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Prause, Louisa; Wienkoop, Nina Kathrin

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRUPTION?

Framing strategies of social movements in West Africa mobilizing against presidential term amendments.

Louisa Prause

Freie Universität Berlin

Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop

Leuphana University of Lüneburg

ABSTRACT: Since 2011 youth movements have staged large protests in African countries for presidential term limits. These have been discussed as struggles against de-democratization. Looking at the movements *Y'en a marre* in Senegal and *Balai citoyen* in Burkina Faso we argue that these protests were just as much triggered by socio-economic grievances linked to a corrupt patronage system. Indeed, corruption has been a major issue for both campaigns. We ask how the movement leaders linked the fight against corruption with their struggle against third term amendments in a way that sparked mass mobilization. We use the framing approach as our theoretical framework and show that a framing based on the concept of citizenship enabled both movements to link the issue of corruption to the issue of presidential term amendments and at the same time create a sense of agency in the constituency. This explains at least partly why both *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* succeeded in their mobilizing efforts.

KEYWORDS: Citizenship, corruption, presidential term limit, social movements, West Africa

CORRESPONDING AUTHORS: Louisa Prause: louisa.prause@fu-berlin.de; Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop: wienkoop@leuphana.de

1. Introduction

Corruption is a major factor negatively influencing the economic and democratic development of countries worldwide (Holmes 2006; You and Khagram 2005). Corruption also serves as a powerful tool through which politicians gain power and maintain their positions in office (Norris 2012; Bueno de Mesquita 2005). This fundamentally undermines citizens' trust in the political system, creating a gap between citizens and their elected representatives (Kubbe forthcoming). This is particularly evident in African countries, where clientelism and high rates of corruption adversely affect democratic governance (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Médard 2002).

In recent years, mass protests have sprung up in several African countries in order to defend democratic institutions. Many of these protests were sparked by attempts of presidents and political elites to change presidential term limits or manipulate constitutions (LeBas 2016; Yarwood 2016). Corruption has been a major issue in several of these movements. However, the issue of corruption is not widely discussed in the academic and media debate on these movements. This is surprising as studies on earlier pro-democracy movements have shown that mobilization for democracy and corruption are often linked - not only in Europe but also in Africa (Harsch 1993).

In this article, we look at two social movements¹ in West Africa that successfully mobilized thousands of supporters in their struggle to fight third term amendments: *Y'en a marre* (We are fed up) in Senegal, and *Balai Citoyen* (Citizens' Broom) in Burkina Faso. *Y'en a marre* was initially aimed at protesting ongoing electricity cuts in Dakar which were closely related to bad governance and corruption in the ministry of energy. The movement leaders mobilized the masses in 2011 and 2012, when the incumbent president Abdoulaye Wade tried to extend his term in office. In neighboring Burkina Faso, protest erupted in 2013 when the president Blaise Compaoré tried to change the constitution to his direct benefit and favor. *Balai Citoyen* emerged with the aim to "clean up" the system of corrupt elite behavior; hence they named themselves 'the citizens' broom'. Both pro-democracy uprisings gained massive support especially from young constituencies. They successfully mobilized citizens as watchdogs for corrupt politicians and contributed to installing a new president in both countries (in Senegal Wade was

¹ Even in a rather narrow understanding of the term, both dominant actors in those popular uprisings qualify as social movements. They consist of (1) a dense network with (2) a shared collective identity beyond specific events who try to (3) prevent or promote societal change by (4) non-institutionalized tactics as our short description of the protest events demonstrate (della Porta/Diani 1999; Snow et al. 2004: 11).

voted out of office, while Compaoré was ousted through mass resistance by the population).

In this article, we ask how the movements *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* in Senegal and Burkina Faso succeeded in linking the fight against corruption to their struggle against third term amendments. We aim to identify the discursive strategies that allow movements to bridge the topics of third term amendments and corruption as well as the conditions that impact such strategies.

Both movements provide examples of persuasive anti-corruption framing within a struggle to defend constitutional democracy. Looking at the way in which pro-democracy movements pick up the issue of corruption is highly important, since empowered citizens are one of the most powerful forces to fight corruption (Welzel, Ingelhart, and Deutsch 2005). We argue that the issue of corruption is also highly important to successful mobilization in pro-democracy struggles, since it underlines the injustice of current regimes. *Balai Citoyen* and *Y'en a marre* not only denounced corrupt politicians, they framed corruption as part of the political system that can be challenged and changed by every citizen, thus adding an important mobilizing component to their framing. With our analysis, we aim to contribute to the study of pro-democracy movements in Africa, as well as the literature on the nexus of political culture and corruption. The focus on corruption also offers a new reading on third term amendment struggles in Africa, stressing the link of political and socio-economic grievances, expressed through the criticism of corruption.

The article is structured as follows: first we place our analysis at the interface of political culture approaches within corruption studies and social movement research. We then describe our theoretical framework – the framing approach – and our methodology. In the empirical part, we present the main protest events of *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* and identify and compare their framing strategies. We conclude by illustrating how both movements succeeded in linking the issues of corruption and third term amendments in one congruent frame and identify key factors that explain why their framing strategies differ in some respects while showing striking similarities in other.

2. Anti-corruption mobilizations of social movements in Africa

In the field of corruption research, the focus has been for a long time on the interplay between elites' behavior, institutional settings, and corruption rates (Norris 2012; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1994; Collier 2002). Scholars have only recently turned

to political culture and the decisive role of empowered citizens to overcome corruption (Welzel 2013). However, citizens can only function as watchdogs against corrupt elites if certain democratic norms that encompass democratic values, social capital, civil society, and civic culture enter the majoritarian public opinion and culture. Thus, to be effective in fighting corruption empowered citizens have to match the majoritarian public opinion and need the support of parts of the political elite (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). This is in line with the findings by Kubbe (2017) who underlines that people, who tolerate corrupt behavior of elites, are more likely to act corrupt themselves and thus reproduce corrupt systems. Nevertheless, even societies in (partly) democratized states face tremendous challenges to get people to the street and to proclaim and defend democratic norms. In particular, former colonized states as well as states marked by particularism have difficulties to mobilize “some sort of critical mass” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, 109).

In those debates, two blind spots can be identified that will be addressed partly by our research – firstly, those studies mainly focus on examples where collective action has impacted democratic freedom positively. Cases where certain democratic rights and citizenship culture are reached but still need to be defended are less considered. In the cases studied in this article, democracy has been on the rise but became anew under threat - a phenomenon that can currently be observed in many countries. Secondly, the ways in which leaders and activists construct and present corruption and link it to other prominent issues in order to mobilize people is often overlooked. Where this has been studied, the focus has been on the success of civil society actors regarding the lowering of corruption, not the mobilization of citizens (Johnston 2005). Success is predominantly understood as lower corruption rates not in terms of anti-corruption mobilization. Consequently, the question of how social movements make sense of corruption and link it to citizens’ and elites’ behavior has been understudied. The social movement literature on anti-corruption mobilization treats these aspects more explicitly. But this academic debate focuses almost exclusively on cases from Europe and North America and to a lesser extent on Latin America (Della Porta 2015; Della Porta and Mény 1997). Social movements in Africa and their struggle against corruption have received very little attention.

At the interface of social movement studies and studies on democracy several authors have looked at recent uprisings in Africa against presidential term amendments. Until now, these struggles have been discussed only as movements against de-democratization. They have been analyzed with regard to their effects on democratization processes, mobilization strategies, and interactions with state actors (Reyntjens 2016; Dulani 2011; Armstrong 2011). The issue of corruption in those uprisings has

been widely overlooked. As our analysis will show, movements often bring together diverse issues within their framing and the issue of corruption has played a pervasive role in these uprisings.

3. Researching collective-action frames

The framing-approach can be a helpful theoretical approach to understand how social movement actors make sense of corruption. Frames are schemata of interpretation that social movement actors construct strategically with the aim to mobilize for contentious action (Goffman 1974; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986). The framing-approach enables us to analyze how social movement actors bring together diverse topics and interpret and present them in a way that is salient and resonant to its addressees. This allows us to identify how social movements construct corruption in a way that appeals to its audience and mobilizes people for collective actions.

In order to mobilize people for protest, movement leaders need to construct the conditions which the movement aims to change in such a way, that people perceive them as problematic and changeable. They do so by using collective action frames (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988).

Collective action frames are “action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford and Snow 2000, 614). They enable participants and bystanders to “locate, perceive and label occurrences” (Snow et al. 1986, 464) by “selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present and past environment” (Snow and Benford 1992, 337). To make sense of frames Snow and Benford (1988) propose the analytical distinction of three core framing tasks: diagnostic framing presents an event, a situation or a social condition as problematic and in need of change. It also attributes blame and often presents certain circumstances as unjust. Prognostic framing answers the question of ‘What needs to be done?’ and offers a solution to the diagnosed problem. It may also include specific proposals regarding strategies and targets (Snow and Benford 1992). Motivational framing provides a rationale for engaging in collective action (Benford 1993). Collective action frames can, but do not have to, entail all three dimensions. This analytical distinction allows for the identification of the discursive strategies social movements use to bring distinct events, conditions and topics together under one congruent frame.

Frames are constructed to achieve certain goals: mobilize participants for protests, recruit new members, find new allies or acquire resources. In order to link their claims

and interpretative frames with those of potential supporters and constituents, social movement leaders engage in frame alignment processes. David Snow and Robert Benford (1986) identified four key alignment processes: Frame bridging, frame extension, frame transformation and frame amplification. The latter “involves the idealization, embellishment, clarification or invigoration of existing values and beliefs” (Benford and Snow 2000, 624). Social movement leaders link the ideas they propose to widely known cultural symbols, meanings or historic events (Snow and Benford 1988). The alignment of a frame with the broader cultural context is key for collective action frames to become resonant and therefore effective.

Frame amplification makes clear, that the framing choices of social movement actors are not arbitrary. The cultural context in which they operate provides important incentives and constraints for certain frames (Jaspers 1997). Framing choices might also be influenced by concrete political opportunities, such as new allies and resulting interactions with other movements or civil society organizations, or important events that lead to a shift in the broader political and cultural discourse of a society (Ferree 2003). Successful frames are often diffused among different movements and between different national contexts (Benford and Snow 2000). In order to be convincing to its constituents and the public, the movement’s frames need to correspond to its own collective identity, which in turn often relates to popular collective identities in the wider cultural context (Poletta and Jasper 2001).

The *framing* approach offers important tools to analyze the way in which social movements make sense of corruption. It enables us on the one hand to decipher the meaning constructions and strategies social movement leaders use to integrate different topics within one coherent framework; in the cases at hand corruption and third term amendments. In combination with other concepts such as identity, diffusion, the cultural context, and political opportunities the framing-approach also offers some insights as to why the social movement leaders opt for a certain presentation of corruption in their struggles against third term amendments.

In this article we use the framing-approach as our theoretical framework to analyze the discursive strategies used by the movements *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen*. In order to do so, we use a multiple case study design (Yin 2009). This design is useful since our study is exploratory in nature (Yin 2009, 5). We aim to identify how both movements succeeded in linking the issue of corruption to the issue of third term amendments. The analysis of two case studies allows us to deduce dimensions of the cultural and political contexts which the respective movements face that might have influenced their framing choices. Two case studies offer the advantage of allowing for “a balanced combination of descriptive depth and analytical challenge” (Tarrow 2010, 246).

Our interest is both intrinsic with regard to the framing strategies used by both movements and instrumental, as we hope to develop a hypothesis on which frames allow for the construction of a link between third term amendments and corruption more generally. We chose *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* since both can be positioned along a line of a broader wave of mobilization against third term amendments that took place in Africa from 2001 onwards (Manji and Ekine 2012). Unlike the struggles in the beginning of the 2000's, *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* also addressed broader issues such as bad governance and corruption. In addition, the struggles in Senegal and Burkina Faso have also been less dominated by opposition parties which had been at the forefront of earlier uprisings against third term amendments. Both are cases of specific interest for analyzing framing strategies as both movements have been very successful in making their claims heard in national and international media – the latter is rarely achieved by social movements taking place on the African continent.

We selected both cases following the logic of literal replication (Yin 2009, 46). We chose two movements with similar characteristics, mobilizing for a similar aim in similar context conditions, thus assuming that the way in which they frame corruption will also be similar. The two movements under study – *Y'en a marre* and *Balai citoyen* – are regularly compared due to their mobilization and leaders (Niang 2015). Led by musicians and journalists, both movements' leaders derived (partly) from the middle-class, demonstrated high rhetoric skills, and have access to media as well as to other communication channels due to their prior popularity. Since movement leaders are central agents strategically constructing frames and developing framing strategies. Within those movements, activists predominantly were from the popular class under which Seddon and Zeilig (2005) subsume students, workers of formal and informal sectors as well as the youth. The members of the movements were mainly male living in the urban centers. Apart from movement characteristics, both mobilizations happened in a comparative institutional setting. Senegal and Burkina Faso share the same presidential constitutions and electoral systems. Certain democratic rights such as the freedom of expression and the right to assembly are formally allowed.

For both movements we analyze the period from the founding of the respective movements until the presidential resignation – in Senegal from January 2011 to March 2012; in Burkina Faso from July 2013 to October 2014. Social movements most commonly express frames through written documents, verbal expressions and visual representations (Johnston 2002). Our data therefore consists of movement documents such as declarations and press communications, rap songs, and transcribed semi-structured

interviews with the movements' leaders and core activists.² Twelve interviews were conducted with *Y'en a marre* activists from February to March 2012 by Louisa Prause and further fourteen interviews with leaders from the movement, more formalized civil society, and external experts were conducted by Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop from January to February 2017. Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop also carried out fifteen interviews, among others with movement leaders of *Balai Citoyen* in Burkina Faso from February to March 2017.³

We used qualitative content analysis to identify the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational elements of the collective action frames (Mayring 2014). For each dimension we identified the key issues on a content level and the key arguments put forward by the movement; looked at central symbols that were used by the movements, such as metaphors, historical references, slogans as well as catch phrases, and analyzed references and appeals to the broader cultural context (Ryan 1991). In the following empirical analysis, we first describe each movement's mobilizations and identify the key frames that allowed to link the issues of corruption and third term amendments. We then compare the framing of both movements to deduce similarities and differences in order to develop explanations regarding these similarities and differences.

4. *Y'en a marre*: Rap, protests, corruption and a 'citizenship frame'

The movement *Y'en a marre* (We are fed up) was one of the key forces that mobilized for collective protests in the run up to the presidential elections in Senegal in 2012. Similar to the presidential election in 2000, the youth stood up against the incumbent president. But different to this former struggle, the alliances and claims have been broader and not directly linked to the oppositional candidates. In 2000, the youth campaigned for Wade to become president in Senegal. However, over the following ten years it became clear that Wade would not fulfill his promises but in contrast seemed to have forgotten his former supporters.

In 2011 and 2012 a wide range of actors such as oppositional parties, student associations, unions, civil society organizations, and media entrepreneurs mobilized against

² We are particularly grateful to our interview partners in Senegal and Burkina Faso for invaluable input. We also highly appreciate the logistical support of our field research from the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Senegal, Rosa-Luxembourg Foundation Senegal, and Institut Général Tiémoko Marc Garango pour la Gouvernance et le Développement (IGD) in Ouagadougou.

³ Direct quotations from the interviews, movement documents and rap songs were translated from French to English by the authors.

attempts of the president Wade to secure a third term in office (Hartmann 2012). *Y'en a marre* was a new actor in the lively civil society scene of Senegal (Honwanda 2015). The organization was founded on 16 January 2011 by a group of rappers and journalists who make up the leadership of the movement until today. Founding members were the journalist Fadel Barro as well as the rappers *Thiat* and *Kilifeu* of the famous hip-hop group *Keur Gui*. Later they were joined by other popular Senegalese rappers. This alignment of hip-hop culture and political engagement is not new for the Senegalese political arena. Since the 1990s, groups such as *Positive Black Soul* whose album *Boule Fale* (drop it) served as name giver for a youth movement that has been articulating political criticism against the government especially prior to the elections in 2000 (Harvard 2001).

Initially the idea to form *Y'en a marre* was sparked by constant electricity cuts throughout the country, which lasted up to several days and were especially frequent in the poor suburbs of Dakar (Interview, movement leader *Y'en a marre*, 28 February 2012, Dakar). The movement staged several important protest events throughout the following year. In March, they launched a campaign called "*1000 complaints against the government of Senegal*". Only two weeks later, on March 19, the public holiday of the 'alternance', *Y'en a marre* took to the streets for the first time. In Senegal, this day commemorates the peaceful handover of presidency from Abdou Diouf of the socialist party to Wade from the liberal party in 2000 (Diop 2010). Since 2001, Wade had put himself at the center of these festivities to demonstrate his power. In protest to this appropriation of the 'alternance', *Y'en a marre* proposed to commemorate the political commitment of the Senegalese citizens in 2000 (Document, *Y'en a marre*, Declaration, 19 March 2011).

In April, *Y'en a marre* launched their campaign *Daas Fanaanal* (My voter's card, my weapon) to motivate the youth to register to vote in the upcoming presidential elections. They articulated their message via rap-concerts, social media channels and the media. Those concerts in their own understanding served as pedagogical events to inform the people about bad governance practices as well as their rights and duties as citizens (Gueye 2013). On 23 June 2011, Senegal saw the largest mass protests since the pre-election protests in 2000. *Y'en a marre* along with other oppositional groups blocked the national assembly. On that day, the parliament was about to vote on a law, which would have almost certainly guaranteed the reelection of Wade. The protests succeeded and Wade took back his proposal.

On 27 January 2012, however, the Senegalese constitutional council, a legal advisory board, decided that the third candidature of Wade was legal. This classification sparked several mass protests staged around the *Place de l'Obelisque* in central Dakar. *Y'en a*

marre protested alongside several oppositional parties and human rights organizations that had formed the *Movement of the 23 June (M23)*. Nevertheless, Wade ran in the elections and made it to the second round, where he ran against the candidate Macky Sall. *Y'en a marre* yet again mobilized voters to participate in the elections, this time under the slogan *Doggali* (finish him off). On 25 March Macky Sall won the presidential election and became the fourth president of Senegal.

Y'en a marre's framing was a major factor contributing to their successful mobilization of the Senegalese youth. In their frame they brought together several issues under the concept of 'citizenship'. This enabled them to link their fight against third term amendments to their fight against corruption. In their diagnostic framing, *Y'en a marre* raises several different socio-economic grievances such as electricity cuts, bad health care, jobs, and education as central problems in Senegal (Document, *Y'en a marre*, Declaration, 19 March 2011). They named youth unemployment in particular as a burden for future development and hence placed their struggle along a social cleavage that had already dominated previous elections and electoral decisions. As a major cause of these grievances, they identified a corrupt political system (Document, *Y'en a marre*, Declaration, 19 March 2011). However, *Y'en a marre* framed corruption not just as a characteristic of Senegalese elites, but as a characteristic of the wider political and cultural habits of Senegalese society. As such they state: "We are fed up with taking a *car rapide*⁴ which is overloaded and then witnessing how the police takes the money of the drivers without denouncing this". In their view, the tolerance of everyday corruption turns every citizen into a collaborator with the system. As a reaction to Wade's attempts to use the constitution to legitimize his running for a third term in office, they extended their framing and diagnosed the violation of the constitution and republican values as a major problem (Document, *Y'en a marre*, Declaration 28 June 2011). They bring these two issues together by framing them both as an abuse of citizens' rights: their political and their socio-economic rights (Document, *Y'en a marre*, Declaration 19 March & 28 June 2011). Responsibility for both is attributed on the one hand to former president Wade, who symbolized the political elites in Senegal, but on the other also to the Senegalese citizens themselves (Prause 2013).

In their prognostic framing *Y'en a marre* proposes to respect the rule of law as the key solution of the identified problems. In the song *Daas Fanaanal* they rap: "Senegal is for everyone. It includes everyone. The minister and the porter both have the same rights". Hereby, their proposal goes beyond a pure change of presidency. It is not just Wade and other corrupt politicians who have to leave office; the whole political culture

⁴ Multicolored mini-buses used for public transport are called 'car rapide' in Senegal.

needs to change: "I am also fed up with myself, always resigned without caring about the future of my community" (Document, *Y'en a marre*, Declaration 19 March 2011). To integrate their critique on the political elites and their claim for a new political culture that respects the rule of law and does not tolerate corruption they present their concept *Nouveau Type de Sénégalais* (New Type of Senegalese, NTS). This concept refers to a new Senegalese citizen, that is "responsible, honest, and committed to a social transformation in Senegal", who "holds up the values of the Republic" and as such protects the democratic institutions (Document, *Y'en a marre*, Declaration 19 March 2011). Each citizen is presented as part of the problem and part of the solution simultaneously. They thus not only refer to citizens' rights but also to citizens' duties.

In their motivational framing, *Y'en a marre* takes up the empowerment component of citizenship. In their Song "Faux! Pas Forcé" (Fake! Don't Push) they rap: "We will be present wherever you summon us. A revolted nation is no match for an old thug". The 'old thug' of course, refers to the president at the time, Abdoulaye Wade. Parallel to other movements such as *Podemos* in Spain, the main message here is that change is possible. *Y'en a marre* thus offers an alternative image of Senegalese citizens who are often perceived as passive and resigned to their fate (Interview, Fadel Barro, 28 February 2012, Dakar). Citizenship in *Y'en a marre's* interpretation always means citizens empowered to achieve political and social change. This explicitly not only entails the power to protect the constitution but also to fight corruption on an everyday basis. Corruption is presented as a main expression of putting the personal gain over the public good and the rule of law. Thus, to protect the rule of law and build a new Senegalese republic one has to start by fighting the everyday practices through which the current political culture is reproduced.

Y'en a marre succeeded in linking the fight against corruption with the fight against the third term amendment of Abdoulaye Wade through a 'citizenship frame'. In referring to a citizen's rights and duties, they were successful in bridging the so far unconnected topics of corruption and constitutional term amendments. Their reference to empowered citizens served as an important motivational component of their framing to mobilize the Senegalese youth. *Y'en a marre* also engaged in frame amplification through the repeated reference to the republic and the connected value of the rule of law. As such they link their framing to long standing discourses about the value of the Republic that have been introduced in Senegal through French colonialism and adopted by the first president after independence, Léopold Sédar Senghor (Bryson 2014).

5. *Balai Citoyen*: Framing corruption as a contradiction to Burkinabe sincerity

In 2013, after 27 years in office, the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, announced his intention to establish a senate that would expand his already extensive presidential powers. As a reaction two popular artists, *Smockey* and *Sams’K Le Jah*, initiated together with journalists the movement *Balai Citoyen*. To sweep the corrupt clan of Compaoré away, they called their movement ‘citizens’ broom’. The ordinary Burkinabe broom became the famous protest symbol of their uprising. The movement became rapidly popular among the urban youth. They organized a number of protest events in collaboration with other opponents of Compaoré who resigned on 31 October 2014.

Even before *Balai Citoyen* emerged as a social movement in Burkina Faso, many human rights organizations, trade unions, and opposition political parties have been active in the struggle against the regime of Compaoré. They were organized mainly within two protest coalitions, *Coalition contre la vie chère* (Coalition against the high cost of living, CCVC) and *Collectif des organisations démocratiques de masse et de partis politiques* (Collective of the democratic mass organizations and political parties, CODMPP). The latter got established in 1998 as a result of opposition journalist Norbert Zongo’s assassination and the lack of prosecution of the assassins in the aftermath (Harsch 2009). The CCVC in turn started their activities in 2008 as a reaction to rising food prices (Engels 2015a). *Balai Citoyen* aimed at overcoming the routinization of protest events, the established opposition forces staged every year (Interview, media spokesperson of *Balai Citoyen*, 10 March 2017, Ouagadougou). They took their inspiration for new protest tactics from the successful mobilizations of *Y’en a marre*, with whom they met during the annual film festival “Ciné Droit Libre” in 2013 (Interview movement leader, *Balai Citoyen*, 10 March 2017, Ouagadougou). Following their first press conference on 18 July 2013, they launched their initial campaign one month later, calling the Burkinabe people to “unite in a civic action for democracy, freedom and good governance” (Document, *Balai Citoyen*, Declaration, 12 August 2013). On 12 August 2013, party members were joined mainly by university students and journalist colleagues as well as other media representatives at *Balai Citoyen*’s first public reunion. Already at the outset, the media reported massively about the movement which was in as much due to the previous success of *Y’en a marre* as to their excellent media networks.

The movement staged further protests in October and December 2013, on the annual memorial days of former revolutionary president Thomas Sankara and the critical journalist Norbert Zongo. Along with other movements, they united activists on the central squares of the capital Ouagadougou to request justice for the assassinations of

Sankara and Zongo for which they held Compaoré accountable (Frère and Englebart 2015). Those mass events were followed by several smaller acts of protest that were partly organized by individual *Cibals* and *Cibelles*, abbreviation of “*citoyens et citoyennes balayeurs*” (civic brooms), the smallest unit of organization in the movement (Document, *Balai Citoyen*, Statute 27 October 2016). In the beginning of 2014, it became clear that Compaoré, despite his promises to hand over power, would try to amend Article 37 of the constitution, so that it would allow him to run for a third term in office. Article 37 limits the presidential mandate to two subsequent terms.

To inform the public about Article 37 and the consequences of its amendment, *Balai Citoyen* held a public conference on 2 July 2014. But it became obvious that to fight the constitutional amendment was only the pretext to mobilize in order to overthrow the regime of Compaoré (Interview, movement leader *Balai Citoyen*, 10 March 2017, Ouagadougou). During the final days before the parliament was to vote on the amendment of Article 37, *Balai Citoyen*, the two major movement coalitions, and political parties called for resistance against the vote. Several trade unions went on strike. The mobilizations peaked just before the appointed vote of the national assembly on 31 October 2014 (Chouli 2015). When several parliamentarians stated publicly to vote in favor of the amendment, hundreds of thousands took to the streets. By first blocking and then burning down the national assembly, they succeeded in hindering the parliamentary vote and Compaoré fled the country, seeking political asylum in Ivory Coast (Engels 2015b).

Similar to *Y'en a marre*, *Balai Citoyen* also brought together several issues under a ‘citizenship frame’ in their mobilization against the retention of tenure limitations and the attempt to expand presidential power. In their diagnostic framing, they identified the suffering of the people, corrupt governance practices, and presidential accountability as key problems for Burkina Faso. *Balai Citoyen* blamed the president and the ruling political elites for these deficiencies. On the one hand, the Burkinabe citizens have the right to economic development and a functioning judicial system; on the other hand, they also have the duty to control the politicians. *Balai Citoyen* attributes a watchdog function to the citizens, who have the duty to resist in the cases of violations of democratic rights, be that civic rights or constitutional rights.

Corruption and bad governance were at the center of *Balai Citoyen’s* diagnostic framing. The presidential attempt to create a new senate in 2013 was framed as one of many examples where the ruling class used the state budget for their expensive projects while the majority of Burkinabe suffers to make a living (Interview, National coordinator of *Balai Citoyen*, 16 March 2017, Ouagadougou). Using an ordinary tool that is easily accessible, the Burkinabe broom stands for the necessary cleaning of the corrupt

system. Referring to the expensive buildings owned by state authorities, *Balai Citoyen* used them as further proof that those politicians rather lined their own pockets than those of the Burkinabe youth. Corruption was framed as an instrument of power of the current elite for their personal benefit. A reason why during those last insurrection days, their private houses and pricy cars were set on fire by protestors (Bonnecase 2016).

In their view, the private visible wealth of ministers in contrast to the national development of Burkina Faso as one of the least developed countries highlighted the selfish rule of the president and hence his missing efforts to serve the nation as a democratically elected president (Protestsong, "Ce président là", Sams'K Le Jah). As a result, this president had forfeited the right to rerun for the upcoming elections. Because in their vision of democratic presidents, the main duty is to develop the country's prosperity and secondly to install justice by applying laws to civil servants and politicians, should be treated as every citizen. Compaoré and his clan were portrayed as the main profiteers of this patronage system that hindered any justice to be reached, neither in socioeconomic nor in juridical terms.

Balai Citoyen thus understands citizens' rights as socio-economic rights. Their diagnostic frame is based on the ideal that economic development goes hand in hand with a democratic one. Within their economic demands, *Balai Citoyen* took up the frame of the high costs of living, revitalized by the CCVC in 2008. However, while the CCVC stressed the neoliberal agenda of governmental decisions that served international interests better than local ones, *Balai Citoyen* strategically transformed this frame by blaming corruption and not neoliberalism as the cause for uneven development. The people have the obligation to stand up for their collective rights and to fight for responsive governance in economic and democratic terms.

However, *Balai Citoyen* also diagnoses the malfunctioning of the juridical institutions, the violation of the rule of law and of citizens' rights through state authorities, as a central problem. Justice, is not just economic justice, but also refers to the juridical clarification of Norbert Zongo's and former socialist president Thomas Sankara's closed files concerning their assassinations. *Balai Citoyen* holds Compaoré personally accountable for this impunity that had characterized his regime since the beginning when he came to power by violently overthrowing his predecessor Thomas Sankara (Zeilig 2016).

In their prognostic framing they demand a president who develops Burkina Faso for the benefit of all and in line with Sankara's thoughts. They claim that political change is only feasible if the Burkinabe people chase Compaoré out of office (Document, *Balai Citoyen*, Declaration, 12 August 2013; Interview Smockey, 14.03.2017, Ouagadougou).

They frame this as the only way to reopen the closed juridical files and to hold corrupt elites responsible for their insincere behavior. As a solution to the problems identified by the movement, they present the compliance to the rule of law, highlighting the separation of powers and the civic exercise to monitor this relation. This would guarantee good governance from their point of view (Interview Smockey, 17 November 2016, Berlin). They envisioned a three-part victory of “justice over injustice, the people against the rulers, and democrats against autocrats” (Document, *Balai Citoyen*, Declaration, 12 August 2013). The movement leaders clearly prefer alternation, not revolution as a first step towards an alternative regime. This sets them apart from protest leaders of Marxist trade unions or student associations who represent the former anti-Compaoré-coalition (Wienkoop 2017). However, beyond a change in presidency *Balai Citoyen* does not have a clear vision of how to solve the grievances in specific policy recommendations.

Regarding their motivational framing, the leaders underline the urgency of the uprising due to an optional change of the constitution that would practically allow Compaoré to run anew. After 27 years in office, *Balai Citoyen* portrays the constitutional amendment plan of Compaoré as the last opportunity to get rid of an autocratic ruling president. In particular and similar to *Y'en a marre*, they highlight the youth as the most powerful opponent.

6. Comparing *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* – The devil lies in the civic (protest) culture

The frame analysis of *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* has shown that corruption has been a key issue for both movements within their fight against constitutional amendments. Even though they mobilized primarily against unwanted presidents, they successfully linked the issue of corruption to their fight against term amendment bids. They succeeded in doing so through a citizenship' frame. Citizenship in its three dimensions of rights, duties, and empowerment has proved to be a persuasive concept that allowed them to bond issues of corruption, the rule of law, and socio-economic grievances with their struggles against another presidential term. In their citizenship frame both movements take up socio-economic grievances of the majority of the population and frame them as a violation of citizens' rights, for which they blame bad governance practices, including corruption, of the political elites. They contrast the personal wealth of state representatives with the poverty of the majority. Both movements argue that the elected presidents have to understand themselves as servants of the nation, in-

stead of pursuing their own individual or international interests. Thereby, the spokespersons bridge corruption to democracy in referring on the one hand to the presidential duty to economically develop the country that in turn would lead to better living conditions, and on the other to the citizens' rights to housing, education, healthcare and so on. The latter also points to the duty of political representatives in democracies as respondents to the population's interests. However, both movements do not question the neoliberal ideal of parallel democratic and economic development that has been originally promoted by international development institutions as part of structural adjustment programs in the 1990s. Accordingly, national economic development constitutes for the movement leaders also an indicator of good democratic governance.

Both movements chose frames conceiving of citizens as empowered citizens who have the duty to play a watchdog role both to democratic ruling and corruption. Both stress the importance of compliance to the rule of law to fight corruption and establish responsive institutions. The political elites and the presidents are framed as part of the people who have to comply with binding laws.

This similar strategy used by *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* to link corruption to extended term ambitions in a citizenship frame can be explained by the similarities of both movements but also the colonial imprint of the French republican model in both countries. Following this concept of democracy, *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* highlight the positivist conception of citizens' rights, underlining the possibilities for participation. In a republican model, the highest aim is a political sphere based on solidarity and moral life and not on conflicting interests. Consequently, the national unity of the people is ranked higher than mechanisms to revitalize debates as in deliberative democratic ideals. Moreover, similarities in their framing are also due to the role model function *Y'en a marre's* success had for the Burkinabe uprising. Seeing that the leaders of *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* met on several occasions, some of the similarities are also due to *Balai Citoyen* modeling their protests in part on *Y'en a marre's* successful framing strategies. Frame diffusion thus provides a crucial factor explaining the similarities in the movements' choices of frames.

Yet, we also observe major differences in the way their citizenship frames were organized. In their construction of an empowered citizen, *Y'en a marre* emphasizes that the Senegalese citizens have to liberate themselves from their resignation to become politically active. Their strategy to fight corruption is to change learned or accepted socializations of corrupt practices within the political system and Senegalese society. *Y'en a marre* thus puts forward the idea of a *Nouveau Type de Sénégalais*, a new type of engaged Senegalese citizen. This resonates well with their movements' identity. *Y'en a*

marre leaders and activists portray themselves frequently as honest, upright and engaged citizens (Interviews, activists Y'en a marre, Dakar; 09.02.2012; 16.02.2012). During their protest events they communicate this not only through words but also in collecting the rubbish after every gathering, during confrontations with security forces they cross their arms above their head to indicate, they are peaceful (non-participating observations of protests by Louisa Prause, 23 June 2011; 22 January 2012; 27 January 2012; 12 February 2012; Dakar).

Balai Citoyen on the other hand refers to their Burkinabe constituency as already empowered citizens due to previous struggles. Under their main slogan "*Notre nombre est notre force*" (Our number is our strength), they evoke the contentious history of the Burkinabe people. The Burkinabe identity as remarkable contentious is a strong image in the wider cultural discourse on national identity in Burkina Faso. *Balai Citoyen* thus frequently evoked their struggles in the tradition of the former socialist president Thomas Sankara who is especially popular among the younger generation (Zeilig 2016). During their sit-ins, they motivated their followers to sing the national anthem and to shout "*la patrie ou la mort*" (Homeland or death) in reference to him. However, they extended a frame based purely on Sankara's ideology to include the values of a constitutional democracy by referring to Burkinabe citizens as "democratic defenders" (Document, *Balai Citoyen*, Declaration, 12 August 2013; Statue, *Balai Citoyen*, 27 October 2016). This stands in sharp contrast to the military regime of Sankara and his Marxist and Pan-African visions.

They present a Burkinabe citizen as someone who feels a belonging to and responsibility for the nation and who follows his or her citizen's duty to resist in case of misuse of power. In reference to the meaning of their country's name, Burkina Faso signifies "country of the sincere people", they conceptualize the Burkinabe people as sincere and upright citizens. They contrast this image with the corrupt political elites. When *Y'en a marre* refers to the citizens' duty to defend republican and democratic values, *Balai Citoyen* refers to the duty of defending the heritage of Thomas Sankara. Thus, while *Y'en a marre* puts forward the establishment of a new citizenship consciousness in Senegal as the solution to the problems, *Balai Citoyen* anticipates the solution in a revitalization of Burkinabe identity that they glorify in a rather backwards turned patriotism. As such they relate their different conceptualizations of citizenship to their respective movement identities, which they based on broader notions of collective identities in both countries.

Differences in their construction of a citizenship frame can furthermore be explained by the dissimilar historical experiences of struggles in both countries. Burkina Faso has, different from Senegal, a strong history of revolutionary fights. This includes the regime

of former president Thomas Sankara ruling from 1983 till 1987, the protests against impunity in the 1990s and the recent protests against the high costs of living in the mid-2000s. Senegal has a very different protest tradition. Key reference point of the *Y'en a marre* movement was the peaceful change of power in 2000, which was preceded by protests for democracy mainly by the Senegalese youth. To amplify their frames, they therefore evoked democratic values more than revolutionary ones and build on the idea of an emancipated citizen that has already been put forward by the earlier youth movement *Boule Fale* (Prause 2013).

Furthermore, since it was the youth who voted Wade to power in 2000, *Y'en a marre* considers the youth as responsible for the control of their elected representatives in order to end corrupt practices. The experience of the youth in Burkina Faso in turn was marked by Compaoré as an autocratic long-term ruler who they experienced as their only ruler. *Balai Citoyen* thus attributed the responsibility for corruption solely to the political elites.

While both movements closely linked the fight against corruption and for consolidated democratic institutions to the rule of law in general, *Balai Citoyen* relates this argument to particular historic cases of non-reached justice. They hold Compaoré and his ministers responsible for the persisting impunity that past political assassinations have not been investigated under his rule. *Y'en a marre*, in reverse, envisions an educated public that is aware of their rights as a first step to strengthen the rule of law and hence to fight corruption. They point out that corruption is reproduced both through the behavior of political elites and ordinary citizens. *Balai Citoyen*, by contrast, attributes corruption to a small circle of elites surrounding the former president.

Thus, while a 'citizenship frame' has proved essential in both cases to bridge corruption to struggles against presidential term amendments, the way the movements organized their framing is highly dependent on the countries' histories, existing collective identities and the protest experiences of their constituency.

7. Conclusion

This article addressed the question of how the movements *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* in Senegal and Burkina Faso succeeded in linking the fight against corruption with their struggle against third term amendments. We used the framing approach to analyze how *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* convincingly integrated the fight against corruption with their struggle against third term bids. Our analysis has shown that both movements succeeded in linking these different issues through a 'citizenship frame' that has proven to be a frame wide enough to integrate several previously unconnect-

ed issues. Both movements succeeded to link socio-economic everyday grievances to political grievances such as the violation of the rule of law, corruption scandals among elites, and power-hungry presidents that try to revise constitutional democracy through the backdoor. The similarities in the frames put forward by both movements can partly be explained through diffusion processes. *Balai Citoyen* modeled their frames in parts on *Y'en a marre*. Furthermore, both countries share similar colonial experiences and as such a French republican understanding of citizenship. Nevertheless, the frame analysis of both movements allows us to hypothesize that the concept of citizenship might provide a key discursive figure that allows movements to integrate corruption within struggles against third term amendments. However, this proclaimed role of 'citizenship' needs to be tested by further research along other case studies. For future research, it would be especially interesting to look at examples in countries that are more and less democratic as it might be that those institutional conditions affect the way citizens are addressed and citizenship is framed by social movements.

Two key features explain why *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* differ in many aspects in the way they constructed their citizenship frame: i) varying histories of democratization and protests; ii) different collective identities.

Y'en a marre stresses past democratic experiences, such as the peaceful change of power from former socialist president Abou Diouf to liberal president Abdoulaye Wade in 2000. *Balai Citoyen* on the other hand refers to past revolutionary struggles and icons in Burkina Faso, such as the socialist president Thomas Sankara. Thus, the different cultural contexts and political experiences provided different incentives for frame amplification. The distinctions of both struggles illustrate the essential role of the respective political culture and shared values in a society. *Y'en a marre* builds upon a collective identity that portrays themselves as engaged and upright citizens who respect the laws. *Balai Citoyen* on the other hand plays upon a collective identity that stresses the contentiousness and the refusal to accept authority blindly. According to these different collective identities, they also put forward different perspectives to fight corruption: Whereas *Balai Citoyen* calls for the political elite to stop corruption and hence tend to change corruption from above, *Y'en a marre* aims at changing the civic culture to more collective responsibility and thus believes to change corruption from below. Differences in the way the citizenship frame is organized and constructed in detail can thus be explained by differences in the specific cultural background and identities. This results in a diverting perception of a solution to fight corruption.

The framing approach has proven to be an important theoretical tool (i) to analyze how movements succeed in linking the fight against corruption to term amendment struggles and (ii) to work out distinct details that differentiate the framing of corrup-

tion in movements that seem very similar at first sight. However, our analysis has also shown that the framing approach on its own is limited in explaining why social movement leaders chose certain frames; and thus why corruption is framed differently. To identify the factors that impact framing choices it is essential to combine the concept of framing with other concepts derived from social movement research. In our analysis the varying political culture, former protest experiences and collective identities have proven to be essential elements to explain differences in the movement frames. For further investigation, it would be interesting to combine our insights with those of a more interactive perspective such as multi-organizational fields in order to account for the influences of allies, opponents, and institutions with whom both movements constantly engaged.

The importance of the cultural context for the framing of corruption confirms the significance of a political cultural perspective within corruption research that highlights the role of emancipative values and norms to hold governments responsible for corruption by mass mobilization. It extends their findings in the way that our qualitative approach shows how broader cultural values and mobilization are connected.

Our analysis has further shown that anti-corruption struggles are not just a phenomenon for movements in the Global North. Despite a highly corrupt and semi-democratic setting, both movements mobilized eventful protests against corruption. This questions the assumption that such collective mobilizations can only be expected to be successful in consolidated democracies (see among others Welzel 2013). African social movements increasingly address this issue, albeit rarely in itself and rather as part of larger struggles for democracy. Hereby they use innovative ways to tackle corruption: they do not just blame political elites but frame the fight against corruption as a citizen's fight.

However, many claims concerning democratic values that stand in direct relation to corruption such as transparency and participation do not apply to *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen* themselves. Both movements are hierarchically structured. A core team of well-known rap artists and journalists directs both movements. Furthermore, it also is unclear from which sources both movements receive their financial means and how much money the movement leaders actually earn through talks and speeches. So far, this has not blemished the reputation of *Y'en a marre*. Here, the movement leaders are still well respected, at least by their primary addressees, in contrast to Burkina Faso where critical voices grow questioning the representativeness and accountability of *Balai Citoyen*.

The current reading of *Y'en a marre* and *Balai Citoyen*, as well as similar movements in other countries such as *Filimbi* in the Democratic Republic in Congo, views them mainly as mobilizations against democratic backslidings. However, a closer look at their

framings has revealed that the struggle for democracy is only one issue among many. These two West African movements are good examples of successfully linking concerns about corrupt elites to governmental legitimacy and bridging claims on democratic and economic behavior of presidents, politicians, and citizens.

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AUTHORS' INFORMATION

Louisa Prause is a PhD candidate at Freie Universität Berlin. In her thesis, she analyzes protests against large-scale land transformations in West Africa. She works as a researcher in the junior research group "Global Change-Local Conflicts?".

Nina-Kathrin Wienkoop is fellow doctoral candidate at the Center for the Study of Democracy, Leuphana University Lüneburg. She is interested in social movement outcomes and the interaction between social movements and institutions. Her research looks at third term amendment struggles in Africa, particularly in Senegal and Burkina Faso.