

Deleuze, a Split with Foucault

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Deleuze, a Split with Foucault

In 1977, Deleuze and Foucault found themselves in opposite camps in the public dispute among French intellectuals, resulting in a parting of the ways between two colleagues who had for many years been friends. Deleuze considered the reason for the split to have been their differing ideas on the connection between the historical situation and philosophical thought; in his view, it was occasioned by the debate over the New Philosophers, in which Foucault supported those intellectuals who, according to Deleuze, opposed the creative thinking of philosophy. After Foucault's death, Deleuze sought to reconcile the two positions, but his attempts only highlighted the depth of the division between them.

KEYWORDS

deleuze, dispositif, foucault, philosophy, power, resistance, revolution, society, television

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1. Introduction

There was a point in time, wrote Deleuze in 1990, before which he had been a political follower of Foucault, and after which he no longer shared Foucault's "evaluation" of many issues.¹ This moment must have come in 1977, when Deleuze and Foucault found themselves in quite obvious mutual opposition, first in the debate over the New Philosophers and then in relation to the Croissant case. 1977 was the year of the German Autumn, as well as of the strongest protest and resistance movement of the *Autonomia Operaia* in Italy. It was, however, also a year of struggles in the Parisian universities, as well as among French intellectuals. Badiou stormed a lecture by Deleuze at the head of a brigade of intervention, for example, and Baudrillard launched an open assault on Foucault's conception of power and pleasure with his polemic *Forget Foucault*. It was with these and other commotions that the period in France that had begun in May 1968 came to an end, pushed into the background by a reactionary transformation of society first noticeable in 1977 that went on to mark the presidency of François Mitterrand. Deleuze perceived one important aspect of this transformation in the new importance accorded to marketing, which led to profound changes in the media landscape and influenced the public confrontation with philosophy and art.

The split between Deleuze and Foucault must be looked at against the background of the sociopolitical change occurring in the late 1970s. The probable cause of the split, at least for Deleuze, was the debate concerning the New Philosophers, in which Foucault, in line with these intellectuals, rejected the creative thinking of philosophy as dangerous: the reason could only have been that Foucault did not share Deleuze's conception of the distinction between the prevailing relations of power and the primary forces. Unlike Foucault, who was going through a crisis at the time, Deleuze had nothing in his psychological or personal life to indicate a reason for the split. After Foucault's death in 1984, Deleuze sought to reconcile the two positions, but his attempt only highlighted the depth of the division between the two erstwhile companions.

The friendship between Deleuze and Foucault began in 1962 and was fostered by their shared project to develop and continue Nietzsche's thought. Foucault became aware of Deleuze through the book *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, and they collaborated on a French edition of Nietzsche's complete works. At the time the two parted ways in the late 1970s, however, both were invoking Nietzsche less and less. The German philosopher remained the distant basis for Foucault's revival of the critical tradition: in his final years, Foucault devoted himself above all to redefining the conditions under which individuals could liberate themselves from the prevailing relations of power. Tellingly, he concerned himself with Kant's question, "What is Enlightenment?" Deleuze, by contrast, delved into the problem of creation, first and foremost in a 1980s confrontation with the paintings of Francis Bacon and with cinema. In *What is Philosophy?*, his

Author's note: This article was translated from German by Michael Scuffil and Casey Butterfield.

¹ James Miller: *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, New York: Simon and Schuster 1993, p. 298.

final book, he and Guattari developed a conception of philosophy as creative thinking. As a successor of Nietzsche, Deleuze rejected the assumption of an immutable foundation of the world, arguing that our world is not a moving image of eternity, as in Plato, but rather a movement-image, without any relation to eternity.

Even during the period that Deleuze and Foucault were working together as friends, each one's thought differed considerably from the other's. One example is the conversation entitled "Intellectuals and Power" (1972), in which they jointly grapple with the following question: How are the entanglements of power that organize and shape our society and experience constituted, and how is it possible to extract oneself from these entanglements or resist them? Whereas Deleuze declares that theory and praxis are entangled in that together they form a multitude of relays, Foucault stresses that theory is a praxis. For Deleuze, theory by its nature extricates itself from organization through power; for Foucault, it is a form of the struggle against power.² The background to this conversation was the *Groupe d'information sur les prisons*, which was formed at Foucault's initiative in 1971 and which Deleuze also joined. This group sought to support prisoners by publicizing and fighting against the conditions prevailing in French prisons. As Foucault said, the task of the intellectual was not to reveal the truth about prevailing sociopolitical structures to others, but rather to undermine power and utilize it for the purpose of defending oneself in particular instances against prohibitions and constraints, surveillance and control.

2. The Odd Term of Power

Discipline and Punish was published in 1975, *The Will to Knowledge* in 1976, the first volume of Foucault's history of sexuality. *The Will to Knowledge* was well received by the public, but Foucault noticed within his own circle a certain lack of comprehension toward this book. He subsequently suffered an intellectual crisis, and in 1977 opened himself up to Deleuze once more, who sent him a detailed note addressing *Discipline and Punish* and *The Will to Knowledge*. In this note, which is known under the title "Desire and Pleasure," Deleuze makes it clear that Foucault is causing problems for him, problems that he directly attributes to the differences that separate Foucault's position from his own. He brings home the extent of these problems to Foucault by demonstratively ending his note in aporia. Foucault is said to have decided shortly after reading "Desire and Pleasure" that he would have no more to do with Deleuze.³

In the two books with which Deleuze concerns himself in his lengthy note, Foucault defines power as a productivity that extends unrestricted into every corner. It generates both things and knowledge of things, shapes both individuals and their understanding. Power, for Foucault, denotes an organizational strategy that spans a network into which dispositives are inscribed. These formations, tied together by power, enforce the organizational strategy in all areas. They

² See Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault: *Intellectuals and Power* [1972], in: Gilles Deleuze: *Desert Islands and Other Texts*, New York: Semiotext(e) 2004, p. 206–13, here pp. 206–208.

³ See Miller: *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, p. 297.

permeate individuals, and through them the whole of society: things and individual bodies, knowledge, and the apparatus of domination in a state, its legislation, and its institutions: "power is [...] the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society."⁴ The entanglements of power also give rise to scattered points of resistance that have no cause but power itself, which they resist. These points, for Foucault, form "the odd term in relations of power [...] an irreducible opposite."⁵

In "Desire and Pleasure," Deleuze states that it is necessary to assume another plane in addition to the network of power. He then breaks off his confrontation with Foucault's comprehension of knowledge, pleasure and power: "Here I stop since two very different types of planes would be interacting here."⁶ In Deleuze's view, Foucault would first have to lay out a plane that established the foundations for the field on which the network of power was constituted. Whereas for Foucault the odd term of power is formed by the points of resistance, for Deleuze it refers to a primary plane which differs by nature from the sociopolitical field in which relations of power are effective. The points of resistance that escape from the strategy of power cannot be explained unless they are understood as interplays of uncoordinated powers, indeed as interplays of ineffective forces.⁷ Where could points of resistance emerge at all, asks Deleuze, if all the various dispositives of power dominated both politics and the economy, as well as the experience of individuals? Who could power allow to stand up to its organizational strategy? Foucault invokes the specific intellectual, who, like any other individual, is also bound to the dispositives that determine the knowledge or the truth of a society.⁸ But how is precisely this intellectual expected to be in a position to escape from the network of power? After all, is he not an excellent instrument of power himself, as long as his political function combines knowledge and power?

Deleuze is able to agree with Foucault's view that those factors which shape our social order are subject to an organizational strategy of power. The concept of power for Deleuze denotes a limited productivity, however. Power provides for the stabilization of movements of change, which permeate society but cannot generate anything totally new. Society does not so much form a rigid architecture of power as a field on which different movements, held together and suppressed by the entanglements of power, cross over one another: "A social field is not defined

⁴ Michel Foucault: *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, trans. Robert Hurley, New York: Pantheon Books 1978 [French 1976], p. 93.

⁵ Foucault: *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, p. 96: "Resistances do not derive from a few heterogeneous principles."

⁶ Gilles Deleuze: *Desire and Pleasure* [French 1994], trans. Lysa Hochroth, in: Gilles Deleuze: *Two Regimes of Madness*, New York: Semiotext(e) 2006, 122–134, here: p. 133 (translation modified).

⁷ The primary plane of which Deleuze speaks is an immanent diagram of forces, a microscopic plane. The second plane, by contrast, is the organizing network of power, a macroscopic plane. "In any case, there is heterogeneity, a difference in the nature between micro and macro, which in no way excludes the immanence of the two. So, my question would be the following: Does this difference in nature allow us to keep talking about dispositives of power?" (in: Gilles Deleuze: *Desire and Pleasure*, p. 119, translation modified). Deleuze does not want to describe an assemblage permeated by the two planes as a dispositive of power, because the dispositive of power only spans one of these planes, and, furthermore, the one that only knows a limited productivity.

⁸ See Michel Foucault: *Truth and Power* [French 1977], trans. Colin Gordon, in: Michel Foucault: *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. by Colin Gordon, New York: Pantheon Books 1980, pp. 109–133, here pp. 126–133.

by its contradictions."⁹ A social field must first and foremost be described by its movements of change and renewal, not by the prevailing relations of power or the resistance offered to these relations.

The dispositives of power form the historical state of society, but in order to do so, in Deleuze's view, they must suppress the renewal movements emerging from the creative forces. He therefore presupposes precisely that primary plane that he considers to be missing in Foucault. The relations of power only ever emerge from fundamental interplays of forces, precisely because they implement these as effective relations of power and consolidate them there. Only on the plane of forces it is possible for something totally new to emerge as a result of new interplays of forces. The relations of power can change when the new creation finds a correlation in the sociopolitical field, in the given historical situation.¹⁰ Accordingly, the task of the intellectual or rather of the philosopher or the artist, does not directly consist of generating resistance.¹¹ In Deleuze's view, anyone who believes that the philosopher can deploy the mechanisms of power against themselves more easily than can any other individual, that he can put power out of action, has succumbed to an illusion. Deleuze stresses that capitalism, state and religion, opinion and the media are powers, but that philosophy is not. Philosophy cannot win in a direct fight against these powers, and so wages a minor war from a position of concealment.¹² It condenses the fundamental forces in order to generate those new creations that can serve as the starting points for changing sociopolitical relations.

Contrary to popular opinion, *The Will to Knowledge* contains no trenchant criticism of Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* (1972), for which Foucault wrote a foreword to the American translation of the work in 1977.¹³ According to him, sex, pleasure, and the knowledge disseminated about them are what regulate the shaping of our individual subjectivity. Because they largely serve the organizational strategy of power, by interweaving with it and multiplying, repressing sex and pleasure is not the foremost priority of the organizational strategy. "Pleasure and power do not cancel or turn back against one another; they seek out, overlap, and reinforce one another."¹⁴ For Deleuze there is a difference between what he, together with Guattari, calls desire on the one hand and pleasure on the other, just as the interplays between forces differ from the relations of power. Pleasure binds desire to individual bodies and transforms desire into the

⁹ Deleuze: *Desire and Pleasure*, p. 127.

¹⁰ As such, Deleuze and Guattari wrote in 1984 that "May '68 was not the result of a crisis, nor was it a reaction to a crisis. It is rather the opposite. It is the current crisis, the impasses of the current crisis in France that stem directly from the inability of French society to assimilate May '68." (in: Deleuze: *May '68 Did Not Take Place* [French 1984], in: *Two Regimes of Madness*, pp. 233–236, here p. 234).

¹¹ Deleuze himself declared that Foucault's problem was how it could be that the organization of the relations of power does not lead to an ossification of society, and how it was possible to resist this organization. His own problem, by contrast, was how it could be that renewal movements and refugee movements did not lead to the dissolution of society, and how it was possible for the prevailing relations to maintain their organization. See Deleuze: *Foucault and Prison* [1986], in: *Two Regimes of Madness*, pp. 272–281, here p. 280.

¹² See Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin, New York: Columbia University Press 1995, epigraph.

¹³ See François Dosse: *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman, New York: Columbia University Press 2010 [French 2007], p. 316.

¹⁴ Foucault: *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, p. 48.

pleasure of a particular subject of experience. It represses desire, but at the same time is constitutive of the individual subject that feels this pleasure. With pleasure, then, the organizational strategy of power enters the body.¹⁵

3. Mediocracy and Philosophy

The New Philosophers, above all André Glucksmann and Bernard-Henri Lévy, are the focus of a 1977 debate in which Deleuze and Foucault quite clearly were at opposite poles. The appearance of the New Philosophers went hand in hand with a profound change in the French media landscape. The television program *Apostrophes*, on which Foucault appeared as a guest in 1976, played an important part here, beginning with its launch in 1975. *Apostrophes* had far-reaching effects on how the public grappled with philosophy and literature, attracting attention to a new generation of authors who were well trained in the media and sought it out. As Deleuze stresses, the New Philosophers pushed themselves into the spotlight by criticizing the renewal movements of May 1968 as fantasies and condemning any philosophical thinking that made it its aim to change the social system as a whole.¹⁶ They justified the reactionary transformation of French society, for example, by pointing to the bloodshed that every revolutionary upheaval to date had led to. Indeed, as part of the reform of the educational system initiated by the minister René Haby, philosophy instruction in high schools was to be sharply reduced. The University of Paris VIII, which had been set up in 1968 as an experimental academic center, and at which Deleuze had begun teaching in 1970, was transferred from Vincennes to the suburb of Saint-Denis in 1980.

Foucault emerged as a highly regarded advocate of Glucksmann. He supported him when he published his book *La Cuisinière et le Mangeur d'Hommes* and in 1977 wrote a positive review of his *The Master Thinkers*. Only a month after this review, Deleuze circulated a short treatise on the New Philosophers, in which he mercilessly unmasked them. As he did not want to turn to the media, he decided to publish the text and distribute free copies in bookstores. In the treatise, Deleuze analysed how journalism was changing as a result of marketing becoming ever more important. Television and radio talks, discussions, and interviews often counted for more than the books being discussed. Audiovisual media in particular gave journalism the power to control opinion through surveys, to determine the importance of different incidents, and even to generate several incidents on its own. Deleuze talked of "a new type of thought, the interview-thought, the conversation-thought, the sound bite-thought."¹⁷ He realized that the New Philos-

¹⁵ Regarding desire and pleasure, Deleuze defines the first of the two very different types of planes as the body-without-organs. This type of plane "opposes all strata of organization" that "will impose upon desire another type of plane, each time stratifying the body-without-organs." (in: Deleuze: *Desire and Pleasure*, p. 130).

¹⁶ "You're on about May 68 again! Whether your thinking tends to the left or the right, you will of course agree, that that was the 'nonesuch' revolution. And, consequently, it was nothing at all." (in: André Glucksmann: *The Master Thinkers*, trans. Brian Pearce, New York: Harper and Row 1980 [French 1977], p. 68).

¹⁷ Gilles Deleuze: *On the New Philosophers (Plus a More General Problem)* [French 1977], trans. Amy Hodges and Mike Taormina, in: *Two Regimes of Madness*, pp. 139–147, here p. 143.

ophers, in trying to utilize the power of the media for themselves, were encouraging the surrender of thought to the media. They were reducing thought to the form of the interview, and jumping on all creative thinking in order to inhibit it. "This marketing enterprise represents the submission of thought to the media. By the same token, thought offers the media a minimum intellectual guarantee and peace of mind to stifle any attempts at creation which would make the media themselves evolve."¹⁸

In his review of *The Master Thinkers*, Foucault praised Glucksmann for not wanting to refute thought with a different thought, nor to wrap it in contradictions; he saw Glucksmann's intent as to "confront [thought] face-to-face with the real that imitates it, to stick its nose in this blood which the thought abhors, absolves and justifies."¹⁹ What Glucksmann actually does is to put thought, and philosophy in particular, into direct contact with historical occurrences. He reverses a simple view of how Marxism bases ideology and the corresponding forms of consciousness on social relations. Borrowing from Foucault, Glucksmann speaks of "a strategy of the text turned into law," which prescribes a particular structure of society and binds individuals into this structure through various mechanisms of power.²⁰ Unlike Foucault, however, he equates these mechanisms of power with the state apparatus: in his view, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche wrote the original text of the German nation-state in the nineteenth century. They gradually developed the strategy that prepared the ground for the Nazis, pressing for the establishment of a German state, committing German society to a revolution of its own, and providing the instruments of knowledge, "the mental apparatus which is indispensable for launching the grand final solutions of the twentieth century."²¹ Glucksmann blamed the lack of resistance to the Nazis on the totalitarian thought of these philosophers.

The New Philosophers are adherents of the ideals of a liberal democracy. They advocate free expression of opinion, the right to strikes and demonstrations, and human rights.²² Their view corresponds to the assumption that the media combine knowledge and power without resorting to the mechanisms of the state apparatus in the process, which is why the New Philosophers are also glad to make themselves available for discussions and interviews that will be broadcast to the masses on television or through other media: the media are increasingly geared to the open market, not state totality, and they shape public opinion according to the interests and needs of society. In this way the media play an important role for the New Philosophers if they

¹⁸ Deleuze: *On the New Philosophers (Plus a More General Problem)*, p. 147.

¹⁹ Michel Foucault: *La grande colère des faits* [1977], in: Michel Foucault: *Dits et écrits, tome 3: 1976–1979*, Paris: Gallimard 1994, pp. 277–281, here p. 279 (translated by the author).

²⁰ Glucksmann: *The Master Thinkers*, p. 38. "Custom requires that text and territory be made to go together [...]. This correspondence runs only one way: from a certain territory a certain text has emerged." (Ibid., p. 37) Glucksmann reverses this correspondence.

²¹ Glucksmann: *The Master Thinkers*, p. 286.

²² Which is what distinguishes modern powers for Glucksmann: "It is not the absence or presence of state ('totalitarian') terrorism, which we find everywhere, but rather the conditions under which it is possible to *struggle against this* — the very concrete possibilities of communication one's opinion, of going on strike, of demonstrating, of examining the records of the powerful, of stopping a colonial or imperial war, or of preventing its secret commencement." (in: André Glucksmann: *The Master Thinkers*, p. 268).

want to be in the position as intellectuals to draw on opinion in order to strengthen the resistance against any political diktat or philosophical vision that derives from a strategist or master thinker.

4. The Split with Foucault

The Croissant case put Deleuze and Foucault at blatantly opposite poles for the second time in 1977, although both were opposed to the extradition of Klaus Croissant to the Federal Republic of Germany. Croissant, who had applied for asylum in France in 1977, was the attorney representing Andreas Baader, a leading member of the Red Army Faction. Whereas Deleuze wrote an article with Guattari indicating West Germany's repressive policy, Foucault deployed juridical arguments.²³ In 1984, Foucault mentioned that because he was unwilling to accept the "terrorism and blood" of the Red Army Faction, he and Deleuze had not been in contact since the Croissant case.²⁴ Deleuze does not express approval of terrorism in any form in the article he coauthored with Guattari in 1977, but he does emphasize that in the course of revolutionary movements, the question arises as to whether one should resort to violence or even terror in response to the violence and bloody inequalities generated by the capitalist system.²⁵

In the autumn of 1978, Foucault visited Iran twice in order to report on the Islamic Revolution for the Italian daily newspaper *Corriere della sera*. His reporting was part of a series of investigative reports about ideas that he was working on with Glucksmann and others. He spent his trips to Iran exploring the link between the ideas that motivated the people on the one hand, and sociopolitical factors on the other. In contrast to the Croissant case, Foucault did not reject the attempt at a social revolution in the country out of hand, presumably because he had the impression that in Iran a whole nation was rising up against the prevailing power structures. The Red Army Faction dictated a revolutionary upheaval and demanded bloody sacrifices from the population. In Iran, however, Foucault saw a people fighting of their own accord against an apparatus of domination that they could no longer tolerate. He saw the revolution as a great political strike and declared: "The uprising of a whole society has choked off the possibility of civil war."²⁶ Foucault does not come across as an advocate of an Islamic government in his reporting. But he does support an upheaval that does not involve the implementation of a political program: "because there is no plan for a government and because the slogans are simple, there can be a clear, obstinate, almost unanimous popular will."²⁷ He throws his weight behind a community

²³ See Gilles Deleuze: *Europe the Wrong Way* [French 1977], trans. Amy Hodges and Mike Taormina, in: *Two Regimes of Madness*, 148–150. See also Michel Foucault: *Va-t-on extraditer Klaus Croissant?* [1977], in: *Dits et écrits, tome 3*, pp. 361–365.

²⁴ Didier Eribon: *Michel Foucault*, trans. Betsy Wing, London: Faber and Faber 1993 [French 1989], p. 260.

²⁵ See Gilles Deleuze: *Europe the Wrong Way*, p. 148.

²⁶ Michel Foucault: *A Revolt with Bare Hands* [Italian 1978], in: Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson (eds.): *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution. Gender and the Seduction of Islamism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2005, pp. 210–213, here p. 211.

²⁷ Michel Foucault: *A Revolt with Bare Hands*, p. 212.

that, by its own hand, shapes the relations of power that correspond to the knowledge, the Islamic faith, that they themselves have chosen.

The Islamic Revolution did not bring a new freedom to the Iranian people. Foucault's reports earned him much criticism, and he replied by stating plainly that he was opposed to any strategist — whether the religious leader, a follower of the shah, or anyone else — who urged revolution and claimed that "a particular death, a particular cry, a particular revolt" made no difference "compared to the great general necessity."²⁸ In line with the New Philosophers, Foucault not only spoke out against the propagation of a comprehensive strategy, but also considered that philosophy was always to be rejected as totalitarian thought when it did not see itself as a praxis that played a part in the struggle against power, since philosophy in such a case would not serve the resistance, but bring disaster. A philosopher must subject the demands and visions of his thought, the instruments of the knowledge that he constructs, to a practical test. He must himself implement the effects of his ideas in his experience, in order to find out whether they help, at particular points, to liberate oneself from the entanglements of power.

In "What is Enlightenment?," an article dating from 1984, Foucault makes clear the stance to which his path leads him as a critical thinker, stressing that "the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions."²⁹ The hubris of the philosophers gives rise to an empty dream of freedom, with dangerous consequences for those who believe in it. For Foucault, the figures who must answer for a change in thinking and a social upheaval are only those who can hold themselves to account for the consequences through a practical test. That same year, Foucault underscored in a conversation "the [fundamental] relationship between philosophy and politics" and pointed in this regard to ancient Greece, where the "philosopher becomes the prince's counselor, teacher, and spiritual adviser."³⁰

Foucault supported the New Philosophers and encouraged their condemnation of any creative thinking. His rejection, in line with these intellectuals, of any philosophy that was not answerable to the consequences of its demands and visions in a practical test was probably what estranged Deleuze: Foucault repudiated the kind of creative thinking in philosophy that Deleuze was seeking to develop as dangerous, because it was a comprehensive outline of another way of thinking. For Deleuze, philosophy's remit is to use renewal movements that emerge from creative forces in order to counter the movements that shape our society and our individual experience. Accordingly, we read in *What is Philosophy?* that "it is not false to say that the revolu-

²⁸ Michel Foucault: *Useless to Revolt?* [French 1979], trans. Robert Hurley, in: Michel Foucault: *Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 3: Power*, ed. by J. Faubion, New York: The New Press 2001, pp. 449–453, here p. 453.

²⁹ Michel Foucault: *What is Enlightenment?*, trans. Robert Hurley, in: Michel Foucault: *Essential Works of Foucault, Volume: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. by Paul Rabinow, New York: The New Press 1997, pp. 303–319, here p. 316.

³⁰ Michel Foucault: *The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom* [Italian 1984], trans. Robert Hurley, in: Michel Foucault: *Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 1: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. by Paul Rabinow, New York: The New Press 1997, pp. 281–301, p. 293.

tion 'is the fault of philosophers' (although it is not philosophers who lead it)."³¹ The philosopher can condense the fundamental forces and thereby create the starting points for the change in historical relations, but he does not provide any prescriptions for sociopolitical transformation. The philosopher qua philosopher is not a political activist, not a strategist of power, and not a spiritual adviser, but a creator.

Foucault changed a variety of his views following the publication of *The Will to Knowledge*, including his conception of the scattered points of resistance that result from the entanglements of power. He did not follow Deleuze's concept of understanding the odd term of power as a fundamental plane that results from the interplay of ineffective forces. Nevertheless, there are also far-reaching differences that separated Foucault's position after 1977 from that of the New Philosophers. Glucksmann, for example, equates the mechanisms of power with the state apparatus, from which power pervades every nook and cranny of society. This is why he stresses that society's struggle for freedom must primarily be directed against the totality of the state and is therefore a struggle that understands free opinion and the open market to constitute resistance against the mechanisms of power. In Foucault's view, the various relations of power operating within a society cannot be derived from the state's apparatus of domination, for the state apparatus is itself pervaded by the organizational strategy of power.

Although Foucault changed his view of the scattered points of resistance that result from the entanglements of power following the publication of *The Will to Knowledge*, he clung to the view that the points of resistance themselves were part of the social field organized by the relations of power. In 1977, Foucault said that "there is indeed always something in the social body, in classes, groups and individuals themselves which in some sense escapes relations of power" because it forms the "underside" — the odd term, as it were — of these relations.³² This *something* was characterized by Foucault as a given possibility of freedom. The Iranian people thus seemed to be seizing a possibility when they fought of their own accord against the apparatus of domination without pursuing the implementation of a program that weakened resistance in the process by binding it to a strategy. In the years leading up to his death, Foucault attributed the possibility of freedom increasingly explicitly to the individual freedom of particular subjects. To this end, he distinguished between relations of power and states of domination. The former constituted the order of interaction or communication between individuals or groups in society: "If there are relations of power in every social field, this is because there is freedom everywhere."³³ This freedom is restricted, however, when the relations of power become ossified as states of domination. In order to examine the conditions under which possibilities of freedom provided by the social field open up to the individual, Foucault also looked at liberal govern-

³¹ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill, New York: Columbia University Press 1994 [French 1991], p. 100.

³² Michel Foucault: *Power and Strategies* [French 1977], trans. Colin Gordon, in: *Power/Knowledge*, pp. 134–145, here p. 138.

³³ Foucault: *The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom*, p. 292.

mentality and the latitude it provides for the self-regulation of the market and other social relations.³⁴

5. An Unwritten Doctrine

After Foucault's death in 1984, Deleuze once again undertook a detailed examination of the thought of his long-standing friend and colleague. He first wrote an essay entitled "Michel Foucault's Main Concepts," which he expanded into a monograph that was published two years later. In an attempt to reconcile Foucault's thought with his own, Deleuze construed the odd term of power Foucault describes in *The Will to Knowledge* as the interplay of forces that he had already envisaged in "Desire and Pleasure." There is, in Foucault, a primary plane, which is added to the plane of relations of power; there is, writes Deleuze, "a perpetual becoming [of forces] that doubles history."³⁵

Whereas in "Desire and Pleasure" Deleuze ends his confrontation with Foucault's position in aporia, after Foucault's death he indicates an alternative, declaring that Foucault's books analyse a variety of historical situations and invent their own specific means to this end. However, this takes into account only half of Foucault's work, as Deleuze points out most clearly in "What is a *dispositif*?", a lecture from 1988: "Out of a sense of rigor, to avoid confusing things and trusting in his readers, he does not formulate the other half." Foucault formulated the other half "explicitly [only] in the interviews."³⁶ The alternative Deleuze exhibits here thus appears to consist of presuming an unwritten doctrine. In actuality, such a presumption would probably have been unthinkable for him, regardless of whether Foucault had really given such great importance to his interviews. As far as Deleuze is concerned, after all, the unwritten half of Foucault's work must be that which opens up access to the fundamental interplay of forces. What Deleuze considers Foucault to have left out of his books is none other than philosophy, which, with its creative thinking, turns against the historical situation by setting out the starting points for the transformation of our society and our experience. To Deleuze, the alternative to the problems with which he is confronted by Foucault's thought can be none other than to presume that his own philosophy represents the outline of that plane that Foucault also viewed as having laid the foundations for the field on which the network of power was constituted, and to which Foucault attested in interviews.

The end of the "Geophilosophy" chapter in *What is Philosophy?* also notes that in addition to the sociopolitical field in Foucault, there is another plane that differs by nature, on which there is a

³⁴ See Michel Foucault: *The Birth of Biopolitics, Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979*, trans. Graham Burchell, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2008 [French 2004], p. 266.

³⁵ Gilles Deleuze: Michel Foucault's Main Concepts [French 1984], trans. Amy Hodges and Mike Taormina, in: *Two Regimes of Madness*, pp. 241–260, here p. 253.

³⁶ Gilles Deleuze: What is a *dispositif*? [French 1989], trans. Amy Hodges and Mike Taormina, in: *Two Regimes of Madness*, pp. 338–348, here p. 347. We cannot, according to Deleuze, "separate the books that have left such an impression on us from the interviews that lead us toward a future, toward a becoming" (*Ibid.*, p. 348).

constant becoming of forces.³⁷ This chapter, which turns on the connection between the given historical situation and philosophical thought, marks the stance toward which Deleuze's own path leads. Together with Guattari, he considers not only the connection between revolution and philosophy, but also with those factors that organize our society and shape our experience: the state and the open market, freedom of opinion, and new forms of communication. In this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari assert quite decisively: "We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation."³⁸ With its creation, philosophy does not turn to public opinion, but to the as-yet-unknown recipients that continue to wage a minor war from a position of concealment against the prevailing relations of power. The brief book *What is Philosophy?* must be seen as an attempt to avoid the assault of market-oriented interview thinking for as long as possible. Except in the context of Foucault, Deleuze stressed at every opportunity that interviews and public conversations are what philosophy needs least, because they primarily serve the ends of marketing. After Deleuze indicated in an interview in 1985 that such conversations always flatter the vanity of the interviewee, he broke it off abruptly with the words, "So, the interview is over."³⁹

³⁷ See Deleuze and Guattari: *What is Philosophy?*, pp. 112–113.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 108.

³⁹ Gilles Deleuze: Mediators [French 1985], in: *Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin, pp. 121–134, here p. 134 (translation modified).