mit fiktionalen Text-(bzw. Bild-)Zeugnissen gefördert. Nach Kaspar H. Spinner wären dies beispielsweise „subjektive Involviertheit“ und „genaue Wahrnehmung“, was Design und Aussagekraft eines Werks betrifft.¹⁷ Um die Entwicklung dieser Fähigkeiten im Rahmen der Themeneinheit zu stimulieren, sollen Visionierung und Untersuchung von zwei filmischen Zeugnissen zur Jagd im Vordergrund stehen. Im Folgenden werden diese beiden Beispiele vorgestellt und auf Wertungen, Einordnungen und Inszenierung der Jagd hin untersucht: Agnieszka Hollands kritischer Spielfilm *Die Spur*, eine Adaption des Romans *Prowadź swój plug przez kości umarłych* (Der

13 Vgl. Ulrike Schmid: Jägerinnen unter Jägern. Rekonstruktion männlicher Herrschaft im Feld Jagd. In: Björn Hayer / Klarissa Schröder (Hrsg.): *Tierethik transdisziplinär. Literatur – Kultur – Didaktik*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2018, S. 151–167, hier S. 159.

14 Lori Gruen: *Entangled Empathy. An Alternative Ethic for Our Relationships with Animals*. New York: Lantern 2015, S. 42.

15 Florian Rietz: *Perspektivübernahmekompetenzen. Ein literaturdidaktisches Modell*. Baltmannsweiler: Schneider Hohengehren 2017, S. 81.

16 Kate Soper: The Beast in Literature. Some Initial Thoughts. In: Karen Seago / Karla Armbruster (Hrsg.): *Literary Beasts. The Representation of Animals in Contemporary Literature*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP 2005, S. 303–309, hier S. 303.

17 Kaspar H. Spinner: Literarisches Lernen. In: *Praxis Deutsch* 200 (2006), S. 6–16, hier S. 7.

Gesang der Fledermäuse) der Literaturnobelpreisträgerin Olga Tokarczuk, und die affirmative Kinodokumentation *Auf der Jagd* von Alice Agneskirchner.

II. *Die Spur*

Hollands Film richtet den identifikatorischen Fokus von Anfang an auf Tiere und deren Beschützerin Janina. Neben ihrer Tätigkeit als Lehrerin widmet sich die Protagonistin dem Tierschutz und lebt überdies in engem Kontakt mit Vierbeinern. So zählen gleich mehrere Hunde zu ihrem Haushalt. Nachdem diese verschwunden sind und sie Jäger als Verantwortliche für die Tat ausmachen kann, beginnt sie einen mörderischen Feldzug gegen die Waidmänner. Den ZuschauerInnen wird Janina – dem Spannungsbogen als Hauptmerkmal des Krimi-Genres geschuldet – allerdings erst spät als Täterin präsentiert. Als besonders diskussionswürdig erscheint dabei, dass die Mörderin für ihre Vergeltungsschläge nicht zur Rechenschaft gezogen wird. Im Gegenteil: Die Schlusssequenz stellt sie als Inbegriff einer fürsorglichen Mutter Natur dar.

Wie kommt diese Positivierung zustande? Sie ergibt sich zunächst aus der Narration, die in der Protagonistin eine beharrlich kämpfende Idealistin ausmacht.

Hollands großer Verdienst ist die Etablierung dieser betagten Frauenfigur mit all ihren Irritationen, ob auf der Haut oder im Verhalten, inmitten einer katholischen, jagdaffinen Männergesellschaft. In der allein Tiere, Kinder – Duszejko unterrichtet als Englisch-Aushilfslehrerin im Dorf und wird sehr geliebt – und eben Außenseiter erkennen, was wirklich zählt.¹⁸

Claudia Lenssen ordnet das Verhalten der Heldin auch dem „Spontigeist der 68er“ zu, insofern Janina „eine Utopie des Widerstands gegen das post-sozialistische, katholisch verbrämte patriarchalische Establishment Polens reanimiere[]“.¹⁹

18 Jenni Zylka: Janina jagt. In: *Der Spiegel*, 04.01.2018. <https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/kino/die-spur-filmkritik-janina-jagt-a-1185926.html> (Zugriff am 04.12.2020).

19 Claudia Lenssen: Kritik zu *Die Spur*. In: *epd film*, 27.12.2017. <https://www.epd-film.de/filmkritiken/die-spur> (Zugriff am 04.12.2020).

Dass sie mit ihrer umwelt- und tierethischen Haltung von Anfang an in Opposition zur Mehrheit der Menschen der ländlichen Gegend steht, veranschaulicht ein bezeichnender Szenenübergang.²⁰ Hierbei hört das Publikum die Heldin aus dem Off, die vom Abhandenkommen ihrer Hunde berichtet. Die Bildebene zeigt in der Totalen eine weite Schneelandschaft, in der zwei Wanderer erkennbar sind. Vermittelt diese Einstellung die Erhabenheit und Wirkmacht der Natur, so repräsentiert die Anschlusssequenz, in welche die Off-Tonspur übergeht, eine weltanschauliche Enge. Es ist nun zu sehen, dass Janinas bislang zu hörender Bericht an einen sie in ihrem dunklen Haus besuchenden Priester adressiert ist. Sie betont, dass die Hunde ihre Familie seien, was zugleich das speziesistisch zementierte Machtgefälle der Jagd moralisch aushebelt. In seiner Replik klassifiziert der Geistliche als Musterfigur eines anthropozentrierten Christentums ihre Schilderungen hingegen als „Gotteslästerung“. Verdeutlicht wird die Konfrontation der Antagonisten durch die Gegenüberstellung der Personen im Profil sowie den dabei geäußerten Satz des Priesters: „Man darf Tiere nicht wie Menschen behandeln.“ Auf ihr Ansinnen, die noch nicht gefundenen Hunde begraben zu wollen, reagiert der Theologe mit Begriffen wie „Sünde“ und „Hochmut“. Das Tötungsverbot wird von ihm ferner lediglich für den Menschen behauptet. Die im Rahmen des Gesprächs gezeigte Detailansicht der Zähne des Pfarrers könnte übrigens als ironischer Kommentar auf die karnivore Lebensweise gesehen werden, tritt doch der Geistliche hier wider Erwarten nicht als Figur des Respekts auf, sondern als Befürworter einer christlich legitimierten Jagdpraxis. Seine apodiktische Aussage „Beten Sie für sich, Tiere haben keine Seele“ weist auf eine mechanistische Auffassung des Daseins hin.

Was die Jagd für de facto leidensfähige Wesen bedeutet, hält eine andere Szene fest. Wir sehen Tiere des Waldes und vernehmen Schussgeräusche. Harte Schnitte wechseln über zum Wild auf der Flucht und schließlich zum Aufschrecken der Protagonistin aus dem Schlaf. Die Schüsse erinnern in ihrer Intensität an ein Kriegsgeschehen. Untermauert wird der Eindruck noch durch einsetzende Perkussion, während sich die Heldin im Auto zur Jagdgruppe begibt. Als Janina auf die Gruppe trifft und mahnt, dass man die Tiere als lebendige Wesen nicht töten dürfe, nimmt sie ein jüngerer Waidmann in den Zwangsgriff. Dieser Akt dokumentiert, dass die Repression der Tiere mit der Repression der Frau innerhalb der patriarchalen Machtstrukturen der Jagd verknüpft ist.

20 *Pokot* (*Die Spur*, PL 2017, R: Agnieszka Holland), ab 00:16:55 min.

Natürlich sind diese Männer mehr als nur Jäger. Sie sind Vertreter des alten, polnischen Patriarchats, die mit ihrem testosterongetränkten Gebaren nicht nur Tiere, sondern auch Frauen wie die junge Dobra Nowina als ihr Eigentum betrachten. Es sind Männer, die wenig mit Modernisierung oder der Europäischen Union anfangen können und noch weniger mit aufmüpfigen alten Schachteln wie Duszejko.²¹

Die Protagonistin wird dabei mit „schwachsinniges Weib“ betitelt, wodurch überdies ihre Kritik als ‚weibliche Hysterie‘ diffamiert wird. Unterstrichen wird die Analogie ebenso durch eine Parallelmontage, die im Weiteren auf der einen Bildebene während der Treibjagd fliehende Tiere, die erschossen werden, zeigt, auf der anderen hingegen Janina Duszejko im Auto, die zuletzt auf einen gerade im Sterben liegenden Eber trifft.²² Das Klischee des ‚hysterischen Weibs‘ wird nunmehr durch einen anderen Typ ersetzt, nämlich jenen der fürsorglichen Mutter. Voller Trauer über das dahinscheidende Lebewesen legt sich die Protagonistin zu ihm. Ansichtig wird das Publikum des barmherzigen Menschen, geleitet von einer spezieübergreifenden Haltung des Mitleids.

Dieser Abschied markiert zugleich den utopischen Neubeginn. Eingeleitet wird dieser am Ende des Films durch eine Schwarzblende. Sie steht mithin für ein nihilistisches Vakuum, dessen Ausgang die Erzählerin aus dem Off andeutet:

Ich bin in einer Zeit aufgewachsen, in der man dazu entschlossen war, die Welt durch revolutionäre Visionen zu verändern. Heutzutage nimmt man alles, wie es ist, und glaubt, dass es immer so bleibt. Aber es muss doch etwas Neues kommen. Das war immer so. Wenn Uranus ins Zeichen des Widders eintritt oder – na egal. Es wird etwas geschehen, das wir nicht vorhersehen können. Es beginnt ein neuer Zyklus und die Realität wird wiedergeboren.²³

Just mit dieser messianischen Aussage schwindet das schwarze Bild und zeigt eine hell erleuchtete Waldlichtung. Wir sehen die Protagonistin beim Imkern, sie wird zum Essen gerufen, das sie mit Verwandten verbringt. Thema der

21 Katja Belousova: Dieser Film ist Polens Antwort auf Quentin Tarantino. In: *Die Welt*, 02.01.2018. <https://www.welt.de/kultur/kino/article172103225/Trailer-und-Kritik-Die-Spur-Dieser-Film-ist-Polens-Antwort-auf-Quentin-Tarantino.html> (Zugriff am 04.12.2020).

22 *Die Spur*, ab 00:55:00 min.

23 Ebd., ab 01:54:38 min.

Unterredung ist die Installation eines neuen Stocks für die ausgeschwärmten Bienen. Im Gegensatz zur Jagd steht diese Maßnahme für einen kooperativen Ansatz, für die Idee eines friedlichen Zusammenwirkens von Tier und Mensch. Ästhetisch bezeichnend fällt in dieser Sequenz die Reduktion von Schnitten auf. Der Beginn des gemeinsamen Speisens, die Konversation und schließlich die erneute Zentrierung der Natur werden im Rahmen einer Kamerafahrt dargestellt. So wird allein über die filmische Gestaltung der Eindruck von Wahrhaftigkeit erzeugt. Das Werk klingt schließlich, unterlegt von milden Klaviertönen, mit einem utopischen Bild aus. Die Protagonistin läuft mit zwei Hunden über die helle Wiese, auf der im Vordergrund Rehe in der Sonne liegen. Zum Ausdruck kommt somit die Hoffnung auf eine gewaltfreie Koexistenz, die als eine krasse Kontrafaktur zum als bestialisch geschilderten Jagdgeschehen zu verstehen ist. Sie eröffnet in ihrer Übercodierung und -belichtung ein Netz aus verschiedenen kulturgeschichtlichen Assoziationen, wobei die deutlichste Referenz wohl auf dem *locus amoenus* liegt. Repräsentiert die Jagd als tradierte und später bürgerliche Praxis die Entfremdung von der Natur im Zeichen der Hybris, so fußt die hoffnungsvolle Vision der Protagonistin auf der Renaissance eines paradiesischen Urzustandes, beruhend auf einem Geist von Respekt, Achtsamkeit und Würde.

An die Implementierung des Films in eine Unterrichtseinheit Jagd ließe sich eine Vertiefung in die tierethische Theoriebildung anschließen. Nach einer ausführlichen Besprechung des Films, die den Blick der SchülerInnen allein schon durch die evozierte Identifikation mit der Heldin auf die Belange und das Leiden der Tiere lenken dürfte, könnten etwa im Rahmen von Arbeitsgruppen Textauszüge aus den Bereichen Mitleids- und Tugendethik, Tierrechtsdiskursen oder auch zur Schnittstelle von Feminismus und Tierschutzbewegung ausgeteilt, gelesen und für Referate aufbereitet werden. Der Film initiiert somit die erste, zunächst noch affektiv geleitete Auseinandersetzung mit dem diskursiv inzwischen weit ausdifferenzierten Gesamtkomplex.

Vor diesem Hintergrund lässt sich sodann auf der Beschäftigung mit dem zweiten kinematografischen Werk der Sequenz aufbauen, nämlich Alice Agneskirchners *Auf der Jagd*. Hierbei haben es die Schülerinnen und Schüler mit einem gänzlich anderen Genre zu tun. Versteht sich Hollands Spielfilm als fiktionales Setting, das mit ästhetischen Mitteln wie Hyperbel oder Metapher arbeitet und nicht der Abbildung der Wirklichkeit verpflichtet ist, suggeriert eine Dokumentation das Gegenteil. Sie verfolgt tendenziell eher eine detailgetreue Wiedergabe der Realität. Gerade für ein junges und mit der audiovisuellen Lenkung durch Filme nicht allzu vertrautes Publikum erweist

sich das Format als voraussetzungsreich, zumal es nicht per se dem Ideal folgt, die Polyvalenzen der wirklichen Welt angemessen zu würdigen. Allen voran Agneskirchners Werk zeugt von einem subjektiven, d. h. dem Urteil und den Maßstäben der Regisseurin folgenden Blick, der als solcher nicht gekennzeichnet wird und die ZuschauerInnen letztendlich mit einseitigen Informationen versorgt. Diese zu erkennen und argumentativ zu dekonstruieren, sollte das Ziel der gemeinsamen Auseinandersetzung in der Klasse sein.

III. *Auf der Jagd*

Agneskirchners Film liegt das Anliegen zugrunde, die Bedeutung der Jagd in unterschiedlichen Facetten herauszustellen und dabei eine Art Milieustudie zu entwerfen. Sie begleitet daher von Anfang an Waidmänner und -frauen – samt deren tierischer Opfer. Zumeist werden letztere nicht in Form von Kadavern gezeigt, vielmehr präsentiert sie die Regisseurin vor allem als integraler Teil einer naturbelassenen Landschaft. So etwa gleich zu Beginn, als die Kamera ein Reh mit einem Fischreiherr, danach einen Fuchs auf der Wiese fokussiert.²⁴ Sodann tritt ein derzeit kontrovers diskutierter und lange Zeit vergessener und vertriebener Waldbewohner in den Vordergrund, nämlich der Wolf. In Totalen und Halbnahen, mal aus der Vogelperspektive, mal auf Augenhöhe, folgt die Kamera ihm zunächst bei seinem Zug durch die Waldgebiete. Darauf folgen harte Schnitte zu in Bewegung befindlichen Rehen und schließlich einem Jäger auf seinem Weg zum Hochsitz im Lichte eines idyllischen Sonnenaufgangs. Während diese neue Erzählebene, hergestellt allein durch die Bilder und ohne Kommentar aus dem Off, von Bildern eines Wildschweinrudels mehrfach unterbrochen wird, sehen wir erneut den Wolf und die Rehe. Hier nutzt Agneskirchner das narrative Potenzial der Parallelmontage, um eine essenzialistische Aussage zu kommunizieren: Der Mensch ist durch das Analogon Wolf von Grund auf als ein Jäger aufzufassen. Problematisch ist an dieser filmästhetisch projizierten Gleichsetzung, dass sie auf eine biologistische Sicht rekurriert. Die menschliche Jagd wird weniger als Kulturpraxis denn als ‚natürliches‘, mithin notwendiges Verhalten deklariert. Diese vermeintlich ursprüngliche Gegebenheit wird jedoch zugleich, wie eine andere Szene belegt, kulturell überformt und hypostasiert. So werden die Festivitäten der sogenannten Hubertusmesse gezeigt.²⁵ Vor und nach dem Gottesdienst, der mitunter der Segnung der Waidmänner (und wenigen

24 *Auf der Jagd. Wem gehört die Natur?* (D 2018, R: Alice Agneskirchner), ab 00:04:03 min.

25 Ebd., ab 01:28:45 min.

Waidfrauen) gewidmet ist, ist ein auf Tannenzweigen aufgebahrter Hirsch mit großem Geweih zu sehen. Der Kadaver ist zum feierlichen Objekt drapiert, das gestorbene Subjekt dahinter erfährt keinerlei Geltung. Zum Ausdruck kommt in der erwähnten Sequenz ebenso die bereits in *Die Spur* thematisierte traditionell-christliche Sichtweise auf die Mensch-Tier-Beziehung, die auf Ungleichheit beruht. Jagd erscheint als religiös geschützte Ausprägung eines anthropozentrischen Weltbilds. Während die Eingangsszene noch die Naturalisierung der Jagd suggeriert, wonach menschliche und nicht-menschliche Jäger auf einer Ebene ständen, betonen andere Teile des Films – in einem unauf löslichen Widerspruch – somit die Exklusivstellung des Menschen. Besonders offensichtlich wird die Paradoxie in einer Szene, die Wandmalereien von der Jagd in der frühen Menschheitsgeschichte ins Zentrum rückt. Unterlegt sind die Bilder mit einer Stimme aus dem Off, die unter Verweis auf die Ausrufung des Anthropozäns dem Publikum mitteilt:

Der Mensch ist Teil der Natur, aber schon längst nicht mehr ein Tier unter vielen [...]. Jeder von uns will leben, jeder von uns braucht Nahrung, sucht ein Territorium. Wie der Wolf, wie das Reh. Die Erde kann ohne uns leben, wir können es nicht. Wie verwalten wir also künftig unsere Welt?²⁶

Die Rede stellt den Menschen einerseits als integralen Bestandteil der Natur dar, vergleicht ihn hier sogar explizit mit dem Wolf, andererseits transportiert der Begriff der Verwaltung einen Lenkungsaufrag. Durch die Einblendung der Wandmalereien wird erneut der Eindruck einer gänzlich unbestreitbaren Natürlichkeit dieser in sich nicht logischen Positionsverortung des Menschen erweckt.

Warum es dessen scheinbarer Dominanz im ökologischen Ganzen bedürfe, offenbart eine Szene aus dem Bereich der Forstwirtschaft.²⁷ Hierin erläutert ein Mitarbeiter der Forstbehörde die Abhängigkeit der Abschusszahlen von der „Bissbelastung“ an Baum- und Pflanzenbeständen. Es wird der Grundsatz „Wald vor Wild“ beschworen. Demzufolge wird Bäumen, deren neurologisches System und Bewusstseinsgrad nicht an jene Ausdifferenziertheit der meisten Wildtiere heranreicht, ein höherer Stellenwert als dem Leben von Rehen und Wildschweinen zugewiesen.

26 Ebd., ab 01:30:01 min.

27 Ebd., ab 00:56:18 min.

Die vermeintliche Versachlichung zur Legitimation der Jagd wird im weiteren Verlauf mithin durch emotionalisierende und mythenbildende Momente verstärkt, wenn etwa ein Jäger im Interview äußert, bei dem Schuss auf die Tiere einem „inneren Trieb“ zu folgen: „Das Wild kommt zu dir, um dir sein Leben zu geben“.²⁸ Diese Selbstapothese wird durch die filmische Narration weder kommentiert noch hinterfragt. Unterdessen wird die Jagd als gute und sinnvolle Praxis durch mehrere Montagen mit der Haltung und Schlachtung von Tieren im Rahmen der industriellen Landwirtschaft kontrastiert. So erscheint sie als die ‚artgerechteste‘ Weise des Umgangs mit animalen Mitwesen. Doch legitimiert die Vermeidung des einen die Aufrechterhaltung eines anderen Leids?

Ethische Überlegungen spielen in Agneskirchners Dokumentation eine untergeordnete Rolle: „Mein Film soll auch ein Waldspaziergang sein und einen sinnlichen Genuss bieten.“²⁹ Und auf die Frage, warum sie TierschützerInnen und TierrechtlerInnen keinen Raum zubillige, antwortet sie: „Ich wüsste nicht, wobei ich zum Beispiel die Tierschützer im Wald filmen sollte. Überhaupt kann ich in einer 90-Minuten-Dokumentation nicht die Welt erklären“.³⁰ Um schließlich doch noch einen ethischen Zug in die strukturell einseitige Pro-Jagd-Argumentation einzubringen, bedient sich die Regisseurin einer etwas naiven Szene. Hierin liest eine Erzieherin oder Lehrerin den zuhören den Kindern Felix Saltens *Bambi* vor. Die darin verbürgte mitleidsethische Komponente wird allerdings nicht weiter beleuchtet und erweist sich lediglich als Feigenblatt. Weder im reflexiven Niveau noch im Hinblick auf die veranschlagte Zeit vermag die Bilderbuchepisode angemessen den ethischen Diskurs abzubilden. Agneskirchners Dokumentation weist bis zum Schluss eine signifikante Parteinahme für die Belange der JägerInnen auf.

Sensibilisierung im Unterricht

Zum Schluss sei noch einmal auf die drei relevanten Stationen einer Unterrichtssequenz zu ethischen Implikationen der Jagd eingegangen. Nachdem der Einstieg zunächst über den Spielfilm *Die Spur* erfolgt ist, ließen sich

28 *Auf der Jagd*, ab 00:10:42 min.

29 Björn Hayer: Ist es die Natur des Menschen, die ihn zur Jagd treibt? Alice Agneskirchner hat einen problematischen Film über die Jagd gedreht und umgeht dabei sowohl unbequeme Fragen wie wissenschaftliche Studien. In: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 16.05.2018. <https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/ist-es-die-natur-des-menschen-die-ihn-zur-jagd-treibt-ld.1385448> (Zugriff am 12.06.2021).

30 Ebd.

die daraus gewonnenen Eindrücken durch ethisches bzw. philosophisches Diskurswissen fundieren. Dadurch wird gesichert, dass die Schülerinnen und Schüler verstärkt die in öffentlichen Diskussionen häufig vernachlässigte Position der Tiere einnehmen und verstehen können. Ausgehend von diesem erweiterten Bewusstsein sollte im letzten Schritt eine Sichtung des Films *Auf der Jagd* stattfinden. Nunmehr besteht das Ziel darin, eine dekonstruktive Lesart zu fördern und ideologische Schichten innerhalb der Narration aufzudecken. Die aus der Unterrichtsreihe abgeleiteten Erkenntnisse leisten zum einen einer tierethischen Grundbildung Vorschub, zum anderen wird dadurch auch die Entwicklung weiterer fachlicher sowie allgemeiner Kompetenzen stimuliert. Gabriela Kompatscher führt folgende Förderaspekte durch die werkorientierte Beschäftigung mit den Human-Animal Studies (HAS) an:

- HAS respektieren Tiere als solche, erkennen sie als Akteure und Akteurinnen mit Wirkungsmacht (agency) an und sehen sie als Subjekte – nicht als Objekte –, und als Individuen mit eigenen Erfahrungen, Interessen, Perspektiven und Empfindungen.
- Kulturelle, philosophische und gesellschaftliche Glaubenssätze und Konstruktionen (wie etwa die Mensch-Tier-Grenze oder die willkürliche Einteilung von Tieren in Kategorien: „Nutztiere“, „Haustiere“, etc.) werden analysiert, kritisch hinterfragt und bei Bedarf dekonstruiert.
- Gleichzeitig werden die Unterschiede zwischen verschiedenen menschlichen und nichtmenschlichen Tieren anerkannt, beachtet und möglichst berücksichtigt (Anerkennung und Inklusion von Differenz).
- HAS plädieren dafür, eine rein anthropozentrische Perspektive zu überwinden und stattdessen die Perspektive der Tiere miteinzubeziehen. Sie fragen sich also u. a.: Was will das Tier? Wie sieht das Tier auf die Welt? Etc.
- HAS versuchen, jeglichen Speziesismus zu überwinden, und bemühen sich um eine tiergerechte Sprache (vgl. dazu die Ökolinquistik).
- HAS haben die Aufgabe, die Gesellschaft in Bezug auf ihren Umgang mit Tieren zu sensibilisieren und zu einer Verbesserung der Verhältnisse beizutragen.³¹

All diese Punkte lassen sich im Rahmen der filmischen Unterrichtsreihe berücksichtigen bzw. vermitteln. Denn nicht nur die Jagd an sich wird einer kritischen Betrachtung unterzogen. Vielmehr knüpfen sich, wie die

31 Gabriela Kompatscher: Literary Animal Studies. Ethische Dimensionen des Literaturunterrichts. In: Hayer / Schröder (Hrsg.): *Tierethik transdisziplinär*, S. 295–310, hier S. 304.

Untersuchung vor Augen geführt hat, an die Sichtung der Filme grundsätzliche Fragen hinsichtlich der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung an. Sie bietet zahlreiche Anschlussmöglichkeiten an umfassende Themenkomplexe und regt die Schülerinnen und Schüler zu einem elementaren Nachdenken über Chancen und Schwierigkeiten der Mensch-Tier-Umwelt-Beziehung an.

Berücksichtigt werden dabei auch grundsätzliche Anforderungen an den Ethik-Unterricht sowie die damit verbundenen Aspekte in den Curricula. So empfehlen, um nur zwei exemplarische Beispiele zu erwähnen, die Lehrpläne von Bayern für die Klassenstufe 12 und von Rheinland-Pfalz für die Klassenstufe 7/8 die Behandlung der Tierethik.³² Vor allem drei Punkte, die einem Leitpapier der PH Heidelberg zum Ethik-Unterricht zu entnehmen sind, erweisen sich in dieser Hinsicht als bedeutend. Zunächst findet eine Vermittlung von ethisch relevantem Sachwissen statt.³³ Darunter sind etwa die Hintergründe zur Auswirkung der Jagd auf die Befindlichkeit der Tiere und das Ökosystem zu subsummieren, die wiederum für die Begründung solider ethischer Schlussfolgerungen unerlässlich sind. Zweitens kann der Unterrichtsschwerpunkt einer „verstehende[n] Erschließung tradierter Wertvorstellungen“³⁴ dienen. Während gewisse kulturgeschichtlich verfestigte Muster wie die Auffassung, die Jagd sei eine notwendige Voraussetzung zum Erhalt des Waldbestands, hinterfragt werden, lassen sich andere Normen stabilisieren, so beispielsweise der Wert von Mitgefühl und – im christlichen Horizont – von Nächstenliebe und Barmherzigkeit. Auch die Vermittlung eines über die Speziesgrenze hinweg ausgeweiteten Rechts auf Gleichheit kann eine Rolle spielen. Damit korreliert die dritte Leitidee der „Reflexion von Möglichkeiten, Sach-, Sinn- und Lebensfragen in Rückbindung an Theorie und Tradition zu klären“³⁵. Diese Zielsetzungen verbinden sich elegant mit Kompatschers dekonstruktiven Ansätzen, die darauf hinauslaufen, gängige Sichtweisen zu hinterfragen und dem Tier letztthin einen Status der Achtung, des Respekts und der Würde zuzuschreiben. Dass der Speziesismus eine

32 Vgl. hierzu Bayern: Eth12 2.3: Tierethik. In: *Lehrplan Plus*, o.D. <https://www.lehrplanplus.bayern.de/fachlehrplan/lernbereich/115028>, sowie Rheinland-Pfalz: Lehrplan Ethik. Sekundarstufe I (Klassen 5 – 9/10). In: *edoweb Rheinland-Pfalz*, 2000. <https://www.edoweb-rlp.de/resource/edoweb:7007252/data> (Zugriffe am 08.02.2022).

33 Bildungspläne ETHIK 2004 Baden-Württemberg. In: *Pädagogische Hochschule Heidelberg*, o.D. https://www.ph-heidelberg.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/Leitged_Eth_Synopse.pdf (Zugriff am 08.02.2022).

34 Ebd., S. 2.

35 Ebd.

unzeitgemäße Ideologie darstellt, lässt sich gegenüber den SchülerInnen rational darstellen und emotional belegen. Gerade für die affektive Dimension emphatischer Anteilnahme spielen künstlerische Werke wie die behandelten Filme eine wichtige Rolle. Sie tragen zu einem Perspektivwechsel bei und sorgen für eine skeptische Betrachtung des anthropozentrischen Weltbilds. Es dürfte sich ein Verständnis vom anderen entwickeln, der oder das vor allem einen gespiegelten Blick auf die eigene leibliche Verletzlichkeit offenbart.

Jobst Paul

The Philosophical Animal Deconstructed

From Linguistic to Curricular Methodology

During the campaign for the regional parliamentary elections in Eastern Germany in October 2019, the right-wing nationalist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) also focused on a few hundred wolves that at that time had begun returning to their former habitats in Germany from across the Polish border. As early as in April 2019, Katrin Bennhold was explaining to the readers of *The New York Times* that AfD politicians had warned voters that they were “facing an invasion” and observed that this rhetoric “[was] strikingly similar to how [these politicians] talk about immigrants, turning the wolf into an object of terror – and the discussion into an allegory for the nation’s culture wars.”¹

Bennhold’s analysis of right-wing political campaign slogans brilliantly sums up the linguistic underpinnings of political, demagogical rhetoric that uses animals as an analogical *machine*. While the “rhetorical animal” has very little to do with animals in the real sense, it has a long history that can be traced back at least some 2,350 years to Aristotle. Later on, the Christian Church Fathers and Thomas Aquinas in particular incorporated the concept into the moral teachings of Christian theology, which laid the foundations for the “rhetorical animal” to play a key role in the writings of virtually all traditional Western philosophers. This is why Jacques Derrida coined the term *philosophical animal*,² which I will use throughout this essay.

1 Katrin Bennhold: A Fairy-Tale Baddie, the Wolf, Is Back in Germany, and Anti-Migrant Forces Pounce. In: *New York Times*, April 23, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/world/europe/germany-wolves-afd-immigration.html> (accessed: July 2, 2021).

2 Jacques Derrida: *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, ed. by Marie-Luise Mallet. New York: Fordham UP 2008, p. 23.

However, the somewhat solemn image of this animal concept and its popular, political, and demagogic functions are closely intertwined. Deconstructing the philosophical animal may therefore, among other things, allow us to reconsider several disastrous cultural practices and habits related to that concept.³ For example, humans who have embraced this kind of thinking have treated nonhuman animals and other humans as enemies or slaves, or as mere resources to be exploited at whim. Meanwhile, we now have a better understanding of the final consequence of these dehumanizing modes of human, economic, and natural exploitation: climate change.⁴

Against this background it is necessary for teachers and educators to develop teaching interventions that reflect the emotional and dramatic nature of the subject, but that also transform it into a cognitive procedure. For this purpose, we can define the philosophical animal as a set of interrelated stereotypical narrative motifs that can be – as shown at the beginning – submitted to discourse-analytical and philological analysis. This approach, as I argue, can be a powerful method for both teachers and students eager to understand and challenge different iterations of the philosophical animal. In the following, I will discuss the need for this kind of intervention and explain its basic theoretical and pedagogical framework. I will conclude by discussing how this approach could be used in different educational settings, suggesting that it is possible to affect change for the better, even in current curricular settings.

3 See Catherine M. Quinsey (ed.): *Animals and Humans: Sensibility and Representation, 1650–1820*. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation 2017; Peter Arnds: *Wolves at the Door: Migration, Dehumanization, Rewilding the World*. London: Bloomsbury 2021. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781501366796> (accessed: January 24, 2022); see also the instructive writings on this matter by Boria Sax, e. g., *Animals in the Third Reich: Pets, Scapegoats, and the Holocaust*. New York: Continuum 2000. In contrast to the historiographical accounts, however, my focus is on linguistic analyses and related teaching interventions. For further reading in animal studies, see the ongoing online bibliography: Linda Kalof / Seven Mattes / Amy Fitzgerald: Animal Studies Bibliography. In: *Animal Studies Program, Michigan State University*, o. D. <http://animalstudies.msu.edu/bibliography.php> (accessed: July 2, 2021).

4 See Thomas Fleischman: *Communist Pigs: An Animal History of East Germany's Rise and Fall*. Seattle: U of Washington P 2020. Fleischman in his study demonstrates how East Germany's excessive pork production barred the development of environmental reflection.

The narrative setting

In the *New York Times* article mentioned at the beginning, Bennhold quotes Silke Grimm, a local AfD politician, who warns of an “invasion of wolves” from Poland, which she says “are dangerous” and “breed explosively.”⁵ Grimm’s description has, of course, little to do with the actual behavior of wolves. However, interpreting this description as a philosophical animal, i. e., as a set of interrelated stereotypical narrative motifs, we have a first clue here, as the term “invasion” – in combination with “explosive breeding” – points to one of the core properties of the philosophical animal – or, as I have termed it: the *animal construct*.⁶ The property in question here is, of course, (pure) sex: the monster-*animal* is a sex machine, multiplying its forces against *us*.⁷ However, as part of a set, the sex-motif regularly points to or even triggers additional narrative motifs that together form the philosophical animal: a dangerous monster-*animal* wandering around, multiplying its forces against

5 Bennhold: A Fairy-Tale Baddie.

6 For a first sketch of this analysis see Jobst Paul: Zur Erinnerung: Tier-Metaphern und Ausgrenzung – Anmerkungen zur sogenannten “Singer”-Debatte. In: Idem / Siegfried Jäger: *Von Menschen und Schweinen*. Duisburg: Duisburger Institut für Sprach- und Sozialforschung 1990, pp. 30–43. I first presented this analysis as a comprehensive tool in: Jobst Paul: *“Erinnerung” als Kompetenz: Zum didaktischen Umgang mit Rassismus, Antisemitismus und Ausgrenzung*. Duisburg: Duisburger Institut für Sprach- und Sozialforschung 1999. I presented an in-depth approach in: Jobst Paul: *Das “Tier”-Konstrukt – und die Geburt des Rassismus: Zur kulturellen Gegenwart eines vernichtenden Arguments*. Münster: Unrast 2004. This was a revised version of my dissertation: *Das “Tier”-Konstrukt als Grundprinzip in Ausgrenzungsdiskursen: Eine diskursanalytische Studie*. Dissertation, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2003. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/29800083_Das_‘Tier’-Konstrukt_als_Grundprinzip_in_Ausgrenzungsdiskursen_eine_diskursanalytische_Studie (accessed: July 2, 2021). I lay out the aspect of self-praise and self-exaltation in dehumanizing speech practices (with special reference to traditional philosophy) in: Jobst Paul: Reading the Code of Dehumanisation: The Animal Construct Deconstructed. In: *Polifonia: Estudos* 33 (2016), pp. 149–178. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304676369_Reading_the_code_of_dehumanisation_the_animal_construct_deconstructed (accessed: July 2, 2021). I present a comprehensive guide to the analysis of degrading speech in: Idem: *Der binäre Code: Leitfaden zur Analyse herabsetzender Texte und Aussagen*. Frankfurt: Wochenschau 2019. A short summary of the guide can be found in: Idem: Handlungsfähigkeit zurückgewinnen – Die Rhetorik der Herabsetzung unter der Lupe der Sprachkritik. In: *Demokratie gegen Menschenfeindlichkeit* 1 (2019), pp. 130–139.

7 Compare this narrative to, for example, the aggressive comments by Clemens Tönnies, CEO of one of Germany’s largest meatpacking companies and (now former) chairman of a renowned German soccer club. Tönnies called on Africans to stop “producing children” (transl. J. P.). See Mitschnitt von Tönnies’ Rede beim Paderborner “Tag des Handwerks”: Originalaufnahme von Tönnies’ Afrika-Aussage. In: *Westfalen-Blatt*, August 6, 2019. <https://www.westfalen-blatt.de/owl/kreis-paderborn/paderborn/originalaufnahme-von-tonnies-afrika-aussage-987274> (accessed: July 2, 2021).

us and lying in wait for (our) food and (our) supplies can also and easily be read as a creature with a (total) lack of any rational capacities, with a (total) lack of the concept of work, and characterized by its (total) inability and unwillingness to put together supplies for “tomorrow” or to feed its offspring. In short: the wolf evoked by Grimm is not only a wandering animal, but also a “stupid” one. In fact, the degrading motif of stupidity (as the inability to work for the common good) is a stereotypical feature of the philosophical animal, which can be observed in, for example, sexist jokes about women or ableist comments about people with disabilities, or in many racist slurs, particularly those referring to migrants.

The third stereotypical narrative motif evoked by Grimm’s portrait of the “wolf” is the *gorging and robbing motif* referring to the beast’s excessive gorging, devouring, eating, tearing into pieces, and biting to death not only food, prey, and flesh, but also anyone of *us* who might be standing in the beast’s way. In many racist texts, the gorging and stealing motif is accompanied by a whole range of secondary stereotypical narratives, for example, about crime, which have proliferated in Germany, especially since 2015. (A common trope in xenophobic attacks on migrants in this period have been claims of *Flüchtlings-kriminalität* or “refugee criminality.”) Notably, the gorging and stealing motif can also easily be combined with the sex motif to warn of the *invaders’* appetite for raping (*our women*).

From a rhetorical standpoint, another narrative motif, which I will refer to here as the *excremental motif*, seems to be the most inflammatory one. Once the wolf or, for that matter, any other beast has devoured its prey, it will fall asleep immediately, lying down in its own excrement. While this implies that the beast has a super-vitalistic immunity to viruses and contaminants, the tacit, inflammatory part of the story becomes clear when we ask what happens once the beast has passed the border to *us*, to *civilization*. Like “trash animals,” such as rats or pigeons,⁸ the philosophical animal is thought to be a carrier of diseases and the cause of epidemic outbreaks, a charge that has also been leveled at many marginalized groups⁹: from anti-refugee to war propaganda and racist hate speech – virtually any variant of dehumanizing speech will take up, in one way or another, the excremental motif in order to stir up resentment and justify violence and hate against imaginary enemies.

8 See Kelsi Nagy / Randy Malamud / Phillip David Johnson: *Trash Animals: How We Live with Nature’s Filthy, Feral, Invasive, and Unwanted Species*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P 2013.

9 See Art Spiegelman: *The Complete Maus: A Survivor’s Tale. Part 1: My Father Bleeds History; Part 2: From Mauschwitz to the Catskills*. 1 CD-ROM. New York: Voyager 1994.

There is one detail within the concept of the philosophical animal – or: the body / mind binary – in particular that betrays its origins in Aristotelian philosophy: it is the faculty of *instrumental* reason, which Aristotle – in his analogical reasoning about the human soul¹⁰ – conceded was part of the *animal* realm, while he reserved *pure* reason for *man* alone. We find this variant, which can be called the *mastermind* motif, in Grimm’s statement above, as well, when she refers to wolves as *collective* enemies: animals living in *packs* – such as wolves – serve as preferred metaphors in right-wing and extremist propaganda and as a means of depicting the *enemy* as a sinister collective planning its bestial attacks with utmost sophistication and brutality. Consequently, the *mastermind* motif can be used to accuse the enemy of all kinds of conspiracies. Antisemitic speech in particular very much relies on this trope.

However, in order to realize the full potential of the philosophical animal as an inflammatory tool, Grimm, in her statement reprinted in *The New York Times*, adds a final narrative turn that one could refer to as a *traitor* component – that is, the suggestion that someone in the *we*-group’s own ranks is secretly colluding with the enemy. Referring to an “invasion” of wolves (from across the border to Poland), Grimm implies that official statements intended to calm the public have been deliberately misleading and are meant to assist the wolves as they make inroads into German territory. Conflating wolves and refugees, she says, “We know that line from the refugee crisis. No one believes a word of it.” In other words, Grimm uses the philosophical animal as a point of departure for a firmly established right-wing narrative that combines the racist stereotyping of migrants with conspiratorial talking points about ruthless political elites shamelessly lying to their constituents.

As noted earlier, wolves do not, of course, breed explosively, and there is no conspiracy, there are no traitors aiding or abetting the “enemy”; the several hundred wolves do not pose any serious threat to lives or livelihoods. However, what is obviously quite real and powerful is the narrative itself, which, however wrong and misleading, eventually enters political discourse and other public debates. In this way, it has real-life effects that sway public opinion, provoke affective responses, provide support to discriminatory ideologies and practices, and, perhaps, trigger violence against minorities.¹¹

10 See Jobst Paul: “Geist” vs. “Tier”: Rassismus und Gewaltästhetik. In: *Osnabrücker Beiträge zur Sprachtheorie* 46 (1992), pp. 210–228.

11 For further details, see Paul: Code, pp. 34–37.

We should, however, be aware that the (ab)use of philosophical animals in political rhetoric not only has a wide range of adverse social effects but also tends to harm real animals. The stigmatization of, for example, wolves as a species has led to centuries of violence. In general, Western philosophy and its recourse to animals has made a considerable contribution to today's environmental crisis. The disastrous social and environmental aspects of the concept of the philosophical animal are, as I stated earlier, two sides of the same coin.

Plants as animals

In the previous section, I showed how philosophical animals can function as vehicles for human ideologies and, in the specific case of the 2019 AfD election campaign, for stereotypical right-wing propaganda and its use of animal constructs to justify violence and the oppression of nonhuman animals. In the following, I will continue by expanding my argument regarding philosophical animals to include plants ("plants as animals") and, in a next step, by considering how the processes described thus far are facilitated by the media.¹² An article in *GEO*, a renowned German-language periodical covering nature and the environment, begins as follows:

In order to obtain nutrients, some plants have become carnivores over the course of evolution. They do not need teeth, their "mouths" are the smooth edges of the pitchers, in the digestive juice of which animals die. However, some pitcher plants also ally themselves with potential victims – for mutual benefit.¹³

Obviously, this hint at carnivorous plants ("*fleischfressende* Pflanzen" or "predatory, meat-eating plants") functions as an "appetizer" for potential readers, although "meat" is nowhere to be seen in the series of photographs accompanying the article. However, the editors seem to be keen to emphasize this very

12 For an in-depth discussion of the aesthetics of violence, see Paul: "Geist" vs. "Tier"; and Jobst Paul: Von Gladiatoren, Grenzschützern und Collateral Murder: Zur psychosozialen Dynamik medialer Gewaltästhetik. In: Rolf van Raden / Siegfried Jäger (eds): *Im Griff der Medien: Krisenproduktion und Subjektivierungseffekte*. Münster: Unrast 2011, pp. 179–200.

13 Klaus Bachmann: Fleischfressende Pflanzen: Die Fallensteller. In: *GEO*, n.d. <https://www.geo.de/natur/naturwunder-erde/die-fallensteller-30169026.html> (accessed: September 20, 2021; transl. J. P.).

dimension and the related motifs of *gorging* and *biting* as the photographs accompanying the article obviously show the metaphorical meat (i. e., flies or ants), presumably right before or in the moment of expiration. At first glance, this is also the case in a close-up photograph of a squirrel (the supposed victim) approaching a carnivorous plant (the supposed killer). Instead of being swallowed by the plant, however, the squirrel is there to demonstrate a surprising, i. e., “vegetarian,” exception to the rule in the world of predatory plants:

In addition to ants, the Rajah Brookes pitcher plant has opened up a new source of nutrients: animal droppings. The *Nepenthes* species, which grows in the Borneo rainforest, attracts small mammals such as the highland squirrel with plenty of nectar. These then climb around on the large pitcher and dispose droppings into it.¹⁴

While this caption aims to set the record straight, albeit by also invoking what I referred to earlier as the excremental motif, there is evidence that descriptions and photographs such as the ones included in *GEO*, even if framed accurately, have had unexpected and, for the plants, negative consequences. For example, the advisory desk of n-tv, a major German news station, decided in October 2017 to change the way it covered carnivorous plants. Readers were now warned not to feed carnivores:

“The worst mistake that is made again and again is to put dead insects, meat, or even cheese in the traps of the carnivores,” says the expert. “The carnivorous plants cannot do anything with such food. On the contrary, the wrong food starts to rot and grow mold, which causes the plant’s pitcher to decay, and in the worst case, causes rot and mold to spread, with the result that the entire plant dies.

If you want to do something good for the plant, you should focus on things other than feeding. Like all other plants, they form chlorophyll in their green leaves with the help of sunlight. A carnivorous species should therefore be placed in [...] very sunny locations.”¹⁵

While the case of carnivorous plants might be a curious or even funny one, it is important to realize that the stereotypical narrative motifs related to the philosophical animal might be activated even without obvious political intent

14 Ibid.

15 Jana Zeh: Muss man fleischfressende Pflanzen füttern? In: *n-tv*, October 24, 2017. <https://www.n-tv.de/wissen/frageantwort/Muss-man-fleischfressende-Pflanzen-fuettern-article20075838.html?ntvDuo=true> (accessed: July 2, 2021; transl. J. P.).

but with real-world consequences, both in the case of animals and plants. In the latter case, it is possible to argue that *philosophical plants* have been used like philosophical animals.¹⁶ For example, discourses about native and invasive plants overlap, as in the case of native and invasive animal species, with those of immigration, especially nativist or xenophobic political rhetoric.¹⁷

Discursive entanglements

As noted above, the philosophical animal often functions as a projection for those who evoke it. If the *they*-group can be conflated with a threatening animal construct using one or more of the motifs described above, the *we*-group, by default, appears to be benign, reasonable, disciplined – in short, *human*. In other words, *we* appear to be the complete opposite of *them*; *we* appear to be altruistic, industrious (from dawn to dusk), committed to the common good (that is, to gathering and accumulating supplies); *we* appear to be ascetic and to despise bodily pleasures. Consequently, as is often the case in authoritarian or fundamentalist ideologies, even activities like sex, starting a family, having children are defined as a service to community – and denying them or being unable or unwilling to perform them is construed as treasonous. Of course, the superlative self-representations that speakers create of themselves when degrading others need not have anything to do with reality. As a rule, these representations work as long as audiences are willing to accept the speakers' empty claims. It would be easy to dismiss the self-exaltation and posturing were it not for the fact that these discursive acts, including (*bestial*) portraits of minorities or opponents,¹⁸ produce discursive realities. These acts even tend to establish rules for fundamentalist social programs that political subjects

16 See Michael Marder: *Plant-Thinking: A Philosophy of Vegetal Life*. New York: Columbia UP 2013.

17 See Richard Mabey: *Weeds: How Vagabond Plants Gatecrashed Civilisation and Changed the Way We Think About Nature*. London: Profile 2010; Jobst Paul: Wir gegen Sie – zu den Abgründen sprachlicher Grenzziehungen. Lecture, May 16, 2019, Kunstverein Heilbronn. In: *DISS Duisburg*, n. d. <http://www.diss-duisburg.de/download/onlinebibliothek/Wir-gegen-Sie-Referat.pdf> (accessed: July 2, 2021). For more literature see Bibliography. In: *Literary and Cultural Plant Studies Network* (University of Arizona / Department of Medienwissenschaft und Neuere Deutsche Literatur, Universität Dresden), o. D. <https://plants.arizona.edu/bibliography/> (accessed: July 2, 2021).

18 See Jennifer Sclafani: *Talking Donald Trump: A Sociolinguistic Study of Style, Metadiscourse, and Political Identity*. London: Routledge / Taylor & Francis 2018; Marco Morini: *Lessons from Trump's Political Communication: How to Dominate the Media Environment*.

and speakers' supporters are expected to live by while those ignoring or violating these rules will be branded as traitors and threatened with punishment. In other words, the philosophical animal, as a rhetorical device and a vehicle for ideologies, can be used not only to degrade and exploit minority groups but also to discipline society as a whole.

Two cultural and normative traditions are also relevant here because they are closely related to these disciplinary aspects: firstly, a rigorous work ethic and its objective of amassing wealth have been associated with the capitalist principle.¹⁹ Secondly, the expectation that one is willing to sacrifice oneself for the common good (against attackers) has been associated with certain – and quite aggressive – interpretations of the doctrine of *Christian love*.²⁰ These traditions and their consequences – for example, the unconditional willingness to obey, to work, and to fight – come very close to what the philosophical animal script defines as its *animal* opponent.²¹

Perhaps we will only fully grasp the formidable impact of the philosophical animal script if we review and reconsider Western philosophy and Christian moral theology. Starting with Plato, both traditions have, in one way or another, resorted to representations of nonhuman animals as beasts in order to create a flattering portrait of *man* as a rational subject and to dream of the ideal state as that of *ants* and *bees*.²² As a result, it may well be that the bulk of Western anthropology would evaporate without the suggestive, nonsensical, and yet powerful philosophical animal.²³

Basel: Springer 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39010-5> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Viktor Klemperer: *LTI: Lingua Tertii Imperii: The Language of the Third Reich*. London: Bloomsbury 2013, esp. ch. 30: "The Curse of the Superlative."

19 For an overview of the literature on this issue, see the reading list: Rassismus und Kapitalismus – Literaturliste. In: *DISS Duisburg*, n. d. <https://www.diss-duisburg.de/disslit/rassismus-und-kapitalismus-literaturliste/> (accessed: July 2, 2021).

20 The relevant literature on this topic is included in the following reading list: Rassismus und Christentum – Literaturliste. In: *DISS Duisburg*, n. d. <https://www.diss-duisburg.de/disslit/rassismus-und-christentum-literaturliste/> (accessed: July 2, 2021).

21 I refer to this phenomenon as the *authoritarian paradox*. See Paul: Code, pp. 63–68.

22 For a discussion of ant and bee metaphors in traditional political thought, see Jobst Paul: The Human Construct and the Morals of Collectivism: Social Insects and the Sacrifice of Intelligence. In: Idem: *Reading the Code*, pp. 162–164.

23 See Jobst Paul: Appendix (Reading the Code of Dehumanisation: The Animal Construct Deconstructed): The Human-Animal Analogy in Philosophy. In: *Research Gate*, January 2020. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338406848_Appendix_Reading_the_code_of_dehumanisation_the_animal_construct_deconstructed_The_Human-Animal_Analogy_in_Philosophy (accessed: July 2, 2021).

Curricular methodology

Having explained the use and the discursive power of the philosophical animal and the function of (stereotypical) narrative motifs, I will now address pedagogical interventions that can be used to examine these issues at different levels and in different contexts. This is all the more urgent as the philosophical animal has become a common discursive currency, or “empty signifier,”²⁴ employed and exchanged at different levels, from the sciences to everyday usage, not only as a shorthand for what is right and wrong, for *us* and *them*, but also for what is *human* and what is *animal*. While animal studies have worked toward deconstructing philosophical animals in different disciplinary contexts, it is, particularly in light of the cultural and moral pervasiveness and the social power of this script, necessary for educators to develop approaches that empower students to engage with philosophical animals (and plants) in a critical and transparent manner in and outside the classroom.

As we have seen, the starting point for analysis can be words or texts as they are the basic data commonly used in linguistic or social psychological inquiries. This kind of data can be examined empirically with the help of the philological methods explained above. Basic analyses do not necessarily require extensive prior knowledge or advanced skill sets. Sequences can start with relatively short text units and can become more and more challenging. The deductive steps following the first insights can be applied to increasingly complex texts and matters that have been, for example, picked from the daily news or from extended historical case studies. These steps may involve basic analytical tools or the use of quite sophisticated linguistic methods. While students can interrogate the philosophical animal rather quickly, educators can expand upon curricula or adjust them to the age and learning curve of students.

It is important to note here, however, that such curricula can – for students and educators alike – be fraught with psychological strain. Of course, the focus should and will always be on empirical findings and transparency. That said, both students and instructors are unlikely to have a completely disinterested or “objective” perspective on the subject matter they have chosen to investigate, in part because it is not possible for them to ignore “the world out there,” their social roles, their personal experiences, or personal values or beliefs. This is the case regardless of whether they have been witnesses to or victims of abuse, whether they are engaging in questionable social behavior

24 See Ernesto Laclau: *Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter in Politics?* London: Routledge 2000.

or not, or have been confronted with controversial and emotionally fraught issues, especially in the context of human and nonhuman animal relations.

As they ask their students to engage with these difficult issues, instructors should keep in mind that this very strain might be crucial for students to engage in long processes of reflection and critical questioning. Although instructors should always be prepared to assist and to engage in dialogues with students, they should also be prepared to take a step back and leave it to the students as they seek to make sense of all of this in the long run. In my experience, young students (aged twelve or older) in particular may be concerned once they begin to reflect on their own verbal use or behavior, or that of their peers or families. They may not be prepared or able to communicate their concerns and emotions immediately. This does not mean, however, that they should be spared the experience of being somewhat embarrassed. Choosing appropriate introductory materials for the very beginning of the curriculum (for children aged twelve or older) may considerably reduce the stress experienced by students.

Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, this very much applies to the material with which children are bound to become familiar very early on – material that reflects the simple and yet very influential and powerful application of the philosophical animal script: name-calling. Although different modern languages have different idiomatic practices, linguistic analyses of offensive terms such as *pig*, *idiot*, or *jackass* show that these terms can be easily attributed to the narrative traits I mentioned at the beginning, namely the motifs of stupidity and sex, as well as the devouring and the excremental motifs.

Younger children with whom I have worked tend to be highly motivated and greatly enjoy participating in the “breaking of the taboo”²⁵ and in the analysis. One possible explanation for this level of involvement seems to be that analysis reveals the cultural dimensions of name-calling, which offers some relief from personal responsibility. Students also discover that they have a choice, namely, to abstain from this practice. In addition, the analysis of name-calling in class can have empowering effects on those students who have already experienced discriminatory language, and it may have sobering effects on those students who tend to use or enjoy it.

It is possible to allow students to develop a more distanced perspective by asking them, in a next step, to interpret aspects of well-known literary traditions,

25 For the outlines of the classroom-experiment, see Paul: “*Tier*”-Konstrukt als Grundprinzip, pp. 64–76. It must be said, however, that in similar crash courses with adults, reactions were nearly identical.

of fables and fairy tales. Both genres are populated by stupid, greedy, devouring, dirty animals, and it is here that we find many of the narrative motifs that I discussed earlier, such as, to mention just one example, the wolf as a devouring mastermind. In addition, by also dealing with the drawings and illustrations that often make fables and fairy-tales so appealing to younger readers, instructors can offer first insights into the repetitive repertoire of visual stereotyping as well.

The latter can serve as a cognitive bridge to the analysis of other visual materials for students aged fourteen and older, who may be particularly fond of, for example, action, horror, or fantasy video games. Here, the focus will not only be on the *animal* character of many of the *enemies* presented in these games but also on the perspectives of the first-person *shooters*. Students are encouraged to consider what the moral and physical properties of these characters are and why they could have become role models, given human rights, and *Western* liberal traditions.

Students aged fourteen and older can quickly develop the skills needed to conduct more systemized analyses of verbally dehumanizing statements. To do so, they need to learn how to verbalize the stereotypical story behind smaller text fragments, for instance, behind the following statement given by Donald J. Trump on June 16, 2015: “When Mexico sends its people [...] they’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”²⁶ Mexico here can easily be identified as a mastermind sending drugs to Americans to sedate them and thus to gain access to, to rob, and to consume their goods (gorging plus excremental motifs) but also to rape (white) American women (sex motif).²⁷ In the same way, studying just a few samples picked from aggressive internet blogs that reveal their mostly simplistic repetitive make-up (the excessive use of the philosophical animal script) can be quite revealing to students: as (online) *hate speech* is often related to current public, political, and ethical issues, students are bound to become more aware of their own civil involvement and the need to take sides.

26 See Amber Phillips: “They’re rapists.” President Trump’s campaign launch speech two years later, annotated. In: *The Washington Post*, June 16, 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/06/16/theyre-rapists-presidents-trump-campaign-launch-speech-two-years-later-annotated/> (accessed: September 20, 2021).

27 More advanced students can be guided to analyze the latter motif in the *King Kong* character, see Gail Dines: King Kong and the White Woman: Hustler Magazine and the Demonization of Black Masculinity. In: *Violence Against Women* 4:3 (1998), pp. 291–307, which can be followed by courses dealing with the ape stereotype more broadly; see Charles W. Mills / Silvia Sebastiani / Wulf Hund (eds): *Simianization: Apes, Gender, Class, and Race*. Münster: Lit 2015. <https://doi.org/10.15446/achsc.v44n2.64029> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

More advanced undergraduate and graduate students can be introduced more systematically and with greater disciplinary scaffolding to the philosophical animal and to a wide range of themes, genres, and disciplines. More specifically, they can be introduced to the discursive strands involved in *them-and-us* rhetoric in contrast to strands that are presumably or definitely not employed in that rhetoric or are employed to a lesser degree. Consequently, more advanced analyses of the philosophical animal will have to deal with discursive, cultural, and political conflicts past and present, and even wars in the broadest sense possible, turning (among others) to racist, sexist, ableist text sources²⁸ but also to the stereotyping in pop lyrics²⁹ and in world literature,³⁰ in addition to some of the philosophical sources already mentioned. However, the specific challenge here is refraining from aiming at any kind of positivistic completeness. The real challenge is coping with the present and future power of binary human / animal discourses, whether in populist speech, in the medical realm,³¹ or even in animal studies.³² The philosophical animal

28 See, for example, Jeffrey Kaplan (ed.): *Encyclopedia of White Power: A Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right*. Walnut Creek / Lanham / New York / Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 2000, p. 373; Salvador Jimenez Murguía (ed.): *The Encyclopedia of Racism in American Films*. Walnut Creek / Lanham / New York / Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 2018; Kristina Fennelly / Erica Joan Dymond / Salvador Jimenez Murguía (eds): *The Encyclopedia of Sexism in American Films*. Walnut Creek / Lanham / New York / Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 2019.

29 See Annie Carl: *My Tropey Life: How Pop Culture Stereotypes Make Disabled Lives Harder*. Portland: Microcosm 2020.

30 Consider, for example, the human-animal binary (as a split personality) in Robert Louis Stevenson's *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (1886), E. T. A. Hoffmann's criminal novel *Das Fräulein von Scuderi* (1819/21) dealing with a jeweler turned beast, or Patrick Süskind's *Das Parfum: Die Geschichte eines Mörders* (1985) about a young perfumer turned beast. But see also Franz Kafka's anti-binary interpretation of an ape (named Red Peter) turned scholar in *Ein Bericht für eine Akademie* (1917).

31 See the role of the *plant* (not *animal*) stereotype in terms such as PVS (persistent vegetative state) or the *bare body* stereotype in the present Harvard definition of human death (with a view to transplantation medicine) in: Ben Sarbey: Definitions of Death: Brain Death and What Matters in a Person. In: *Journal of Law and Bioscience* 3:3 (2016), pp. 743–752. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5570697/> (accessed: July 2, 2021).

32 For a discussion of the idea to counter the human abuse of (real) animals by conferring human rights on some species, see, for example, Paola Cavalieri / Catherine Woollard (eds): *The Animal Question: Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights*. Oxford / New York: Oxford UP 2004. This contribution to the debate seems to ignore that this would not be the end but rather a continuation of the binary category of the human. More or less the same principle applies vice versa to the sociobiological polemic declaring all humans to be animals (with the exception of the sociobiologists, of course).

script has developed a narrative potential that goes far beyond crude bashing in the form of online hate speech. More often than not, binary messages are clad in fine ironic allusion, in solid scientific claims, in sophisticated propaganda, and in secretive conspiracy theories that twist and intertwine with the narrative motifs mentioned above in novel and complex ways. In other words: it may take a lot of practice to perform the simple, the only real task, namely verbalizing the one stereotypical story at the core of it all.

Moral and social learning

Having discussed options for and personal experiences using this approach to teach the philosophical animal, I would like to conclude by addressing one question regarding the analysis as a whole, namely, that of its exact psychological and ideological contexts. In his article *Learning from Negative Morality*, the Swiss pedagogue Fritz K. Oser describes *negative morality* as something based on the

[...] supposition that knowledge and experience of negative behaviour protects right or positive behaviour. Because of experienced *mistakes* the subject remembers this experience and thus more strongly resists a new moral trap. The question of indignation about injustice and shame about *real* unfair or hurtful behaviour will be stressed in a more cognitive and discourse-orientated way.³³

As Oser rightly points out here, what we call justice, equality, or human rights cannot be defined or grasped positivistically. What these norms or values really mean only becomes clear due to the pain caused by violations and by disregarding said norms and values. Analyzing the philosophical animal, one of the most obvious linguistic manifestations of these violations and of moral disregard, can be a means for students to engage with what we share as values, including those not yet universally applied to nonhuman others. Providing students with the skills to interrogate the binary constructions at work in all kinds of relations between humans, nonhuman animals, and the natural world can be a crucial step. Learning to see, to experience, to analyze, to deconstruct the philosophical animal can help students to create non-binary fields of experience and practice, perhaps even a culture not defined by rigid binary structures and thinking. This openness is urgently required.

33 Fritz K. Oser: Learning from Negative Morality. In: *Journal of Moral Education* 25:1 (1996), pp.67–74.

Pamela Steen

Spinnenbrille, Dog-Cam und Gassi mit Ziege

Reflexionen über ein tierlinguistisches Projektseminar

Tierlinguistik: Tiere in linguistischer Forschung und Lehre

Ein sprachwissenschaftliches Seminar mit Methoden und Fragestellungen der Human-Animal Studies zu verbinden, ist – zumindest für die deutschsprachige Universitätslandschaft – noch ungewöhnlich. Anders als in der Literaturwissenschaft, bei der Texttiere – wenn auch unter anderem Blickwinkel – immer schon ein prominentes Thema waren, tauchen Tiere in der Sprachwissenschaft meist nur als forscherscher ‚Beifang‘ auf, z. B. bei der Analyse von (Tier-)Metaphern, (Tier-)Kosewörtern, (Tier-)Namen. In der Gattungsforschung, u. a. bei der Untersuchung von Tischgesprächen im Beisein von Haustieren¹ oder von Gassigesprächen², haben Tiere zumindest einen Stellenwert als Akteur*innen. Dennoch fällt es der linguistischen Pragmatik bzw. Gesprächsanalyse (anders als z. B. der Ethnomethodologie und Interaktionssoziologie) nach wie vor schwer, Tiere theoretisch als *gleichrangige* soziale Akteur*innen zu behandeln, mit denen nicht nur eine *quasi-soziale* Kommunikation möglich ist.³ Der Mensch, das *animal symbolicum*, wird meist

1 Vgl. Jörg R. Bergmann: Haustiere als kommunikative Ressource. In: Hans Georg Soeffner (Hrsg.): *Kultur und Alltag*. Göttingen: Schwarz 1988, S. 299–312.

2 Vgl. Sarah Torres Cajo / Nils Bahlo: „Ach der ist ja süß...“. Gassigespräche. Eine kommunikative Gattung im Hinblick auf Soziabilität und Zweckorientierung. In: *Deutsche Sprache*, 01/2016, S. 77–96. <https://doi.org/10.37307/j.1868-775X.2016.01.05> (Zugriff am 05.01.2022).

3 Vgl. Hans-Werner Huneke: *Sprechen zu Tieren. Formen und Funktionen tiergerichteten Sprechens*. München: Ludicium 2004.

noch immer als Vergleichsmaßstab genommen und ‚das Tier‘ als Differenzfigur der menschlichen kulturellen Umwelt zugeordnet.

So wie die Ökolingustik⁴, die anthropozentrische und von einem Nützlichkeitsdenken geprägte Sprache in Bezug auf die nichtmenschliche Umwelt kritisch hinterfragt, und wie die Zoosemiotik 2.0⁵, die Formen der *humanimalischen* Bedeutungskonstitution in Diskurs und Interaktion untersucht, will auch die Tierlinguistik⁶ eine neue Sicht auf Tiere in der sprachwissenschaftlichen Forschung und Lehre implementieren. Es gilt, als empirisch fundierte Kulturlinguistik bzw. kulturwissenschaftliche Linguistik, zu untersuchen, wie Menschen und Tiere *gemeinsam* mittels Interaktion bzw. Kommunikation *Naturkulturen*⁷ hervorbringen. So war es auch das primäre Ziel des hier nachgezeichneten Projektseminars, die Teilnehmer*innen ‚weg vom Schreibtisch und hin zu den Tieren‘ zu bekommen. D. h., ihnen sollten Tiere nicht nur als sprachliche und/oder mediale Konstrukte begegnen. Vielmehr sollten die Teilnehmer*innen die Tiere auch in ihrem Lebensraum, ihrer (kulturellen) Umwelt als Subjekte kennenlernen. Der konkrete Feldzugang sollte dazu führen, empathischer für die Tiere als Lebewesen zu werden, um evtl. sekundär ethische Haltungen zu hinterfragen und eigene anthropozentrische Maßstäbe bei den Analysen zu erkennen. Im unmittelbaren Fokus stand jedoch nicht die moralische Komponente, wie in manchen kritischen Bereichen der Human-Animal Studies, sondern die reflektierende Auseinandersetzung mit der eigenen Forschungsposition.

4 Vgl. Reinhard Heuberger: Das Tier in der Sprache. In: Reingard Spannring / Karin Schachinger / Gabriela Kompatscher / Alejandro Boucabeille (Hrsg.): *Disziplinierte Tiere? Perspektiven der Human-Animal Studies für die wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2015, S. 123–135, hier S. 124–125. <https://doi.org/10.14361/transcript.9783839425183.123> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

5 Vgl. Gianfranco Marrone / Dario Mangano (Hrsg.): *Semiotics of Animals in Culture. Zoo-semiotics 2.0*. Cham: Springer 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72992-3> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

6 Vgl. Pamela Steen: „Tiere sind die besseren Menschen“. Moralisierung im Web 2.0 aus tierlinguistischer Perspektive. In: Björn Hayer / Klarissa Schröder (Hrsg.): *Tierethik transdisziplinär. Literatur – Kultur – Didaktik*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2018, S. 191–210. <https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839442593-011> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022); dies.: *Menschen – Tiere – Kommunikation. Praxeologische Studien zur Tierlinguistik*. Berlin: Metzler 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64157-6> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

7 Vgl. Donna J. Haraway: *Das Manifest für Gefährten. Wenn Spezies sich begegnen – Hunde, Menschen und signifikante Andersartigkeit*, aus d. Engl. v. Jennifer Sophia Theodor. Berlin: Merve 2016.

Die möglichen Untersuchungsgebiete der Tierlinguistik sind dabei vielfältig. So können etwa narrative Interviews, Gesprächspraktiken und Interaktionen, in die Tiere involviert sind (z. B. beim Gassigehen oder Sport), Beiträge in den sozialen Medien, Tiere im TV (z. B. in Zoosendungen) und in Filmen untersucht werden. Für das tierlinguistische Seminar wurde ein allgemeines Thema gewählt, das kommunikative und interaktive Mensch-Tier-Praktiken im urbanen Lebensraum behandelt. Aufgrund der Ausrichtung als Projektseminar wählten die Teilnehmer*innen die Analysemethoden und Untersuchungsaspekte im Rahmen ihrer Projektarbeiten eigenständig, je nach Forschungsinteresse.

Menschen und Tiere in der Stadt

Das Seminar mit dem Titel „Zoopolis“⁸: Mensch-Tier-Begegnungen in der Stadt“ wurde im lehramtsbezogenen Masterstudiengang/ Deutsch sowie im Master Germanistik⁹ zusammen mit dem literaturwissenschaftlichen Seminar „Tiere in der Literatur – Transgressionen zwischen Natur- und Kulturräumen“ der Literatur- und Kulturwissenschaftlerin Uta Schaffers an der Universität Koblenz-Landau (Koblenz) angeboten. Das Besondere an dem germanistischen Masterstudiengang ist die modulare Integration linguistischer und literaturwissenschaftlicher Seminare, die thematische Symbiosen ermöglicht, wodurch das übergeordnete Thema „Tiere in Naturkulturen“ aus zwei disziplinären Perspektiven vertiefend behandelt werden konnte. Für die kulturlinguistische Perspektive konnten insofern Synergieeffekte angenommen werden, als die Verbindung empirisch beobachtbarer Stadttiere mit fiktiven literarischen Tieren generell den Sinnhorizont erweitert und somit auch die Einstellung gegenüber realen Tieren verändern kann. Ein solches integriertes Modul kann somit programmatisch die grundsätzliche „materiell-semiotische Verfassung“¹⁰ von Tieren, wie sie etwa in den Cultural and Literary Animal Studies postuliert wird, besonders gut verdeutlichen.

8 Vgl. Sue Donaldson / Will Kymlicka: *Zoopolis. Eine politische Theorie der Tierrechte*, aus d. Engl. v. Joachim Schulte. Berlin: Suhrkamp 2013.

9 Der Studiengang heißt seit dem Wintersemester 2020/21 „Sprache – Literatur – Medien“, davor „Dynamiken der Vermittlung“.

10 Roland Borgards: Tiere und Literatur. In: Ders. (Hrsg.): *Tiere. Kulturwissenschaftliches Handbuch*. Stuttgart: Metzler 2016, S. 225–244, hier S. 240. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05372-5> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

Das Projektseminar fand aufgrund der Corona-Pandemie als Online-Seminar statt. Diesbezüglich mussten kurzfristig Änderungen im Ablauf und in der Thematik vorgenommen werden, und die Teilnehmer*innen konnten hinsichtlich ihrer Projekte Mensch-Tier-Begegnungen nicht mehr ohne Einschränkungen erforschen. So war z. B. auch der für die erste Sitzung geplante Rundgang über den Campus in Koblenz, um die Wahrnehmung der Studierenden für die sie alltäglich umgebenden Tiere zu schärfen, nicht möglich. Spontane Begegnungen mit ‚Haus‘- bzw. ‚Wildtieren‘ wie der Campus-Katze, Stadttauben, Spatzen, Meisen, Mäusebussarden, Ameisen usw. wären mit einem Besuch bei Zuchthühnern, die nahe des Moselufers gehalten werden, kontrastiert worden. In einer Diskussion über die Möglichkeiten und Bedingungen der humanimalischen Begegnungen mit diesen tierlichen Stadtbewohner*innen wäre der fundamentale Zusammenhang von sprachlicher Tier-Kategorisierung und tierlichen Lebensbedingungen sowie humanimalischen Praktiken (z. B. die Campus-Katze streicheln; dem Amselgesang lauschen; Stadttauben ignorieren; Hühner züchten usw.) reflektiert worden. Stattdessen wurde im Zuge des E-Learnings ein Ausschnitt aus dem Dokumentarfilm *De Wilde Stad*¹¹ gezeigt. Der Filmausschnitt, der als Teaser für die eigenen Feldforschungen diente, zeigt, wie gut Stadttiere an ihr Habitat, den urbanen Lebensraum, angepasst sind. In dem Film wird die städtische Fauna zudem aus der Perspektive einer Freigänger-Katze als Ich-Erzählerin inszeniert, sodass hier bereits die Tierperspektive eine wichtige Rolle spielte. Auch die für den Abschluss des Seminars geplante Posterpräsentation im Rahmen einer interdisziplinären HAS-Tagung an der Universität Koblenz-Landau musste pandemiebedingt ausfallen. Auch aus diesem Grund bietet der vorliegende Beitrag eine willkommene Möglichkeit, zumindest einige exemplarische Ergebnisse der Projektarbeiten präsentieren zu können.

Bausteine des Seminars:

Theorie – Feld – Tierperspektive – Resonanz

Das Seminar bestand insgesamt aus vier ineinandergreifenden Bausteinen. (Abb. 1) Mit dem Baustein *Theorien* (1) begann das Seminar. Dieser führte über den *analytischen Zugang* bzw. den *Feldzugang* (2) und über die *Innovative Methode* und die *Rekonstruktion der Tierperspektive* (3) schließlich zur Reflexion der eigenen, *methodisch basierten Resonanz Erfahrung* (4).

11 *De Wilde Stad* (NL 2018, R: Mark Verkerk).




Abb. 1: Seminarbausteine.

Die Entwicklung von einer kognitiv basierten Sicht auf das Seminarthema hin zu einer auch emotionalen oder empathischen Perspektive (Pfeil auf der linken Seite) begann im Prinzip mit der ersten Sitzung und wirkte am Ende wieder auf die behandelten theoretischen Positionen zurück (Pfeil auf der rechten Seite). Dazwischen standen Fragen nach dem Feldzugang und den adäquaten analytischen Methoden sowie die zu entwickelnden Forschungsfragen. Ob sich die Teilnehmer*innen bei der Entwicklung und Durchführung ihrer Projekte eher deduktiv von Theorien oder induktiv von eigenen Feldd Forschungen leiten ließen, wurde ihnen freigestellt, jedoch sollten alle Bausteine bei der Dokumentation berücksichtigt werden.

Theorien

Nach einer allgemeinen Einführung in die Prämissen und Forschungsschwerpunkte der Tierlinguistik setzten sich die Projektgruppen mit interdisziplinären Texten auseinander. Ziel dieser ersten Phase war es, zunächst ein Grundverständnis vom Forschungsgegenstand (Mensch-Tier-Begegnungen in der Stadt) zu entwickeln, die Teilnehmer*innen für die verschiedenen wissenschaftlichen Perspektiven auf (Stadt-)Tiere zu sensibilisieren und u. a.

die folgenden Fragen zu beantworten: Was ist überhaupt eine Stadt?¹² Was ist ein Ökosystem und was bedeutet der Begriff der *Umwelt*?¹³ Wie lassen sich die Konzepte *Natur* und *Kultur* darin begreifen?¹⁴ Wie können (Stadt-) Tiere sprachlich kategorisiert werden?¹⁵ In welchem Zusammenhang stehen Umwelten mit der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung?¹⁶ Wenn „Stadt“ als „eine relativ große, dicht besiedelte und dauerhafte Niederlassung gesellschaftlich heterogener Individuen“¹⁷ verstanden wird, so zählen im Sinne der Human-Animal Studies zu diesen heterogenen Individuen auch nicht-menschliche Tiere. Diese kommen jedoch in der soziologischen Raum-Definition nur implizit vor, wenn die Autor*innen „Raum“ als „relationale (An)Ordnungen von Lebewesen und sozialen Gütern an Orten“¹⁸ definieren. Die Stadt als Raum gibt zudem gesellschaftliche Ordnungen vor; diese werden aber durch relationale, auch humanimalische Handlungen erst gebildet. In der Stadt kommt es aufgrund einer gewissen Mensch-Tier-Dichte daher häufig zu territorialen Streitigkeiten. Dies betrifft vor allem „Schwellenbereichstiere“¹⁹ und solche, die diskursiv als ‚invasive Arten‘ kategorisiert werden, wie z. B. Nilgänse.

Ausgehend von diesem theoretischen Ansatz der ‚invasiven Arten‘ verbindet Markus Möwis in seiner Projektarbeit eine Diskursanalyse zur „Nilgans-Plage“ mit einer teilnehmenden Beobachtung am Rheinufer in Koblenz.²⁰ Obwohl die Tiere in lokalen Zeitungen häufig als aggressiv gegen Menschen konstruiert werden, stellte Möwis bei seinen Feldstudien fest, dass die Einheimischen die Tiere nicht weiter beachten und sich auch die Nilgänse durch die

12 Vgl. Martina Löw / Silke Steets / Sergej Stoetzer: *Einführung in die Stadt- und Raumsoziologie*. 2., aktual. Aufl. Opladen / Farmington Hills: Budrich 2008, S. 11–14.

13 Vgl. Jakob von Uexküll: *Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen. Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten. Bedeutungslehre*. Reinbek: Rowohlt 1958, S. 21–46.

14 Vgl. Marcus Schmitt: Wildtiere in der Stadt. In: Hans Werner Ingensiep (Hrsg.): *Das Tier in unserer Kultur. Begegnungen, Beziehungen, Probleme*. Essen: Oldib 2015, S. 159–185.

15 Vgl. Kelsi Nagy / Philip David II. Johnson: Introduction. In: Dies. (Hrsg.): *Trash Animals. How We Live with Nature's Filthy, Feral, Invasive, and Unwanted Species*. Minneapolis / London: U of Minnesota P 2013, S. 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.5749/minnesota/9780816680542.003.0001> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

16 Vgl. Löw / Steets / Stoetzer: *Einführung in die Stadt- und Raumsoziologie*, S. 52–66.

17 Vgl. ebd., S. 11.

18 Vgl. ebd., S. 63.

19 Donaldson / Kymlicka: *Zoopolis*, S. 467.

20 Vgl. Markus Möwis: *Die „Nilgans-Plage“. Gänsefüßchen im Diskurs*. Unveröffentlichte Hausarbeit, Universität Koblenz-Landau 2020.

spaziergehenden Koblenzer*innen nicht gestört fühlen. Jogger*innen weichen den grasenden Gänsen weiträumig und routinemäßig aus, Tourist*innen fotografieren sie begeistert. In der alltäglichen Praxis – so Möwis’ Fazit – spiegeln sich die vielen negativen Positionierungen im Diskurs, die argumentativ für eine Bejagung der Gänse fungieren, und die behaupteten territorialen Probleme kaum wider. Vielmehr scheinen Nilgänse im Koblenzer Alltag angekommen zu sein. Es ist dies ein Beispiel dafür, dass im medialen Diskurs „Fakten“²¹ über Tiere verhandelt werden (z. B. invasive Auswirkungen auf andere Arten, für Menschen schädliche Ausscheidungen), die dann zu bestimmten Praktiken (wie das Töten) führen, die in der alltagsweltlichen humanimalischen Praxis jedoch wenig bis gar keine Relevanz besitzen. Somit zeigen Möwis’ Ausführungen, dass zwei Arten von *Stadt* existieren, die mit diskurs-linguistischer und ethnomethodologischer Methode kontrastiert werden können: Zum einen gibt es die diskursive Stadt, die Tiere oftmals mittels sprachlicher Kategorisierungen ausschließt. Diesem sprachlich konstruierten Ort steht zum anderen die lebensweltliche, gelebte Stadt als Raum für Menschen *und* Tiere gegenüber, die sich flexibel und situativ gestaltet, d. h. ad hoc immer wieder neue „An(Ordnungen)“²² bildet.

Analytischer Zugang / Feldzugang

Für den Seminarbaustein *Analytischer Zugang / Feldzugang* modifizierten die Teilnehmer*innen bekannte linguistische Methoden im Sinne einer tierlinguistischen Fragestellung. Mögliche Erhebungs- und Analysemethoden waren die teilnehmende Beobachtung, Gesprächsanalyse, Linguistic Landscape-Forschung und Diskursanalyse. So verknüpfte eine Gruppe zum Thema „Empathie mit Spinnen“ die Diskursanalyse mit dem leitfadengestützten Interview sowie einem Selbstversuch, um die Spinnenperspektive einzunehmen.²³ Zentrales Ergebnis ihrer Diskurs- und Narrationsanalyse ist die

21 *Fakten* werden hier mit Ekkehard Felder als Konstrukte verstanden, die grundsätzlich bestreitbar sind. Vgl. Ekkehard Felder: Faktizitätsherstellung mittels handlungsleitender Konzepte und agonaler Zentren. Der diskursive Wettkampf um Geltungsansprüche. In: Ders. (Hrsg.): *Faktizitätsherstellung in Diskursen*. Berlin / Boston: de Gruyter 2013, S. 13–28, hier S. 14. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110289954> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

22 Löw / Steets / Stoetzer: *Einführung in die Stadt- und Raumsoziologie*, S. 63.

23 Vgl. dazu unten den Abschnitt „Spinnenbrille“ sowie Alina Voß / Stephanie Weiß / Katharina von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie, innerhalb der Mensch-Tier-Interaktion, am Beispiel der Spinne, ist, in Form von Mitgefühl und Grausamkeit, wechselseitig vorhanden*. Unveröffentlichte Hausarbeit, Universität Koblenz-Landau 2020.

omnipräsente sprachliche Verdinglichung²⁴ von Spinnen, denen oftmals eine „Du-Evidenz“²⁵ abgesprochen wird. Anders als bei Nilgänsen, die im (Koblenzer) Alltag eher einen indifferenten Empathie-Status genießen, insofern sie von den Bürger*innen weitgehend als Stadtbewohner*innen akzeptiert werden, lässt sich in Bezug auf Spinnen, die von vielen Menschen zwar im Naturhaushalt, aber nicht im eigenen Haushalt geduldet werden,²⁶ von einem „Empathie-Dispositiv“²⁷ sprechen. Unsere Empathie in Bezug auf Tiere ist hochgradig selektiv,²⁸ und da viele Menschen Spinnen eklig finden, dürfen die Tiere weggesaugt oder erschlagen werden. Dieses Dispositiv kann sich durch ein sprachliches Euphemisieren ausdrücken, wie ein Auszug aus dem narrativen Interview der Projektarbeit belegt: „Wenn ich eine Spinne in der Wohnung habe, dann muss ich ganz ehrlich sagen, ich besitze einen Hund (lacht). Dieser Hund spielt gerne mit Mücken und auch mit Spinnen. Da kann es halt dann schon passieren, dass sie das nicht überlebt.“²⁹

Durch die Verwendung des Verbs „spielen“ wird die Aktivität des Haushunds mit im Haushalt ebenfalls lebenden Spinnen durch die Erzählerin zunächst als eine harmlose Aktivität unter Tieren gerahmt. Obwohl die Erzählerin zuvor von einer allgemeinen „Daseinsberechtigung“³⁰ der Spinnen spricht, wird der Hund in der zitierten Sequenz als Stellvertreter des Menschen konstruiert, der das Beseitigen der Spinnen quasi ‚wie zufällig‘ übernimmt. Der Ausdruck „spielen“ stellt sich daher nachträglich kontextbedingt als ein

24 Vgl. Klaus Petrus: Die Verdinglichung der Tiere. In: Chimaira – Arbeitskreis für Human-Animal Studies (Hrsg.): *Tiere Bilder Ökonomien. Aktuelle Forschungsfragen der Human-Animal Studies*. Bielefeld: Transcript 2013, S. 43–62. <https://doi.org/10.1515/transcript.9783839425572.43> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

25 Theodor Geiger: Das Tier als geselliges Subjekt. In: Richard Thurnwald (Hrsg.): *Forschungen zur Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, Bd. X.1: Halbbd.: Arbeiten zur biologischen Grundlegung der Soziologie. Leipzig: Hirschfeld 1931, S. 283–307, hier S. 297.

26 Vgl. Josef H. Reichholf: *Haustiere. Unserer nahen und doch so fremden Begleiter*. Berlin: Matthes & Seitz 2017, S. 170.

27 Liebert versteht darunter ein spezifisches kollektives Empathie-Profil, das durch gesellschaftliche Normen geprägt ist, vgl. Wolf-Andreas Liebert: Hermeneutik und Empathie. In: Ders. / Katharina Jacob / Klaus-Peter Konerding (Hrsg.): *Sprache und Empathie. Beiträge zur Grundlegung eines linguistischen Forschungsprogramms*. Berlin / Boston: de Gruyter 2020, S. 107–137, hier S. 131–132. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110679618-006> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

28 Vgl. Pamela Steen: Selektive Empathie mit Tieren. In: Jacob / Konerding / Liebert (Hrsg.): *Sprache und Empathie*, S. 249–284.

29 Voß / Weiß / von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie*, S. 33.

30 Ebd., S. 32.

‚totspielen‘ heraus, das die Erzählerin ohne Empathie für die Spinne geschehen lässt. Sie schafft, indem sie die Verantwortung für Leben und Tod auf den Hund überträgt, gegenüber den Spinnen als unliebsamen ‚Haustieren‘ eine sprachliche und damit kognitive und soziale Distanz.³¹ Das Empathisieren mit Tieren, das zeigt auch die Projektarbeit der Teilnehmerinnen, erweist sich als eine Brückenpraktik, um zu Tieren, trotz ihrer wahrgenommenen oder konstruierten Andersheit, einen kognitiven, emotionalen und leiblichen Zugang zu erhalten. Empathie erlaubt in interspezifischen Begegnungen eine „Immersion in die Welt des Anderen, sein Erleben und sein Sich-Selbst-Erleben“³² – vorausgesetzt, sie wird zugelassen und kultiviert. Interspezifisches Empathisieren wird damit zu einem zentralen tierlinguistischen Forschungsbereich.³³

Der jeweils von den Projektgruppen gewählte analytische Zugang ist eng mit dem Feldzugang verwoben. Die Gruppen konnten diesbezüglich einen Schwerpunkt hinsichtlich verschiedener Herangehensweisen setzen. So untersuchte eine Gruppe die *Praktik (1)* des Fütterns von streunenden Katzen als Schwellenbereichstiere u. a. mit der Analyse narrativer Interviews zu *erzählten* Fütterungspraktiken. Die zweite Möglichkeit der Herangehensweise betraf eine ausgewählte *Tierart (2)*, die dann mit verschiedenen Analyse- und Erhebungsmethoden untersucht wurde (z. B. Wolf, Hund). Eine Verbindung beider Zugänge realisierte eine Gruppe, die für ihre Projektarbeit ein Video mit einer Ziege drehte. Das Video war Teil eines semistrukturierten Interviews in Form einer Online-Umfrageaktion mit zehn Befragten. Zunächst wurde gefragt, ob es sich bei Ziegen um *Haus-* oder *Nutztiere* handelt. Insgesamt neun der Befragten sprachen sich für eine Kategorisierung als *Nutztier* aus.³⁴ Dann wurde den Teilnehmer*innen das bei YouTube³⁵ eingestellte, selbstgedrehte Video mit der Ziege Emma gezeigt, die absichtlich klischeehaft als ‚Haustier‘ dargestellt wurde, um die Aussage des Videos zu verstärken.³⁶

31 Vgl. ebd., S. 33.

32 Liebert: Hermeneutik und Empathie, S. 113.

33 Vgl. auch Steen: *Menschen – Tiere – Kommunikation*.

34 Vgl. Anna Christin Stahl / Maryam Sultan / Canan Sönmez: *Die Beeinflussung des Mensch-Tier-Verhältnisses durch mediale Inszenierung. Ein Aufbruch sprachlicher Zuschreibungen?* Unveröffentlichte Hausarbeit, Universität Koblenz-Landau 2020, S. 42.

35 Anna Christin Stahl: Big City Goat Emma Goes Oberwesel. In: *YouTube*, 23.06.2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cwg9vAPwQKM> (Zugriff am 17.11.2020).

36 Vgl. Stahl / Sultan / Sönmez: *Die Beeinflussung des Mensch-Tier-Verhältnisses*, S. 43.



Abb. 2: Anna Christin Stahl: *Gemeinsame Mittagspause.*

Das Video sollte bei den Befragten zu einer Konfusion naturalisierter Kategorien beitragen. So wird die Ziege im Video in alle erdenklichen Praktiken involviert, die sonst eher mit Hunden ausgeübt werden, z. B. steigt die Ziege in ein Auto, nimmt an einem Picknick teil (Abb. 2) und wird Gassi geführt. (Abb. 3) Anschließend wurde die Befragung fortgesetzt. Fünf der Befragten sind sich nun hinsichtlich der adäquaten Kategorisierung unsicher, die anderen fünf plädieren noch immer für die Kategorie *Nutztier*. Sie begründen dies mit Praktiken, die anderen Tieren vorbehalten sind (Gassi gehen nur mit Hunden), dem Aussehen (Ziegen sind optisch nicht ansprechend), dem geteilten Raum (ein zu großer Platzbedarf für Ziegen) sowie dem menschlichen Nutzen (Ziegen können als Nahrungsmittel dienen).³⁷ Die Projektgruppe wertet die angegebenen Gründe, die den Oberkategorien *Normalität*, *Ästhetik*, *Aufwand* und *Utilisierung* zugeordnet werden können, als zentrale stereotype Diskursmuster, die Empathie gegenüber Ziegen hemmen können und somit zu einem entsprechenden Dispositiv gehören.³⁸

Die Projektarbeit ist insgesamt als besonders kreativ zu bezeichnen, da sie verschiedene Erhebungs- und Analysemethoden vereint und die Ziege Emma von Anfang bis Ende als zentrale soziale Akteurin in die Forschung eingebunden wird. Auch wenn die kleine Umfrage noch keinen repräsentativen Charakter hat, legt Emmas Transformation vom realen zum medialen und damit zum sprachlich kategorisierten Tier auf reflektierte Weise typische Mechanismen der menschlichen Aneignung von Tieren als ‚Nutztiere‘ offen und zeigt

37 Vgl. Stahl / Sultan / Sönmez: *Die Beeinflussung des Mensch-Tier-Verhältnisses*, S. 44.

38 Vgl. ebd., S. 44–45.



Abb. 3: Anna Christin Stahl: *Gassi gehen mit Emma*.

gleichzeitig, wie gewohnte Denkmuster durch mediale Inszenierungspraktiken beeinflusst werden können.

Mit der dritten Herangehensweise konnten sich die Teilnehmer*innen auf einen spezifischen *Ort* (3) in der Stadt konzentrieren (z. B. Katzencafés, der Taubenwagen der Koblenzer Stadtaubenhilfe, der Balkon als urbaner Schwellenbereich). Der vierte Zugang erfolgte schließlich über den Schwerpunkt indexikalischer oder symbolischer *Spuren* (4). So beschäftigte sich eine Gruppe mit der urbanen Beschilderung hinsichtlich der Konstruktion interspezifischer Räume.³⁹ Eine andere Gruppe untersuchte den Wolf als „Konstruktion – Fiktion – Mythos“⁴⁰, begegnete dabei zwar digitalen Wölfen im Computerspiel, die erhoffte Begegnung mit realen Wölfen in der Oberlausitz wurde jedoch zur spannenden Spurensuche. Mit der Verbindung von Medienanalyse und Feldforschung spürten die Teilnehmer*innen in ihrer Arbeit der diskursiven Konstruktion von Wölfen, d. h. ihrer *materiell-semiotischen*⁴¹ An- und Abwesenheit nach.⁴²

39 Vgl. Tobias Hoffmann / Tina Knewitz: *Eine Analyse von Tierschildern und ihrem Nutzen*. Unveröffentlichte Hausarbeit, Universität Koblenz-Landau 2020.

40 Alex Henschel / Daniel Friedemann / Lilith Goldschmidt: *Der Wolf. Konstruktion – Fiktion – Mythos*. Unveröffentlichte Hausarbeit, Universität Koblenz-Landau 2020.

41 Vgl. Borgards: *Tiere in der Literatur*, S. 239.

42 Vgl. Pamela Steen / Ulrike Schmid: Diskursive Schemata der Wolfskonstruktion. Auf medialer Spurensuche nach materiell-semiotischen Knoten. In: Anna Mattfeldt / Carolin Schwegler / Berbeli Wanning (Hrsg.): *Natur – Umwelt – Nachhaltigkeit. Perspektiven auf Sprache, Diskurse und Kultur*. Berlin / Boston: de Gruyter 2021, S. 123–164. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110740479-006> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

Tierperspektiven

Während die beiden ersten Seminarbausteine *Theorien* sowie *Analytischer Zugang/Feldzugang* die Kompetenzen der Studierenden eher auf einer kognitiv-rationalen Ebene ansprachen, waren die Bausteine *Innovative Methode/Tierperspektive* und *Methodisch basierte Resonanzerfahrung* auch auf emotional-affektive Einstellungen gerichtet. Mit diesen Bausteinen verließ das Seminar den vertrauten linguistischen Boden, insofern es nicht mehr primär um die Anwendung gelernter Methoden ging, sondern um die Transformation der eigenen Forscher*innenperspektive oder auch -persönlichkeit. Dies ist ein Vorgang, der vermutlich in den Human-Animal Studies nahezu unvermeidlich ist, wenn die zentrale Aufgabe „das Erforschen und kritische Hinterfragen unserer Beziehungen mit anderen Tieren, des Zusammenspiels und der Wechselwirkung von Menschen und anderen Tieren“⁴³ ist. Clinton R. Sanders und Arnold Arluke forderten bereits in den 1990er Jahren, die Tierperspektive in die ethnomethodologische Forschung einzubeziehen,⁴⁴ wie dies etwa auch Kenneth Shapiro mit seinem Hund Sabaka in Form einer *dichten Beschreibung* gelingt.⁴⁵

Um Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Perspektivübernahme zu diskutieren, wurden einführend zwei Bücher vorgestellt, in denen die Autoren relativ radikal vorgehen. So beschreibt Charles Foster, wie er versuchte, eine Zeit lang als Tier zu leben. Er wollte „die Welt aus dem Blickwinkel unbekleideter wallisischer Dachse, Londoner Füchse, Otter im Exmoor, von Mauerseglern in Oxford und Rothirschen in Schottland und Südwestengland“ wahrnehmen und dabei lernen, „wie es sich anfühlt, sich schlurfend oder gleitend durch Landschaften zu bewegen, die vor allem von Gerüchen und Geräuschen und weniger von visuellen Eindrücken geprägt sind.“⁴⁶ Eine ähnliche Mission hatte der „GoatMan“ Thomas Thwaites, der ‚als‘ Ziege lebte und sich hierfür

43 Reingard Spannring / Karin Schachinger / Gabriela Kompatscher / Alejandro Boucaille: Einleitung. In: Dies. (Hrsg.): *Disziplinierte Tiere?*, S. 13–28, hier S. 17. <https://doi.org/10.14361/transcript.9783839425183.intro> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

44 Vgl. Clinton R. Sanders / Arnold Arluke: If Lions Could Speak. Investigating the Animal-Human Relationship and the Perspective of Nonhuman Others. In: *The Sociological Quarterly* 34,3 (1993), S. 377–390. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.1993.tb00117.x> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

45 Vgl. Kenneth J. Shapiro: Understanding Dogs through Kinesthetic Empathy, Social Construction, and History. In: *Anthrozoös* 3,3 (1990), S. 184–195. <https://doi.org/10.2752/089279390787057540> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

46 Charles Foster: *Der Geschmack von Laub und Erde. Wie ich versuchte, als Tier zu leben*, aus d. Engl. v. Gerlinde Schermer-Rauwolf / Robert A. Weiß. München / Berlin: Piper 2017, S. 9.

ein Ziegenskelett nachbaute.⁴⁷ Beide Autoren wollten die Tiere nicht einfach nur imitieren, sondern die Umwelt aus ihrer Perspektive erleben. Hierfür ist eine Form der (typisierten) *allozentrischen Empathie* notwendig, bei der man versucht, die Befindlichkeit des Anderen zu verstehen, wobei dessen Andersheit mitberücksichtigt wird.⁴⁸

Eine weniger radikale – digitale – Lösung zur Perspektivenübernahme fanden Max Meuer und Philipp Schuster. In ihrer Projektarbeit über sprachlich-medial konstruierte Mensch-Hund-Beziehungen analysierten sie ein Video aus dem YouTube-Kanal „Gohan the Husky“⁴⁹. In diesem Video läuft der Husky Gohan mit einer ihm auf den Rücken montierten Kamera durch seine Welt.

In ihrer Rekonstruktion des Videos nehmen Meuer und Schuster die Hundeperspektive unter Zuhilfenahme der Uexküll'schen Subjektlehre ein.⁵⁰ Aus Gohans Perspektive stellt sich der Spielplatz (Abb. 4) nicht als ein Ort dar, der – anders als für Kinder – mit Affordanzen zum Spielen ausgestattet ist. Für ihn sind die Spielgeräte Objekte mit dem *Wirkton*⁵¹ ‚Hindernis‘, die er überwinden muss. Zudem haben die Zahlen am Spielgerät (siehe linke Seite des Bildausschnitts) als arbiträre Symbole für ihn keine Bedeutung.⁵² Für ihn haben Orte besondere *Merktöne*, die für Menschen nicht wahrnehmbar sind.⁵³ So unterbricht er seinen Weg, um an Büschen zu schnüffeln oder über Mauern zu sehen. Weshalb er das macht, kann aus menschlicher Perspektive, die sich in die Hundeperspektive hineinversetzt, nur vermutet werden. Quasi auf Gohans Rücken geschnallt, machen die Beobachter*innen über den digitalen Kanal jede seiner Bewegungen mit und sind meistens erstaunt über deren Rhythmus und Richtungen. Die Hundeperspektive

47 Vgl. Thomas Thwaites: *GoatMan. How I Took a Holiday from Being Human*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press 2016.

48 Vgl. Thiemo Breyer: Empathie und ihre Grenzen. Diskursive Vielfalt – phänomenale Einheit? In: Ders. (Hrsg.): *Grenzen der Empathie. Philosophische, psychologische und anthropologische Perspektiven*. München: Fink 2013, S. 13–42, hier S. 28. https://doi.org/10.30965/9783846755167_003 (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

49 Gohan the Husky: A Day in My Husky's Point of View! – GoPro on My Dog! Wow! In: *YouTube*, 13.07.2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOHD6vKiWlg> (Zugriff am 20.11.2020).

50 Vgl. von Uexküll: *Streifzüge*.

51 Vgl. ebd., S. 69.

52 Vgl. Max Meuer / Philipp Schuster: *Durch welche sprachlichen Mittel konstruiert der Mensch seine Beziehung zu Hunden?* Unveröffentlichte Hausarbeit, Universität Koblenz-Landau 2020, S. 34–35.

53 Vgl. von Uexküll: *Streifzüge*, S. 68.



Abb. 4: Gohan the Husky: *Gohan auf dem Spielplatz.*

über die Kamera einzunehmen bewirkte bei den Seminarteilnehmer*innen vor allem, dass sie sich ihrer eigenen Grenzen der Wahrnehmungsübertragung bewusst wurden.

Auch Foster, der nur schamanischen Transformationen ein Einswerden mit Tieren zugesteht, versucht mit der Methode, über seine Erfahrungen zu schreiben, „den Grenzverlauf möglichst exakt zu beschreiben“. ⁵⁴ Eine literarische Form haben auch einige Teilnehmer*innen in ihren Projektarbeiten mit der Form der Autozoographie ⁵⁵ und Tiercomics gewählt, um aus der Sicht einer Ente, einer Spinne, eines Nilganskindes sowie von Emma über das tierliche Leben zu schreiben. Die literarisch beschriebene Realität löste sich dabei unterschiedlich stark in Fiktion und Anthropomorphisierung auf, ermöglichte aber den Teilnehmer*innen, sich das Untersuchungsobjekt Tier kognitiv und emotional auf individuelle Weise anzuverwandeln, indem sie sich beim Schreiben die mit ihnen geteilte Lebenswelt aus Sicht der Tiere vorstellten.

⁵⁴ Foster: *Der Geschmack von Laub und Erde*, S. 22.

⁵⁵ Vgl. Frederike Middelhoff: *Literarische Autozoographien. Figurationen des autobiographischen Tieres im langen 19. Jahrhundert*. Stuttgart: Metzler 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05512-5> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

Methodisch basierte Resonanzerfahrung

Für den Baustein *Methodisch basierte Resonanzerfahrung* wurde eine seminarbegleitende Reflexionsmethode eingeführt: Damit die Studierenden gegenüber den Tieren, die ihnen *alltäglich* begegnen, mit denen sie ihre Lebenswelt teilen, sensibler wurden, waren sie angehalten, ein Tiertagebuch als eine Form des persönlichen Nature Writing zu führen. In *Magie des Staunens* beschreibt Rachel Carson einen Weg, wie wir wieder unsere Augen für die unbemerkte Schönheit um uns herum öffnen können. Wir müssen uns die Frage stellen: „Was, wenn ich dies nie zuvor gesehen hätte? Was, wenn ich wüsste, ich würde es nie wieder sehen?“⁵⁶ Das Tiertagebuch sollte also, ähnlich der von Thomas Stodulka für die Ethnographie entwickelten „Emotionstagebücher“⁵⁷, Felderfahrungen nachträglich leichter zugänglich machen. Das Tagebuch sollte außerdem dazu animieren, überhaupt Felderfahrungen zu machen. Ein besonderer Anreiz war deshalb die Möglichkeit, dass die Teilnehmer*innen jederzeit ausgewählte Beiträge im Rahmen multimodaler Tier-Blogs auf einer digitalen Lernplattform publizieren konnten. Schließlich wurden sie gebeten, in ihren Projektarbeiten das Führen des Tiertagebuchs zu reflektieren. Viele bestätigten, es führte generell dazu, dass der „Blick in der Stadt unbewusst immer wieder auf Tiere gelenkt worden ist.“⁵⁸ Damit war das primäre Ziel erreicht. Doch sollte dieser neue Blick im besten Fall auch zu Perspektivveränderungen im Zuge der Forschung führen. Mit den Worten Hartmut Rosas ging es darum, dass die Seminarteilnehmer*innen parallel zu ihren Forschungen hierfür relevante Resonanzerfahrungen machten. Diese Resonanzerfahrungen sind nach Rosa (im Idealfall) durch vier Merkmale⁵⁹ geprägt:

1. Die eigene Begegnung mit den Tieren führt zu einem „*Moment der Berührung*“⁶⁰. Ein solches affizierendes Moment beschreibt Anna Christin Stahl beim intensiven und bewussten Beobachten von Insekten, als sie plötzlich „keinen Ekel mehr empfand“⁶¹. Die Teilnehmerin entwickelte ein neues

56 Rachel Carson: *Magie des Staunens. Die Liebe zur Natur entdecken*, aus d. Engl. v. Wieland Freund / Andrea Wandel, mit Illustrationen v. Johann Brandstetter. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 2019, S. 40.

57 Thomas Stodulka: Zaubersformel, Scharlatanerie, Projektion? Empathie als Methode und Emotion als Erkenntnis ethnographischer Forschung. In: Jacob / Konerding / Liebert (Hrsg.): *Sprache und Empathie*, S. 63–80, hier S. 74. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110679618-004> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).

58 Vgl. Stahl / Sultan / Sönmez: *Die Beeinflussung des Mensch-Tier-Verhältnisses*, S. 59.

59 Vgl. Hartmut Rosa: *Unverfügbarkeit*. Wien / Salzburg: Residenz 2019, S. 38–44.

60 Ebd., S. 38 (Herv. i. Orig.).

61 Stahl / Sultan / Sönmez: *Die Beeinflussung des Mensch-Tier-Verhältnisses*, S. 57.

„intrinsisches Interesse an dem begegnenden Weltausschnitt“⁶², als sie beim Anblick der Insektenbewegungen „eine Form der Faszination verspürte“⁶³.

2. In der Auseinandersetzung mit den Tieren spüren die Teilnehmer*innen bestenfalls auch ein „*Moment der Selbstwirksamkeit*“⁶⁴, wenn sie das Gefühl haben, mit ihrer Präsenz auch den tierlichen Anderen zu erreichen. So schildert Markus Möwis seine Verwunderung darüber, dass er bei den von ihm beobachteten Amseln keine Scheu auslöste: „An dem Tag konnte ich mich ihnen aber bis auf zwei Meter nähern. [...] Alles in allem war es ein wirklich schöner Moment, den ich definitiv nicht vergessen werde.“⁶⁵

3. Als weiteres Merkmal benennt Rosa das „*Moment der Anverwandlung*“⁶⁶. Tatsächlich beschreiben viele Seminarteilnehmer*innen, dass eine „Veränderung der Weltbeziehung“⁶⁷ stattgefunden habe, eine innere und äußere Transformation. So hebt Anna Christin Stahl hervor, dass sich ihr Blickwinkel und ihre Forschungsmethode dergestalt verändert haben, dass sie nun „in Zukunft nicht einfach nur sprachliche Phänomene untersuchen“ will, „sondern auch nach den Hintergründen fragen möchte“.⁶⁸ Und Markus Möwis räumt ein, dass er am Anfang zwar nicht wusste, wohin die Methode des Tiertagebuchs führt, er aber nun immer wieder gern stehenbleibt und den Moment genießt, wenn er Tiere in der Stadt erblickt.⁶⁹

4. Das vierte Merkmal ist das „*Moment der Unverfügbarkeit*“⁷⁰. Denn Resonanz ist „konstitutiv *ergebnisoffen*“.⁷¹ Diese Tatsache ist vor allem aus Sicht der Lehrenden relevant, denn Resonanzerfahrungen können nicht gelehrt werden, auch wenn man sich wünschen würde, dass die Seminarinhalte den Teilnehmer*innen langfristige Denkanstöße geben oder mit (positiven) Emotionen verbunden werden.

Das soziologische Konzept der Resonanz kann also – wie auch Empathie – mit linguistischen Methoden als Teilnehmer*innenkonstrukt untersucht werden, z. B. in Gesprächen über ‚Zootiere‘ oder im Hinblick auf verbalisierte

62 Rosa: *Unverfügbarkeit*, S. 39.

63 Stahl / Sultan / Sönmez: *Die Beeinflussung des Mensch-Tier-Verhältnisses*, S. 57.

64 Rosa: *Unverfügbarkeit*, S. 39 (Herv. i. Orig.).

65 Möwis: *Die „Nilgans-Plage“*, S. 25.

66 Rosa: *Unverfügbarkeit*, S. 41 (Herv. i. Orig.).

67 Ebd.

68 Stahl / Sultan / Sönmez: *Die Beeinflussung des Mensch-Tier-Verhältnisses*, S. 58.

69 Vgl. Möwis: *Die „Nilgans-Plage“*, S. 25.

70 Rosa: *Unverfügbarkeit*, S. 43 (Herv. i. Orig.).

71 Ebd., S. 44 (Herv. i. Orig.).

zwischenleibliche Erfahrungen mit Tieren.⁷² Gleichzeitig können Resonanz-erfahrungen auch Bestandteil der tierlinguistischen Methode sein, wenn sich die Forscher*innen, wie hier die Seminarteilnehmer*innen, selbst in das soziale Feld hineinbegeben (z. B. bei einem Besuch im Zoo oder einem Katzen-Café), Kontakt mit dem tierlichen Untersuchungsobjekt aufnehmen und es dann in der Begegnung als Subjekt (Individuum, Persönlichkeit) erfahren. Methodisch basierte Resonanzerfahrungen können somit die eigene Forschungsperspektive verändern und eine methodologische Anthropozentrik minimieren oder suspendieren.

Im Folgenden wird nun der Selbstversuch der Teilnehmerin Katharina Anna-Lena von Werne skizziert, der aufzeigt, welche Resonanz- und Empathieerfahrungen sie in einem mehrstufigen Verfahren mit einer Spinne machte.⁷³ Dadurch, dass sie – anders als bei der Dog-Cam, die im Internet fertige Videos präsentiert – auch die Technik zur Perspektivenübernahme nicht nur reflektierte, sondern auch selbst herstellte, war sie gezwungen, kognitiv und emotional tiefer in den Prozess einzusteigen. Dadurch wurden nicht nur Grenzen der Perspektivenübernahme offenkundig, der Moment der Anverwandlung trat auch besonders stark hervor.

Tierperspektive und Resonanz: Die ‚Spinnenbrille‘

Spinnen erschienen ihr (bis zu dem Selbstversuch im Rahmen des Seminars) aufgrund ihres Aussehens als sehr fremd, weshalb Katharina von Werne zunächst eine innere Barriere (Scheu, Unwohlsein, Ekel) ausmachte, die einen Zugang zu diesen Tieren erschwerte.⁷⁴ Dieses Wissen nutzte sie aber, um ein Stufenkonzept zu entwickeln und besagte Barriere zu überwinden:

1. Die Sensibilisierung gegenüber der Form der Spinne durch das Zeichnen eines Repräsentanten.
2. Die Darstellung der Spinnenperspektive durch eigene Fotoaufnahmen.
3. Die Entwicklung einer Spinnenbrille zum eigenen Nachempfinden der Spinnensicht.⁷⁵

72 Vgl. die verbalisierten Resonanzerfahrungen hinsichtlich einer symmetrischen Fremdbewührung von einer Frau mit ihrem ‚Heimtier‘, einem Königspython, bei Steen: *Menschen – Tiere – Kommunikation*, S. 199–212.

73 Vgl. Voß / Weiß / von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie*.

74 Vgl. das „Moment der Unverfügbarkeit“ bei Rosa: *Unverfügbarkeit*, S. 43 (Herv. i. Orig.).

75 Vgl. Voß / Weiß / von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie*, S. 36.

Jede Stufe generierte ein spezifisches Wissen über (menschliche und tierliche) Wahrnehmung, das jeweils für die nächste Stufe erforderlich war. Zur Vorbereitung des ersten Schritts suchte sich die Teilnehmerin eine in ihrer Umgebung lebende Spinne, um diese erst zu fotografieren und dann zu zeichnen. Allerdings standen ihr dabei Berührungsängste im Weg, sodass sie stattdessen ein früher gemachtes Foto einer Gartenkreuzspinne als Zeichenvorlage nutzte.

Viele Augen, viele Perspektiven?

Katharina von Werne dokumentierte ihre Gedanken in Form von Feldnotizen und stellte fest, dass das Heranzoomen an die Foto-Spinne weniger beängstigend war als vermutet. Unterschiedliche Körperteile verursachten bei ihr jedoch unterschiedliche Reaktionen:

Allein die Haare! Ich weiß nicht – ich habe irgendwie ein Problem mit den Haaren. Die Augen finde ich niedlich. Also das überrascht mich wirklich, aber die Augen sind echt niedlich. Aber diese Beine? Der Hinterleib? [...] Aber die Augen sind okay und ich denke, dass das schon einmal ein gutes Zeichen ist.⁷⁶

Auf dieser Reflexionsstufe stellte sie fest, dass die Augen der Spinne bei ihr keine negativen Emotionen auslösten, anders als etwa die Haare, die Beine und der Hinterleib. Gerade aber der Blick ist für die Entwicklung von Empathie zentral.⁷⁷ In der Phase des Zeichnens (Abb. 5) veränderte sich nun ihre Sprache, die Hemmschwelle beim Betrachten des Spinnenkörpers wurde zugleich kleiner.⁷⁸ Wie sie später selbst reflektierte, ‚berührten‘ ihre Augen quasi das Bild, es kam zum *„Moment der Berührung“*.⁷⁹ Sie verglich die Spinne zudem mit anderen Tieren. Besonders erstaunlich ist dabei, dass sie Ähnlichkeiten mit einem Schmetterling ausmachte:

Immer wieder, wenn ich mal aus dem Fokus auf eine Stelle hochblicke und das gesamte Bild betrachte, denke ich jedes Mal ‚wie ein Juwel‘. Ich weiß nicht wieso, aber die Musterung erinnert mich ein wenig daran. Der Unterleib oder Panzer oder

76 Feldnotizen 1.1 (30.05.2020). In: Voß / Weiß / von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie*, S. 37.

77 Vgl. Steen: *Menschen – Tiere – Kommunikation*, S. 151.

78 Vgl. Voß / Weiß / von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie*, S. 38.

79 Rosa: *Unverfügbarkeit*, S. 38 (Herv. i. Orig.).




Abb. 5: Katharina von Werne: *Zeichnung der Gartenkreuzspinne*.

was auch immer ist besonders interessant. [...] Aber mir fällt auf, dass das Muster total symmetrisch ist. Wie die Flügel eines Schmetterlings. Es spiegelt sich in der Mitte und ist so geometrisch und filigran, dass die hellen Flecken wirklich wie kleine Edelsteine wirken.⁸⁰

Benutzte sie anfänglich Adjektive wie „schlimm“⁸¹ oder „haarig“⁸², sprach sie nun von „filigran“ oder „flauschig“⁸³. Die Ausdrücke zeigen, dass die Teilnehmerin eine andere Einstellung zur Spinne entwickelte und auch die Aspekte Schönheit und Ästhetik („kleine Edelsteine“) in ihrer Wahrnehmung eine Rolle spielten. Gleichzeitig war sie mit Beschreibungskategorien wie „Unterleib oder Panzer oder was auch immer“⁸⁴ unzufrieden, ein Indikator für sie, dass sie einen (neuen) Zugang gefunden hatte. Dennoch reflektierte sie an dieser Stelle, dass es noch keine Empathie war: „Die menschliche Perspektive wurde mir sehr bewusst, doch zu keiner Zeit während des Zeichnens nahm

80 Feldnotizen 1.3 (02.06.2020). In: Voß / Weiß / von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie*, S. 39.

81 Feldnotizen 1.1 (30.05.2020). In: Ebd., S. 37.

82 Feldnotizen 1.2 (01.06.2020). In: Ebd., S. 38.

83 Feldnotizen 1.3 (02.06.2020). In: Ebd.

84 Ebd., S. 39.

ich die Perspektive der Spinne ein.“⁸⁵ Es mangelte noch an einer Zuschreibung von „Du-Evidenz“⁸⁶, da sie die Spinne lediglich als Objekt betrachtete. Es war „eine bloße Gewöhnung an die dingliche Erscheinung“⁸⁷.

Auf der zweiten Stufe folgte eine Annäherung an die Perspektive der Spinne, indem sie mittels Fotoaufnahmen versuchte, diese zu rekonstruieren und sich fragte: „Was kann sie alles sehen, wenn sie in ihrem Netz hängt?“⁸⁸ Da die Spinne über mehrere Augen verfügt, die an unterschiedlichen Positionen am Kopf angebracht sind, schien der Teilnehmerin ein 180°-Blick möglich.⁸⁹ Der Wendepunkt in ihrem Selbstversuch war aber die Erkenntnis, dass sie selbst Teil der Umwelt der Spinne war: „Hier wurde mir bewusst, dass wir einander gegenüberstanden.“⁹⁰ Erst dann konnte die Zuschreibung von Du-Evidenz gelingen. Der „*Moment der Selbstwirksamkeit*“⁹¹ war erreicht, als sie sich selbst als Eindringling in der Umwelt der Spinne empfand. Auf die Berührung erfolgte also eine „aktive Antwort“⁹². In dieser Erkenntnisphase las sich Katharina von Werne in die Arachnologie ein und lernte immer mehr über die Sehfähigkeiten verschiedener Spinnenarten,⁹³ z. B. dass diese nicht nur von links nach rechts, sondern auch von unten nach oben sehen. Die Gartenkreuzspinne nimmt nur schemenhaft und auf kurze Distanz Dinge in ihrer Umwelt wahr. (Abb. 6) Erst das spezifische Wissen über das tierliche Andere ermöglichte Empathie.

Dennoch bereitete es ihr zu diesem Zeitpunkt immer noch Schwierigkeiten, sich Nahaufnahmen von Spinnen anzusehen, vor allem war sie sich nicht sicher, ob sie wirklich dazu bereit war, einer realen Spinne ‚in die Augen zu sehen‘: „Bei den Spinnen, zumal jenen, die in schwer zugänglichen, eher finsternen Winkeln im Haus entdeckt werden, schreckt die Ansicht durchs Vergrößerungsglas eher weiter ab. Da gerät das Spinnenporträt schnell zum

85 Voß / Weiß / von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie*, S. 40.

86 Geiger: *Das Tier als geselliges Subjekt*, S. 297.

87 Ebd., S. 303.

88 Voß / Weiß / von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie*, S. 40.

89 Vgl. Rainer Nitzsche: *Spinnen. Biologie. Mensch und Spinne. Angst und Giftigkeit*. Norderstedt: BoD 2018, S. 87.

90 Voß / Weiß / von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie*, S. 42.

91 Rosa: *Unverfügbarkeit*, S. 39 (Herv. i. Orig.).

92 Ebd. (Herv. i. Orig.).

93 Vgl. Friedrich G. Barth: *Sinne und Verhalten. Aus dem Leben einer Spinne*. Berlin: Springer 2001, S. 131. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56813-8> (Zugriff am 14.01.2022).



Abb. 6: Katharina von Werne: *Spinnensicht horizontal*.

Monster“⁹⁴. Eine weitere wichtige Erkenntnis war daher für sie die Tatsache, dass Empathie keine statische Stufe, sondern fluide und ein andauernder Arbeitsprozess ist.

„Hybride“ Wahrnehmung

Die intensive Recherche und der Wissenszuwachs waren für die Teilnehmerin die Initialzündung des gesamten Selbstversuchs, denn darauf baute die dritte Stufe auf: Die Entwicklung der Spinnenbrille (aus angeschnittenen Papierrollen als Augen, Klebeband und Schnürsenkeln), mit der es gelingen sollte, die Perspektive der Spinne noch besser nachzuempfinden. (Abb. 7)

In ihrer Arbeit beschreibt sie die technische Entwicklung der Brille sehr detailliert,⁹⁵ das Ergebnis wird hier zusammengefasst wiedergegeben: In erster Linie musste sie einen Weg finden, um ihren Mangel an Augen auszugleichen, d. h., sie musste es mit der visuellen Beschränkung von zwei menschlichen Augen schaffen, auch hinter sich blicken zu können, ohne den Kopf zu drehen, weshalb sie auch zwei kleine Spiegel zu Hilfe nahm. Daher kann dieser Schritt – das Angleichen der menschlichen an die tierliche Perspektive – auch als ‚hybride‘ – humanimalische – Wahrnehmung bezeichnet werden. Das erstmalige Testen der Brillen-Konstruktion erlaubte ihr ein neues Sehen, das mithilfe von Fotoaufnahmen nur unzulänglich nachgestellt werden kann. (Abb. 8) Sie versuchte, eine achttägige Spinnensicht auf Basis einer zweiäugigen Menschensicht durch eine einzige Kameralinse adäquat wiederzugeben. Doch selbst mit der Darstellung von nur drei der vier Augen in der Mitte der Brille erkannte sie das Prinzip der ineinander überlappenden Sichtfelder, sodass die Spinnensicht nicht allzu sehr von der menschlichen Sicht abzuweichen schien. Die Brille erlaubte ihr schließlich, vor dem Hintergrund ihres eigenen Sehens, ihre gewohnte Weltsicht zu ändern und

94 Reichholz: *Haustiere*, S. 169.

95 Vgl. Voß / Weiß / von Werne: *Die Ausprägung der Empathie*, S. 42–45.



Abb. 7
Katharina von Werne:
Spinnenbrille.

sich einen Eindruck von dem Leben der Gartenkreuzspinne zu machen. Hier lässt sich sogar von einem aus der Empathie entwickelten Sehen sprechen, das zur Horizonterweiterung und zu einem „*Moment der Anverwandlung*“⁹⁶ führte. Seitdem begegnet sie Spinnen auf einer anderen Ebene; sie ekelt sich nicht mehr vor ihrem Körper, sondern sucht zuerst die Augen:

Jemandem in die Augen zu blicken und seinen erwidern den Blick zu spüren bedeutet, mit ihm in Resonanz zu treten – es sei denn, wir sperren uns dagegen, indem wir ihn mit feindseligem Blick abwehren oder mit stumpfem Blick ignorieren.⁹⁷

96 Rosa: *Unverfügbarkeit*, S. 41 (Herv. i. Orig.).

97 Ebd., S. 40.




Abb. 8: Katharina von Werne: *Spinnenbrillensicht*.

Fazit

Die Verbindung von Wissen, Begegnungen mit Tieren, Empathie und Resonanzerfahrungen förderte die Kreativität der Studierenden und führte zu einer größeren Nachhaltigkeit des vermittelten Lernstoffs. Und die Erfahrung, nicht nur in diesem Projektseminar, zeigt: Studierende in den Sprachwissenschaften sind generell offen für das Einbeziehen des Tier-Themas in Verbindung mit neuen Ausrichtungen der HAS. Viele angehende Lehrer*innen sehen in einer Fokussierung auf Tiere zudem Anknüpfungspunkte für den späteren Schulunterricht, etwa bei der Sensibilisierung von Schüler*innen in der Grundschule oder bei Diskussionen im Ethik-Unterricht in höheren Stufen. Darüber hinaus sprechen tierlinguistische Seminare auch das eigene Verhältnis der Studierenden zu Tieren an und führen damit auch – ob gewollt oder ungewollt – zu ethischen Debatten. Als Lehrende gerät man dabei leicht in einen Zwiespalt, wie viel ethische Diskussion zugelassen werden sollte oder darf, zumal die eigene Position dabei keine Rolle spielen sollte. Auch wenn die Studierenden bei der Frage, wie man am besten die Tierperspektive einnehmen könnte, zu Beginn des Seminars „Zoopolis“ große Unsicherheit und Berührungsängste zeigten oder Probleme damit hatten, den vertrauten linguistischen Rahmen zu verlassen und Neuland zu betreten,

zeigte sich schließlich, dass aktivierende Methoden, die ihnen einen kreativen, spielerischen Raum lassen, induktive Reflexionen befördern. Diese können in die linguistischen Forschungen einfließen, ohne dass die deskriptive Ebene verlassen werden muss. Sicherlich ließen sich – zumal im Rahmen einer Präsenzlehre – noch einige verbessernde Modifikationen vornehmen (z. B. eine stärkere Konzentration auf ausgewählte Methoden, intensivere Diskussionen). Generell eignete sich das Seminarthema aber sehr gut, um einen direkten Kontakt mit (in der Stadt lebenden) Tieren zu suchen und um ihn für die Forschung fruchtbar zu machen; grundsätzlich dürfte dies aber auch bei anderen Themen möglich sein, z. B. bei einem Seminar zur Zookommunikation. Daher – so das Fazit zu den Seminarreflexionen – ist es insgesamt für ein tierlinguistisches Seminar vielversprechend, die eigenen disziplinären Grenzen methodisch für didaktische Zwecke auch einmal zu überschreiten und kreativen, unüblichen Ideen und Denkprozessen Raum zu geben.

Greta Gaard

Epilogue

The presence of human-animal studies (HAS) in Germany is a particular delight to those outside the country: we can learn from the ways each national culture investigates how human-animal relations mirror diverse cultural narratives about equity and hierarchy, empathy and alienation, belonging and marginalization, selfhood and extended-family, self or not-self. As both Jobst Paul (in this volume) and Jeannie Shinozuka (2013) have observed, “dehumanizing modes of human, economic, and natural exploitation” (Jobst Paul) have been variously used in national contexts to vilify (for example) wolves returning to their former habitat as “immigrants” (Germany), or to portray Japanese and Japanese-Americans as foreign invaders, “a contagious and poisonous ‘yellow peril’” that shaped anti-Asianism in the years leading up to World War II in the US.¹ Each scholar draws on their national cultural contexts to analyze the “discursive strands involved in *them and us rhetoric*” (Jobst) that involve not only the philosophical animal but also their associations of “plants as animals” (Jobst), as in the case of carnivorous plants, or *animalized* associations of Japanese immigrants with “vile, disease-breeding vermin” (Shinozuka). Such insights affirm the significance of human-animal studies as a field that goes beyond the definition of discipline.

In the first volume to define the field, *Teaching the Animal: Human-Animal Studies across the Disciplines*, editor Margo DeMello speaks of human-animal

1 Jeannie Shinozuka: Deadly Perils: Japanese Beetles and the Pestilential Immigrant, 1920s–1930s. In: *American Quarterly: Journal of the American Studies Association* 65:4 (2013), pp. 831–852. <https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2013.0056> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

studies variously as “an academic discipline”² and an “interdisciplinary field,”³ while the volume’s first essay describes human-animal studies as “committed to the critique of discipline-specific methodologies, and the ‘interbreeding’ of methods of knowledge production.”⁴ That these definitions are quite different and yet simultaneously descriptive says a lot about the exuberant evolution of the field. As a discipline, human-animal studies initially drew intellectual tools from both the humanities and the social sciences, quickly expanding to include tools from natural sciences such as ethology, zoology, and ecology. Expressed through a journal article, a monograph, or a university class, human-animal studies might be multidisciplinary, drawing on knowledge from diverse disciplines but staying within their boundaries; or, the course might be interdisciplinary, exploring questions and scholarship between and among disciplines. But the greatest potential for human-animal studies manifests in its capacity for *transdisciplinary* inquiry, centering the problems themselves (i. e., oppression), and generating knowledge beyond academic disciplines, addressing academic institutions, governments, social movements, and civil society – with the potential for transforming the assumptions and structures of knowledge by challenging academic and cultural-economic norms.⁵ The discovery of West Nile virus is a case in point.

When the chief pathologist at the Bronx Zoo in New York City, Tracey McNamara, noted many crows dying near and around the zoo in summer 1999, she became concerned – particularly when three flamingoes, a pheasant, and a bald eagle died a month later. That same summer, doctors in another borough of New York City were treating a rising number of encephalitis cases. Suspecting that both humans and birds were suffering attacks from the same pathogen, McNamara sent virus samples from her dead birds to the National Veterinary Services Laboratory in Iowa, and then convinced the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to analyze the genetic materials from the samples. West Nile virus, a zoonotic disease, was discovered in the US because a zoo pathologist worked – like Michaela Keck (in this volume) – from the

2 Margo DeMello: Introduction. In: Idem (ed.): *Teaching the Animal: Human-Animal Studies Across the Disciplines*. New York: Lantern 2010, pp. xi–xix, here p. xiv.

3 Ibid., p. xi.

4 Annie Potts / Philip Armstrong: Hybrid Vigor: Interbreeding Cultural Studies and Human-Animal Studies. In: DeMello (ed.): *Teaching the Animal*, pp. 3–17, here p. 3.

5 Sue L. T. McGregor / Russ Volckmann: *Transversity: Transdisciplinary Approaches in Higher Education*. Tucson: Integral 2011.

understanding that, whether human or bird, *we are all animals*.⁶ In describing her intellectual approach, McNamara uses the metaphor of the birdcage, observing that the bars are our *a priori* assumptions and expectations, and that only when we strip away the bars of rigid thinking are we able to see clearly.

Perhaps McNamara had read feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye, whose essay defining “Oppression” uses a birdcage metaphor to explain the double bind, one of the most ubiquitous features of oppression, wherein the oppressed are constrained into situations where options are severely reduced, and every option also carries a penalty. The bars on the cage seem thin enough, and it is not immediately evident why the bird does not fly away until the observer steps back to notice it is not the single wire bar, but rather the network of bars and their interrelationship that is “as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon.”⁷ Frye’s feminist metaphor was developed to describe the conditions of women under patriarchy; McNamara was using the birdcage to describe zoonosis; ecofeminists have bridged the gap and restored the *absent referent* to Frye’s birdcage metaphor, observing that species oppression as a feminist metaphor still omits the birds themselves – and have used this example to develop an ecofeminist multispecies intersectional analysis.⁸

Posthumanism, human-animal studies, critical animal studies: these terminological distinctions have been important in naming different ways of viewing the problem of animal suffering and oppression, the modes of inquiry, and the desired goals. Initially a critique of human-centrism, posthumanism was developed by theorists such as Donna Haraway, Cary Wolfe, N. Katherine Hayles, and others.⁹ The discourse itself was largely theoretical, with few or

6 Tracey McNamara: How Monitoring Animal Health Can Predict Human Disease Outbreaks (TED x UCLA). In: *TED*, April 2018. https://www.ted.com/talks/tracey_mcnamara_how_monitoring_animal_health_can_predict_human_disease_outbreaks (accessed: January 24, 2022).

7 Marilyn Frye: Oppression. In: Idem: *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory*. Trumansburg: Crossing 1983, pp. 1–16, here p. 5.

8 On animal bodies as the “absent referent,” see Carol J. Adams: *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory*. New York: Continuum 1990; on the birdcage as a multispecies ecofeminist metaphor of oppression, see Greta Gaard: Women, Animals, and Ecofeminist Critique. In: *Environmental Ethics* 18:4 (1996), pp. 439–441. <https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics199618411> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Lori Gruen: On the Oppression of Women and Animals. In: *Environmental Ethics* 18:4 (1996), pp. 441–444. <https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics199618412> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

9 See Donna Haraway: *When Species Meet*. Minneapolis, U of Minnesota P 2007; Cary Wolfe: *What is Posthumanism?* Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P 2009; N. Katherine Hayles: *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics*. Chicago: U of Chicago P 1999.

no applied activism; animal advocates charged that posthumanists tended to engage in wordplay, yet failed to interrogate the exploitation of other species or to discuss activism on their behalf.¹⁰ Locating the genesis of human-animal studies around 2004, simultaneous with the heightened popularity of posthumanism, Margo DeMello describes human-animal studies as promoting “the study of the interactions and relationships between human and nonhuman animals,” whereas critical animal studies is “an academic field of study dedicated to the abolition of animal exploitation, oppression, and domination.”¹¹ Shortly thereafter, critical animal studies scholars distinguished their approach as “a radical, interdisciplinary field dedicated to establishing a holistic total liberation movement for humans, nonhuman animals, and the Earth.”¹²

By 2012, at least two feminist animal studies scholars¹³ had noted that the preceding tripartite taxonomy of scholar-activist human-animal inquiry tends to background or omit at least two centuries of activism and theory articulated through women’s advocacy for animals, from the intersections between the suffrage and anti-vivisection movements,¹⁴ to the feminist intersectional analyses of speciesism as it interfaces with critical race studies¹⁵ and the emergence

10 Zipporah Weisberg: The Broken Promises of Monsters. In: *Journal of Critical Animal Studies* 7:2 (2009), pp. 22–62.

11 Margo DeMello: *Animals and Society: An Introduction to Human-Animal Studies*. New York: Columbia UP 2012, p. 5.

12 Anthony J. Nocella II / John Sorenson / Kim Socha / Atsuko Matsuoko: Introduction. In: Idem (eds): *Defining Critical Animal Studies: An Intersectional Social Justice Approach for Liberation*. New York: Lang 2014, pp. ix–xxxvi, here p. xxvi.

13 Susan Fraiman: Pussy Panic Versus Liking Animals: Tracking Gender in Animal Studies. In: *Critical Inquiry* 29:1 (2012), pp. 89–115. <https://doi.org/10.1086/668051> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Greta Gaard: Feminist Animal Studies in the U.S.: Bodies Matter. In: *DEP: Deportate, esuli, profughe* 20 (2012), pp. 14–21.

14 Josephine Donovan: Animal Rights and Feminist Theory. In: *Signs* 15:2 (1990), pp. 350–375. <https://doi.org/10.1086/494588> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

15 Claire Jean Kim: Multiculturalism Goes Imperial: Immigrants, Animals, and the Suppression of Moral Dialogue. In: *DuBois Review* 4:1 (2007), pp. 233–249. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X07070129> (accessed: January 24, 2022); A. Breeze Harper: Race as a “Feeble Matter” in Veganism: Interrogating Whiteness, Geopolitical Privilege, and Consumption Philosophy of “Cruelty-Free” Products. In: *Journal for Critical Animal Studies* 8:3 (2010), pp. 5–27; Maneesha Deckha: Toward a Postcolonial, Posthumanist Feminist Theory: Centralizing Race and Culture in Feminist Work on Nonhuman Animals. In: *Hypatia* 27:3 (2012), pp. 527–545. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2012.01290.x> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

of both vegan studies and veganism of color.¹⁶ Observing the humanist limitations of intersectional theories, feminist animal studies scholars use a multispecies intersectional approach. As Nik Taylor and Richard Twine explain,

This move toward intersectionality, originally pursued by ecofeminists (e.g. Adams 1994; Plumwood 1993; Merchant 2003) makes clear how the material and symbolic exploitation of animals intersects with and helps maintain dominant categories of gender, “race” and class. In turn, this troubles the humanist premise of many extant feminist, anti-capitalist and anti-racist politics by pointing out that dominant identities and practices of gender, “race” and class help maintain the human exploitation of animals.¹⁷

As climate change compels greater awareness of the ecological and economic foundations of our multispecies flourishing and survival – as well as the global inequities of wealth, habitat, self-determination and safety – the diverse emphases in multispecies studies have inspired collaborations.¹⁸ From an otherwise humanist discipline, environmental justice, David Naguib Pellow has explored radical environmental and animal rights movements whose conceptual grounding aligns them with what he calls “critical environmental justice,” creating a new framework for “total liberation.”¹⁹

These developments suggest further directions for multispecies studies: for example, bringing Lori Gruen’s ecofeminist study of entangled empathy²⁰ into conversation with fields such as ecopsychology and ecotherapy due to the ways

16 Laura Wright: *The Vegan Studies Project: Food, Animals, and Gender in the Age of Terror*. Athens: U of Georgia P 2015; and idem (ed.): *The Routledge Handbook of Vegan Studies*. New York: Routledge 2021. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003020875> (accessed: January 24, 2022); Julia Feliz Brueck (ed.): *Veganism of Color: Decentering Whiteness in Human and Nonhuman Liberation*. Sanctuary 2019.

17 Nik Taylor / Richard Twine: Introduction: Locating the “Critical” in Critical Animal Studies. In: Idem (eds): *The Rise of Critical Animal Studies*. New York: Routledge 2014, pp. 1–15, here p. 4. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203797631> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

18 See, for instance: Human Animal Research Network Editorial Collective: *Animals in the Anthropocene: Critical Perspectives on Non-Human Futures*. Sydney: Sydney UP 2015; and Deborah Bird Rose / Thom van Dooren / Matthew Chrulew (eds): *Extinction Studies: Stories of Time, Death, and Generations*. New York: Columbia UP 2017.

19 David Naguib Pellow: *Total Liberation: The Power and Promise of Animal Rights and the Radical Earth Movement*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P 2014; and idem: *What is Critical Environmental Justice?* Cambridge: Polity 2018.

20 Lori Gruen: *Entangled Empathy: An Alternative Ethic for Our Relationships with Animals*. New York: Lantern 2015.

these fields utilize affect studies, exploring questions such as how might analyses of eco-grief and eco-anxiety illuminate the emotions of humanimals – diverse in species, race, class, and citizenship status – variously exploited and commodified through the practices of industrial animal agriculture? And what might scholars do with the information gathered through such interdisciplinary explorations?

Texts such as Jason Hribal's *Fear of the Animal Planet: The Hidden History of Animal Resistance* narrates animal agency, as does Mieke Roscher (in this volume), while Gay Bradshaw's *Elephants on the Edge* might be helpful in developing theories of multispecies grief and anxiety (see Roman Bartosch, in this volume), especially in conjunction with patrice jones's *Aftershock*, exploring the *animal-bodied affects* of human-bodied animal advocates working as allies in rescue operations, whether with Humane Societies or with the Animal Liberation Front.²¹

Moreover, as Andreas Hübner (in this volume) argues, our teaching of multispecies studies must interrogate the educational and learning processes of the very institutions where we teach and learn. As Australian animal studies scholars have shown in their report, "A Sustainable Campus: The Sydney Declaration on Interspecies Sustainability," multispecies ethical practices can be productively linked with campus sustainability initiatives, challenging and transforming practices such as student cafeteria food options, industrialized animal agriculture, materials use, and waste disposal, redefining food justice "not only as justice for human consumers and producers of food and the land used by them, but also [as] justice for the nonhuman animals considered as potential sources of food themselves."²² Intersectional approaches linking multispecies justice with other movements for human and environmental justice function as a teaching tool, exposing the structure of oppression – what ecofeminist Karen Warren called "the logic of domination"²³ – and thereby inviting interrogation, discussion, and transformation.

21 Jason Hribal: *Fear of the Animal Planet: The Hidden History of Animal Resistance*. Stirling: AK Press 2010; G. A. Bradshaw: *Elephants on the Edge: What Animals Teach Us about Humanity*. New Haven: Yale UP 2009. <https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300154917> (accessed: January 24, 2022); patrice jones: *Aftershock: Confronting Trauma in a Violent World: A Guide for Activists and Their Allies*. New York: Lantern 2007.

22 Fiona Probyn-Rapsey / Sue Donaldson / George Ioannides / Tess Lea et al.: A Sustainable Campus: The Sydney Declaration on Interspecies Sustainability. In: *Animal Studies Journal* 5:1 (2016), pp. 110–151.

23 Karen Warren: The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism. In: *Environmental Ethics* 12 (1990), pp. 125–146. <https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics199012221> (accessed: January 24, 2022).

In sum, we need more narratives that re-place human-animal relations within the larger context of human-human and humanimal-ecological relations, cultural narratives of self and success, gender and environment. To that end, Freya Mathews' *Ardea* has much to offer: with a narrative that includes multispecies relations, environment and economics, gender and power, *Ardea* provides more details about the forces that combine to create species hierarchy and oppression than does J. M. Coetzee's *The Lives of Animals* (1999).²⁴ Moreover, while Coetzee's protagonist is variously described as pitiful or ineffective, as Alexandra Böhm notes (in this volume), *Ardea* describes the ecological selfhood of a woman philosopher whose psyche is rooted in and nourished by the larger multispecies inter-identity of living beings and ecosystems. German human-animal studies scholars will appreciate Mathew's multispecies reframing of Goethe's Faustian challenge, here contextualized amid climate-changing forces of economic "development" predicated on ecosystem destruction, species loss, homophobia, and the loneliness of human-centrism. Perhaps the most critical insight offered by multispecies scholars is our recognition of how the collapse of individualism – and the separate, superior human self – is requisite to our rediscovery of ecological multispecies kinship, powering and re-storying our collective humanimal resistance and recovery in the Anthropocene.

24 Freya Mathews: *Ardea: A Philosophical Novella*. Punctum 2016. <https://doi.org/10.21983/P3.0147.1.00> (accessed: January 24, 2022); J. M. Coetzee: *The Lives of Animals*. Princeton: Princeton UP 1999.

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In light of the dramatic growth and rapid institutionalization of human-animal studies in recent years, it is somewhat surprising that only a small number of publications have proposed practical and theoretical approaches to teaching in this inter- and transdisciplinary field. Featuring eleven original pedagogical interventions from the social sciences and the humanities as well as an epilogue from ecofeminist critic Greta Gaard, the present volume addresses this gap and responds to the demand by both educators and students for pedagogies appropriate for dealing with environmental crises.

The theoretical and practical contributions collected here describe new ways of teaching human-animal studies in different educational settings and institutional contexts, suggesting how learners – equipped with key concepts such as agency or relationality – can develop empathy and ethical regard for the more-than-human world and especially nonhuman animals. As the contributors to this volume show, these cognitive and affective goals can be achieved in many curricula in secondary and tertiary education. By providing learners with the tools to challenge human exceptionalism in its various guises and related patterns of domination and exploitation in and outside the classroom, these interventions also contribute to a much-needed transformation not only of today's educational systems but of society as a whole.

This volume is an invitation to beginners and experienced instructors alike, an invitation to (re)consider how we teach human-animal studies and how we could and should prepare learners for an uncertain future in, ideally, a more egalitarian and just multispecies world.

With contributions by Roman Bartosch, Liza B. Bauer, Alexandra Böhm, Greta Gaard, Björn Hayer, Andreas Hübner, Michaela Keck, Maria Moss, Jobst Paul, Mieke Roscher, Pamela Steen, and Nils Steffensen.

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