Earnings baths by bank CEOs during turnovers

Publikation: Arbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere und BerichteArbeits- oder Diskussionspapiere

Authors

This study investigates the development of income-decreasing discretionary
expenses surrounding CEO turnovers at banks. We expect incoming CEOs to take an earnings bath during the initial stage of their tenure. For a sample of German banks over the period 1993-2012, we document that (1) incoming CEOs increase discretionary expenses, i. e. engage in big bath accounting, during their rst (partial) year in charge, (2) incoming CEOs from outside the bank take a larger earnings bath than insiders, and (3) incoming CEOs take a smaller earnings bath when the incumbent CEOs retire than when they leave for other reasons. Our ndings are robust to several modications. Most importantly, they also hold true when the incoming CEO's objective of rectifying shortages in the existing stock of risk provisions has been taken into account, which may provide an alternative explanation for observing extraordinary amounts of discretionary expenses in turnover years.
OriginalspracheEnglisch
ErscheinungsortFrankfurt am Main
VerlagDeutsche Bundesbank
Auflage1
Anzahl der Seiten37
ISBN (Print)978–3–95729–014–4
ISBN (elektronisch)978–3–95729–015–1
PublikationsstatusErschienen - 2014