Evidencing and Explaining Democratic Congruence:
The Perspective of “Substantive” Democracy

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ABSTRACT
Data from 85 societies worldwide show that the supply and demand of democracy are dramatically more congruent when one substantiates supply and demand measures by genuine commitments to democracy’s defining freedoms. Using substantiated measures of both democratic supplies and demands, regression analyses suggest that congruence emerges from a statistically independent effect of prior democratic demands on subsequent democratic supplies. Using multi-level models, we examine the mechanisms behind this effect. We find, first, that substantive demands for democracy arise in response to an increasing utility of freedoms, irrespective of the prior existence of democracy. Second, we find that substantive democratic demands have expressive utility and hence nurture expressive mass actions that make these demands felt, irrespective of repression. The utility logic guiding these mechanisms makes democratizing mass pressures possible. We conclude that the perspective of “substantive democracy” is useful to evidence and understand a classic theme in political science: democratic congruence.

Key words: congruence, demand and supply of democracy, substantive democracy. 

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INTRODUCTION

“The substantive concerns are the abiding ones” (Verba 1965:513).

Some 2,400 years ago, Aristotle (1984 [350 BC]) reasoned in Book IV of Politics that democracy emerges in middle-class communities in which the citizens share an egalitarian participatory orientation. Since then theorists claimed repeatedly that the question of which political regime emerges and survives depends on the orientations that prevail among the people. Very explicit on this point, Montesquieu (1989 [1748]:106) argued in De L’Esprit des Lois that the laws by which a society is governed reflect the people’s dominant mentality: whether a nation is constituted as a tyranny, monarchy or democracy depends, respectively, on the prevalence of anxious, honest or civic orientations. Likewise, Tocqueville (1994 [1835]:29) postulated in De la Démocratie en Amérique that the flourishing of democracy in the United States reflects the liberal and participatory orientations among the American people.

In modern times, the failure of democracy in Weimar Germany was the most flagrant illustration of the idea that political regimes rest on compatible orientations among their people. Because this failure had such catastrophic consequences as the Holocaust and World War II, it troubled social scientists, psychologists, and public opinion researchers alike. Much of the research inspired by this break with civilization shared the premise that democracy is fragile when it is a “democracy without democrats” (Bracher 1971 [1955]). In this vein, Lasswell (1951:473, 484, 502) claimed that democratic regimes emerge and survive where most of the population believes in the idea of people power that inspires democracy. Similarly, when Lipset (1959:85-9) speculated why modernization is conducive to democracy he concluded that this is so because modernization changes mass orientations in ways that make people supportive of democratic principles, such as popular control over power. More recently, Huntington (1991:69) argued that rising desires for democratic freedoms is the mediating mechanism explaining why modernization has nurtured democratizing mass pressures in scores of countries in recent decades. Evidence for this mediation model has been presented by Welzel (2007:417).

Most influential on this topic, Almond and Verba (1963:498) and Eckstein (1966:1) introduced the term “congruence,” claiming that political regimes become stable only to the extent to which their authority patterns satisfy people’s authority beliefs—“regardless of regime type,” as Eckstein (1998:3) notes. According to this logic, authoritarian regimes are stable to the extent that people believe in the legitimacy of absolute authority, as much as democratic regimes are stable to the extent that people believe in popular control of political authority (Almond 1998:vii).
Some scholars have extended these propositions to suggest that in order to become stable, political regimes have to supply democracy at levels that satisfy the people’s demand for it (Inglehart & Welzel 2005:187). This should become evident in a strong cross-sectional correlation between the level at which elites supply democracy and the strength of the masses’ demand for democracy.

However, in contradiction to these ideas, Inglehart (2003:54) shows that the correlation between institutionalized democracy and mass preferences for democracy is remarkably weak, so weak indeed that democratic mass preferences explain only a minor proportion of the cross-national variation in democratic institutions. Similar results are reported by Hadenius and Teorell (2005) who raise skepticism against any explanation of democracy that invokes mass orientations. These findings suggest abandoning the assumption of a close link between political regimes and mass beliefs, and aligning with elite theorists who claim since long that democracy emerges and survives when elites agree on it, not when the masses want it (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Higley & Burton 2006).

Before accepting such a far-reaching conclusion, we examine another possibility. This possibility is hinted at by the literature on “democracies with adjectives” (Collier & Levitsky 1997). This literature suggests that standard measures of institutionalized democracy tend to overrate the actual supply of democracy, for these measures largely disregard the power practices, in particular rule of law, that set the freedoms that define democracy into effect (Diamond 2002; O’Donnell 2004; Zakaria 2003). On the demand-side, the literature on “democrats with adjectives” (Schedler & Sarsfield 2007) goes in the same direction, implying that standard measures of democratic preferences tend to overrate people’s actual demand for democracy, as these measures overlook the mass values that make people appreciate democracy for the freedoms that define it (Bratton & Mattes 2001; Mattes & Bratton 2006; Rose & Shin 2003; Shin & Tusalem 2007).

Thus, standard measures of both the supply and demand of democracy could be largely spurious. They might lack “substance,” in that they fail to tap genuine commitments to the freedoms constituting democracy. If this is so and standard measures of democratic institutions and democratic preferences are indeed devoid of substance, congruence should be evident in significantly greater strength when one substantiates supply-side and demand-side measures of democracy, qualifying them for the governance practices and mass values that do involve genuine commitments to the freedoms that define democracy. The point then is not a lack of congruence but a lack of substance in standard measures with which congruence is examined.

The article proceeds in the following steps. First, we outline in theory under which premises congruence should work, arguing that a focus on substantive democracy is needed to understand the limits within which congruence is likely to operate. Then we show that standard measures of both institutionalized democracy and public preferences for democracy lack substance in the sense that they fail to tap genuine commitments to the defining freedoms of democracy, in terms of power practices on the part of elites and in terms of firm beliefs on the part of the masses. Using indicators of “enlightened” power practices to substantiate supply-side measures of democracy, and indicators of
"emancipative" mass beliefs to substantiate demand-side measures of democracy, we find congruence to be strikingly evident: substantive supplies of democracy satisfy substantive demands for it to 72 percent. Elaborating on this finding, we find that substantive demands for democracy emerge for other reasons than the prior exposure to democracy and that once such demands are present, they translate into expressive actions that make these demands felt to those in power. We interpret this as evidence that congruence emerges as a supply-side response to mass demands for democracy, provided these demands are substantive. We conclude that a focus on "substantive democracy" is useful to evidencing and explaining democratic congruence.

**THEORY**

**Why Congruence?**

Inspired by the idea of congruence scholars assume a close association between the level at which democracy is institutionalized and the extent to which people prefer it. This association constitutes the "structure-culture link" that is thought to stabilize political regimes (Almond & Verba 1963:246). Inglehart and Welzel (2005:186-91) conceptualize this link as a "supply-demand relation with regard to democratic freedoms," arguing that the institutionalization of democracy constitutes the supply of democratic freedoms while mass preferences for democracy constitute the demand for them. A tendency towards congruence is inherent in a supply-demand relation because in such a relation *supplies are under selective pressures to satisfy demands* (Easton 1965). In a supply-demand logic, congruence means that institutional supplies of democratic freedoms are under selective pressures to satisfy the public demands for these freedoms (Inglehart & Welzel 2005:187).

This assumption is informed by the legitimacy framework formulated by Eckstein (1979), Gurr (1974) and Eckstein and Gurr (1975). Accordingly, congruence shapes the evolution of political regimes by determining the amount of mass support a given regime can rely on and, vice versa, the amount of mass opposition it risks provoking. By definition, congruent regimes are in accordance with a population’s prevailing legitimacy beliefs and thus receive more mass support than incongruent ones. By contrast, incongruent regimes disatisfy a population’s legitimacy beliefs and because of this risk more mass opposition than congruent ones. While mass support helps to stabilize given regimes, mass opposition is a risk factor that increases the probability of regime termination. These conditions favor congruent regimes in making them more supported and less opposed than incongruent ones. Thus, congruent regimes outline and, at any point in time, outnumber incongruent ones. This should be reflected in a significant cross-national correlation between given regimes’ actual authority structures and the respective populations’ beliefs about what forms of authority are legitimate. With respect to democratic freedoms, this implies a significant correlation between the amount of freedoms institutionalized by a regime and the amount of freedoms desired among the
population. In a strong formulation of congruence theory, we expect that variation in national populations’ demands for democratic freedoms explains most of the regime variation in the supply of these freedoms.

Few scholars doubt that supply-demand congruence is indeed a factor that matters for the survival of democratic regimes (Bratton & Mattes 2001; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Dalton 2004; Diamond 1999; Mattes & Bratton 2007; Mishler & Rose 2002; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998; Rose & Shin 2001; Shin & Wells 2005, Shin & Tusaleem 2007). This is plausible because when, in a democracy, the public does not really value democratic freedoms and instead prefers strong leaders and some version of authoritarian rule, anti-democratic forces are more easily voted into office and little opposition from the public will emerge when power holders compromise or abandon democratic freedoms (Diskin, Diskin & Hazan 2005).

For authoritarian regimes, the case is often seen differently. Unlike democracies, authoritarian regimes can use repression to silence opposition (Tarrow 1998:83-87). Leaving opposing mass demands unsatisfied does not, in this view, affect the stability of authoritarian regimes. Repression allows them to endure, even if the masses find their preferences “falsified” (Kuran 1991).

However, most authoritarian regimes did not have to prove their ability to repress mass opposition. Many of them were not confronted with widespread mass opposition throughout most of their time (Wintrobe 1998:20; Francisco 2005:58). This might be partly because a credible threat of repression alone keeps people from openly opposing a regime. However, for the credibility of repression to be the key factor in silencing opposition, there must be a source of opposition in the first place. A most fundamental source of opposition is the belief in the illegitimacy of authoritarian rule, yet his belief might not always be widespread. In fact, as Huntington (1991:143) notes, most of the authoritarian regimes that were swept away by mass opposition late in the twentieth century, were initially “almost always popular and widely supported.” Obviously, as long as authoritarian regimes are supported, people do not consider authoritarian rule illegitimate. Only when people find appeal in the freedoms that define democracy, do they consider authoritarian rule illegitimate (Feng & Zak 1999:163). Only then can the threat of repression become a relevant factor in stabilizing authoritarian rule. Yet, even a credible threat of repression does not guarantee the survival of an authoritarian regime when people desire democratic freedoms. Instead, there is ample evidence from the non-violent, pro-democratic mass upheavals of recent decades that when a population begins to long for freedoms, mass opposition does emerge--despite repressive threats (Karatnycky & Ackerman 2005; Schock 2005; Welzel 2006, 2007).

Once opposition becomes manifest, the success of attempts at repression not only depends on the extent of coercion used; it depends as much on the size of the mass opposition itself (Huntington 1991:143; Feng & Zak 1999:163). Indeed, mass opposition can grow so massive that repression becomes too costly, overwhelming the power holders’ capacities (Ulfelder 2005). This happened quite often during the last three decades: massive mass opposition swept away authoritarian regimes in scores of
countries, including some strongly coercive regimes (Schock 2004:156-7; Thompson 2004).

The link between repression and opposition is not a simple inverse relation such that dictators only have to increase repression to silence opposition (Davenport 2005). Moreover, the often cited “inverted-U-shape” relationship does not always hold, for even massive repression sometimes increases rather than decreases mass opposition (Francisco 1995). One possible reason why mass opposition sometimes grows even in face of more severe repression can be found in “value-expectancy theory” (Klandermans 1984; Opp 1994), “intrinsic value theory” (Axelrod 1986) and “expressive utility theory” (Kuran 1993). When regime opponents are particularly convinced of their case and firmly believe in the legitimacy of their claim for democratic freedoms, we face internalized ideals that have “intrinsic value” (Axelrod 1986:1011). The intrinsic value of an internalized ideal gives acts of opposition that express this ideal “expressive utility” (Kuran 1993:183). Expressive utility grows in direct response to the level of repression because acts that express opposition gain in significance under more severe repression. Thus, if the logic of expressive utility governs, more people engage in opposing actions precisely when repression is intensifying. With more people participating in opposition, the expected success of opposition grows, increasing the incentive to engage even further. The resulting “surprise” (Kuran 1991) over the strength of mass opposition has repeatedly broken the resistance of authoritarian rulers, opening the way to a transition to democracy (Feng & Zak 1999; McFaul 2002).

The point is that the desire for democratic freedoms and the corresponding belief in the illegitimacy of dictatorial powers are variables, not constants. When these variables grow strong, they provide a powerful motivational force for the mobilization of mass opposition in authoritarian regimes (Oberschall 1996:97, 102; Welzel 2006:874; 2007:399). Repression cannot isolate authoritarian regimes from the destabilizing effect of eroding legitimacy and rising mass demands for democracy (Tarrow 1998:85).

In conclusion, then, congruence does matter for authoritarian regimes as well. Authoritarian regimes are congruent as long as their lacking supply of democratic freedoms corresponds with weak demands for these freedoms among the masses. When these demands grow strong, however, authoritarian regimes run into trouble, facing a greater likelihood of emerging mass opposition and thus a greater risk of collapse.

The selective mechanism supposed to favor congruent over incongruent regimes is the amount of mass support a given regime is generating, or respectively, the amount of mass opposition it is risking. Regimes whose authority patterns are in accordance with most people's legitimacy beliefs generate much regime support, which is helpful to regime survival. Regimes whose authority patterns are in discordance with most people's legitimacy beliefs are, almost by definition, unpopular. Incongruent regimes' unpopularity is a risk factor, which increases their likelihood of termination by anti-regime mobilization and mass upheavals. The higher risk of termination on the side of incongruent regimes creates a tendency towards the prevalence of congruent regimes.

Congruence theory suggests that institutionalized authority patterns tend to be in accordance with the legitimacy beliefs of most of the population in a country. Thus,
people's authority beliefs should—at any given point in time—be a powerful predictor of the institutionalized authority patterns. Applied to democratic freedoms, congruence means that mass demands for democratic freedoms are of high predictive power for the institutional supply of these freedoms. One possible measure of congruence, then, is the extent to which people's demand for democratic freedoms predicts the institutional supply of these freedoms.

Why a Focus on “Substantiveness”?

Democracy has a supply side and a demand side. On the supply side it becomes manifest when power holders institutionalize democratic freedoms. On the demand side it becomes manifest when ordinary people prefer democracy as a form of governance. An essential quality of both the supply of democracy and the demand for it is “substantiveness.” With substantiveness we denote the extent to which power holders and ordinary people are committed to the freedoms that define democracy. On the supply side, such a commitment requires that elites effectively respect democratic freedoms in the daily practice of power. To the extent they do so, the supply of democracy is substantive. On the demand side, a genuine commitment requires the masses to value democracy intrinsically for the freedoms that define it. To the extent this is the case, demands for democracy are substantive. “Substantiation” then is the process by which democracy becomes effectively respected on the supply-side and intrinsically valued on the demand-side. Figure 1 summarizes this conception of substantive democracy.

Based on this conceptualization we hypothesize that demands for democracy exert selection pressures on the supply of democracy insofar—and only insofar—as these demands are substantive. Let us explicate this qualification.

Power holders opt to supply democracy for various reasons, not all of which are a response to a public demand for democracy. For instance, foreign powers might push a country's leaders to introduce democracy and when the respective country depends on foreign aid such pressures might be successful (Burnell 2008; Mansfield & Pevehouse 2008). But insofar as democracy is supplied in absence of corresponding demands, power holders are under little domestic pressure to respect democratic freedoms in the daily practice of power. As a consequence, power-holders' power-maximizing interests remain unchecked, making it easy to corrupt formally enacted democratic freedoms. In this case, the supply of democracy is devoid of substance.

When ordinary people for their part prefer democracy, they might do so for various reasons, not all of which reflect a genuine valuation of the freedoms that substantiate democracy. People may prefer democracy because they hope that it makes their country prosperous or because they see democracy as a means to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor. In this case, people are interested in the economic output of democracy, not in the freedoms that substantiate democracy (Bratton & Mattes 2001). Public pressures on power holders to effectively respect democratic freedoms are
Figure 1. Substantiating Democracy on its Supply and Demand Side

**SUPPLY SIDE**

Democratic Institutions (provided by the 'elites')

**DEMAND SIDE**

Democratic Preferences (expressed by the 'masses')

**SUBSTANTIATION:**
Rooting democratic institutions and preferences in genuine commitments to the freedoms that define democracy:

- **“Enlightened” Governance:** power practices that effectively respect given freedoms.
- **“Emancipative” Values:** mass beliefs that intrinsically value people’s freedoms.

**SUBSTANTIVE Supply of Democracy:** Democratic institutions insofar as enlightened governance makes them effectively respected.

**SUBSTANTIVE Demand for Democracy:** Democratic preferences insofar as emancipative beliefs make them intrinsically valued.

weakly congruent

strongly congruent
unlikely to emerge in this case. Such pressures are likely to emerge only when people value democracy for its substantiating freedoms. Consequently, the supply of democratic freedoms should become subject to demand-side pressures only to the extent that these demands are substantive.

In summary, our main hypothesis is that a focus on substantively supplied and demanded democracy is needed to discover congruence in its real strength, for the selection pressures that generate congruence should emanate from substantive demands only and should be targeted at substantive supplies specifically.

ANALYSIS

Incongruent Democratic Supplies and Demands

It is standard to tap mass demands for democracy by asking people about their regime preferences. The Global Barometers Surveys and the World Values Surveys ask people around the world how strongly they agree with the idea of “having a democratic system.” However, Bratton and Mattes (2001), Mishler and Rose (2002), Shin and Wells (2005) and others emphasize that regime preferences for democracy are meaningless unless they go together with a rejection of authoritarian alternatives to democracy. Thus, Klingemann (1999) measures people’s democratic preferences by coupling their support for democracy with their rejection of authoritarian alternatives, especially the idea of “having the army rule,” the strongest authoritarian alternative to democracy. Only those respondents who agree to have a democratic system and at the same time disagree with having the army rule, have a consistent preference for democracy.

We use World Values Surveys data because these surveys cover regime preferences for by far the widest array of countries.1 Depending on whether respondents prefer democracy strongly or fairly and at the same time reject military rule strongly or fairly, their commitment to democracy is measured on a nine-point scale with minimum 0 and maximum 100. Values above 50 indicate the extent to which people prioritize democracy over authoritarian rule, while values below 50 indicate the reverse. Because this measurement includes no further qualification in regard to the extent to which people value the freedoms that substantiate democracy, one cannot take this measure as an indication of people’s intrinsic democratic preferences. Rather, one has to read the measure as an indication of people’s unsubstantiated democratic preferences, leaving it open for further qualifications in how far the preferences are rooted in values that prize the freedoms that substantiate democracy.

1 For information on the World Values Surveys visit the website: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. We use data from the third to fourth waves (1995-2000) of the World Values Surveys. For countries for which more than one measurement point is available we averaged the available measures.
We operationalize the strength of an entire society's democratic preference using the population mean on the just described scale. Population mean-levels can obtain any value between 0 and 100.\(^2\) Applying congruence theory to this measure one would expect that cross-national variation in democratic preferences is strongly related with variation in institutionalized democracy, such that the more a public prioritizes democracy over authoritarian rule, the more democratic a country is in its institutional structures.

The most widely used indicators to measure the level at which countries supply democracy are the Freedom House ratings of civil and political freedoms (Freedom House 2007).\(^3\) Even though Freedom House claims to measure effectively respected rather than formally enacted freedoms, power practices showing how effectively elites indeed respect given freedoms are insufficiently taken into account. This is obvious from the weak link between the freedom ratings and rule of law data as provided by the World Bank’s “good governance” indicators. If the freedom ratings indeed measure effectively respected freedoms, the freedom ratings must absorb rule of law differences so that countries with the same freedom rating show very little variation in rule of law. However, countries with the same freedom rating show great variation in rule of law. To be precise, 60 percent of the cross-national variation in rule of law is unabsored by the freedom ratings (Welzel & Alexander 2008:28). In light of this evidence, the Freedom House ratings measure the supply of democratic freedoms in a way that is not sufficiently substantiated by rule of law. It is a largely unsubstantiated measure of the supply of democracy (Rose 2009).

How much congruence is there between unsubstantiated indicators of democratic institutions and democratic preferences? Updating Inglehart’s (2003:49) findings on a broader basis, the left-hand diagram in Figure 2 shows a statistically significant link between a society’s democratic institutions in 2002-06 and its democratic preferences in 1995-2000. Even though this link is positive, its most striking property is its weakness. Most of the variation in the supply of democracy (73 percent to be precise) remains unexplained by the demand for democracy.

Even a comparatively high level of democratic preferences provides no guarantee for a high level of democratic institutions. In fact, on a preference level between 70 and 80 percent one can find democratic institutions on practically every level, be it at 10 percent as in Iraq or at 100 percent as in Finland. In accordance with elitist versions of democratic theory, in determining the level at which to supply democratic institutions, mass demands seem hardly to constrain the elites’ regime choices.

\(^2\) As an alternative we calculated per country the percentage of respondents falling into the upper half, third, and quarter of this scale, respectively. Using these measures instead of the mean scores did not alter the results reported throughout this article.

\(^3\) We reversed the 1-7 Freedom House scales for civil and political liberties such that higher numbers indicate more freedom. We standardized the resulting scale to a maximum of 100 and a minimum of 0.
Figure 2. Democratic Preferences and Democratic Institutions I

EFFECTIVE Democratic Institutions 2002-06

Democratic Preferences 1995-2000

y = 1.9383x - 104.02
R² = 0.3595

Democratic Institutions 2002-06

Democratic Preferences 1995-2000

y = 0.0027x^2 + 2.3214
R² = 0.2708
The obvious weakness of congruence is not a methodological artifact of the Freedom House ratings. Using instead the democracy-autocracy scores from the Polity project (Marshall & Jaggers 2008), the correlation between the mass demand for democracy and the institutional supply of democracy drops to an r=.33 (compared to r=.55 when Freedom House is used). Using a combination of the Freedom House and Polity scores does not do a better job in depicting congruence either. Different indicators point to the same conclusion: there is much more incongruence than congruence between the supply of democracy and the demand for it.

There are two ways to read this finding. Either the link between democratic supply and demand is indeed as weak as we have seen. Or congruence is limited to substantive democratic supplies and demands and simply does not show up in its real strength with unsubstantiated measures. The following sections show that the second possibility holds true.

Substantive Supply: Effectively Respected Democratic Freedoms

A growing literature suspects that democracy often lacks substance in the sense that democracy’s defining freedoms are not effectively respected in the elites’ daily practice of power (Diamond 2002; Collier & Levitsky 1997; Zakaria 2003; Rose 2009). Because democratic freedoms are institutionalized through constitutional laws and rights, democratic freedoms cannot take effect when the elites do not respect legal norms in their daily practice. Democratic freedoms are effectively respected to the extent that elites abide to the rule of law (Rose 2009). To the extent that rule of law is absent, it disables democratic freedoms (O’Donnell 2004). Corruption is a key indicator of violated rule of law, involving illegal practices like financial misappropriation, bribery, patronage, clientelism and nepotism (Sandholtz & Tagepeera 2005). These mechanisms disable democratic controls over public spending and personnel recruitment, the two core areas of democratic politics (Warren 2006). Undermining democratic controls disempowers the people. And because people empowerment is what democracy is about, the disempowering effects of corruption and rule of law violations bereave democracy of its substance. To supply democratic freedoms in substantive ways, elites must respect these freedoms through lawful and uncrupt—in a word: “enlightened”—power practices.

As described in Table 1a, we combine information on the institutionalization of democratic freedoms with information on enlightened governance, deprecating democratic freedoms to the extent that enlightened governance is absent. Technically, we use the Freedom House ratings of civil and political freedoms, transformed into a percentage scale from 0 to 100, and weight these percentages by fractions from 0 to 1.0 indicating the degree of lawful and uncrupt governance (1.0 representing the known maximum and 0 representing the known minimum of lawful and uncrupt governance). The source of the latter data are the World Bank’s “rule of law” and “anticorruption” indices,
Table 1a. Substantive Supply (Effective Democratic Institutions)

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<th>CONCEPTS</th>
<th>Effective Democratic Institutions</th>
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<td>Democratic Institutions</td>
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<td><strong>MEANINGS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutionalization of democratic freedoms</td>
<td>“Enlightened” Governance: power practices that respect institutionalized freedoms effectively</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INDICATORS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined FH Civil and Political Freedom Ratings</td>
<td>Combined WB Rule of Law and Control of Corruption Ratings</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SCALES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage Scale (0 to 100 range)</td>
<td>Weighting Scale (fractions of 1.0)</td>
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Table 1b. Substantive Demand (Intrinsic Democratic Preferences)

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<th>CONCEPTS</th>
<th>Intrinsic Democratic Preferences</th>
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<td>Democratic Preferences</td>
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<td><strong>MEANINGS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Preferences for democracy over authoritarian alternatives</td>
<td>“Emancipative” Values: mass beliefs that value intrinsically the freedoms underlying democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INDICATORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>WVS Klingemann-index of democratic regime preferences</td>
<td>WVS Inglehart/ Welzel index of “self-expression values”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SCALES</strong></td>
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<td>Percentage Scale (0 to 100 range)</td>
<td>Weighting Scale (fractions of 1.0)</td>
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which are averaged into a combined index of “enlightened governance” as the two scores correlate anyway at r=.95 (Kaufman, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2005). We interpret the resulting index as measuring effective democratic institutions, which indicates a “sub-

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4. To create its anticorruption and rule of law scores, the World Bank gathers data from various sources. We transformed the data available for 2002 to 2006 into normalized scales with minimum 0 (the lowest empirical anticorruption and rule of law levels) and maximum 1.0 (the highest empirical levels). Then we averaged the two scores, keeping the resulting index within the 0-1 range.
stantive” supply of democracy. A conceptual justification and validity test of this index of effective democracy is provided by Welzel and Alexander (2008).

We define the supply of democracy as the extent to which countries institutionalize democratic freedoms, no matter how much these freedoms are substantiated by power practices that respect them. The substantive supply of democracy is the institutionalization of democratic freedoms insofar as they are effectively respected in the elites’ practice of power. A substantive supply of democracy involves a genuine commitment to democratic freedoms on the part of the power holders.

Enlightened governance does not provide democratic freedoms. But it does substantiate democratic freedoms to the extent they are given. A score in enlightened governance should therefore affect a resulting score in effective democracy only within the limits set by the initial democracy score. This is exactly what the weighting procedure does and so a score in effective democracy can never exceed the original democracy score but it can always fall short of it. Accordingly, weighting democracy for enlightened governance has a deflationary effect: among the 85 societies of our sample, the mean unweighted level of democracy is at 70 percent, the mean effective level of democracy is at 44 percent.

The right-hand diagram in Figure 2 retains the unsubstantiated measure of democratic mass demands on the horizontal axis but uses the vertical axis for the substantiated measure of democratic institutions. Weighted for enlightened governance, democratic institutions now show greater congruence with a population’s democratic preferences. Statistically, the substantiated measure of democratic institutions is explained to 36 percent by variation in mass preferences for democracy, in contrast to 27 percent for the unsubstantiated measure. Comparing the two diagrams in Figure 2, it is obvious that the substantiated supply measure evidences more congruence because the deflationary effect affects more those countries which seem to over-supply democracy when one looks at unsubstantiated measures. This pattern reveals an important regularity: whenever democratic institutions seem to be supplied in excess of people’s demand for them, unlawful and corrupt power practices bereave these institutions of their substance.

**Substantive Demand: Intrinsically Valued Democratic Freedoms**

The recent literature underlines the need to come to a more qualified understanding of what is behind people’s demand for democracy (Bratton, Mattes & Gymiah-Boadi 2005; Dalton 2004; Diamond 2003; Klingemann 1999; Rose & Shin 2001; Shin & Tusalem 2007). To accomplish this one has to go beyond mere regime preferences, tapping the values that motivate people to demand democracy (Schedler & Sarsfield 2007). Doing so enables one to identify “intrinsic” preferences for democracy (Bratton & Mattes 2001). In contrast to “instrumental” preferences, where democracy is valued as a means to other ends, such as prosperity, with intrinsic preferences democracy is valued for the freedoms that define it. Thus, an intrinsic valuation of democracy requires people to adopt
emancipative values that prize the freedoms of the people (Inglehart & Welzel 2005:270).

Based on WVS data Welzel (2006, 2007) operates with different versions of “emancipative values,” of which we use the internally most consistent one, as shown in Table 2. This version comprises four key orientations that all represent a common underlying dimension: (1) an expressive orientation that emphasizes the voice of the people; (2) an egalitarian orientation that supports the equality of women to men; (3) a liberal orientation that pronounces reproductive self-determination; (4) an autonomous orientation that emphasizes “autonomy” and “imagination” against “faith” and “obedience” as goals to teach children. Together these four orientations form an emancipative belief in ordinary people's freedoms, considering all people as equal and autonomous persons with the right to make their voices heard and counted. We summarize these four orientations into a multi-point index of “emancipative values” with minimum 0 (for someone taking the least emancipative position in all four orientations) and maximum 1.0 (for someone taking the most emancipative position on all four orientations). Because of their focus on ordinary people's freedoms, emancipative values are of substantiating quality for democratic regime preferences.

The level of emancipative values determines how much a democratic preference of given strength is tied to an intrinsic valuation of the freedoms that substantiate democracy. Thus, we weight a person's democratic preference, measured in percentages, by this person's emphasis on emancipative values, measured in fractions. This produces weighted percentages that yield intrinsic preferences for democracy. To have a strongly intrinsic preference for democracy a person must both have a strong preference for democracy and hold strong emancipative values. To measure an entire society's intrinsic democratic preferences we calculate the national average on the index of intrinsic democratic preferences, as depicted in Table 1b.

The demand for democracy is the extent to which people prefer democracy, no matter how much these preferences are rooted in emancipative values. The substantive demand for democracy is that part of democratic preferences which is rooted in emancipative values. Only substantive demands reflect a genuine commitment to democratic freedoms on the part of ordinary people.

The weighting procedure makes sure that emancipative values substantiate democratic preferences strictly within the limits of these preferences. Thus, intrinsic democratic preferences can never exceed but always fall short of unsubstantiated democratic preferences. Accordingly, weighting democratic preferences for emancipative values has a deflationary effect: on average among the 85 societies of our sample, unsubstantiated democratic preferences score at 78 percentage points, while intrinsic democratic preferences achieve a score of just 34 percentage points.

The left-hand diagram of Figure 3 plots the unsubstantiated supply measure against the substantiated demand measure. Comparing this diagram with the two diagrams in Figure 2, it becomes obvious that demand-side substantiation evidences even more congruence than supply-side substantiation: after demand-side substantiation the
Table 2. A Concept of Emancipative Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Agree that woman can be by herself</th>
<th>Disagree that men better political leaders</th>
<th>Disagree education to be more important for boys</th>
<th>Agree that abortion can be justified</th>
<th>Agree that homosexuality is justified</th>
<th>Autonomy indicated as goal in education</th>
<th>Imagination as goal in education</th>
<th>Obedience not a goal in education</th>
<th>Faith not a goal in education</th>
<th>Priority on giving people more say in government</th>
<th>Priority on giving people more say in local affairs</th>
<th>Priority on protecting freedom of speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables in VS</td>
<td>V59</td>
<td>V61</td>
<td>V62</td>
<td>V44</td>
<td>V204</td>
<td>V202</td>
<td>V205</td>
<td>V12</td>
<td>V15</td>
<td>V19</td>
<td>V21</td>
<td>V71, 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coding</td>
<td>for each item 0, .33, .66, 1.0 from least to most egalitarian position</td>
<td>for each item 0, .1, .2, . . . , .9, 1.0 from least to most liberal position</td>
<td>for each item 0 for the non-autonomy and 1.0 for the autonomy position</td>
<td>for each item 0, .5, 1.0 from least to most expressive position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subindex</td>
<td><em>EQUITY</em>: priority on gender equality over patriarchy</td>
<td><em>LIBERTY</em>: priority on sexual freedom over restriction</td>
<td><em>AUTONOMY</em>: priority on self-determination over obedience</td>
<td><em>EXPRESSION</em>: priority on voice over security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scaling</td>
<td>Item scores added and divided by 4 (multi-point 0 to 1.0 scale)</td>
<td>Item scores added and divided by 3 (multi-point 0 to 1.0 scale)</td>
<td>Item scores added and divided by 4 (multi-point 0 to 1.0 scale)</td>
<td>Item scores added and divided by 3 (multi-point 0 to 1.0 scale)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scaling</td>
<td>Subindex scores added and divided by 4 (multi-point 0 to 1.0 scale)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EMANCIPATIVE BELIEFS**
Figure 3. Democratic Preferences and Democratic Institutions II

![Graph showing relationships between Democratic Preferences and Democratic Institutions](image-url)
variation in democratic institutions that is explained by democratic mass preferences increases from 27 to 59 percent. Comparing the left-hand diagram in Figure 3 with the left-hand diagram in Figure 2 reveals an important reason why demand-side substantiation evidences more congruence: whenever the supply of democracy seems to under-satisfy the people’s demand for democracy, the demand turns out to be without substance, lacking the values that make people prize democracy for its defining freedoms.

**Congruence Reestablished**

These findings show that where democratic freedoms are supplied on a level that seems to over-satisfy people’s demand for democracy, these freedoms are not effectively respected by power holders. In substantive terms, there is no over-saturation in these cases. And where democratic freedoms are supplied on levels that seem to under-satisfy people’s demand for democracy, these demands lack an intrinsic valuation of democracy’s defining freedoms. In substantive terms, there is no under-saturation. In a substantive perspective, elites neither greatly over-satisfy nor under-satisfy the masses’ demands for democracy.

This becomes obvious in the right-hand diagram of Figure 3, which plots effective democratic institutions against intrinsic democratic preferences, evidencing an astounding degree of congruence: intrinsic mass preferences for democracy explain the level at which elites effectively institutionalize democracy to 72 percent. Clearly, substantiation changes the picture, evidencing far greater congruence between democratic supplies and demands. This in itself is an important finding. It implies that *some* adjustment mechanism must be at work to bring substantive democratic supplies and demands into congruence. But how does this mechanism operate? The temporal order in which we arranged independent and dependent variables suggests that elites satisfy mass demands for democracy to the extent that these demands are substantive. To give this interpretation credibility, one has to demonstrate that (a) the effect of intrinsic mass preferences for democracy on effective democratic institutions is statistically independent and (b) there is a causal mechanism explaining this effect.

**Establishing Statistical Independence**

To make credible that the effect of an earlier measure of one variable on a later measure of another variable is causal, one has to demonstrate that this effect is statistically independent (a) from alternative causes and (b) from reverse causality (Bollen 1984).

To begin with alternative causes, modernization is the most widely discussed cause in the promotion of democracy (for an overview see Boix 2003). Thus, we tested the effect of intrinsic democratic preferences in 1995-2000 on effective democratic institutions in 2006 (the latest available measure) against a host of modernization indicators, each measured at the beginning of the period over which we measured democratic
preferences, that is, in and about 1995. But regardless which indicator we use, the effect of preferences on institutions remains always strongly positive and highly significant. In the worst case, under control of the advancement of a society's knowledge economy, the effect yields a partial correlation of \( r = +.49 \), significant at the .001-level (\( N = 79 \)).

Considering reverse causality, we isolate that part of intrinsic democratic preferences which is independent of effective democratic institutions at the beginning of the time when the preferences are measured (in 1996 to be precise, the earliest available measure of effective democratic institutions). Because this part of intrinsic democratic preferences is free from an influence of effective democratic institutions, it is free from reverse causality. We test whether this independent part of intrinsic democratic preferences is still associated with effective democratic institutions in 2006. But to do that we isolate that part of these institutions that is unrelated to their level in 1996. This reduces effective democratic institutions to the part that is not self-perpetuating over time. Thus, controlling for effective democracy in 1996, we still find a positive partial correlation of \( r = +.30 \) (significant at the .008-level, \( N = 78 \)) between intrinsic mass preferences for democracy in 1995-2000 and effective democracy in 2006. Including as an additional control the strongest modernization indicator we could find, the knowledge economy in 1995, the partial correlation decreases to \( r = +.26 \) but remains significant at the .024-level (the knowledge economy's own partial association with effective democracy is \( r = +.08 \) and insignificant).

These findings establish that the positive effect of intrinsic mass preferences for democracy in 1995-2000 on effective democratic institutions in 2006 is statistically independent (a) from alternative causes and (b) from reverse causality. But temporal order

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As control indicators we used 1995 measures of the ten-component “modernization index” by Hadenius and Teorell (2006), the “social progress index” by Estes (1998), the “human development index” of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2000), a measure of “capital mobility” used by Boix (2003), the “white settler mortality rate” (logged and non-logged versions) used by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), per capita GDP in purchasing power parities (logged and non-logged versions), the “index of power resources” by Vanhanen (2003) and the World Bank’s “knowledge index.” We also used 1995 measures of the “Gini-index” to control for the effect of income equality as well as Alesina et al.’s (2000) “ethnic fractionalization index.” Furthermore, we controlled for percentages of denominational Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims in a society as of the mid 1990s, based on data from the Encyclopedia Britannica.

To measure advancement of the knowledge economy we use the World Bank’s “knowledge index” (KI) as of 1995, which indicates “a society’s ability to generate, adopt and, diffuse knowledge. The KI is the simple average of the normalized scores of a society on the key variables in the three knowledge economy pillars: education, innovation, and ICT (World Bank 2008).” The knowledge index combines data on education (using indicators like the tertiary enrollment ratio), on innovation (using indicators like the number of patents per 10,000 inhabitants), and on information technology (using indicators like the number of internet hosts per 1,000 inhabitants). The index is scaled from 0 to 1.0, with higher values indicating a stronger knowledge economy. A description of index construction and data are available for download at: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp.
and statistical independence are only necessary and not sufficient conditions to establish causality. In addition, one must specify a plausible causal mechanism and demonstrate its operation. By what mechanism could substantive mass demands for democracy affect the substantive supply of democracy?

**Congruence Mechanisms**

As we argued in the theory section, substantive mass demands for democracy should affect the level at which elites supply democracy substantively because these demands provide a source of mass pressures to democratize. For this to be the case, two mechanisms must be in operation. First, there must be a demand creating mechanism through which people adopt intrinsic democratic preferences and this mechanism must work independent of the prior endurance of democracy. Otherwise intrinsic preferences for democracy could not become a source of democratizing pressures under absent democracy. Second, there must be a demand activating mechanism through which intrinsic democratic preferences translate into expressive mass actions that make these preferences felt to those in power. This link must hold against state repression. Otherwise intrinsic democratic preferences could not be a source of democratizing mass pressures when power holders issue repressive measures against expressive actions.

Let’s consider the demand creating mechanism. The crucial question is whether there are factors that make the utility of democratic freedoms so obvious that people begin to value these freedoms independent of having experienced them. From the viewpoint of institutional learning (Rustow 1970), one would deny this possibility and argue that an intrinsic preference for democracy can only emerge after one has experienced democracy by prolonged exposure to it. In contrast to this “experience logic,” Welzel and Inglehart (2008) favor a “utility logic.” The key point is that, even if people have gained no experience with democratic freedoms, the idea of exerting freedoms can become intuitively appealing to them. People do not need to have freedoms in order to imagine how useful they can be. Yet, the utility of freedoms is perceived more easily in cognitively mobilized societies in which high levels of education and an advanced knowledge economy equip people with higher cognitive skills. These skills widen people’s action repertoire and their awareness of it. Widened repertoires and awareness increase the actual as well as the perceived utility of democratic freedoms: the actual utility increases because people with a wider repertoire can do more with freedoms; the perceived utility increases because people with more awareness recognize easier what use they have of freedoms. Actual and perceived utility determine how strongly people wish freedoms to be established when they are denied and how strongly they wish to protect them when they are supplied.

Now consider the demand activating mechanism. Here the question is whether intrinsic preferences for democracy translate into expressive actions that make these preferences felt to those in power. This is an evident question because state repression might block preferences from action. If this were the case, intrinsic preferences for de-
democracy could not be a source of mass democratizing pressures in repressive regimes. However, “value-expectancy theory” (Klandermans 1984; Opp 1999), “intrinsic value theory” (Axelrod 1986), and “expressive utility theory” (Kuran 1993) suggest that preferences lead to action even in the presence of repression, if these preferences are intrinsic. Superficial preferences that are not anchored in deeply held beliefs have little “intrinsic value.” Such preferences are easily discouraged from action and “falsified.” But this is different for intrinsic preferences. By definition, intrinsic preferences are internalized as values that make people believe in the legitimacy of their preferences (Axelrod 1984:1104). Intrinsic preferences inspire people with a sense of what is morally their right. Goals that appeal to people by an ethos of justice have extra mobilizing power because of their “expressive utility” (Kuran 1993:183). People who have deeply internalized an ideal, such as freedom, yield an “expressive use” from taking action for this ideal—irrespective of the success of this action. Goals with a high expressive use are less susceptible to collective action problems because the expressive use is unavailable to people who free-ride on others’ action. Only the ones who act yield it. Expressive utility, thus, increases readiness for action and this effect can trump the discouraging effect of repression at times.

In summary, two mechanisms must operate for intrinsic democratic preferences to become a source of democratizing mass pressures. First, there must be a demand creating mechanism, such as cognitive mobilization, that allows intrinsic democratic preferences to emerge independent of a society’s experience with democracy. Second, there must be a demand activating mechanism that translates intrinsic democratic preferences into expressive mass actions that make these preferences felt to those in power, even in the presence of repression.

To test the first proposition, we use Gerring’s “democracy stock” variable as of 1995 (Gerring et al. 2005). This variable adds up the democracy scores a society has accumulated over time on the Polity IV autocracy-democracy index but depreciates scores from past years by one percent for each year they are preceding the reference year 1995. This index reflects a society’s accumulated experience with democracy with a premium on recent experience. In addition we use the World Bank’s above described “knowledge index” in 1995. This index measures the advancement of a society’s knowledge economy, which we consider a suitable proxy of the cognitive mobilization with which the utility of freedoms is supposed to increase.

Intrinsic democratic preferences are a micro-level attribute of individuals but become relevant through their overall strength at the macro level of entire societies. To examine the micro-macro link in shaping intrinsic democratic preferences, Table 4 uses multi-level models. We are interested in the generality of the utility logic that might

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7 We thank John Gerring for his generosity in sharing his data with us.
8 In all multi-level models, variables were entered on a scale range from 0 for the lowest and 1.0 for the highest possible value. Then we followed the standard procedure in multi-level modeling (Bryk & Raudenbusch 2002) and centered all micro-level variables on the mean of the respective society and all macro-level variables on the global mean.
shape intrinsic democratic preferences. At the macro-level, we assume the utility of democratic freedoms to increase with the advancement of the knowledge economy. Accordingly, a society’s base level of intrinsic democratic preferences should grow with the advancement of the knowledge economy. But if the experience logic trumps the utility logic, the advancement of the knowledge economy would increase a society’s base level of intrinsic democratic preference only in connection with a sizeable democratic experience. In this case, the effect of the knowledge economy would turn insignificant taking a

Table 3. Examining the Demand Creating Mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDICTORS:</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.34 (41.66)***</td>
<td>.34 (56.49)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Societal-level Effects:*

- Democracy Stock 1995  
  .24 (9.83)***
- Knowledge Economy 1995  
  .27 (7.82)***

*Individual-level Effects:*

- Biological Age 1995-2000  
  -.08 (-7.56)***
- Political Interest 1995-2000  
  .04 (8.13)***
- Education Level 1995-2000  
  .12 (25.40)***
  * Democracy Stock  
    .11 (7.01)***
  * Knowledge Economy  
    .11 (9.39)***

*Explained Variances:*

- Within-society variation of DV  
  12.1%
- Between-soc. variation of DV  
  44.5%
- Variation in effect of education  
  36.7%

*N*  
200,449 respondents in 87 societies

*Note:* Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with T-ratios in parentheses. Individual-level variables are centered on society means; society-level variables are centered on the global mean. Models calculated with HLM 6.01. Data are from WVS III (1995-97) and IV (1999-2000). Significance levels: *p < .10; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

society’s democracy stock into account. At the micro level, education is a major vehicle of cognitive mobilization that should increase the perceived utility of democratic freedoms. For this reason, education should strengthen intrinsic democratic preferences. But if the experience logic holds, the democracy stock might moderate the preference effect of education. Perhaps education strengthens intrinsic democratic preferences only in societies with a sizeable democracy stock.
Model 1 in Table 3 seems to confirm the experience logic. As one can see under “societal-level effects,” the democracy stock has a significantly positive effect on a society’s base level of intrinsic democratic preferences, accounting for some 45 percent of the cross-national variation in base level of these preferences. And looking under “cross-level interactions,” one can see that the strength of education’s effect on intrinsic democratic preferences is moderated positively by the size of a society’s democracy stock: the effect of education on intrinsic democratic preferences grows stronger with the endurance of democracy. In fact, the democracy stock moderates the effect of education so strongly that this moderation accounts for about 37 percent of the cross-national variation in the strength of education’s preference effect. And yet, democracy stock does by no means entirely moderate the preference effect of education. Education helps to strengthen intrinsic democratic preferences even in societies with small democracy stocks. This is obvious from the fact that, controlling for age and political interest, the individual level effect of education on intrinsic democratic preferences remains significantly positive, even taking the moderation of this effect by democracy stock into account.

Model 2 adds a society’s advancement in the knowledge economy as a determinant of the base level of intrinsic democratic preferences and as a moderator of the preference effect of education. This changes the picture decisively. At the societal-level, much more than the democracy stock, the knowledge economy turns out to be a determinant of intrinsic democratic mass preferences. Together, the democracy stock and the knowledge economy explain almost 70 percent of the cross-national variation in the base level of intrinsic mass preferences for democracy. But as Figure 4 documents, 49 percent of the variation are accounted for by the knowledge economy and only 11 percent by the democracy stock (another 9 percent are accounted for by the inseparable overlap between the two). The situation is similar when comparing the democracy stock and the knowledge economy as moderators of the preference effect of education. As Figure 5 illustrates, the democracy stock moderates the preference effect of education in a positive manner, accounting for 25 percent of the cross-national variation in the strength of education’s effect on intrinsic democratic preferences. But the knowledge economy moderates the preference effect of education even more strongly, accounting for 41 percent of its variation. When one controls the two moderations against each other, the democracy stock becomes an almost insignificant moderator while the knowledge economy remains a highly significant moderator of education’s preference effect (see under “cross-level interactions” in Model 2). Democracy stock appears to be a strong determinant of the base level of intrinsic democratic preferences and a strong moderator of the preference effect of education only in connection with the knowledge economy.

---

9 Age and political interest are included as standard controls in political preference models. Of course the effect of education is also positive and significant without controlling for age and political interest. The age measure is taken V237 of the WVS and measures biological age in years. Political interest is taken from V95 of the WVS, which asks: “How would you say you are in politics?” We coded “not at all interested” 0, “not very interested” .33, “somewhat interested” .66 and “very interested” 1.0.
economy. Vice versa, the knowledge economy is a strong determinant and moderator in these regards even in disconnection from the democracy stock.

The fact that we find the preference effect of education to be moderated by the knowledge economy is in line with the logic of utility. Higher education provides some advantage in each society and thus has some utility everywhere. But the utility of education amplifies with the advancement of knowledge economies because an abundance of knowledge-based activities provides more opportunities to utilize education. Since the preference effect of education is supposed to derive from the utility of education, it is logical that this effect amplifies when the utility of education grows.

What about the demand activating mechanism: Do intrinsic democratic mass preferences translate into contentious actions that make these preferences felt to those in power? Again we are interested in the generality of the utility logic that might activate intrinsic democratic preferences. Because a preference has high “expressive utility” when it is intrinsic, intrinsic democratic preferences should nurture expressive actions that make these preferences felt. But the deterrence effect of repression might trump the utility logic. In this case, state repression would moderate the activation of intrinsic democratic mass preferences, perhaps to an extent that intrinsic democratic preferences are entirely blocked from expressive action when state repression is severe.

To test these propositions, we use Gibney, Wood and Cornett’s (2008) “political terror scale” as a measure of the level of state repression (Davenport 2008). As our dependent variable, we use Welzel’s (2007) index of expressive actions based on WVS data. This index measures participation in such expressive actions as petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations on a 27-point scale as footnoted.

---

10 For each year, the political terror scale measures human rights violations by the state on two five-point scales, one based on information by Amnesty International, the other based on information by the US State Department (both scales correlate at \( r = .94 \)). We average the five-point scales for each year and then the yearly measures over the period 2002-06. The resulting index is transformed into a normalized scale with minimum 0 and maximum 1.0 and centered on the global mean as entered in the multi-level models. Data and study description available at: www.politicaltrerrals.org.

11 V96 to V98 of the WVS ask whether people “would never do,” “might do” or “have done” the following: “signing petitions,” “joining boycotts,” “attending peaceful demonstrations.” We coded “would never do” 0, “might do” .30, and “have done” 1.0 for each of the three actions. The scores are added over the three actions and averaged, yielding a 27-point scale with minimum 0 (would never do any of the three) and maximum 1.0 (have done each of them). Readiness to act is coded less than a third than actual action in order to keep intention and action apart (even three intended actions do not add up to one actual action). Yet, intention is given some recognition rather than none because intention provides a pre-disposition to act that can be mobilized. For those who suspect that coding intention “spoil” our findings, we can assure that the multi-level models yield the same results when one dichotomizes actual action against everything else and analyzes this binary variable in logistic multi-level models.
Table 4. Examining the Demand Activating Mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREDICTORS:</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Expressive Action Tendency 2000-2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>Model 1 Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.29 (26.34)***</td>
<td>.29 (39.75)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Societal-level Effects:
- State Repression 2000-05 - .27 (-5.97)*** Not significant
- Intrinsic Preferences (base levels) .99 (10.08)***

Individual-level Effects:
- Biological Age 2000-05 - .04 (-2.31)*
- Political Interest 2000-05 .20 (26.08)*** .20 (26.07)***
- Education Level 2000-05 .12 (15.71)*** .12 (15.71)***
- Intrinsic Preferences 2000-05 .28 (18.33)*** .28 (19.70)***
  * State Repression - .39 (-5.34)*** Not significant
  * Intrinsic Preferences (base levels) .99 (4.96)***

Explained Variances:
- Within-society variation of DV 15.2% 15.2%
- Between-society variation of DV 28.6% 68.4%
- Variation in effect of preferences 47.4% 59.6%

N 194,414 respondents in 88 societies

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with T-ratios in parentheses. Individual-level variables are centered on society means; society-level variables are centered on the global mean. Models calculated with HLM 6.01. Data are from WVS IV (1999-2000) and V (2005). Significance levels: *p<.10; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Again we use multi-level models to examine the micro-macro interplay in activating intrinsic democratic preferences. Model 1 in Table 4 shows that state repression has a significantly negative effect on a society’s base level of expressive actions, explaining about 29 percent of the variation in base levels of expressive actions. In addition, state repression moderates negatively the otherwise positive effect of intrinsic democratic preferences on expressive actions: with more severe state repression the activation effect of intrinsic preferences diminishes and about 47 percent of this diminishment is explained just by state repression. Still, it is noteworthy that the activation of intrinsic preferences remains relatively high even in the presence of high levels of state repression.

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12 We chose to present the models in Tables 4 and 5 in sequential temporal order to signify that we think the demand creating mechanism tested in Table 4 to precede the demand activating mechanism tested in Table 5. However, our results do not rest on this temporal specification. Instead, when calculating the models in Table 4 in the temporal specification of the models in Table 5, and vice versa, we obtain identical results.
Figure 4. Intrinsic Democratic Preferences as a Function of a Democracy Stock and the Knowledge Economy
Figure 5. Education’s Effect on Intrinsic Democratic Preferences as a Function of Democracy Stock and the Knowledge Economy
Figure 6. Expressive Actions as a Function of State Repression and the Level of Intrinsic Democratic Preferences

\[ y = 0.0533x - 0.1106 \]

\[ R^2 = 0.0172 \]

Intrinsic Democratic Preferences (controlling for state repression)

\[ y = 1.0886x - 0.1327 \]

\[ R^2 = 0.5518 \]

State Repression (controlling for intrinsic preference level)
Figure 7. Intrinsic Democratic Preferences’ Effect on Expressive Actions as a Function of State Repression and the Level of these Preferences
Democratic preferences is not entirely moderated by state repression: even controlling for this moderation, intrinsic democratic preferences retain a generally positive effect on expressive actions. State repression diminishes this tendency but does not eliminate it. In fact, the role of state repression as a depressor of expressive action turns out to be fully insignificant as soon as we take the base level of a society’s intrinsic democratic preferences into account.

This is obvious from Model 2. At the societal-level, the explained variance in the base level of expressive mass actions raises from 29 to 68 percent when we include the base level of a society’s intrinsic democratic preferences. Controlling for these preferences’ positive effect on expressive actions, the negative effect of state repression becomes insignificant. Figure 6 visualizes this finding. Of the 68 percent explained variance in base levels of expressive actions, an insignificant 2 percent are accounted for by state repression, while fully 55 percent are accounted for by the base level of intrinsic democratic preferences (another 11 percent are accounted for by the inseparable overlap between the two). Looking at moderations, Figure 7 confirms that state repression diminishes the activation effect of intrinsic democratic preferences at the individual level. This negative moderation accounts for 29 percent of the cross-national variation in the size of the activation effect. But stronger than the negative moderation of the activation effect by state repression is its positive moderation by a society’s base level of intrinsic democratic preferences. This accounts for 37 percent of the cross-national variation in the size of the activation effect. Controlling the two moderations against each other (see Model 2 under “cross-level interactions”), only the positive moderation by a society’s base level of intrinsic democratic preferences proves significant.

That a person’s intrinsic democratic preferences affect this person’s tendency to take action more strongly when a society’s base level of intrinsic democratic preferences is higher, makes sense. Specifically, this finding makes sense in the utility logic: it shows that the utility of expressing intrinsic preferences varies as a result of “social proof,” a well-known confirmation mechanism in social psychology (Cialdini 1993). Accordingly, when one sees more people in one’s society holding one’s own intrinsic preferences, one feels socially confirmed in these preferences. Social confirmation encourages action for these preferences, increasing their “expressive utility” when more people share them.

These findings demonstrate, first, that the mechanism that shapes intrinsic democratic preferences is not primarily conditioned by the endurance of democracy. Instead, intrinsic democratic preferences are shaped by a utility logic that operates largely independent of democracy. Second, the mechanism that activates intrinsic democratic preferences is by no means disabled by state repression. The very intrinsincness of these preferences gives them such high “expressive utility” that even repression cannot block them from expressive action. In summary, intrinsic democratic preferences are shaped and activated by a utility logic whose operation neither requires the presence of democracy nor the absence of repression. In connection, these two conditions make the emergence of mass pressures to democratize possible.
CONCLUSION

Democracy is a supply-demand phenomenon. On the supply side it becomes manifest in that power holders institutionalize democracy. On the demand side it is reflected in ordinary people’s preference for democracy. Substantiveness is an essential aspect of both the supply of democracy and the demand for it, raising the question, “To what extent do given democratic supplies and demands indicate a genuine commitment to the freedoms that define democracy?”

On the supply-side, genuine commitments to democratic freedoms require elites to adopt enlightened power practices that effectively respect the democratic freedoms that are formally enacted. Hence, we specify substantive supplies of democracy by depreciating institutionalized democracy for the absence of enlightened governance. On the demand-side, genuine commitments to democratic freedoms require the masses to embrace emancipative values that prize democracy intrinsically for the freedoms that define it. Thus, we specify substantive demands for democracy by depreciating overt preferences for democracy for the absence of emancipative values.

Unsubstantiated measures of supply-side and demand-side democracy are largely incongruent, showing many cases in which elites apparently over-supply democracy relative to what the masses demand, and even more cases in which they seem to under-supply democracy. In substantive terms, however, elites rarely over-supply democracy. In most cases where this seems to be the case, the supplies are devoid of substance, evidencing that formally enacted democratic freedoms are not effectively respected in practice. Likewise, elites hardly under-supply democracy relative to people’s demands. In all cases where this seems to be true, mass demands for democracy lack substance, reflecting the absence of values that prize democracy for its intrinsic freedoms. In substantive terms, then, elites tend to supply democratic freedoms at levels that satisfy the people’s demand for them.

Further evidence suggests that mass demands for democracy become substantive when cognitive mobilization increases the actual and perceived utility of democratic freedoms. This effect is independent of whether and how long democracy is already in place in a country. Democracy itself is not needed to produce a substantive demand for it. Moreover, once demands for democracy have become substantive, their intrinsicness gives them expressive utility and so they nurture expressive actions that make these demands felt, even in the face of repression. Congruence in substantive terms is unlikely to exist simply because the masses internalize the regime choices of elites. It is more likely to emerge because the elites satisfy mass demands, once these demands have become substantive. In conclusion, the perspective of “substantive democracy” is helpful for evidencing and understanding a classic theme of political science: democratic congruence.
REFERENCES


